Explain consciousness to the layman.

[Piggy]

This is not true if A and B are the same thing. And that's all that's needed for the comp.lits to be safe.

Not given what they're really saying.

PixyMisa, for example, tries to use this dodge by saying that the simulator and the "world of the simulation" are "one and the same".

But then look what he does....

When asked what the simulator is, he describes the machine.

When asked what the simulation is, he describes the target system. And claims it's objectively real in a way that's independent of the actual target system and any human imagination.

It's like saying that when Olivier plays Hamlet, Olivier and Hamlet are "one and the same", but that as Olivier is playing Hamlet, Hamlet becomes somehow "real" in some place other than the imagination of the viewers.

Can't have it both ways.

When Olivier plays Hamlet, Olivier is real, Hamlet exists in the imaginations of the audience (provided they understand what a play is, speak English, and so forth).

Or to put it another way, if I carve a statue of Napoleon, the only real thing I'm making is an oddly shaped hunk of marble. I do not simultaneously create a "real" Napoleon -- there is only a Napoleon in the imagination of a viewer.

To say that the behavior of Olivier produces the behavior of Olivier and the behavior of a Hamlet which exists anywhere outside the audience's imaginations is nonsensical.

It gets even worse when you then conclude that the simulator machine itself can be swapped for the thing it's supposed (by someone) to be simulating.

This requires that the symbolic value of what the machine is doing must be understood by the physical system you're putting it into.

It's like saying you can take the marble machine and use its symbolic function to replace a part that can emit more than a half dozen marbles at a time.

 

[Piggy]

Bootstrapping problem here.

There's no bootstrapping issue. You're just reacting.

Oh, well, that clears that up, then.

Exactly how I said they can.

You never said how.

Why not? And why does it have to stand for anything? It's just a symbol.

So.... you believe that there can exists symbols which are not in any way symbolic of anything.

You're starting to sound unhinged.

 

[Piggy]

Logical computations are physical computations. It's impossible to perform a logical computation without a physical substrate; it's also impossible to perform a logical computation without specifically using properties of a physical substrate.

These are not two different kinds of things.

Sure they are.

Physical computations happen in the real world, no matter what we think about them.

But if I want to use a physical computation symbolically, then in my mind I have to associate the physical computations with logical ones which I imagine.

Yes, logical computations require physical ones, but they also require someone to decide what those physical computations are supposed to represent.

I can use an abacus, for instance, which allows me to imagine that the beads "mean" something. The beads have to be real and have to actually move (physical computations) but the logical computations which overlay those physical computations (say, adding a list of numbers) exist only in my imagination.

This is so fundamental and so obvious, it's absolutely jaw-dropping that anyone could manage to talk themselves into the notion that the imaginary logical computation (which does not objectively exist but is simply a value I decide to place on the physical event) is actually real because the physical computation is.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Oh, well, that clears that up, then.

Well, to be clear, when I said "data" and I did involve consciousness, you objected to it because, how can there be data if there's no consciousness? As I said. You're just reacting. You're on the edge, ready to jump whenever these trigger words are mentioned.

You never said how.

Sure I did. I'll go over it again in a bit more detail.

A symbol is a particular configuration of matter which is identifiable by a certain transformation, and can also be distinguished from different configurations of matter--which are themselves identifiable. The phrases "identifiable" and "distinguished" refer to processes that react in similar ways and distinct ways, respectively, to those configurations. The configurations need not be exact entities--so long as they are stable states within a particular system.

So.... you believe that there can exists symbols which are not in any way symbolic of anything.

Absolutely. Even when you drag my big honking conscious mind into the equation, and I write programs intentionally accomplishing a particular thing, I can point you to symbols that do not represent anything.

You're starting to sound unhinged.

You're reacting.

 

[Piggy]

Symbolic manipulation is a real event. The comp.lit's your attacking are saying that the very act of manipulating those symbols is what produces consciousness. Nobody but you is claiming that consciousness adds more work to the system than is needed to manipulate the symbols.

Bootstrapping problem here.

Without consciousness in the first place, how can symbols even exist, much less be "manipulated"?

There cannot be any "symbols" until someone somewhere decides that a real object somehow stands for something else (real or imagined).

There can be similarities between systems, but that's not the same as saying that one is a "symbol" of the other.

There's no bootstrapping issue. You're just reacting.

Oh,well, that clears that up, then.

Well, to be clear, when I said "data" and I did involve consciousness, you objected to it because, how can there be data if there's no consciousness? As I said. You're just reacting. You're on the edge, ready to jump whenever these trigger words are mentioned.

Are you drinking?

This is a serious question, because you're obviously not following what's being said.

The post I was responding to wasn't about "data".

You claimed that "manipulating symbols" produces consciousness.

