On Consciousness

[trebor]

What else could it be?

Now I'm really lost, so you are saying a physical process produced by a computer must be different that a physical process produced by a brain?

 

[dlorde]

As is any reasonable person.

I can't agree with that, I know quite a few people who have a very favourable view of such psychedelics, used with care, yet are eminently reasonable in all other respects.

 

[Fudbucker]

Now I'm really lost, so you are saying a physical process produced by a computer must be different that a physical process produced by a brain?

All processes are physical. But that doesn't mean they're all the same. They just have that in common.
Photosynthesis and consciousness are both physical processes, but you don't think they're the same, do you?

 

[trebor]

All processes are physical. But that doesn't mean they're all the same. They just have that in common.
Photosynthesis and consciousness are both physical processes, but you don't think they're the same, do you?

I am not sure why you think Photosynthesis is relevant...

The question is why do you think consciousness produced by a brain must be different to consciousness produced by a computer?

 

[Fudbucker]

As loathe as I generally am to engage someone who resorts to dictionary attacks so early, you seem a fairly reasonable person so I'll give it a shot.


"Consciousness" refers to an instance of the particular set of computations performed by our brains, the way your OS (while running) is an instance of a particular set of computations.

Well, my OS is a program, which is to say it is a particular configuration of switching operations. Consciousess is a particular configuration of neurons firing, so there are definite similarities.

Still, I would like a definition of "compute". I cited a dictionary definition, because, AFAIK, no one has provided a definition yet. Maybe I missed it.

Or for a more direct analogy, the way the rocket guidance of the Saturn V was an instance of the particular set of computations built into its analog computer. Unfortunately we don't have a good word for an instance of a particular set of computations that isn't easily confused with the set's products or the algorithms the computations are generated from.

Is the rocket guidance of the Saturn V conscious? If not, what makes one set of computations result in consciousness, while another does not. If so...are you serious?

It has everything to do with it. How do you think pain receptors sense injury? The physical processes are very similar, and this is the most vital part of the pain response.

Pain receptors don't feel pain. Pain is in the mind.

While the way thermostats feel heat is a pale shadow of our own, at the most basic level it's the same thing - a system sensing its environment and reacting appropriately.

That could be said of nearly anything: iron atoms responding to a magnetic field. Again, the word "feel" becomes trivialized to such an extent it has nothing to do with the subjective experiences we all have. Any theory which results in "mercury thermometers have subjective experiences" should be rejected out of hand. Classic reductio ad absurdium. If mercury thermometers don't have subjective experiences, then they don't feel.

I'll admit this is largely hyperbole, but it's there for a reason: making an anthropocentric distinction right off the bat tends to cloud everything that follows in a kind of low grade dualism. You can track the pain response all the way up and down, hitting nothing but physical processes performing minor computation the whole time, and there'd still be people arguing "Yes, but that's not feeeling."

It's not. A definition of feeling must explain why things feel good and bad, hot, cold, etc.. There's more to pain than just injury avoidance- the fact that it feels bad.

It must produce simulated energy, or it's not accurately-simulated photosynthesis.

Uh, what is "simulated energy"???

But I think you're presuming consciousness to be the energy in this analogy. It's not. It's the photosynthesis itself, the instances of that particular set of computations. Whether those computations are performed by physical macromolecules or simulated ones is inconsequential, the process is the same. They're both photosynthesis.

Simulated photosynthesis and real photosynthesis are obviously not the same thing. A "forest" of computers running photosynthesis sims won't produce any Oxygen. That this has to be pointed out to people again and again on a science forum, of all things, is incredible.

We've yet to find anything in the brain that can't be described as a computational process.

Link for this claim?

Some people posit that we eventually will, a hypothesis that some here (myself among them) derisively call the "magic bean" theory. It's a god of the gaps for dualism: consciousness is the product of physical computation plus a magic bean, without which the computation alone could never be conscious.

I don't know about magic beans, but the quotes that Piggy provided show experts who actually study this stuff for a living aren't nearly as sure as some of the people here. That should make anyone pause in declaring "consciousness is such and such".

 

[Fudbucker]

I am not sure why you think Photosynthesis is relevant...

