Explain consciousness to the layman.

[dlorde]

As has been pointed out, the Turing test isn't even supposed to be a test of consciousness. However, as a test for anything, it's absurdly subjective. What if Dr Jones does the test one day, and finds the machine is conscious - and the next day Professor Smith does it, and finds that it isn't. Is the machine conscious one day, and not the next, purely based on the impression some scientist gets from it?

Science is about objective, repeatable tests. It's not about faith-based acceptance.

I agree that the Turing Test isn't scientific, it's not intended to be; and it's not clear that it makes any deliberate distinction between 'intelligence' and 'consciousness', or that it's intended to establish whether machines can 'think'; Turing himself didn't think that was a worthwhile question. But it seems self-evident that if the tester cannot distinguish the respondent from a human respondent, then it must be giving the appearance of consciousness.

To claim that the Turing Test is invalid because it could be passed by a mimic is to miss the whole point of it - which is to question what it means to pass the test.

 

[dlorde]

I would say that if something can have subjective experiences, then it's conscious, in some sense.

What is your definition of a 'subjective experience'?

I assume that 'subjective' simply means that it is part of the internal activities of the entity in question (is this a redundant qualifier? is it coherent to speak of 'objective experience'?).

 

[westprog]

What is your definition of a 'subjective experience'?

I assume that 'subjective' simply means that it is part of the internal activities of the entity in question (is this a redundant qualifier? is it coherent to speak of 'objective experience'?).

It probably is redundant - but I wanted to distinguish between having an experience and being affected by the environment.

 

[punshhh]

Philosophers probably have speculated on the nature of God.

Of course and the role and origin of the concept of God in human consciousness.

You ask "why not?"; one very good reason comes to mind - it makes little sense to speculate on the nature of something you have no reason to suppose exists at all. Even less to speculate that this unproven entity might be the manufactured product of yet other unproven entities... Ockham's Razor and all that.

Well if one is going to have a broad philosophical perspective on existence, sooner or later the possibility of a creator is included in the speculation. In fact there are not many alternative explanations to consider.

We will shortly have evidence of highly intelligent AI emerging naturally in nature. One could consider that once you have a situation in which DNA can emerge, AI is a natural progression from there. On occasion AI may evolve to the extent that it can secure its own survival and development for the long term. From here it is only a matter of time before they begin to manipulate matter and perhaps gravity and time.

 

[punshhh]

Conscious by whose definition?

Well I would expect to see something approximating a living mind, with a sense of being and experience in the physical world and a subjective interpretation.

If these attributes are present, I would regard it a candidate for consciousness. But establishing if it is conscious in a similar way to that experienced by a living conscious entity may not be possible.

Looked in the mirror today?

Yes and I had a sense of truly existing as a unique being.

 

[westprog]

I'm not sure that's the case; more precisely, it depends on the definition. I don't see that a direct comparison with human intelligence is necessarily implied, intended, or appropriate.

What other word is more appropriate for the nature of what is being described and labelled?

It might be helpful to consider animal consciousness. Most of us would agree that other animals have various degrees of consciousness. Would you be happy to say there is no qualitative difference between human consciousness and that of the most minimally conscious animal you can think of? Are levels of consciousness purely quantitative?

It seems to me that there are probably many different qualitatively different forms of consciousness, that share certain common features (e.g. self-awareness).

That's not my understanding of the majority of computationalist claims (of which there is a variety). The basic claim is that consciousness is a computational process, therefore it is theoretically possible to produce an artificial consciousness by computational methods. Some would extend this to producing a human-like consciousness by computational modeling inspired by a detailed knowledge of the functioning of the human brain.

However, the full gamut of human experience involves the physical and mental development and interaction of a human body and brain over many years in a variety of environmental contexts; I don't recall any computationalists claiming that all this could be be 'completely fulfilled by the appropriate computer simulation', except in the most speculative discussion. In my experience, most discussions in this area focus around the probable differences in human and artificial conscious experience, as is the case in most science fiction treatments (Asimov's robots, HAL in 2001, Blade Runner, Marvin the paranoid android, Kryten in Red Dwarf, et al).

I'm dealing with the computational case as presented here. It's been made quite explicit by its proponents that - in principle - that equivalent computations will produce identical experiences of consciousness, and that sensory experience can be entirely duplicated in the simulation - and hence, the interaction of body and brain - something that I've constantly represented as being of the utmost importance - is in fact, not essential. For example, it's been clearly stated that it would be possible to run a simulation at any speed, with interaction with the environment being entirely simulated - and that any conscious experience would be entirely identical. It's been claimed that this is provably true. It's been claimed that people who don't believe in this necessarily believe in magic. So while I agree that in general, the computational case is more nuanced, that isn't the case here.

 

[dlorde]

Well I would expect to see something approximating a living mind

What does that mean? what would qualify as such (recursive definition not acceptable)?

with a sense of being and experience in the physical world and a subjective interpretation.

Do you mean self-aware?

 

[dlorde]

I'm dealing with the computational case as presented here. It's been made quite explicit by its proponents that - in principle - that equivalent computations will produce identical experiences of consciousness, and that sensory experience can be entirely duplicated in the simulation - and hence, the interaction of body and brain - something that I've constantly represented as being of the utmost importance - is in fact, not essential. For example, it's been clearly stated that it would be possible to run a simulation at any speed, with interaction with the environment being entirely simulated - and that any conscious experience would be entirely identical. It's been claimed that this is provably true. It's been claimed that people who don't believe in this necessarily believe in magic. So while I agree that in general, the computational case is more nuanced, that isn't the case here.

