Yes, just as I said.
You present impressively definitive statements, saying "[Tenet] knew that these terrorists were inside of the US as to take part in a plan by KSM to hijack several large commercial aircraft and fly these into the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon, and US Capital building."
And yet when asked to back them up, we end up with selective quotes and guesswork, which even then can't justify what you've said already.
Well hey, carry on. But I've wasted enough of my life on this crap: I'm outta here.
In spite of my many questions you have been asked, you singularly are unable to answer why when the CIA and FBI HQ knew a huge al Qaeda attack was just about to take place inside of the US, and even knew Mihdhar and Hazmi were going to take part in this attack, the information that Mihdhar and by association Hazmi were going to take part in this attack came from Tom Wilshire's email on July 23, 2001 back to Blee, Black, information that was passed on to Tenet, they allowed the FBI HQ agents that they had control over to shut down FBI Agent Steve Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi?
Let see if we can connect the dots.
First the CIA knew a huge al Qaeda attack , organized by al Qaeda terrorists leader bin Laden, is aimed at the US and is just about to take place. The information on this attack is so profound that the CIA director George Tenet sets up a meeting with Rice and calls her from his car, and with Blee, and Black briefs Rice on this attack, and that something should be done immediately to prevent this attack.
But Tenet, Black, and Blee, leave out the fact at this meeting that al Qaeda terrorists Nawaf al-Hazmi was already in the US in order to take part in this attack, and that his travel companion, Khalid al-Mihdhar had a multi-entry visa for the US so he could join Hazmi in this attack.
The CIA had been told on June 12, 2001 that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was directing this huge attack and was recruiting al Qaeda terrorists to link up with other al Qaeda terrorists who were already in the US, "their colleagues" in order to carry out terrorist attacks for bin Laden.
But the CIA already had been given the KSM Bojinka plot, the plan to hijack several large US airliners and crash these into the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon and the US Capital building.
On August 22, 2001 the CIA and the FBI HQ are informed by FBI IOS agent Margaret Gillespie that both al Qaeda terrorists Mihdhar and Hazmi are inside of the US in order to take part in an al Qaeda terrorists attack.
So in the simplest terms the CIA had massive warnings of a horrific al Qaeda attack inside of the US that will cause mass causalities.
They also were told that it was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed that was directing this attack and sending in more al Qaeda recruits to link up with al Qaeda terrorists already inside of the US. The CIA knew one of these al Qaeda terrorists inside of the US was Nawaf al-Hazmi. And that Khalid al-Mihdhar had a multi-entry visa for the US, was Hazmi’s traveling companion, and had this visa so he could join Hazmi in any terrorist attack inside of the US. The CIA had already been given the Bojinka plot of KSM that described the hijacking of several large US commercial airliners and crashing these into the World Trade Center towers, the Pentagon and the Capitol building.
On August 22, 2001 the CIA and FBI HQ were both told that these al Qaeda terrorists were inside of the US, clearly in order to take part in the al Qaeda terrorist attack they had been warned about. The CIA managers Blee, Black and Tenet, had even been told in July by Tom Wilshire, that Mihdhar, would be found at the next big al Qaeda attack.
We also know from the August 6, 2001 daily briefing given to the President of the United States, that the CIA knew that there had been surveillance by what were thought to be terrorists of Federal buildings in Manhattan consistent with a future plan for aircraft hijacking.
But we are told that in spite of these very obvious dots, the CIA just somehow for some unexplained reason could just not connect all of these very obvious dots together. (Was this because the CIA was not really the CIA, they were instead the CSA, the Central Stupidity Agency, may be that is the reason they could not connect these very obvious dots.)
But even if for some GOD only knows reason they could not connect Mihdhar and Hazmi to the KSM hijacking plot, they had already connected Mihdhar and Hazmi to a terrorist attack inside of the US.
HELLO, HELLO, Knock, knock, knock, is anybody home? How simple and obvious can I make it.