I pointed out that nothing in the universe can be a "symbol" until and unless somebody somewhere decides that it stands for something, and since there's no little person inside our non-conscious brains to make such a decision, it makes absolutely no sense to claim that consciousness is "produced" by the manipulation of symbols.

This is not a knee-jerk reaction, it's a valid point.

 

[Piggy]

A symbol is a particular configuration of matter which is identifiable by a certain transformation, and can also be distinguished from different configurations of matter--which are themselves identifiable. The phrases "identifiable" and "distinguished" refer to processes that react in similar ways and distinct ways, respectively, to those configurations. The configurations need not be exact entities--so long as they are stable states within a particular system.

Jesus H. Christ Brown....

If you want to use shop-talk, keep it in the shop, please.

By that definition, dimes poured into a sorting machine are "symbols" which can be "distinguished" from other "symbols" (like nickels and quarters) by the "processes" of the machine (dimes fall through a hole that nickels and quarters don't fall through).

This is the anthropomorphic language that Westprog rightly warned against -- use it too often and your thinking will get sloppy.

So let's please drop the metaphoric language, and stick with direct talk.

All I can get from what you're saying here is that consciousness is caused by some interaction of matter and energy.

Yeah.

 

[Piggy]

But correlation is not causation. It doesn't matter how much you want the correlation to be causative, it most likely ain't. In this case we already have a dang good idea of what's causing the correlation: the same neural structures doing the thinking are making the waves. I can see how you might get turned around by the language used by some papers, but you need to read a little more critically to see that they're talking about the physical structures acting at those frequencies, not the electromagnetic waves their actions generate.

One last cite: if you hit the cortical inhibitory cells hard enough, the whole thing goes boinoioioing in the gamma band.

By the way, I want to make clear that I was not proposing that the signature waves are the cause of conscious awareness.

And the scenario of the waves interacting with neural noise was simply a speculation to demonstrate a point (which I obviously flubbed, btw).

The article on binocular rivalry is interesting, and I'll have to compare it w/ other stuff I've got on the shelf here.

But I'm curious whether you think this study which you cited, for example, favors the computational or biological model.

To my mind, it's consistent with the latter.

 

[Modified]

If the computer that doesn't and cannot control the body is entirely equivalent to the one that can, as the computationalists claim, then the fact that some other computer can is irrelevant. We've already established that the ability to control the body is not important.

I would certainly not use the term "entirely equivalent" and neither would anyone else I suspect, but maybe "equally conscious". I would also not argue that a computer that can reproduce the functions of the brain at the I/O level exactly is necessarily conscious, just that if it is conscious then an otherwise equivalent computer running at a slower speed is also conscious.

If you accept the computational view, then it inherently follows that you don't view the capability of replacing a brain and operating a human body as being significant functionality.

I don't, but others here have seemed to express this view, along with the opinion that such a thing is impossible.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Are you drinking?

I'm a teetotaler. #2445.

You're reacting to the word "symbol" in this case. So, let's keep a list.
symbol which by the way is the standard term.
data
So what should I call it? I really don't care. I'm more of a concept guy than a word guy.

But this is the thing I want to talk to about. I can use severely abstract terms, but you're going to like it.

 

[westprog]

Why not? And why does it have to stand for anything? It's just a symbol.

How can it be a symbol if it doesn't stand for something else? That's what a symbol is.

 

[Piggy]

I'm a teetotaler. #2445.

You're reacting to the word "symbol" in this case. So, let's keep a list.
symbol which by the way is the standard term.
data
So what should I call it? I really don't care. I'm more of a concept guy than a word guy.

But you damned well better give me a word for it.

Unless you just want to avoid thinking about it.

Do let me know when you're ready to have a conversation though. This is getting old.

What do you mean "the" standard term? Standard for whom?

It's obviously a term you're using in a highly specialized way -- so that a log floating down a river is a "symbol" -- which you cannot expect people outside your niche to understand in the way you intend it.

(ETA: And by your definition, saying that consciousness is caused by the manipulation of symbols apparently means that it's caused by the interactions of matter and energy... which isn't really saying much.)

There is a common meaning of the word "symbol" which is a representation of another thing, so please, let's not confuse things unnecessarily.

To call me on the carpet for "reacting" to your use of shop-talk in a way that's bound to be confusing to people outside your field is simply juvenile.

If you want to talk about impulses in the brain, then dammit, talk about impulses in the brain.

 

[Piggy]

How can it be a symbol if it doesn't stand for something else? That's what a symbol is.

Not where he works.

Obviously, we're not doing our homework by studying his shop talk.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Jesus H. Christ Brown....

Reacting.

By that definition, dimes poured into a sorting machine are "symbols" which can be "distinguished" from other "symbols" (like nickels and quarters) by the "processes" of the machine (dimes fall through a hole that nickels and quarters don't fall through).

