On Consciousness

[rocketdodger]

Rocket Dodger claimed, in the Robot Consciousness thread, I think, that you could build a conscious brain out of rope.

Dunno if he's reconsidered that position.

Ropes, pullies, and buckets, to be specific.

I suppose you could find a clever way to make pullies and buckets out of rope in the first place, so yeah you could build a brain out of nothing but rope if that is what you mean.

I can tell you right now Pixy will agree with me. We have been telling you for years that the requirements for the building blocks of a computer is that they can switch. If you can find a way to make a rope switch, then go for it. If not, then whatever point you were trying to make isn't valid.

 

[rocketdodger]

Until and unless we figure out what the brain's doing when it performs consciousness, we can't even imagine designing conscious machines to study, much less building them.

This is why it isn't even worth discussing things with you, piggy.

Someone brings up good research.

You respond with "blah blah blah, I didn't read it, I don't need to, it wasn't an MRI and it wasn't done by someone with a "biologist" in their title, so it isn't relevant."

 

[Modified]

Because the brain is a computer.


I'd rather ask you why you believe that's a coherent question.

That fact that it's not coherent demonstrates that "a brain is a computer" is meaningful, but "a truck is a computer" is not.

 

[rocketdodger]

Again I ask, does anyone think feeling thinking conscious machines already exist? This is a skeptics' forum, is it not? I can't imagine such an assertion going unchallenged.

There are no machines that are conscious in all the ways humans are. There aren't even machines that are conscious in all the ways a squirrel or a bird might be.

There are machines that are conscious in the way a paramecium might be.

If you don't think a paramecium is conscious, then that implies you don't think there are any machines that are conscious in that way.

There are a number of machines that some people say are conscious in certain ways that aren't exactly the same as the ways animals are conscious, because they are using a definition for "consciousness" that the machines happen to satisfy. It is easy -- I can define "consciousness" as spinning, and that means a centrifuge is conscious.

If you don't agree with the definitions these people use, then you obviously don't think those machines are conscious. However, the machines still do whatever they do -- your choosing to not apply a term to what they do doesn't change reality.

As soon as you get away from the generic "consciousness" and think hard about what the specific inquiry is, things become much more clear.

 

[rocketdodger]

That can't be right. Between you saying we know nothing about it, and Pixy saying we've got a firm grasp of it, there has to be a middle ground where reality lies.

Well, you have to look at the sources.

Pixy writes code for a living and one could say he even does research in computer science, and he thinks in terms of the most fundamental behavior that could be required for consciousness.

Piggy can't be bothered to even read research done by others, never mind perform his own, and he thinks in terms of every behavior that might be required for full human consciousness.

Obviously the conclusion those two extremes reach will be very different from each other.

The "middle ground" you speak of can be reached by 1) taking the time and effort to at least try and understand the science behind the issue and 2) being specific and honest about the behaviors in question.

If there is any fault in Pixy's approach, it is that he assumes people will take his words literally. Saying a sufficiently advanced thermostat is aware of itself means only that. However most people read it and think he means "like a human," which is absurd, so they then think he is absurd. Should Pixy need to say "aware of itself, but not like a human, in particular the thermostat can't see, it has no body map, it can't sense anything but temperature, it has no imagination, and in general it's reference to "self" is so simple and alien to a human that we actually shouldn't even think of it as being "aware" of itself, except that in a formal sense this term does apply ?" I dunno. If he said that, he certainly would head off 90% of the pointless responses people make. On the other hand, he wouldn't need to say that if people bothered to educate themselves on what self reference actually is.

I tend to think that compromising "downward" is bad policy, people should always strive to educate themselves to where they can understand what someone else is talking about. But then again, I'm a Democrat.

 

[Fudbucker]

Originally Posted by Fudbucker
However, I think it's clear Pixy isn't making a definitional claim, but rather stating that a brain is a kind of computer.

Well, they're really the same thing here, since computers are defined by their function.

You getting this, Belz? Cause I have no idea what Pixy means here. I read "A brain is a computer" to mean a brain is a KIND of computer (which is how you said you read it). But now Pixy seems to be making a definitional claim: they're the same thing.

Pixy, are you are making an equivalence claim?

Just to be clear, is your position:
For any X, if X is a computer, X is a brain?

??

 

[I Ratant]

How can the brain INCLUDE a computer if you think the brain is a KIND of computer? Does a Mustang include a car???

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The Mustang is the whole megilla.
It contains a motor.
The motor produces heat.
The heat is removed by the radiator.
The brain is only a part of the body.
It consumes energy and creates heat.
This heat must be shed... or radiated, if you will.

