Free will and omniscience

[Bill Thompson 75]

For free will to exist, there must be a choice I can make, where it is possible that I choose either one. Pick a necessary binary choice "A or not A" (e.g. "I will stand up") and examine it. For me to have free will in this choice, it must be possible for me to choose A, and it must be possible for me to choose not A.

Let us assign the choice to time T2. (So, A might be, "I will stand up at noon.") At an earlier time T1, I have not yet made the choice. Let us also define a time T0, which is earlier than T1.

We can now be more precise about the free will condition: For me to have free will in the choice at T2, it must be possible at T1 for me to choose A at T2, and it must be possible at T1 for me to choose not A at T2.

At all times T0, T1, and T2 the Omniscient Being must know whether I will choose (or have chosen) A or not A.

Now, what does it mean for it to be "possible" for me to choose a choice? There are many elements involved in assuring that a choice is possible -- for instance, it's not possible for me to choose to have lunch in Honolulu today, because it is already lunchtime and Honolulu is thousands of miles away. But that's circumstantial impossibility. Under different circumstances (lunch tomorrow, or I happen to be an astronaut on the launch pad just about to blast off for a suborbital flight intended to splash down a few minutes later near Honolulu), it would be possible.

Of more import is when a choice would cause a logical contradiction. That makes it logically impossible. For example, I cannot choose to draw a square triangle even if I'm poised with pencil and paper, because a square triangle is a contradiction, as it has three sides (being a triangle) and other than three sides (being square) simultaneously. Likewise, if there is an omniscient being, it is not possible for me to utter a fact that the omniscient being doesn't know, as the omniscient being would have to both know and not know that fact. That would be a contradiction.

Logical impossibility is therefore sufficient to prove impossibility. Just because something is logically possible (e.g. lunch in Honolulu) doesn't mean it's actually possible, but if it not logically possible, then it is definitely not possible.

The omniscient being at time T1 knows that I will choose A or that I will choose not A.

Note that it is not possible for me to do other than choose A or not A (which would be, not A and not not A, that is, A and not A) because that itself would be a logical contradiction. At T2 I can either stand up, or not stand up; I cannot do both, or neither.

So, there are two possible cases at time T1:

- The OB knows I will choose A at time T2
- The OB knows I will choose not-A at time T2

In the first case, it is not possible at time T1 for me to choose not A at time T2, because that would be a contradiction. (By the definition of omniscience, the OB's knowledge at time T1 is sufficient to prove A at T2; by the definition of choice, my choice of not A proves not A at T2, so we have A and not A, a contradiction.)

In the second case, it is not possible for me at time T1 to choose A, because that would also be a contradiction.

Since one and only one of these cases must apply at T1, in no case is it possible for me at T1 to choose A at T2 and possible for me at T1 to choose not A at T2. So, one of the the original premises must be false. Either I cannot have free will to make a choice of A or not A at T2, or an omniscient being cannot know at T1 what my choice will be (and hence, cannot exist as defined).

What Bill is trying to argue using atemporal causality is something like this:

There are two cases, A (I choose A) or not A (I choose not A).

Both cases are possible at T0 and T1 (hence, free choice is preserved) but if I choose A at T2, the OB knows A at T0 and T1, and if I choose not A at T2, the OB knows not A at T0 and T1 (so omniscience is preserved).

But the fact remains, per the argument above, that at T1, the OB must know A or not A, so at T1 one of the choices must be impossible. The same applies to T0 and right up until T2 when the choice is made. So that argument amounts to, I have free will, I just don't have it at any given time. I have it never.

Respectfully,
Myriad

You use the idea of logical impossibility inconsistently in your argument.
Your argument confuses two ideas.
1) The logical impossibility of a choice other than the one that is made
2) The logical impossibility of multiple options before choice is made

Your argument primarily addresses 1).
It appears to use 2) but that is because at any time T the choice made is already known.

Your argument is implicitly based on the premise that knowledge is the basis for the choice.
But if you do an analysis that uses the choice as the basis of the knowledge you will see that your argument is no longer valid.

