Explain consciousness to the layman.

[dlorde]

I am reading a book that was recommended by Dan Dennet called, "I am a strange loop"
...
Has anyone else read this book?

Yes, I've read it.

 

[dlorde]

... What happens to the legs when the processor is executing the arm code?

Sorry, I missed this bit. Isn't this handled by the parallelism you mentioned earlier? Have you not seen Asimo, Big Dog, and all the other embodied robots with multiple appendages in action?

 

[westprog]

Sorry, I missed this bit. Isn't this handled by the parallelism you mentioned earlier? Have you not seen Asimo, Big Dog, and all the other embodied robots with multiple appendages in action?

Even with massive parallelisation, (if that's a word - spell check doesn't think so) the vast majority of memory isn't being active most of the time.

I'm hesitant to compare with the human brain - we know that the human brain produces consciousness, after all - but when we look at mappings of brain activity, we can see that there is activity all over the brain. If we look at what a computer is doing, even a multi-core multi-processor system - then it's dealing with a handful of bytes at a time, sequentially, and what it isn't dealing with it is totally isolated from.

 

[dlorde]

Even with massive parallelisation, (if that's a word - spell check doesn't think so) the vast majority of memory isn't being active most of the time.

It isn't necessary to use much memory to achieve that goal...

... when we look at mappings of brain activity, we can see that there is activity all over the brain. If we look at what a computer is doing, even a multi-core multi-processor system - then it's dealing with a handful of bytes at a time, sequentially, and what it isn't dealing with it is totally isolated from.

I don't see the problem - it seems like a matter of implementation choice; how is it different from the appearance of a multi-processor system handling multiple concurrent processes compared with a single-processor system handling multiple virtual concurrent processes? Exactly the same instructions and data can be processed (on identical hardware if necessary). All it seems to imply is that the brain is doing different things in different ways from the computer systems you looked at - and we already know that; those systems weren't attempting to emulate the brain.

 

[annnnoid]

A system that is the result of at least a hundred million years of development and refinement by trial and error has, in a few tens of years, developed remarkable machines - that already outperform many of its capabilities.

We are only just starting to tackle machine intelligence and we already have IBM's Watson - which can answer questions better than the world champions - questions thought to be the sole province of the highest intelligence and consciousness, without having either - it wasn't designed to have either. Nobody really thought it would beat world champions after only a few years development, and it couldn't have been made ten (maybe even five) years earlier because the technology just wasn't available. Machines like it are going to change our lives. It seems to me that if the same effort is put into developing some form of recognisable consciousness, the technology will soon become available, and it will happen. Whether a serious effort will be made, who knows.

People can make mocking reference to science-fiction, but I've lived it; given the choice between a Startrek communicator and my smartphone, I know which one I'd choose. Most of the everyday technology we have now was science-fiction (or not even dreamt of) when I was at school.

This is the most common position I’ve heard echoed by computationalists. How spectacular are the achievements and progress we’ve made. What wondrous machines and contraptions we’ve managed to produce…all the result of this ‘thing’ that…somehow…managed to evolve over ‘x’ hundred million years. What it is and how it’s created seem to be incidental (who cares…we’ve got Watson and his progeny on the horizon!)…and I don’t think I’ve ever heard a computationist tackle those obvious questions I presented earlier. Since you are, in fact, ‘consciousness’…why don’t you know what it is? Does this mean that you do not, in fact, know who you are?

You speak of all this progress and technology and achievement…but it is a documented fact that very often when people have the opportunity to leave it all behind and just be people – with each other – they find that life becomes actually meaningful…again. ‘Real’ is, I think, the operative word. That would be one of the distinguishing features of this thing we call consciousness….the ability to adjudicate the authenticity of its own condition, when so enabled. I’m not a luddite and wouldn’t ever suggest a return to the dark ages…but there are things that matter and there is always a cost to ignoring them (as is apparent).

 

[Frank Newgent]

Not necessarily so if we are in a simulation.

Nope, necessarily.

It would just imply that things such as "particles" and "cause" have a slightly different meaning than we tend to think.

You know that thing we call an electron? That is always gonna be an electron, regardless of whether we are in a simulation or not.

Unless it were a fart machine... George Carlin could be at the keyboard. The sim runner might be insane/motivated by things unfathomable. You'd be unable to trust your own mind if that were the case.

Wish I didn't have to bring up such unlikely possibilities but I am not the one arguing we are unable to determine whether we are in a simulation or an actual external world.

My point of view is that the very question of whether we are in a simulation or the external world necessarily acknowledges the external world.

If the brain in a vat can ask if it's a brain in a vat, then it's not a brain in a vat.

 

[Mr. Scott]

Because they are not alive.

When we make living machines they may become conscious and have feelings.

How do you know this?