OK; I don't have a problem with the idea that - in principle - duplication of a particular brain state and its full environmental context in a conscious simulation would result in identical conscious experience. If that's what you meant by 'there is nothing in the human experience that wouldn't be completely fulfilled by the appropriate computer simulation', then consider me a provisional subscriber to that idea (pending a convincing argument to the contrary).

I notice you didn't respond to the first part of my post...

 

[Leumas]

Show me a conscious computer and I might believe.

What...you must not be a science FICTION fan.... how about Hal, and Data and Tron and I-Robot and scads of others….you really have pay more attention and GET WITH IT man.

 

[Leumas]

Real Virtuality

Blessed are those who don't see conscious computers and yet believe.

The problem is not that they do NOT see and believe.... the problem is that they have seen too much science FICTION and it has become so common place that they no longer can distinguish reality from the movies and fiction.

Unlike with the gods stuff (or probably just like it) they have been OVER SATURATED with the ideas of FICTIVE conscious computers and thus it MUST be true and anyone who denies it is a heretic to the new religion of science fiction and therefore must be a believer in magic and soles.

If you have grown up with Transformers and Star Trek and Terminator and Ben 10 you start wishing upon a friend who is like Data and the World Of Warcraft may seem like the ghost in the machine.

It is hard to keep focused on reality in a world where Virtual Reality has become more common and earns tons more money than any mundane reality. Either you are playing too much video games or you are making them or you are watching too many movies and TV “reality shows” or you are making them, whichever it is you are way too immersed in the world of make belief and it is understandable that your reality may become a haziness of Virtuality.

Make belief these days (and perhaps always) has become REAL VIRTUALITY and it is a lot more entertaining and profitable than boring mundane reality where you cannot wish upon a star computerized imaginary friend.

 

[yy2bggggs]

The problem is not that they do not see and believe.... the problem is that they have seen too much science fiction and it has become so common place that they no longer can distinguish reality from the movies and fiction.

How exactly are you coming to this conclusion? What is your epistemic approach?

 

[westprog]

No, hearts have more than one potential pattern of impulses -- normal beat, tachycardia, fibrillation... these are all workable solutions to the problem of how to get from A to B.

The heart is a switch, and switching to the wrong setting will kill you.

Now, if a calculation is the application of a rule to an input in order to produce an output, then of course the oceans are literally seas of chemical calculations running according to the rules of physics.

It's quite possible to perform certain calculations using chemical reactions. This is because chemistry can objectively be considered just as computational as electronics or neurology.

 

[westprog]

Are you going to explain the point of that question, or do you just enjoy being mysterious?

It's actually a useful point. A story is something imaginary. It's a simulation - every bit as valid a simulation as a computer running a program. As such, the story exists inside the mind of the person reading the story, just as the tornado exists in the mind of the person using the computer simulation. We recognise that the book with the story in is a physical object, with real physical properties. We also realise that a story about a tornado doesn't share any important physical similarities with a real tornado - and any such similarites aren't the important thing about the story. A computer simulation of a tornado which prints out lists of numbers is far more likely to be useful and accurate than one which switches on a fan.

Naturally, a story within a story is just another imaginary object. It's no more or less real than an ordinary story. DC comics in the 1960's were fond of writing "imaginary stories" where, say, Superman might marry Lois Lane. Alan Moore wrote about imaginary stories "Aren't they all?". And so they are - stories, simulations, computer games. They exist in imagination.

 

[westprog]

Only in the sense that "real tornado" idiomatically refers to a particular weather pattern. It is not true that "simulated tornado" is not a real thing, and is also not true that "simulated tornado" does not have particular kinds of effects.

A book about tornadoes or a picture of a tornado or a film or a computer game are all real things. They aren't, however, real tornadoes - they are imaginary tornadoes.

 

[westprog]

I just accidentally replied to a post from around page #40. It says a lot about the thread that I didn't even notice. I could probably just reply to the same few posts over and over and nobody would notice the difference.

 

[westprog]

How exactly are you coming to this conclusion? What is your epistemic approach?

We've had people citing their experience with computer games as giving particular insight into this area.

 

[westprog]

What if we made a simple machine that was programmed to build replicas of itself and sent it off into space, could its descendants eventually evolve intelligence and consciousness, given millions or billions of years?

Since conscious life evolved from inanimate, non-conscious materials, then clearly that would be possible. Or at least possibly possible, and possibly impossible, depending on what the requirements of consciousness are and whether they could be present in an evolved machine.

 

[westprog]

I notice you didn't respond to the first part of my post...

Have just been travelling several thousand miles over the last few days, so replies have been hit and miss.

 

[westprog]

It might be helpful to consider animal consciousness. Most of us would agree that other animals have various degrees of consciousness. Would you be happy to say there is no qualitative difference between human consciousness and that of the most minimally conscious animal you can think of? Are levels of consciousness purely quantitative?

I'm certainly in favour of a view that we don't understand what consciousness is - that we might be referring to multiple different things - and that consciousness might be present to a greater or lesser degree. Ultimately, it's certainty with which I disagree.

 

[westprog]

How the heck does that work out? So I have my robot human body simulacrum and let's say that the computer brain part is too big to fit in the skull cavity so all I have there is a wireless receiver/sender of information from the computer and that wireless conduit passes on data to the actual artificial muscles and gets feed back from the sensors in real time, so it can catch balls and so on.

Are you saying that you can imagine a set up whereby the computer running that thing might be conscious but if you just had the computer running by itself it would cease to be conscious?

I consider it at least possible that the capacity to interact with the world in real time is an essential element of consciousness. This is not the computational view, at least as expressed here. The essence of a computation is that it does not interact with the real world, and its outcome is entirely time-independent.