An argument can be established using the following logic:
At any time T I cannot choose other than what the chooser knows.
At any time T the OB cannot have knowledge of the choice I make other than what I chose.
The truth of both of these statements is not a logical impossibility and they allow for a compatibility between omniscience and free will.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

No, I'm not. But since you clearly haven't understood almost anything anyone else has written in this thread, it's not surprising you completely missed my meaning, too. That is, unless your misinterpretation of my comment is more of your intentional dishonesty or willful ignorance.

Your wrongness about my meaning seems to be the basis of your wrongness about the relevance of my comment.

My statement doesn't negate yours. For all practical purposes it is yours.

But your persistent and dishonest attempt to change the meaning of what you've said is noted... again. Do you ever get tired of all that backpedaling?

Yes...

No. The omniscient being knows the results of the choice before it is made. The total list of options available to the chooser consists of a single item.

That isn't what I'm claiming, not even close, so you're wrong again. How does it feel to be so thoroughly trounced by your own contradictions, goalpost moving, redefining terms, convoluted logic, and assorted other dishonest tactics that you have to resort to making up crap in order to support your position?

My noting your inability to present a cogent argument isn't griping. Pretty much everyone else has mentioned how you don't make sense, how your comments are nonsense, gibberish, and yes, lies. You own your failure. At least have the decency to take responsibility for it rather than blaming other people.

Your predilection for gainsaying without content may support your pursuit to be the most persistent troll.

 

[Myriad]

You use the idea of logical impossibility inconsistently in your argument.
Your argument confuses two ideas.
1) The logical impossibility of a choice other than the one that is made
2) The logical impossibility of multiple options before choice is made

Your argument primarily addresses 1).
It appears to use 2) but that is because at any time T the choice made is already known.

A logical impossibility is any event that results in a contradiction. This can happen in different ways because the contradiction can occur in different ways. That is consistent throughout the argument.

Your argument is implicitly based on the premise that knowledge is the basis for the choice.
But if you do an analysis that uses the choice as the basis of the knowledge you will see that your argument is no longer valid.

You're using some kind of shorthand phrases in your wording that don't make sense. Whose choice is the basis of whose knowledge? My argument is not implicitly based on any premise that (anyone's) knowledge is the basis for (anyone's) choice (at any time). Merely that the OB's knowledge limits the chooser's choice, by limiting the possible choices (eliminating choices by making it impossible to select them without causing a logical contradiction, and there therefore impossible altogether), and that is not the premise but the logical conclusion.

An argument can be established using the following logic:
At any time T I cannot choose other than what the chooser knows.
At any time T the OB cannot have knowledge of the choice I make other than what I chose.
The truth of both of these statements is not a logical impossibility and they allow for a compatibility between omniscience and free will.

What does "I cannot choose other than what the chooser knows" mean?

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Belz...]

It works the same way that the choice is known to the OB, whatever mechanism that is is irrelevant.
If you are going to say that omniscience doesn't work then there is no point in participating in this debate.
If you are going to say that omniscience works in this debate then use the mechanism of omniscience.

I see you didn't take that last chance I gave you.

Comparisons aren't things--I missed that one.

Interesting.

When you say that everything exists in numbers I guess I'll interpret that to mean that things don't exist in numbers since a number is not a set, but that things are countable and numbers are used to communicate the extent of the count.

Keep being dishonest, Bill. It really helps the debate.

So what you are saying is that it is logically possible for a choice to be known before the choice is made, but it is not logically possible for the choice to be reason for the knowledge.
Do you get that there is no differentiation in the logical possibility of those two things?

Oh, did you already forget the last time I talked about the OB knowing because of extrapolation ?

Either memory is one of the worst I've seen on this forum, or you're being dishonest again. Gee, I wonder...

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

A logical impossibility is any event that results in a contradiction. This can happen in different ways because the contradiction can occur in different ways. That is consistent throughout the argument.

There won't be a contradiction if you create logical constructs that differentiate between the two uses of logical impossibility.

You're using some kind of shorthand phrases in your wording that don't make sense. Whose choice is the basis of whose knowledge?

The chooser's choice is the basis fpr the OB's knowledge.