If you look closely enough at "life" you see machines. Very complicated machines. There isn't a trace of anything extra that could be responsible for consciousness.

So, what is in life machines that makes consciousness possible, that's missing in machines we make?

 

[rocketdodger]

You overlooked the word ‘relative’…which is the relevant part. We’re dealing with something that has been described…not unreasonably…as the most complex object in the known universe.

Ok if you are comparing the models to actual consciousness then yes, they are relatively simple. Extremely relatively simple.

So I guess I’ll just conclude you flatly disagree with the conclusions presented in that quote. Where the cog sci community says we don’t know what consciousness is or how it is created….you say that either doesn’t matter or we do. Ok then.

But you are making up communication that never took place -- don't do that.

For people to say "we don't know what consciousness is or how it is created" doesn't mean "it could be anything at all, and even magical beans could create it." It means within the framework of what we already know about the universe.

I am willing to bet most of these "cognitive scientists" will agree that yes, we are made of particles and yes, we come from a sperm and an egg, so any explanation of consciousness that falls outside those well established constraints is probably wrong.

 

[rocketdodger]

Unless it were a fart machine... George Carlin could be at the keyboard. The sim runner might be insane/motivated by things unfathomable. You'd be unable to trust your own mind if that were the case.

Wish I didn't have to bring up such unlikely possibilities but I am not the one arguing we are unable to determine whether we are in a simulation or an actual external world.

My point of view is that the very question of whether we are in a simulation or the external world necessarily acknowledges the external world.

If the brain in a vat can ask if it's a brain in a vat, then it's not a brain in a vat.

No, this is a fallacy, a decades old one at that -- this is taken from the wikipedia page on Roger Penrose:

The Penrose/Lucas argument about the implications of Gödel's incompleteness theorem for computational theories of human intelligence has been widely criticized by mathematicians, computer scientists and philosophers, and the consensus among experts in these fields seems to be that the argument fails, though different authors may choose different aspects of the argument to attack.

The Penrose/Lucas argument is exactly what you are proposing, except instead of knowledge about external reality it is knowledge about the mathematical truth of incompleteness.

It is a fallacy, and the flaw is that you assume the knowledge "is this a simulation or external reality" references the possible actual external reality -- it does not. Such knowledge merely references our idea of what the actual external reality may be.

 

[rocketdodger]

You speak of all this progress and technology and achievement…but it is a documented fact that very often when people have the opportunity to leave it all behind and just be people – with each other – they find that life becomes actually meaningful…again. ‘Real’ is, I think, the operative word. That would be one of the distinguishing features of this thing we call consciousness….the ability to adjudicate the authenticity of its own condition, when so enabled. I’m not a luddite and wouldn’t ever suggest a return to the dark ages…but there are things that matter and there is always a cost to ignoring them (as is apparent).

My personal interest in this subject is the implications in the area of life extension. There are two outcomes I would like to see before I die, either of them would be fantastic.

1) Genuine strong AI is created that can help human researchers solve the problems of medicine, not just to heal people but also to let them live much longer.

2) A real understanding of neural network based consciousness is gained, to the point where we can "upload" and continue experiencing existence without our biological bodies ( which unfortunately wither away and die after a number of years ).

So I hope you see that meaningful relationships with other humans is my goal as well. To be precise, allowing people to maintain those meaningful relationships for longer than nature currently lets us.

 

[westprog]

How do you know this?

If you look closely enough at "life" you see machines. Very complicated machines. There isn't a trace of anything extra that could be responsible for consciousness.

So, what is in life machines that makes consciousness possible, that's missing in machines we make?

The self-sustaining processes of life, for a start. We don't have machines that can replicate themselves, that can power themselves indefinitely, that are self-repairing: when we have machines that can do all these things then we can start to consider whether there's anything "special" about life.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Unless it were a fart machine... George Carlin could be at the keyboard. The sim runner might be insane/motivated by things unfathomable. You'd be unable to trust your own mind if that were the case.

Wish I didn't have to bring up such unlikely possibilities but I am not the one arguing we are unable to determine whether we are in a simulation or an actual external world.

My point of view is that the very question of whether we are in a simulation or the external world necessarily acknowledges the external world.

If the brain in a vat can ask if it's a brain in a vat, then it's not a brain in a vat.

No, this is a fallacy, a decades old one at that -- this is taken from the wikipedia page on Roger Penrose:

The Penrose/Lucas argument about the implications of Gödel's incompleteness theorem for computational theories of human intelligence has been widely criticized by mathematicians, computer scientists and philosophers, and the consensus among experts in these fields seems to be that the argument fails, though different authors may choose different aspects of the argument to attack.

Soory, don't know what that has to do with what I posted.