Absolutely, unapologetically, yes. The sorting machine is a symbol manipulation machine. Adenine on DNA is a symbol.

This is the anthropomorphic language that Westprog rightly warned against -- use it too often and your thinking will get sloppy.

Huh?

So let's please drop the metaphoric language, and stick with direct talk.

Why are you so adamantly against thinking about distinctions and similarities with respect to processes? This is such a silly thing to develop a strong sensitivity over.

All I can get from what you're saying here is that consciousness is caused by some interaction of matter and energy.

Yes. Isn't everything?

But as best I can tell, you're actually claiming that a system that is capable of reacting to particular configurations of things in consistent ways, and reacting to particular yet distinct configurations of things in consistent yet distinct ways, cannot produce consciousness. But you never give a satisfactory explanation why.

Worse off, you give a theory explaining that if you add to these kinds of systems electromagnetic induction with some sort of thing that metaphorically works like harmony--though you don't explain what this thing is--that it explains everything. Though you don't explain what it explains exactly, and why the things you're rejecting do not explain it.

And that's the one thing I've been trying to get you to say. So if you want to drop metaphorical language, and talk direct, then please, by all means, directly answer the following questions without using metaphorical language.

How does electromagnetic induction integrate data in the brain, and why can it not be integrated using: (a) regular neural communications? And (b) traditional computation?

 

[yy2bggggs]

How can it be a symbol if it doesn't stand for something else? That's what a symbol is.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_(formal)

"Symbols of a formal language need not be symbols of anything."​

 

[PixyMisa]

Piggy went over this with you regarding the marble adding machine.

Piggy hasn't the faintest idea what he's talking about.

The computer observing the hand in Metamorphosis of Narcissus can only compare the physical configuration its viewing with configurations it has been programed to compare and only in ways it is programed to do. Perhaps a computer can be programed to recognise what the other hand shaped form in the painting can be compaired to.

This is true of computers to precisely the same extent that it is true of humans.

So computers hold opinions of their own, I see.

Yes.

Any point at which one draws the line and says this indicates monism, cannot deny that it may be an aspect of a more fundamental dualism and visa versa.

As explained ad nauseam, dualism can be phrased in only two ways: Either the statement is logically inconsistent - in which case we discard it - or it is a logically consistent statement regarding a logically inconsistent universe - in which case it is useless even if true.

Dualism is either wrong or useless, and can be safely ignored under all circumstances.

The distinction is entirely relative, material monism is a blatant assumption.

Not at all. Material monism is the way the Universe appears to behave. Not an assumption but a working model.

 

[yy2bggggs]

There is a common meaning of the word "symbol" which is a representation of another thing, so please, let's not confuse things unnecessarily.

Yes there is such a common usage of the word symbol. Are you referring to the common usage when you draw a distinction between physical computation and symbolic computation?

To call me on the carpet for "reacting" to your use of shop-talk in a way that's bound to be confusing to people outside your field is simply juvenile.

But you're standing in the shop. Nobody tricked you to come in, or dragged you in--you ran into here screaming something about anthropomorphisms and how nobody in here cares about brain research.

 

[Leumas]

So computers hold opinions of their own, I see.

Yes.

And you have the audacity to claim that we are the ones with the magic bean claims… are you starting a new cult for worshiping computers soon?


Your red herrings and equivocations of claiming that we are dualists and magic bean holders is very reminiscent of the Christian tactics of claiming that Atheism is a religion.

 

[PixyMisa]

And you have the audacity to claim that we are the ones with the magic bean claims.

No audacity required. An opinion is merely an evaluation of some object or system beyond its immediately quantifiable physical properties. Computers do this all the time.

You are the ones with the magic bean claims, and this response of yours is more of the same.

Your red herrings and equivocations of claiming that we are dualists and magic bean holders is very reminiscent of the Christian tactics of claiming that Atheism is a religion.

Poppycock. Asserting that opinions are something exotic and rarified that cannot be held or expressed by machines is just another example of your magic beanism - and we already have quite enough examples, thanks.

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, and Leumas, Punshhh, and everyone else: The brain is a computer. Whenever you say "computers can't do this or that", the brain is a computer. It's a pulse-coded switched network, but that's not something different, it's a type of computer.

The moment you start to make a point about the difference between brains and computers, you're already wrong, and it's all downhill from there.

 

[Leumas]

Oh, and Leumas, Punshhh, and everyone else: The brain is a computer. Whenever you say "computers can't do this or that", the brain is a computer. It's a pulse-coded switched network, but that's not something different, it's a type of computer.

The moment you start to make a point about the difference between brains and computers, you're already wrong, and it's all downhill from there.

Are you really that incapable of distinguishing between reality and speculative imagination?