My argument is not implicitly based on any premise that (anyone's) knowledge is the basis for (anyone's) choice (at any time). Merely that the OB's knowledge limits the chooser's choice, by limiting the possible choices (eliminating choices by making it impossible to select them without causing a logical contradiction, and there therefore impossible altogether), and that is not the premise but the logical conclusion.

You are stating that the OB's knowledge limits the chooser's choice,
You could also conclude from your argument that since the OB's knowledge is formed by the chooser's choice that it is the chooser's choice that limits the chooser's choice,

What does "I cannot choose other than what the chooser knows" mean?
Respectfully,
Myriad

It means my choice will be in line with what the OB knows about my choice.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

I see you didn't take that last chance I gave you.
Interesting.
Keep being dishonest, Bill. It really helps the debate.
Oh, did you already forget the last time I talked about the OB knowing because of extrapolation ?
Either memory is one of the worst I've seen on this forum, or you're being dishonest again. Gee, I wonder...

I thought you understood that this debate is about omniscience, not omniscience plus the omnipower to extrapolate all knowledge from the beginning of time, or any other powers you wish to sneak into the debate to bolster your desperate attempt to save your argument.

 

[I Ratant]

...

What does "I cannot choose other than what the chooser knows" mean?

Respectfully,
Myriad

.
It's the new street talk.
Called "omnigibberish".

 

[Myriad]

You are stating that the OB's knowledge limits the chooser's choice.

The fact that the OB has the knowledge (and is omniscient), not the knowledge itself, is what limits the chooser's choice.

There is no causal mechanism involved in that limitation. The limitation is a logical necessity, a condition that must logically exist, given the OB's existence. My argument remains sound whether or not the OB ever reveals any knowledge to the chooser, and whether or not the chooser even knows the OB exists.

Either James or John is happy. If James is not happy, then it follows that John is happy. There is no need to consider how James's unhappiness could possibly make John happy. No such causal mechanism is implied by the logic. Only a set of conditions that hold true, and a conclusion that follows.

If the conditions hold true that a being knows what I will choose in the future and is omniscient, then I can make only that choice. Free will requires the possibility that I make different choices, which is inconsistent with being limited to one choice. Hence the omniscient being and free will cannot both exist. None of the mechanisms matter (how I make my choice, how the OB knows) in establishing that.

----------

Now, if you do want to speculate about mechanisms, we can say:

If the OB gets omniscient knowledge by perfectly extrapolating future events based on past or present conditions and physical law, the reason that's inconsistent with free will is that extrapolating future events based on physical law is only reliable if all physical events are deterministic.

If the OB gets the knowledge by existing outside of time, then the reason that's inconsistent with free will is that from outside the space-time continuum, the continuum must exist as a single fixed entity that doesn't change. All time, and therefore all seeming change, must already be contained inside the continuum. You and I, being frozen unchanging inside that continuum like characters on a reel of film, do not actually make any choices at all even though we might seem to.

(You might argue that the entire continuum could change, but that has serious implications, including: there must be another additional dimension of time outside the continuum for that change to take place in; the past we perceive can change, along with our memories of it; and the omniscient being now needs yet another means of being omniscient about those changes.)

If on the other hand there is no fully omniscient being, then it becomes logically possible that the future is unwritten, the flow of time and the distinct present moment are real physical phenomena rather than cognitive illusions, perfect prediction is impossible, God might actually resemble the being depicted in the Bible (discovering, repenting, changing His mind), and people have free will.

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Belz...]

I thought you understood that this debate is about omniscience, not omniscience plus the omnipower to extrapolate all knowledge from the beginning of time, or any other powers you wish to sneak into the debate to bolster your desperate attempt to save your argument.

I see you followed my advice to continue to be dishonest.

On the one hand you propose a mechanism for omniscience, then deny you did so, and then say the mechanism isn't important. On the other hand you ask how omniscience could work given my argument, then I give you a mechanism, then you say this mechanism is off-topic and an attempt to save my argument.

I think you've very confused about how debates and discussions are supposed to progress.

Suit yourself.

 

[Belz...]

