Explain consciousness to the layman.

[Darat]

In layman's terms I would say that it's what it feels like to experience something. It's what we observe about ourselves that isn't connected with behaviour.

You are of course entitled to use any strange and idiosyncratic meaning for an arbitrary label.

 

[punshhh]

I have explained this to you many times, as have others. You're not paying attention.

You consistently assert that a brain is required to interpret the results of a computer. We point out that the brain is a computer; that everything it does can also be done by a computer.

You assert that it is somehow more. You can't say what, or how, or why you think so. You just insist that it is.

That's your magic bean.

Do computers abstract subjects?

Can conscious beings perform objective actions free of a subjective perspective/abstraction?

You need to take out the bean in your own eye before poking around in any one else's.

Oh and I did mention the fig leaf of materialism dualists like yourself hide behind.

 

[Leumas]

[snip]
Let’s start with the opening paragraph:

Consciousness poses two related problems. The first is to determine which features of the brain determine the extent to which consciousness is present. For example, why are certain corticothalamic circuits important to conscious experience, whereas cerebellar circuits are not, although the number of neurons in the two structures is comparable and their neurobiological organization is similarly complicated? And why is consciousness strikingly reduced during deep slow-wave sleep or during absence seizures, despite high levels of neural firing?

[snip]

It is also accepted that consciousness is a specialized function of the brain – in other words, you’re not conscious just because you have a brain – and that consciousness does not merely “emerge” as a result of some critical mass of neurons. This is not an assumption, but is based on decades of research and experimentation.

I think you are drawing the wrong inferences from the quoted part of the report on this aspect.

You are misunderstanding the use of the term “Critical Mass”.

The critical mass is not JUST the number of neurons..... Critical Mass is a euphemism drawn from Nuclear Physics that means that there has to be a CERTAIN AMOUNT/DEGREE/LEVEL/THRESHOLD of something or another. Have a look here.


The critical mass argument is not to do with MASS as in amount of brain matter but rather what you actually say later on

What they’re implying here is that there can only be a “you”, there can only be an “experience”, if there is some degree of integration of information caused by real physical activity.

"Some degree of integration" = critical mass of integration.


Or there has to be a critical mass of combination of things:

[snip]
Yes, the specific geometry of the connectivity matters; yes, the location of specific neuromodulators and their effects matter; yes, the architecture matters; yes, the fine temporal rhythms of the spiking patterns matter, and so on. Many of the fond hopes of the opportunistic minimalists [a version of computationalism: NB] have been dashed: they had hoped they could leave out various things, and they have learned that no, if you leave out x, or y, or z, you can’t explain how the mind works.”

The critical mass argument is not arguing that it is a certain amount of matter....otherwise the drastically epileptic child who had a good portion of her brain removed to eventually become a functional and conscious person would have not happened.


I think you are drawing the wrong conclusion from the words

why are certain corticothalamic circuits important to conscious experience, whereas cerebellar circuits are not, although the number of neurons in the two structures is comparable and their neurobiological organization is similarly complicated?

It is to do with the DEGREE or THRESHOLD of a certain level (i.e. critical mass) of functionality.

Also when they say

Consciousness has a physical substrate and... the physical substrate must be working in the proper way for us to be fully conscious – it is enough to fall asleep, receive a blow on the head, or take certain drugs such as anesthetics to affect our consciousness dramatically.

Then it is NECESSARILY an emergent property of the things that "have to be working in the proper way".

If things have to be working in a certain way for something to occur then that something is emerging from the fact that the things were working in the proper way.

 

[PixyMisa]

This is ironic, considering how long your own posts are getting.

I'll give Piggy credit - he's making an effort, putting together serious posts, and referring to real work in the field.

Of course, he's completely misconstrued every aspect of the research and his conclusions are hopelessly wrong, but he is honestly trying.

 

[PixyMisa]

Do computers abstract subjects?

They do little else.

Can conscious beings perform objective actions free of a subjective perspective/abstraction?

Sure. This is called "not paying attention".

You need to take out the bean in your own eye before poking around in any one else's.

You have an entire bean field in your eye. It seems to be obscuring your vision.

Oh and I did mention the fig leaf of materialism dualists like yourself hide behind.

You did, yes. It was entirely nonsensical then, and it still is now.

 

[Belz...]

You need to go back and read some of Belz's stuff, cause he either said that or confused me enough to think he did.

What ? Where did I say that ? I never said or implied such thing. Quote me.

