Free will and omniscience

[dafydd]

I don't see any question about being able to know the mind of an omniscient being, only whether it would be possible to detect its existence or perhaps to demonstrate its non-existence. Which would need to be allowed in the first instance, and as many argue, without free will in the second. The second however might be possible as suggested by Daniel Dennet (if I understand his take) in a deterministic universe were a sort of free will is allowed through evitability, whereby we can avoid certain outcomes such as by ducking a brick being thrown at us. Unless we choose to be hit in order to bring about a lawsuit. You can find youtube videos about his arguments relating to free will.

And if you don't see the brick coming?

 

[punshhh]

And if you don't see the brick coming?

A little bird might tell you.

 

[Chucky]

And if you don't see the brick coming?

That proves the individual isn't omniscient. Ouch!

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Ok, then. Give us your definition of the word, then.
Mine: Omniscience means the being in question knows everything that has, is, or will happen. In other words, an omniscient being existing at the creation of the universe knows every event that will happen until its end. "Knowing", of course, precludes the possibility that any of those events will change.
Your turn.

I looked at Wikipedia, Dictionary.com, Merriam-Webster.com, and Online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and they all have the same common definition, as I have frequently referred to.
However, you seem to want to expand that definition to include your argument against choice or free will.
Using personal, uncommon definitions to establish an argument is generally considered inappropriate. Actually, though, it's ludicrous.
That is your option, but of course then it leaves you out of the mainstream line of this thread.

If you wish to continue the argument with a universally accepted definition then you still have to show how knowing equates to an absolute barrier on choice.

Fundamentally, you have to show that it is not possible for the choice to have been the generator of the knowledge.

 

[Tony]

If you wish to continue the argument with a universally accepted definition then you still have to show how knowing equates to an absolute barrier on choice.

Already been shown, you are just hiding your head in the sand.

 

[Tony]

You're suggesting the action should be a response to the response to the action? (ETA: B causes A causes NOT-B.) That's logically circular and absurd, regardless whether or not the response to the action comes before or after the action.

It seems pretty simple that a response happening before the action means that the action can't be changed (ie. no free will) lest the original response be in error or be changed itself. Put it another way, if you know with absolute certainty that I will eat an apple in 2 hours (to you it has already happened), what will happen if I eat a banana instead? If it is logically circular and absurd, well yeah. The idea of omniscience being compatible with freewill is logically circular and absurd.

I don't know how you got that from what I wrote, maybe I'm not understanding you. I went back to your original post and realized that it is pretty vague and that I might have been thinking you were saying something you weren't. So lets begin again.

When you're dealing with the ability to know future events, things don't necessarily happen in order of causality;

Please clarify, how do you know this?

a response to an action can easily precede the action that caused it.

Easily? Again, how do come about this knowledge?

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

I think there's another element you can consider:

C means "n is certain"

If n is certain, rather than just possible, then by definition:

C -> P
C -> ~P(~n)



It seems to me inherent in omniscience that, if God knows or predicts n, then n is certainly true; in other words,

G -> C

from which it follows trivially that

G -> ~P(~n)

Additionally, from the definition of omniscience, we may say that for all possible binary choices I(A), we may define a statement n that is known by our omniscient agent to be true, such that either n = I(A) or n = ~I(A).

So, for all possible choices, we can say that

G -> P ^ ~P(~n)

Thus we can see that there can be no action A for which:

P(I(A)) ^ P(~I(A))

leading to the conclusion that omniscience contradicts free will.

Dave

It appears your logic skills may need a little work.

Your rejection of P(I(A)) ^ P(~I(A)) translates to
It is not true that
( (It is possible that I choose action A) and
(It is possible that I do not choose action A) )

This means I cannot choose to do something and also choose to not do the same thing.

You interpreted this to mean that free will is not compatible with omniscience.
This conclusion is faulty.

Of course, if I choose A then I cannot choose not A.
That's not the argument.
The argument is: did I have the free choice to choose something other than A to begin with.

Run your entire proof again but use B instead of A.

You now have:

Thus we can see that there can be no action A for which:
P(I(A)) ^ P(~I(A))
and
Thus we can see that there can be no action B for which:
P(I(B)) ^ P(~I(B))

If I choose A then I cannot choose not A and If I choose B then I cannot choose not B.
This says nothing about which I must choose to begin with.

Now, to show that omniscience contradicts free will, you have to show that I must choose A or B, somehow.
I'm thinking you can't do that.
The conclusion is that omniscience does not contradict free will.

 

[SumDood]

I looked at Wikipedia, Dictionary.com, Merriam-Webster.com, and Online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and they all have the same common definition, as I have frequently referred to.

And none of those site say anything about omniscience being atemporal.

An exception, for purposes of this discussion, is that omniscience is an atemporal way of knowing things.

Who is using a "personal, uncommon definition" again?

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Already been shown, you are just hiding your head in the sand.

All that's been shown is that if it is assumed that omniscience contradicts free will, then it can be proven that omniscience contradicts free will.
We are trying to get beyond that bit of logic to some analysis.

Such as:
If I make a choice the OB (omniscient being) knows the choice.
If I had made a different choice, then the OB has different knowledge of my choice.
The OB knows all, including the options I had and the choice I actually made.
This covers my process of making a choice and it covers the OB's property of omniscience.
There is nothing there that indicates that the OB's knowledge of my choice determined my choice for me.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

And none of those site say anything about omniscience being atemporal.

Who is using a "personal, uncommon definition" again?

So your point is that they didn't use the word "atemporal" and it would take to much effort too read the definitions to know if it means that or not and so I'm just going to claim that it doesn't mean that, right?