There is no causal mechanism involved in that limitation. The limitation is a logical necessity, a condition that must logically exist, given the OB's existence. My argument remains sound whether or not the OB ever reveals any knowledge to the chooser, and whether or not the chooser even knows the OB exists.

This is where you lost Bill.

 

[GeeMack]

Your predilection for gainsaying without content may support your pursuit to be the most persistent troll.

What you mistakenly see as "without content" is my consistently pointing out your failure to support your position in a sane and/or honest way. Your desperate flailing, dishonestly changing your position from post to post, and liberally applied willful ignorance does not constitute an argument. It constitutes a failure to provide one.

Oh, and since I'm not involved in a pursuit to be a troll of any sort, your comment above lends additional support to the evidence I've already presented which shows beyond reasonable doubt that you're a liar. Your willingness to continue with that failed strategy, even after it has been exposed so many times, is apparently boundless.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

The fact that the OB has the knowledge (and is omniscient), not the knowledge itself, is what limits the chooser's choice.

There is no effective difference in these points.

There is no causal mechanism involved in that limitation.

There is no causal mechanism involved in the OB's knowledge formed by the choice, other than whatever causality is involved with omniscience to begin with.

The limitation is a logical necessity, a condition that must logically exist, given the OB's existence.

Since you describe the impossibility based on the existence of the OB (speaking hypothetically for the audience), you may use an argument based on principles of logic, but it does not form logical impossibility.

My argument remains sound whether or not the OB ever reveals any knowledge to the chooser, and whether or not the chooser even knows the OB exists.

These would be factors outside of the definition of omniscience that would require extended analysis.

Either James or John is happy. If James is not happy, then it follows that John is happy. There is no need to consider how James's unhappiness could possibly make John happy. No such causal mechanism is implied by the logic. Only a set of conditions that hold true, and a conclusion that follows.

I assume you are creating an analogy where either I have no choices or the OB is not omniscient and therefore, where the knowledge of the choice comes from does not affect the knowledge.
However, note that you are making an unwarranted assumption in that analogy in that it must be one way or the other.

The definition of omniscience does not require that dichotomy.
That needs to be a conclusion reached through analysis.

My argument points out an exception to that analysis.
You need to point out, within the framework of omniscience, why the choice made cannot form the knowledge of the choice for the OB, and thus not be constrained by such knowledge but merely reflect the accuracy of such knowledge.

If the conditions hold true that a being knows what I will choose in the future and is omniscient, then I can make only that choice. Free will requires the possibility that I make different choices, which is inconsistent with being limited to one choice. Hence the omniscient being and free will cannot both exist. None of the mechanisms matter (how I make my choice, how the OB knows) in establishing that.

This is making the same unwarranted assumption.

Imagine that the OB likes to check his knowledge once in a while.
He knows the choice I will make in tomorrow.
On the day after tomorrow he thinks either,
"He chose just as I thought he would" or
"My knowledge exactly matched his choice."
These are reasonable thoughts within the scenario, neither of which imply any constraint.

Now, if you do want to speculate about mechanisms, we can say:

If the OB gets omniscient knowledge by perfectly extrapolating future events based on past or present conditions and physical law, the reason that's inconsistent with free will is that extrapolating future events based on physical law is only reliable if all physical events are deterministic.

If the OB gets the knowledge by existing outside of time, then the reason that's inconsistent with free will is that from outside the space-time continuum, the continuum must exist as a single fixed entity that doesn't change. All time, and therefore all seeming change, must already be contained inside the continuum. You and I, being frozen unchanging inside that continuum like characters on a reel of film, do not actually make any choices at all even though we might seem to.

(You might argue that the entire continuum could change, but that has serious implications, including: there must be another additional dimension of time outside the continuum for that change to take place in; the past we perceive can change, along with our memories of it; and the omniscient being now needs yet another means of being omniscient about those changes.)

If on the other hand there is no fully omniscient being, then it becomes logically possible that the future is unwritten, the flow of time and the distinct present moment are real physical phenomena rather than cognitive illusions, perfect prediction is impossible, God might actually resemble the being depicted in the Bible (discovering, repenting, changing His mind), and people have free will.