 

[tsig]

No. However, the speculation about the interaction of brain waves and neural "noise" is just that, speculation. It's certainly testable, if anyone cared to design the test, but it's also certainly not tested, so there's no reason to believe it.

On the other hand, the coordination of the signature brain waves during consciousness, and the parallels of experience during the losing and gaining of consciousness, these are observable.

Given that observable coordination, we have to consider the waves some sort of NCC. If they're just "noise" from some other process, then they're noise from a process which is also coordinated w/ states of awareness.

If the integrated information theory describes something correct, then the brain waves interacting with "noise" from the neural structures is an interesting thought to entertain, and it would fit the bill.

It might be odd to think of your own awareness, all of your experiences, as being caused by something so weak, but when you think about it, there's no reason why that should matter at all. Why not a brain wave as a medium for information from the electric hum of the various shapes of neural tissue?

You're not making any sense.

 

[tsig]

Another trap is to take the metaphor literally.

This is an especially sticky tar baby if you spend a lot of time with machines that are specifically designed to make imaginary things look real, and/or in a discipline that uses a standard set of metaphors almost all the time (e.g. information theory, mathematics, computer programming).

The results can be very odd, like taking the post office metaphor of the brain literally, so that you actually believe that patterns of neural impulses are "images" of things which which are "recognized" by brain structures and "routed" to the appropriate destination.

The error becomes somewhat clearer when you apply that to a coin sorting machine, and claim that the coins are "recognized" and "routed", rather than that they simply follow the laws of physics and fall down whenever they're not supported.

But given our experience with the marble machine, there may be some here who would accept that as a literal explanation, too.

If you try to apply that to a log in a river, however -- the log was "recognized" by the river and "routed" into the appropriate channel, rather than "the log was too big to go down one channel so it went down the other" -- the mistake should be apparent to anyone.

Have you ever managed to think using logs?

 

[tsig]

I'm not saying they aren't.

But you forget what evolution can do with junk.

And as always, you forget that there is no current explanation of consciousness, so it's not possible that any "test" has demonstrated that brain waves aren't involved. And you simply don't want to discuss the actual observations of the correlations.

But you're right, correlation isn't causation. All we have at the moment is a correlation, but it's a damn exciting one.

Unless of course you're clinging steadfastly to debunked ideas, or you're so deluded that you believe you have solved the problem of consciousness and are simply being ignored by the Nobel committee out of spite.

Science doesn't know so it must be magic brain waves.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Then it is NECESSARILY an emergent property of the things that "have to be working in the proper way".

If things have to be working in a certain way for something to occur then that something is emerging from the fact that the things were working in the proper way.

Sort of depends on how you like to explain the issue. Working in the “proper way” also means that neural assemblies aren’t hindered from communicating with other neural assemblies.


Or to use the exact phrasing (reversed):

Our findings suggest that unconsciousness may be the increase of inhibitory assemblies across the brain's cortex. These findings lend support to Greenfield's hypothesis of neural assemblies forming consciousness.

Source (press release): http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2011-06/eso-3ms060711.php

And a video: http://www.livescience.com/14559-brain-losing-consciousness-3d.html

 

[westprog]

but we already have computers not made of artificial neurons, and they work fine.

I mean work as a brain replacement. An actual insert in the skull cavity operate the body replacement.

If we assume you mean the opposite, you seem to be saying we know it wouldn't work because we haven't done it yet...

We know it won't work because we are assured, as part of the computational theory, that a conscious computer emulating the human mind by running the same program need not have the requirement of having to operate the body.

 

[punshhh]

They do little else.

No they follow programs parrot fashion just like your marble machine.

No doubt it is possible to make a computer with sensory apparatus which can view and analise in some preprogramed way one of my favourite Dali paintings Metamorphosis of Narcissus. But unless it had been specifically programed to recognise that the hand in the foreground also represented a crouching person(or the symbolism of the ants). It would not compute and as such would not be able to abstractly interpret the subjective messages in the painting.

Sure. This is called "not paying attention".

Incorrect, when a person is not paying attention, their behavior is still subjectively modified.
The mind both conscious and unconscious dwells in a subjective reality, unlike a computer.

You did, yes. It was entirely nonsensical then, and it still is now.

It is a subtle distinction monism and dualism are intertwined.

 

[PixyMisa]

No they follow programs parrot fashion just like your marble machine.

Exactly.

Sorry, did you think those two statements were somehow contradictory?

No doubt it is possible to make a computer with sensory apparatus which can view and analise in some preprogramed way one of my favourite Dali paintings Metamorphosis of Narcissus.

Yes, of course. And it's been done.

