Nice try, but you fail, here is the time line of the interaction between the FBI, FBI HQ and the CIA.
August 28, 2001
FBI IOS HQ Agent Dina Corsi and her supervisor Rod Middleton, tell FBI Cole bombing investigators, FBI Agent Steve Bongardt and his team, on August 28, 2001 that in spite of the fact that they already had her EC to start an intelligence investigation, he is not allowed to start any investigation for Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi because her EC has a NSA cable as part of it that was prohibited from being be given to FBI criminal investigators. But Corsi had already gotten approval from the NSA to pass the NSA information on Mihdhar and Hazmi to the FBI criminal investigators just the day before on August 27, 2001. So Corsi knew this reason why Bongardt could not start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi was an out and out lie and that she had no legal right to block his investigation for these two al Qaeda terrorists.
Bongardt requested that Corsi consult the NSLU, the FBI in house lawyers, to determine if her refusal to allow him to start an investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi was correct in view of the fact that he knew that the NSA information had no connection to any FISA warrant and knew that these terrorists were inside of the US in order to take part in some horrific al Qaeda attack.
On August 29, 2001,
FBI Agent Dina Corsi, with her supervisor Rod Middleton, tells FBI Cole bombing investigators, FBI Agent Steve Bongardt and his team that the attorney they had contacted Sherry Sabol, and ruled that Bongardt could not start or take part in any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. But we learn from 9/11 Commission report, page 538, that Sherry Sabol actually told Corsi and Middleton, according to the testimony Sabol gave to DOJ IG investigators on November 7, 2002, that since the NSA information had no connection to any FISA warrant Bongardt could take part in any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. This lie will finally shut down FBI Agent Steve Bongardt’s investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, ensuring that the al Qaeda terrorists will be free to carry out the attacks on 9/11. Corsi also sends Bongardt an email that says “if at such time that information is developed of a substantial Federal crime ( by Mihdhar and Hazmi) this information will be passed over the wall”.
But FBI IOS HQ Agent Dina Corsi already knew on August 22, 2001, according to the DOJ IG report, page 301, that the CIA had a photo of Walid Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur. She knew this directly connected Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who she knew were also at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting, to the planning of the Cole bombing. So she already knew that she had no legal right to block Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi. By hiding this information from FBI Agent Steve Bongardt, he will have no way to counter her illegal and nefarious obstruction of his investigation, even though he knows that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US to carry out some horrific terrorist attack. He tells Corsi, "why do you think they are here, do you think they are going to F****** Disneyland"
August 30, 2001
Middleton gets the photo of Walid Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur from the CIA. This is the photographic proof that had been hidden by the CIA from the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing since January 4, 2001, that directly connects both Mihdhar and Hazmi to the crime of planning the Cole bombing. In spite of getting this photo, and the fact he had been working directly with Corsi to shut down Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, he never calls Bongardt and gives him permission to start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. Middleton continues his nefarious effort to block this investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi by Bongardt and his team of criminal investigators.
Incredibly Tom Wilshire who had been supervising both Corsi and Middleton, had been told along with Corsi on August 22, 2001 that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US. He had written his CTC managers, Blee, Black and Tenet on July 23, 2001, indicating that Mihdhar would be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda attack. In this email he had requested permission to turn the Kuala Lumpur information over to the FBI Cole bombing investigators, but was denied, in this his second request, by Richard Blee, Cofer Black and George Tenet. This is clear evidence that in spite of the fact that Wilshire was ostensibly working for the FBI, he was still secretly under the control of the CIA and his former CIA managers.
So on August 22, 2001 Wilshire not only knows these al Qaeda terrorists are inside of the US but also knows that they were here in order to take part in the huge al Qaeda attack the CIA and FBI HQ had been warned about since April 2001. In spite of this knowledge it is now clear that former CIA Deputy Chief of the CIA Bin Laden unit, Wilshire had directed Corsi and Middleton, to keep the investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi away from Bongardt and his team, and knew when they were criminally obstructing Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi that this will insure that the huge al Qaeda attack that the CIA and FBI HQ was aware of will not be stopped.
The information that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US on August 22, 2001 also went back to the CIA Bin Laden unit, first to Blee, then Black and finally George Tenet. So by August 23, 2001 these three CIA managers not only knew Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in a horrific al Qaeda attack, but by this date also know that Moussaoui thought to be connected to al Qaeda, had been arrested by the FBI while trying to take flying lesions on a B747 simulator, with absolutely no prior flight experience at all. They also know that someone at FBI HQ had been blocking any progress in the investigation of Moussaoui.
All of this information comes directly out of the DOJ IG report and was confirmed by the documents entered into the Moussaoui trial. This is not evidence of incompetence, unless you simply ignore this evidence altogether that is now in the public domain, but clearly is evidence of malice.
