I can respect the fact that people can reasonably disagree on the matter.
It did, but as stated, the effects were more indirect.
When Hamburg was largely burned to the ground in July of 1943 it had a tremendous psychological impact. Albert Speer stated that another half-dozen German cities wrecked in the same way in short order would "bring Germany's armaments production to a total halt." Erhard Milch stated that "If we get just five or six more attacks like those on Hamburg, the German people will just lay down their tools, however great their willpower..." But the RAF couldn't replicate what it had done at Hamburg, so Germany recovered. As it was some four months' of war production was lost in the city. That's not inconsequential. (Whether that was worth the cost in lives is another calculation entirely.)
More generally, the European bombing campaign produced the following effects. Quoting from The Crucible of War 1939-1945 by Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnson, and William G.P. Rawling:
There are some noteworthy indirect effects in the above. Were those effects worth the cost in human lives? That's the harder question to answer. I personally would answer yes, because war is hell and whatever one can do to shorten the hell likely means fewer deaths overall.
The idea was sound—ball bearing production was one of the key choke points in war production. The problem was that at the time the USAAF attempted to knock it out it did so with an insufficiently strong bomber force (it wasn't really grasped just how many bombers were needed to truly knock out a target) and without long-range fighter escort. So that the results were ultimately disappointing should not be surprising.
The Allies were also misled in their bomb damage assessments. They get the post-strike photos of a target, see all kinds of wrecked buildings, would conclude the target had been destroyed, cross it off the list, and move to the next target. Only it was often the case that the damage on the ground was not nearly as severe as it looked from the air. So a wrecked facility wasn't really wrecked and production would be resumed in relatively short order.
The Allies also left some potentially decisive targets off the list. There was no campaign against the German electrical supply, for example, even though a sustained effort against it could have produced results as decisive as those obtained in the attacks against oil and transportation.