So in spite of having all of this knowledge, the CIA with the FBI HQ agents they had corrupted did several and still today, unexplained things.
First Blee, Black, and Tenet refuse to allow Tom Wilshire, the former Deputy Chief of the CIA bin Laden unit, the very person who had blocked FBI Agent Doug Miller’s cable on Mihdhar from going to the FBI on January 5, 2000, and who had been moved over to the FBI ITOS unit in mid-May 2001 as Deputy Chief, to pass the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI and the FBI Cole bombing investigators. They actually refused two of his requests to pass this information to the FBI in July 2001. The CIA clearly knew that the Cole bombing investigators did not know about the Kuala Lumpur meeting or the fact that Walid bin Attash had been at this meeting with Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi planning the Cole bombing. The CIA had been keeping this information super secret from the FBI Cole bombing investigators and knew by hiding the photo of bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur that these FBI investigators would never have the necessary information to start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi.
But on August 22, 2001, the FBI Agent Margaret Gillespie found out from the INS that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US and gave this information to Tom Wilshire and FBI Agent Dina Corsi. Corsi was given the task by Wilshire, to write up the EC to start an intelligence investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. Both Corsi and Wilshire knew that if an intelligence investigation for Mihdhar was started, the FBI OIPR would almost never allow a parallel criminal investigation to be started for the same target, meaning this intelligence investigation will keep Bongardt from investigating and searching for Mihdhar.
In spite of Wilshire knowing that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the US to take part in a huge al Qaeda attack, “the big one” that will cause mass casualties, see DE 939 Wilshire’s email back to his CTC mangers, Blee, Black on August 23, 2001, this EC which was started at the behest of Wilshire, was labeled “Routine”, meaning this investigation had no real importance or urgency to finding Mihdhar or Hazmi quickly. Wilshire even reviewed this EC just before it was sent over to the FBI New York office on August 28, 2001.
When this EC was accidently routed to FBI Agent and Cole bombing investigator Steve Bongardt on August 28, 2001, Bongardt called Corsi immediately and said that this investigation should go to him and his team. Corsi said that because the EC contained a NSA cable, with restrictions on giving this to FBI criminal investigators, he had to destroy her EC and he could not start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. But we know from the DOJ IG report, that the permission for Corsi to send the NSA cable to the FBI Cole bombing investigators had been approved by the NSA general counsel the day before, on August 27, 2001. So Corsi had no legal right to block Bongardt’s investigation.
When Bongardt complained and stated that the NSA information was not connected to any FISA warrant, he requested that Corsi get a legal ruling from the FBI NSLU to see if he could start an immediate investigation for Mihdhar, knowing that they were inside of the US in order to take part in some horrific al Qaeda attack.
On August 29, 2001 Corsi told Bongardt that the NSLU attorney she had contacted, Sherry Sabol, had ruled that he could have no part in any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. But the 9/11 Commission report states that Sabol told Corsi on August 28, 2001 that since the NSA information had no connection to any FISA warrant, Bongardt could take part in any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi.
These lies cost almost 3000 people their lives on 9/11. But it gets worse, much worse.
On August 29, 2001 Corsi send Bongardt an email that stated; “at such time as information is developed of a substantial Federal crime, (by Mihdhar and Hazmi), this information will be passed over the wall”.
In the DOJ IG report page 301-302, it says that Corsi knew by August 22, 2001 that the CIA had a photo of Walid Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur. This directly connected the mastermind of the Cole bombing that had killed 17 US sailors to both Mihdhar and Hazmi who were at this al Qaeda planning meeting at the same time as bin Attash. So Corsi already knew that there was information of a substantial Federal crime at least 6 days before she tells Bongardt that he has to stop his investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. She also knew that it would be illegal and serious Federal crime for her to block Bongardt's investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, yet she does this anyway.