Photosynthesis and consciousness are both physical processes. Yet they are not the same. I thought you were claiming they were. Do you agree they're different?

The question is why do you think consciousness produced by a brain must be different to consciousness produced by a computer?

I never said it must be different. Since the computers we have now aren't conscious, we can't know how machine consciousness might compare to organic consciousness. Maybe they'll be the same, maybe not.

 

[AlBell]

Your response bears no relation to what rocketdodger wrote, so again I'll say: No, that's just you.

No, *you* are wrong. See #1894 where RD agrees with my statement.

 

[AlBell]

Yes.

However, it is worth noting that relying on a successfully passed Turing test would probably disqualify a number of humans themselves from being "human level" conscious. I don't think there is an issue with this, for instance I don't believe that an individual with severe mental handicaps is "human level conscious." That doesn't mean they don't see red, though.

These threads cause many of us to "see red".

I'm not sure what you mean, here.

My meaning was just that if a machine is sitting here talking to you about how it experiences red, and it sounds like the same kind of stuff you would say, then you have no reason to believe that it is "faked" or "trickery" or any type of "chinese room" thing going on. The simplest explanation is that the machine does indeed experience red similarly to us. Otherwise, why would it be using similar language?

I await some actual proof beyond 'simplest explanation' as to how you and other comp.lits justify your bolded assertion.

ps. Recognizing red does not demonstrate consciousness, nor have any machines other than maybe pixy.bot been discussing these topics.

 

[rocketdodger]

I await some actual proof beyond 'simplest explanation' as to how you and other comp.lits justify your bolded assertion.

The justification is that there is no even remotely plausible way to program a machine explicitly to discuss seeing red at the level an adult human is capable of discussing seeing red.

The only plausible approach is to program the machine to sense the environment and learn using some architecture that offers features similar to what we know are required for human consciousness and just let it go.

So if we make such a machine, and eventually it is having a discussion with us about "yeah I see red" and it can defend its position under scrutiny, you tell me what the possible explanations could be. Prove that Commander Data isn't conscious. Good luck with that one. Dr. Soong didn't put some big switch statement in Data's programming that tells him exactly how to answer all your questions, you know.

ps. Recognizing red does not demonstrate consciousness, nor have any machines other than maybe pixy.bot been discussing these topics.

I hold that being able to discuss recognizing red demonstrates consciousness.

Do you have proof otherwise? Every known system capable of discussing red is conscious. We have no existing counter-examples, and furthermore we have no conceivable counter-examples.

 

[steenkh]

It makes more sense to speak in terms of what goes on in the brains of two people who are seeing red is similar, or dissimilar, or sort of similar, or whatever, and the ways things are similar, or dissimilar, or sort of similar, etc, are this: < then include the stuff Pixy has been talking about>

I agree.

 

[Fudbucker]

I'm not playing this time. This focus on semantics is useless.

Cars are vehicles.

It's not just semantics. you said "If consciousness is computational..."

What do you mean by that? Do you think every instance of computation results in consciousness? If not, which instances of computation result in consciousness? Why do those instances result in consciousness while others don't?

I see this is a fundamental flaw in the computationalist position. Either every instance of computation results in consciousness (which is absurd), or some instances of computation result in consciousness, but others don't, but there's no rythme or reason, other than some vague hand-waving towards self-referential processes.

 

[trebor]

Photosynthesis and consciousness are both physical processes. Yet they are not the same. I thought you were claiming they were.

You must be referring to some other poster. My only comment was to question why you think Photosynthesis was in any way relevant to the topic.

Do you agree they're different?

Yes, they are quite different.
A computer would be a much better parallel to a brain than Photosynthesis.

I never said it must be different.

My error, I see you stated that they 'should be' different.

 

[trebor]

Do you think every instance of computation results in consciousness?

Does the function of every biological brain result in consciousness?
I would say not, looking at the large variety there is.

If not, which instances of computation result in consciousness? Why do those instances result in consciousness while others don't?

Well, looking at biological brains it seems that a large complex brain is needed and even then only parts of the function of them seems to be responsible for the production of consciousness.

I see this is a fundamental flaw in the computationalist position. Either every instance of computation results in consciousness (which is absurd),

That really would be absurd, not seen anyone claim it either.