 

[I Ratant]

The rope then is a ruler. You can consider the rope to be a component in a speed-calculating computer, but by itself the rope just lies there on the deck of the ship.

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All of my computers and calculators and ropes just lie there getting dusty until I decide to do something with them.
I decide that in my onboard computer, my wetware.
Which in the winter time I keep a cap on, lest the heat generated by living and using it escapes and I get cold in the head area.

 

[Fudbucker]

In answer to your question of evidence:

Consciousness is the ability to think about your own thoughts. Self-awareness.

I don't agree with this. I can be conscious of basic perceptions (hot, cold, pain, etc.), which don't have any underlying self-aware thoughts attached to them.

Computer programs do this via the technique of reflection. Not all programs do this, but many complex and/or real-time systems do, because it's as useful a technique for computers as it is for animals.

But you haven't demonstrated that computers are able to think. They're just a collection of binary switches switching away (of course, brains are just collections of neurons, but we are in the unique position of KNOWING brains can think). At what point does a computer begin to "think". Could ENIAC think? Does a pocket calculator think?

Feeling is either awareness of of an abstract representation of sensory data, or the conscious reflection of the same. So again, many computers do this.

But you can feel absent sensory data. Memories can arouse feelings. And your definition lacks the essence of what it is to "feel" something. Pain hurts. It feels bad. Can a computer also experience pain? If so, what kind of computer? If a computer can feel, do you think they can suffer? That is the logical extension of your claim. That opens a unique can of worms. We generally think it's immoral to cause needless suffering...

Thinking is just processing data, so all computers do this by definition.

I'm not JUST processing data when I think of my family, and feel all the emotions those thoughts bring. Your definition is lacking.

Even if it's true that that computers are thinking, feeling conscious machines, it doesn't follow that the brain is a kind of computer. The architecture is all wrong. Brains aren't binary collections of switches, they don't need programs to function, they're analog and digital.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't agree with this. I can be conscious of basic perceptions (hot, cold, pain, etc.), which don't have any underlying self-aware thoughts attached to them.

You can be aware of those perceptions without self-awareness. But you can't know that you're aware of those perceptions without self-awareness.

That one little trick, that self-referential loop: That's consciousness.

But you haven't demonstrated that computers are able to think.

Of course I have. That's what computers do.

But you can feel absent sensory data. Memories can arouse feelings. And your definition lacks the essence of what it is to "feel" something. Pain hurts. It feels bad. Can a computer also experience pain?

Sure, absolutely.

If so, what kind of computer?

Any suitably-programmed general-purpose computer can do this. Per the Church-Turing thesis, all general-purpose computers are equivalent in power (though not necessarily capacity).

If a computer can feel, do you think they can suffer?

Definitely.

That is the logical extension of your claim. That opens a unique can of worms. We generally think it's immoral to cause needless suffering.

Yep.

I'm not JUST processing data when I think of my family, and feel all the emotions those thoughts bring. Your definition is lacking.

Really?

Then what are you doing that is (a) relevant and (b) isn't just processing data?

Because the brain is a computer, a data processing engine. We can chase the signals from neuron to neuron, we can inspect the bias levels applied by various neurochemicals, and that is what is going on in there. When you think of your family - or anything else - that's data processing.

Even if it's true that that computers are thinking, feeling conscious machines, it doesn't follow that the brain is a kind of computer.

True. But the brain is a computer.

The architecture is all wrong.

Eh?

Brains aren't binary collections of switches

It basically is a binary collection of switches. It's a pulse-coded switched digital network.

they don't need programs to function

Of course they do. The program is encoded in the structure of the brain itself, kind of like ENIAC^WP, but, oh, several times more complex.

they're analog and digital.

Mostly digital. Not that it matters a lot; electronic computers can be analog or digital, and you can process analog data on a digital computer and digital data on an analog computer.

This is a computer:



So is this:



So is this:



So is this.

So is this.

And so, very importantly (a lot of people get stuck at this point), is .

Edit: This is a computer inside a computer inside another computer, recorded on a computer, loaded onto a computer, and then sent through a series of computers so that your computer can watch it on your computer.



Wait for it.... Waaaait for it...

Neat, huh?

 

[PixyMisa]

If he said that, he certainly would head off 90% of the pointless responses people make.

Alas, no. (See any number of arguments here where I've said "I mean precisely this, nothing more, nothing less" and the other party has simply gone on attacking the position I've just explained fourteen times I do not hold.)