 

[Tony]

Such as:
If I make a choice the OB (omniscient being) knows the choice.
If I had made a different choice, then the OB has different knowledge of my choice.
The OB knows all, including the options I had and the choice I actually made.
This covers my process of making a choice and it covers the OB's property of omniscience.
There is nothing there that indicates that the OB's knowledge of my choice determined my choice for me.

But no matter what you do, you can only do what the OB knows you will do, thus, there is no free will.

 

[AvalonXQ]

The use of C for certain is just a way of conflating the two concepts which I assert are not equivalent.

I would agree that -P(-n) -> C, but I would not agree that the inverse is true.

 

[Myriad]

It appears your logic skills may need a little work.

Your rejection of P(I(A)) ^ P(~I(A)) translates to
It is not true that
( (It is possible that I choose action A) and
(It is possible that I do not choose action A) )

Correct

This means I cannot choose to do something and also choose to not do the same thing.

No. It (the negation of P(I(A)) ^ P(~I(A))) means that it is not the case that: it's possible that I choose A and also possible that I do not choose A. It says nothing about choosing both; it's about both possibilities, not both choices.

You interpreted this to mean that free will is not compatible with omniscience.
This conclusion is faulty.

Let's see.

Of course, if I choose A then I cannot choose not A.

Nope, that's not what the statement says. That might be true but it would be a different statement. This statement is limited to stating that it's possible I choose A, and it's possible I do not choose A. Look closely; "~A" never appears.

That's not the argument.
The argument is: did I have the free choice to choose something other than A to begin with.

Whose argument are you talking about? Not mine or Dave's. If you choose something other than A, then you do not choose A, given that A is defined a necessary (binary) choice. (You may challenge with a claim that no such choices exist, but that will be an uphill battle.) No B is needed for the argument.

Run your entire proof again but use B instead of A.

You now have:

Thus we can see that there can be no action A for which:
P(I(A)) ^ P(~I(A))
and
Thus we can see that there can be no action B for which:
P(I(B)) ^ P(~I(B))

If I choose A then I cannot choose not A and If I choose B then I cannot choose not B.
This says nothing about which I must choose to begin with.

You've changed the argument presented, to a different argument that shows nothing of interest. That doesn't win you anything, though.

Now, to show that omniscience contradicts free will, you have to show that I must choose A or B, somehow.
I'm thinking you can't do that.
The conclusion is that omniscience does not contradict free will.

No, to show that the premises cannot all be true, it suffices to show that they lead to a contradiction -- in this case, that P(I(A)) ^ P(~I(A)) ^ ~(P(I(A)) ^ P(~I(A)))

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Tricky]

So your point is that they didn't use the word "atemporal" and it would take to much effort too read the definitions to know if it means that or not and so I'm just going to claim that it doesn't mean that, right?

You have frequently relied on atemporality to get around the problem of effect preceding cause. So the definition you are using includes atemporality. I don't mind you constructing a definition of your own that includes atemporality, but don't fall back on reference book definitions if they are not the same definitions that you are using.

So I'm asking you and AvalonXQ again if atemporality is one of the premises you posit for your conclusion that both omniscience and free will are possible. It is not a difficult question.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

But no matter what you do, you can only do what the OB knows you will do, thus, there is no free will.

Is your argument that you assume your point is true and therefore it is true or is your argument just to gainsay my conclusion?

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

You have frequently relied on atemporality to get around the problem of effect preceding cause. So the definition you are using includes atemporality. I don't mind you constructing a definition of your own that includes atemporality, but don't fall back on reference book definitions if they are not the same definitions that you are using.

So I'm asking you and AvalonXQ again if atemporality is one of the premises you posit for your conclusion that omniscience is possible. It is not a difficult question.

Omniscience is defined as knowing everything. So, if the OB exists at any time, say even today, it knows everything, not just things from the past or future, but from all time. Therefore, the knowledge that the OB has is not constrained by time, and therefore, the knowledge is accurately described as atemporal.

Nobody is positing that omniscience is possible.

 

[Tricky]

Omniscience is defined as knowing everything. So, if the OB exists at any time, say even today, it knows everything, not just things from the past or future, but from all time. Therefore, the knowledge that the OB has is not constrained by time, and therefore, the knowledge is accurately described as atemporal.

Nobody is positing that omniscience is possible.

Boy, you are just as slippery as a catfish in butter.

Okay then, do you agree that IF omniscience and free will can both exist that it WOULD require atemporality?

 

[tsig]

I looked at Wikipedia, Dictionary.com, Merriam-Webster.com, and Online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and they all have the same common definition, as I have frequently referred to.
However, you seem to want to expand that definition to include your argument against choice or free will.
Using personal, uncommon definitions to establish an argument is generally considered inappropriate. Actually, though, it's ludicrous.
That is your option, but of course then it leaves you out of the mainstream line of this thread.

If you wish to continue the argument with a universally accepted definition then you still have to show how knowing equates to an absolute barrier on choice.

Fundamentally, you have to show that it is not possible for the choice to have been the generator of the knowledge.

om·ni·scient
adj \-shənt\
Definition of OMNISCIENT
1
: having infinite awareness, understanding, and insight
2
: possessed of universal or complete knowledge



We all know what the choice is after it's been made. Omniscience means you know every choice that has been made or will be made.

 

[dafydd]

"Monsieur, (a + b^n)/n =x, therefore God exists. Any answer to that!"

 

[Tony]

Is your argument that you assume your point is true and therefore it is true or is your argument just to gainsay my conclusion?

No