She, Wilshire and the CIA all knew that the CIA had been deliberately hiding this photo of bin Attash from Bongardt so he would never have the information he needed to start any investigation for these al Qaeda terrorists. The CIA had known about the Walid bin Attash identification since January 4, 2001, about the same time Wilshire was given this same information. They all knew without some connection to the planning of the Cole bombing or some other crime, Bongardt will simply never have the information he needed to start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi.
But they all also knew that a huge al Qaeda attack is just about to take place inside of the US that would cause mass casualties. In spite of knowing about this attack and knowing that blocking Bongardt’s investigation will allow this attack to take place, they all continued to either block Bongardt’s investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi or allowed Corsi to block Bongardt’s investigation of these two al Qaeda terrorists who will take part in this huge al Qaeda attack.
On August 30, 2001 the photo of Walid Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur was sent by the CIA to Rod Middleton, FBI Agent Dina Corsi's supervisor. So on this date he had the photographic proof that Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing. Yet in spite of being on the phone with Corsi shutting down Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, he never gave this horrific information to FBI Agent Steve Bongardt so Bongardt could start an investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi before they had time to carry out some horrific al Qaeda attack.
On September 5, 2001, after the intelligence investigation was given to FBI Agent Robert Fuller, Fuller called Corsi to say he has gotten nowhere in his investigation and search for Mihdhar and he needed Mihdhar’s credit card number, which was known by Saudi Arabian Airlines since Mihdhar had flown into the US on July 4, 2001 on this airline. In spite of knowing that Fullers investigation has stalled out without this credit card number, Corsi refused to give Fuller permission to call Saudi Arabian Airlines and get this credit card number. This effectively blocked all forward progress in Fullers investigation. Six days later, on September 11, 2001 the attacks on 9/11 took place.
So these questions remain.
Why did Blee, Black and Tenet refuse to give the information on Mihdhar and Hazmi to the Rice, Hadley and Clarke on July 10, 2001. Tenet even said that had Rice taken him more seriously, she could have prevented the attacks on 9/11. But then why did he refuse to allow Wilshire permission to give the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI Cole bombing investigators on July 13, 2001 just three days after the July 10, 2001 meeting at the White House, and again on July 23, 2001, when he must have known this would block the one investigation that could have prevented the attacks on 9/11?
Why did Wilshire work with FBI Agent Dina Corsi and SSA Rod Middleton to illegally shut down Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi when they all knew that the result would be many Americans would be killed in the al Qaeda terrorist attacks that Bongardt could have prevented?
Why did Corsi block Fuller's investigation of Mihdhar when she knew he bhad failed to make any progress in his investigation and needed Mihdhar's credirt card number. What possible reason did she have to prevent Fuller from contacting Saudi Arabian Airlines to get this number?
Why did none of this information come out at the 911 Commission Public hearings when they had Tenet and FBI Director Robert Mueller testify under oath at these hearings?
The fact that this July 10, 2001 meeting took place was never even reported in the 9/11 Commission report, in spite of the fact that Rice, Tenet and Clarke all knew about this meeting when they testified at the 9/11 Commission hearings, and this information was given to Zelikow and Richard ben-Veniste by Tenet in a private meeting?
The 9/11 Commission report asked the question; Why did the CIA and FBI HQ not connect the fact that Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the US to their knowledge of a huge al Qaeda attack the CIA and FBI HQ knew was just about to take place? But the July 5, 2001 email from Wilshire back to Blee, Black, and Tenet had connected the people at the Kuala Lumpur meeting to the warnings of a huge al Qaeda attack, and his July 23, 2001 email to Blee, Black and Tenet, directed connected Mihdhar by name and by association, Hazmi to this huge attack? This was email collected by the DOJ IG, and was information that the 9/11 Commission claimed to have had.
Not only did the CIA and FBI HQ deliberately allow the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out the attacks that took place on 9/11, but the 9/11 Commission then covered over their criminal and nefarious deeds, even when they claimed to have had all of the same information that I have cited in this blog.