...or some instances of computation result in consciousness, but others don't, but there's no rythme or reason.

Why do some biological brains produce consciousness and others do not?
Do you think all functioning brains produce consciousness?

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Well, my OS is a program, which is to say it is a particular configuration of switching operations. Consciousess is a particular configuration of neurons firing, so there are definite similarities.

Still, I would like a definition of "compute". I cited a dictionary definition, because, AFAIK, no one has provided a definition yet. Maybe I missed it.

The way I've usually seen it used, a process is computational if it theoretically can be accurately described with a algorithm that can be run on a turing-complete machine. To compute, then, is to follow that algorithm.

Is the rocket guidance of the Saturn V conscious? If not, what makes one set of computations result in consciousness, while another does not. If so...are you serious?

No, and there's no obvious distinction. To judge whether a given set of computations is conscious, I give you the Turing Test and all of the other work AI research has put forth in the last century. Personally I would argue that it's a meaningless term altogether which serves only to confuse people, as everyone who uses the term means something subtly different by it and no one ever settles on a mutually agreed-upon definition before the hair-pulling starts.

Pain receptors don't feel pain. Pain is in the mind.

Then you don't feel your toe getting stubbed. The impact is felt by the pain receptor, a cascade of which triggers the pain response.

That could be said of nearly anything: iron atoms responding to a magnetic field. Again, the word "feel" becomes trivialized to such an extent it has nothing to do with the subjective experiences we all have. Any theory which results in "mercury thermometers have subjective experiences" should be rejected out of hand. Classic reductio ad absurdium. If mercury thermometers don't have subjective experiences, then they don't feel.

It's not. A definition of feeling must explain why things feel good and bad, hot, cold, etc.. There's more to pain than just injury avoidance- the fact that it feels bad.

You're arguing from a dualist pespective: rejecting an argument because it trivializes what you know to be true and important. Their term for your argument is "qualia," not just perception but sensation. Still boils down to dualism.

Uh, what is "simulated energy"???

If self.bound_ADP() and self.bound_P(): self.get_ADP().phosphorylate(self.get_P())

Simulated photosynthesis and real photosynthesis are obviously not the same thing. A "forest" of computers running photosynthesis sims won't produce any Oxygen. That this has to be pointed out to people again and again on a science forum, of all things, is incredible.

It'll produce oxygen within the simulation. It'll have to, that's one of the first steps! If it doesn't, it's not simulating photosynthesis.

Link for this claim?

Sure thing. If you ever find a magic bean, be sure and let us know.

I don't know about magic beans, but the quotes that Piggy provided show experts who actually study this stuff for a living aren't nearly as sure as some of the people here. That should make anyone pause in declaring "consciousness is such and such".

That's because Piggy chooses to quote experts which agree with him.

 

[Dancing David]

Does the function of every biological brain result in consciousness?
I would say not, looking at the large variety there is.



Well, looking at biological brains it seems that a large complex brain is needed and even then only parts of the function of them seems to be responsible for the production of consciousness.

This seems to be a rather odd statement. Much of the brain is part of the process that is commonly referred to as consciousness.

What are you trying to say and how did you get there?



And how are you defining consciousness.

All the perceptions are generally part of consciousness.

That really would be absurd, not seen anyone claim it either.



Why do some biological brains produce consciousness and others do not?
Do you think all functioning brains produce consciousness?

No, but it really depends upon the definition.

It is like the term 'life', a checklist of attributes.

 

[PixyMisa]

I can't agree with that, I know quite a few people who have a very favourable view of such psychedelics, used with care, yet are eminently reasonable in all other respects.

Those are otherwise reasonable people.

Seeking insights in psychoactive drugs is like seeking to improve your time in the hundred metres by dipping your stopwatch in treacle: It doesn't help, potentially hurts, and it totally misses the point.

 

[PixyMisa]

This seems to be a rather odd statement. Much of the brain is part of the process that is commonly referred to as consciousness.

But there are parts that aren't - autonomic functions, for example, or the primary visual cortex.

 

[PixyMisa]

It's not just semantics. you said "If consciousness is computational..."

