In which case maybe paloalto would have done better to stick to that argument, rather than provide a less than accurate impression of what "State of Denial" actually said.
The information I posted as evidence was just the tip of a massive ice berg of information on these threats. In the interests of brevity my reply was limited to just a small part of the information that the CIA was aware of on these al Qaeda attacks in the summer of 2001. Here is just a bit more information on this al Qaeda threat the CIA and FBI HQ were aware of and on the briefing at the White House. :
On July 10, 2001:
CIA Director George Tenet finds the briefing that counterterrorism chief Cofer Black gave him earlier in the day (see July 10, 2001) so alarming that he calls National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice from his car as he heads to the White House and says he needs to see her right away, even though he has regular weekly meetings with her. [WASHINGTON POST, 10/1/2006] Tenet and Black let a third CIA official, Richard Blee, who is responsible for Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, brief Rice on the latest intelligence. Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke are also present. [MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, 10/2/2006]
'Significant Attack' - Blee starts by saying, “There will be a significant terrorist attack in the coming weeks or months!” He argues that it is impossible to pick the specific day, saying Osama bin Laden “will attack when he believes the attack will be successful.” He mentions a range of threat information including:
A warning related to Chechen leader Ibn Khattab (see (July 9, 2001)) and seven pieces of intelligence the CIA recently received indicating there would soon be a terrorist attack (see July 9-10, 2001);
A mid-June statement by bin Laden to trainees that there would be an attack in the near future (see Mid-June 2001);
Information that talks about moving toward decisive acts;
Late-June information saying a “big event” was forthcoming;
Two separate bits of information collected “a few days before the meeting” in which people predicted a “stunning turn of events” in the weeks ahead. This may be a reference to intercepts of calls in Yemen, possibly involving the father-in-law of 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar (see June 30-July 1, 2001).
Multiple, Simultaneous Attacks in US Possible - Blee says that the attacks will be “spectacular,” they will be designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities and interests, there may be multiple, simultaneous attacks, and they may be in the US itself. Blee discounts the possibility of disinformation, as bin Laden’s threats are known to the public in the Middle East and there will be a loss of face, funds, and popularity if they are not carried out. Tenet and Black will both later recall the meeting as the starkest warning they gave the White House on al-Qaeda before 9/11 and one that could have potentially stopped the 9/11 attacks if Rice had acted on it (see July 10, 2001) and conveyed their urgency to President Bush. The meeting will not be mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney General Ashcroft receive the same CIA briefing about a likely imminent, multiple, and simultaneous al-Qaeda strike that was given to the White House on July 10, 2001 (see July 10, 2001). In 2006, the State Department will reveal the two were briefed within a week of the White House briefing, at the request of National Security Adviser Rice. One official who helped prepare the briefing later describes it as a “ten on a scale of one to ten” that “connected the dots” to present a stark warning that al-Qaeda is ready to launch a new attack. A Pentagon spokesman says he has no information “about what may or may not have been briefed” to Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld does not answer questions about it. Ashcroft says he was not given any briefing and calls it “disappointing” that he was not briefed. After it is confirmed that Ashcroft was briefed, apparently on July 17, Ashcroft will still claim not to remember the briefing, and will say he only recalls another CIA briefing earlier in the month (see July 5, 2001). Journalist Andrew Cockburn later reports that, “according to several intelligence sources,” Rumsfeld’s reaction to the briefing at the time “was one of vehement dismissal, complete with cutting observations about the CIA falling victim to ‘vast doses of al-Qaeda disinformation’ and ‘mortal doses of gullibility.’” McClatchy Newspapers will comment that these briefings raise “new questions about what the Bush administration did in response, and about why so many officials have claimed they never received or don’t remember the warning.” On July 26, 2001, it will be reported that Ashcroft has stopped flying on commercial airlines within the US.
Notice the link that I had posted earlier,
http://news.intelwire.com/2012/05/ex...ts-on-911.html. In these just released papers, found at this link, is a description that in July and August 2001 the al Qaeda terrorists were preparing their training camps to defend against air strikes by the America military. This is a sure sign that the threats the CIA and FBI HQ had been receiving were indeed real.
On June 12, 2001 according to the 9/11 Commission report, the CIA learns that the attacks that they had been warned about since April 2001 are being directed by Khalid Sheik Mohammed. And the CIA already had been given the final phase of the Bojinka plot by Philippine intelligence from a confession by Abdul Hakim Murad, a KSM associate, which described in detail a plan by KSM. In this confession, Murad says that KSM had been planning a terrorist attack that would involve the hijacking of multiple aircraft in the US and target the WTC Towers 1 and 2, the Pentagon and the Capitol building along with other buildings in the US. This plot was also on the Razmi Yousef’s computer which Philippine intelligence had sized at the time they arrested Murad. So by July 10, 2001 the CIA knew this plan would kill large numbers if not thousands of Americans and would result in the destruction of the WTC Towers and parts of the Pentagon and the Capitol building.
I don’t know what more they needed to connect the dots.
The big question is why did the CIA not alert the White House or the FBI Cole bombing criminal investigators to the presence of Nawaf al-Hazmi who was inside of the US at the time of the July 10, 2001 meeting at the White House, or to the fact that they knew that Khalid al-Mihdhar had a US visa, clearly because he intended to take part in any attack that Hazmi was also part of. Also, while on July 10, 2001 the CIA clearly knew that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing, they never gave this horrific information to the Cole bombing investigators.
Why did Tenet, Black and Blee refuse to give their own planted CIA spy at the FBI HQ, Tom Wilshire, permission twice on July 13, 2001 and on July 23, 2001 to pass the Kuala Lumpur information, that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with Walid Bin Attash actually planning the Cole bombing, to the FBI Cole bombing investigators? July 13, 2001 was just three days after delivering their horroific warning to the White House. The CIA knew without this information that any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi would be almost impossible for the FBI Cole bombing investigators to initiate. These FBI criminal investigators, without this Kuala Lumpur information, simply would never have the evidence they needed to initiate just such an investigation. And both the CIA and FBI HQ knew that without this investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, there would be no way to prevent any terrorist attack al Qaeda was planning
On August 22, 2001 the FBI HQ and the CIA were alerted to the fact that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in the massive al Qaeda attack. A even more horrific questions is why when the CIA and FBI HQ, who both knew about this attack, did they let the FBI criminal investigations of any and all al Qaeda terrorists found inside of the US to be either blocked or shut down, when they knew it would result in the murder of many Americans?
This does not make any sense at all.
The FBI HQ knew these investigations were being shut down, because it was their very own FBI HeadQuater's agents that were blocking the Moussaoui investigation (by Maltbie and Frasca) or shutting down the investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi (by Wilshire, Corsi and Middleton). The CIA knew the investigations of al Qaeda terrorists were being blocked or shut down, because Tenet admitted he knew by August 23, 2001 about the Moussaoui investigation and the issues Samit was having trying to convince FBI HQ to let him have a search warrant. And it was the CIA's own spy inside of the FBI, Tom Wilshire, former Deputy Chief of the CIA Bin Laden unit, who was secretly working for his CIA managers Blee, Black, and Tenet while ostensibly working as the Deputy Chief of the ITOS unit over both the RFU with Maltbie and Frasca and the bin Laden unit with Corsi and Middleton, who was shutting down the investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi.
To date no one has answered these very simple questions.