Respectfully,
Myriad

These mechanisms would not be within the definition of oimniscience.

 

[Myriad]

Imagine that the OB likes to check his knowledge once in a while.
He knows the choice I will make in tomorrow.
On the day after tomorrow he thinks either,
"He chose just as I thought he would" or
"My knowledge exactly matched his choice."
These are reasonable thoughts within the scenario, neither of which imply any constraint.

What implies the constraint is the lack of any possibility of day-after-tomorrow thoughts like these:

"He chose the opposite of what I thought he would."
"I learned something new from his unexpected choice."
"Wow, these free-will creations, they're full of surprises."

If day-after-tomorrow thoughts like those cannot occur, then free will cannot exist. Existence of free will in such a case is an immediate, direct, and obvious logical contradiction.

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

I see you followed my advice to continue to be dishonest.

On the one hand you propose a mechanism for omniscience, then deny you did so, and then say the mechanism isn't important. On the other hand you ask how omniscience could work given my argument, then I give you a mechanism, then you say this mechanism is off-topic and an attempt to save my argument.
I think you've very confused about how debates and discussions are supposed to progress.
Suit yourself.

You are confused not so much about how debates are supposed to progress, you're confusion is not realizing that debates are supposed to progress.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

What you mistakenly see as "without content" is my consistently pointing out your failure to support your position in a sane and/or honest way.

Pointing does not constitute debate.

Oh, and since I'm not involved in a pursuit to be a troll of any sort,

You don't have to pursue if it comes naturally.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Ignoring the tough parts of my post makes it easier to debate, doesn't it?

What implies the constraint is the lack of any possibility of day-after-tomorrow thoughts like these:

"He chose the opposite of what I thought he would."
"I learned something new from his unexpected choice."
"Wow, these free-will creations, they're full of surprises."

If day-after-tomorrow thoughts like those cannot occur, then free will cannot exist. Existence of free will in such a case is an immediate, direct, and obvious logical contradiction.

Respectfully,
Myriad

Let's get simple again.
Here is clear, concise, and complete logic.

If it is the event of the choice that is the catalyst for the knowledge of the choice to enter the the OB's repository of all knowledge, then the knowledge of the choice does not limit the event of the choice, but rather it is the event that limits the knowledge.
This constitutes a defeating counter to the idea that if knowledge occurs first then the choice is set in stone.
So, the only way to defeat my argument is to clearly show why the choice cannot form the OB's knowledge of the choice.
This counter has not yet been successfully presented.

 

[GeeMack]

You are confused not so much about how debates are supposed to progress, you're confusion is not realizing that debates are supposed to progress.

Odd that you seem to expect a debate to progress while you haven't been able to form a rational argument. This isn't really a debate. It's you dishonestly changing the criteria from post to post, making unsupportable assertions, and being willfully ignorant of other people's explanations. It's other people patiently and articulately pointing out where and why you continue to fail. The failure to progress is yours. You own it. Every bit of it.

 

[GeeMack]

[* Whining about failing snipped. *] This counter has not yet been successfully presented.

Well yes it has, your willful ignorance of the clearly presented explanations notwithstanding.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Odd that you seem to expect a debate to progress while you haven't been able to form a rational argument. This isn't really a debate. It's you dishonestly changing the criteria from post to post, making unsupportable assertions, and being willfully ignorant of other people's explanations. It's other people patiently and articulately pointing out where and why you continue to fail. The failure to progress is yours. You own it. Every bit of it.

Well yes it has, your willful ignorance of the clearly presented explanations notwithstanding.

Good arguments. Unfortunately, since they are only good at disruption they qualify you as a troll and troll arguments are filed in the bird cage.

 

[Dave Rogers]

You're using some kind of shorthand phrases in your wording that don't make sense. Whose choice is the basis of whose knowledge? My argument is not implicitly based on any premise that (anyone's) knowledge is the basis for (anyone's) choice (at any time).

I made the same response to Bill a few pages back when he first raised the argument that the choice was the source of the knowledge. It didn't seem to register then, so I doubt it will now.

Dave