What do you mean by that? Do you think every instance of computation results in consciousness?

No.

If not, which instances of computation result in consciousness?

Self-referential ones.

Why do those instances result in consciousness while others don't?

Because that's what the word means.

 

[Fudbucker]

The way I've usually seen it used, a process is computational if it theoretically can be accurately described with a algorithm that can be run on a turing-complete machine. To compute, then, is to follow that algorithm.

Have to think about that. That's certainly not a vague definition.

No, and there's no obvious distinction. To judge whether a given set of computations is conscious, I give you the Turing Test and all of the other work AI research has put forth in the last century. Personally I would argue that it's a meaningless term altogether which serves only to confuse people, as everyone who uses the term means something subtly different by it and no one ever settles on a mutually agreed-upon definition before the hair-pulling starts.

I'm sympathetic to the Turing test. I think I've posted this earlier, but if a machine passes a rigorous Turing test (not a ten line conversation with a chat-bot, for example), we should act as if it were conscious. I also think conscious computers would be the most amazing thing ever (own personal bias). The machine that passes a Turing Test might very well be conscious, once that level of complexity has been reached that allows it to pass.

So now we're refining it a bit to consciousness (machine consciousness) being a sufficiently complex machine capable of passing a Turing test. This isn't too far removed from a sufficiently complex organism passing a Turing Test (e.g., evaluating whether a species of extraterrestrial life is conscious).

Still the question remains: why does a certain level of complexity, a certain arrangement of transistors, neurons, or whatever lead to consciousness? What is the mechanism? Anyone got a good layman's book they'd like to recommend?

Then you don't feel your toe getting stubbed. The impact is felt by the pain receptor, a cascade of which triggers the pain response.

The impact is ulatimately felt in the brain, as that is the organ capable of feeling things. I don't think a specific cell feels anything anymore than a mercury thermometer feels anything.

You're arguing from a dualist pespective: rejecting an argument because it trivializes what you know to be true and important. Their term for your argument is "qualia," not just perception but sensation. Still boils down to dualism.

I've been avoiding qualia because it can be a loaded term, but I don't see any dualism. Maybe special pleading, if I want concsiousness and feeling to apply to only my class of organisms. But I don't want that. I want a definition that will account for the subjective feelings everyone gets. A definition that allows for thermometers to feel is trivialized to such an extent, it doesn't apply to anything in the real world. Cell Nuclei control all the operations of the cell. Do a cell feel? If it feels, what exactly does it feel? fear when a virus invades? Pain when the cell wall ruptures?

If self.bound_ADP() and self.bound_P(): self.get_ADP().phosphorylate(self.get_P())

This is the response from me asking what simulated energy is. I have no clue what you wrote.

It'll produce oxygen within the simulation. It'll have to, that's one of the first steps! If it doesn't, it's not simulating photosynthesis.

Again, Oxygen "within the simulation" isn't Oxygen. And what does "within the simulation" mean? Sounds very dualistic. A simulation is simply a physical process a computer engages in. How do you go "within that process"?

You posted

We've yet to find anything in the brain that can't be described as a computational process

I ask for a link and you provided one that goes to the definition of "null hypothesis" in Wiki. I wanted something a little more robust: a quote from an expert who agrees that everything in the brain can be described as a computational process. Who, doing work on the brain, believes that?

That's because Piggy chooses to quote experts which agree with him.

Aside from a smattering here and there, he's posted the most exhaustive list of "big names" working in the field.

 

[PixyMisa]

Still the question remains: why does a certain level of complexity, a certain arrangement of transistors, neurons, or whatever lead to consciousness? What is the mechanism? Anyone got a good layman's book they'd like to recommend?

Godel, Escher, Bach is the place to start.

Again, Oxygen "within the simulation" isn't Oxygen.

Within the simulation, it is.

And what does "within the simulation" mean?

It means within the simulation.

Sounds very dualistic.

Nope.

A simulation is simply a physical process a computer engages in.

Yes. So are you.

How do you go "within that process"?

The same way you go within any process.

Aside from a smattering here and there, he's posted the most exhaustive list of "big names" working in the field.

Yes, he engages in quote mining rather than making an argument from evidence. We noticed.