 

[I Ratant]

Of course I have. That's what computers do (think).


...

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Computers work with ones and zeroes.
The significance of any operation is performed outside the computer by the programmer.

 

[Belz...]

You getting this, Belz? Cause I have no idea what Pixy means here.

That much is clear.

Read Rocketdodger's post just above yours.

 

[Belz...]

Just to be clear, is your position:
For any X, if X is a computer, X is a brain?

No. All As are Bs does not entail that Bs are As.

 

[rocketdodger]

.
Computers work with ones and zeroes.
The significance of any operation is performed outside the computer by the programmer.

That's equivalent to saying the significance of anything you do was performed by whoever or whatever set up the laws of physics.

Is that really the position you want to take?

 

[PixyMisa]

.
Computers work with ones and zeroes.

Computers work with anything that can be represented by ones and zeroes, which includes the Universe, all its laws, and everything in it.

 

[PixyMisa]

You getting this, Belz? Cause I have no idea what Pixy means here. I read "A brain is a computer" to mean a brain is a KIND of computer (which is how you said you read it). But now Pixy seems to be making a definitional claim: they're the same thing.

Pixy, are you are making an equivalence claim?

Just to be clear, is your position:
For any X, if X is a computer, X is a brain?

If you're taking the usual definition and not a metaphor, a brain is a particular implementation of a computer (biological, cellular, switched network).

But functionally, they're the same thing. All my examples above, and that thing in your head, all computers, and all equivalent in power (not capacity, but in their basic ability to instantiate algorithms).

This is kind of important.

There is no magical hey-this-is-like-a-computer-only-better. It's not mathematically possible. If the brain does it, then one way or another, any computer built on any other substrate can do it.

 

[I Ratant]

That's equivalent to saying the significance of anything you do was performed by whoever or whatever set up the laws of physics.

Is that really the position you want to take?

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Unless I'm mistaken, the laws of physics are THE laws the universe runs by.
Our brain/imagination may be able to conceive of things outside those laws, but we have no way to get around them, other than by thought, which is all we do about any thwarting or work arounds.

 

[I Ratant]

Computers work with anything that can be represented by ones and zeroes, which includes the Universe, all its laws, and everything in it.

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True. Knots on a rope as mentioned.
Ones and zeroes are just voltage levels which are interpreted.

 

[Mr. Scott]

Regarding a computer emulating a brain, why not ask me why a computer couldn't emulate my truck and get me to work every morning?

Here's how I analyze this question: A device can be defined in terms of its inputs, process, and outputs.

E.g., a radiator device has the intended purpose of inputting concentrated heat energy and using entropy to output diffuse heat energy. Almost every physical thing in the universe has the side effect of radiating (even a black hole, says Mr. Hawking).

A truck's purpose s to take the inputs of gasoline, driving controls, storage space, and output movement around our world on roads and such of what it's storing.

The brain's function, once again, is to take input from the five senses, and output muscle and hormone controls to the body. The earliest central nervous systems, e.g. c. elegans, had this function, like all more evolved brains of higher complexities, like ours. The brain's "purpose" is to pass on the genes that made it, and among its many ways of doing this is to dazzle mates with mastery in fine arts by controlling muscles that hold paint brushes, musical instruments, etc.

Massimo Pigliucci^WP has argued that emulating a conscious brain in a computer is akin to emulating photosynthesis in a computer. You don't get sugar and you don't get consciousness.

Photosynthesis inputs light, water, and carbon dioxide, and outputs sugars and oxygen. A computer can't emulate this. It can simulate it (like a computer can simulate ping pong), but it won't produce sugar.

A computer, by its most familiar understanding, inputs information (keyboard, camera, mike, Internet, etc.) and outputs information (screen, speakers, etc). The brain, likewise, inputs information (senses) and outputs information (muscle signals). In this sense, the brain and the standard computer are the same. In theory, a computer could replace the brain, inputting senses and outputting muscle control. We already do this in bits, with prosthetic eyes, ears, arms and fingers. Also, in theory, a brain could replace a computer in a robot (e.g. Robocop). This is what we mean when we say the brain is a computer: information in, information out. What we are arguing is the process inside the brain which produces, as a side effect, consciousness, and whether or not consciousness is computation or an output in and of itself.

The anti-computationalists apparently see consciousness itself as an output of the brain (see this thread's post #1) like sugar is an output of photosynthesis. I've yet to see them bring home. All I've seen is, essentially, appeals to emotions.