But by disagreeing with me are you saying you believe "a brain in a vat" questioning whether it's a brain in a vat might still be only a brain in a vat?

If so... from where does such knowledge of an external reality (outside the vat) originate?

That it might somehow might possibly be so because that possibility exists within the realm of all that is potentially capable of happening if you are a really advanced brain in a vat?

Parsimony is more elegant, no? I dare say we are not brains in a vat!

The Penrose/Lucas argument is exactly what you are proposing, except instead of knowledge about external reality it is knowledge about the mathematical truth of incompleteness.

It is a fallacy, and the flaw is that you assume the knowledge "is this a simulation or external reality" references the possible actual external reality -- it does not. Such knowledge merely references our idea of what the actual external reality may be.

Soory... again, I don't see how that follows from what I posted though you seem to be confirming that that you believe one is unable to distinguish an external reality from a simulation.

 

[!Kaggen]

My personal interest in this subject is the implications in the area of life extension. There are two outcomes I would like to see before I die, either of them would be fantastic.

1) Genuine strong AI is created that can help human researchers solve the problems of medicine, not just to heal people but also to let them live much longer.

2) A real understanding of neural network based consciousness is gained, to the point where we can "upload" and continue experiencing existence without our biological bodies ( which unfortunately wither away and die after a number of years ).

So I hope you see that meaningful relationships with other humans is my goal as well. To be precise, allowing people to maintain those meaningful relationships for longer than nature currently lets us.

Meaningful relationships with other humans has nothing to do with the time spent with them. Wanting to live forever is purely a selfish pursuit.

 

[!Kaggen]

Soory, don't know what that has to do with what I posted.

But by disagreeing with me are you saying you believe "a brain in a vat" questioning whether it's a brain in a vat might still be only a brain in a vat?

If so... from where does such knowledge of an external reality (outside the vat) originate?

That it might somehow might possibly be so because that possibility exists within the realm of all that is potentially capable of happening if you are a really advanced brain in a vat?

Parsimony is more elegant, no? I dare say we are not brains in a vat!




Soory... again, I don't see how that follows from what I posted though you seem to be confirming that that you believe one is unable to distinguish an external reality from a simulation.

Unless your a vat in a brain ;-)

 

[punshhh]

rocketdodger is the one who's always claimed IT IS IMPOSSIBLE to know whether we are experiencing an actual reality or are in a simulation. Ask him.

When I argued that it is possible to deduce whether we are experiencing an actual world here and now as opposed to be experiencing a simulation I was told... ah, you read it.

I don't engage Laca, I get walls of abusive text.

In order for the real world to be indistinguishable from a simulation, surely it would require that the whole universe is the simulation including the dynamics of spacetime and the big bang. Thus the hardware running the sim would be external to the universe and we have a dualism.

Perhaps folk watch the matrix and think how easy it would be for reality to be like that. It would require some mother f***r of a piece of hardware to run that I tell you.

 

[punshhh]

Nope, necessarily.

It would just imply that things such as "particles" and "cause" have a slightly different meaning than we tend to think.

You know that thing we call an electron? That is always gonna be an electron, regardless of whether we are in a simulation or not.

You realise that the electron in the sim would not be the same as the electron in the piece of hardware outside the universe running the sim, don't you. The former is only a simulation of the later and the later may not even be an electron. It might be something else beyond our comprehension.

I just had a vision ( or is it a nightmare) of an infinite regression of simulated universes all simulations of simulations of simulations ad infinitum...

 

[Belz...]

A causal relationship between the state of a physical system and it's predecessor is inherent in all such systems. That's not some special trick of computers, it's common to everything in the universe.

As I said, you don't know how computers work. Either that, or you refuse to admit that there's a difference between computers and other systems.

we have no more reason to suppose that computers are conscious than any other inanimate object.

That sounds remarkably circular. The use of the word "inanimate", meaning non-alive, used to mean "non-conscious" ?

 

[Belz...]

The desperate need for nothing about human beings to be "special" doesn't mean that it's possible to claim the ability to program thoughts, memories, feelings and sensations, when nobody knows how to do that.

Thanks for proving my point:

Seems to me like we're assuming that thoughts, memories, feelings and sensations are somehow "special".

Here's a simple test - if you can change the order of instructions without changing the outcome of a program, then you can legitimately assume that there is no causal relationship between said instructions.

Who here said that there is no causal relationship between instructions ?

 

[Belz...]

.....???????????....hmmmm.....

Maybe you just need a vacation. I know this great place in southern Georgia. Don't know if I'll get there myself but I'm thinkin we can all use a change of perspective now and then.

What was the point of that post, and how does it relate to mine ?

 

[Belz...]

Now that's an example of arguing from ignorance.

It's a question, actually. Coming from someone who claims that other people use the term wrong, it's damn funny.