But unless it had been specifically programed to recognise that the hand in the foreground also represented a crouching person(or the symbolism of the ants). It would not compute and as such would not be able to abstractly interpret the subjective messages in the painting.

Computers are perfectly capable of forming inferences and testing them, without the inference or the test being pre-programmed.

Incorrect, when a person is not paying attention, their behavior is still subjectively modified.

But it's not subjectively modified with respect to whatever it is they're not paying attention to - by definition.

The mind both conscious and unconscious dwells in a subjective reality, like a computer.

Fixed that for you.

It is a subtle distinction monism and dualism are intertwined.

No, and no.

 

[tsig]

No they follow programs parrot fashion just like your marble machine.

No doubt it is possible to make a computer with sensory apparatus which can view and analise in some preprogramed way one of my favourite Dali paintings Metamorphosis of Narcissus. But unless it had been specifically programed to recognise that the hand in the foreground also represented a crouching person(or the symbolism of the ants). It would not compute and as such would not be able to abstractly interpret the subjective messages in the painting.


Incorrect, when a person is not paying attention, their behavior is still subjectively modified.
The mind both conscious and unconscious dwells in a subjective reality, unlike a computer.


It is a subtle distinction monism and dualism are intertwined.

Would you recognize the symbolism if you had not been trained to do so?

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm not saying they aren't.

But you forget what evolution can do with junk.

You forget that evolution can't overrule physics.

And as always, you forget that there is no current explanation of consciousness, so it's not possible that any "test" has demonstrated that brain waves aren't involved.

First, your premise is false. Second, the tests have been done. Brain waves aren't involved. There are multiple insurmountable problems with your position, which have been pointed out to you repeatedly, and which you haven't even attempted to address.

And you simply don't want to discuss the actual observations of the correlations.

I have discussed them. The correlations are real. Your conclusion, however, is baloney.

But you're right, correlation isn't causation. All we have at the moment is a correlation, but it's a damn exciting one.

It's real, yes. It's real noise. This is known, Piggy.

Unless of course you're clinging steadfastly to debunked ideas

What debunked ideas? All you've been doing here is bunking.

or you're so deluded that you believe you have solved the problem of consciousness and are simply being ignored by the Nobel committee out of spite.

What problem? Why would I expect a Nobel prize for a problem that I don't believe exists?

You're the one claiming that consciousness is a great mystery. I think it's simple and obvious, and that the real complexities lie elsewhere.

 

[Frank Newgent]

I'm not saying they aren't.

But you forget what evolution can do with junk.

You forget that evolution can't overrule physics.

And as always, you forget that there is no current explanation of consciousness, so it's not possible that any "test" has demonstrated that brain waves aren't involved.

First, your premise is false. Second, the tests have been done. Brain waves aren't involved. There are multiple insurmountable problems with your position, which have been pointed out to you repeatedly, and which you haven't even attempted to address.

And you simply don't want to discuss the actual observations of the correlations.

I have discussed them. The correlations are real. Your conclusion, however, is baloney.

But you're right, correlation isn't causation. All we have at the moment is a correlation, but it's a damn exciting one.

It's real, yes. It's real noise. This is known, Piggy.

Unless of course you're clinging steadfastly to debunked ideas

What debunked ideas? All you've been doing here is bunking.

or you're so deluded that you believe you have solved the problem of consciousness and are simply being ignored by the Nobel committee out of spite.

What problem? Why would I expect a Nobel prize for a problem that I don't believe exists?

You're the one claiming that consciousness is a great mystery. I think it's simple and obvious, and that the real complexities lie elsewhere.

How large would the algorithm representing all of the information (within its context) from this post be?

 

[westprog]

As for all the claims that perennially clog up consciousness threads on this forum – e.g. consciousness is the result of logical computations, consciousness is caused by self-referential information processing, consciousness requires no physical substrate beyond what is required to “run the logic”, consciousness can be programmed, you can replace a brain with a computer simulation of a brain, a conscious robot would be conscious at any operating speed, your brain “is a computer”, there is no real difference between consciousness and all the other activity of the brain, thermostats might be conscious for all we know, consciousness might be a whole-body function, consciousness is the result of interaction of symbols – all of these claims are, in light of the current state of research, pure bunk... as Westprog and I have been so patiently trying to explain.

I won't comment in detail on the entire post, which speaks for itself, except to say that in contrast to the claims of the computationalists, this produces actual references to real people doing real work on consciousness, rather than appealing to a mythical computational consensus that if it ever existed, has now dissolved in a sea of facts.

 

[westprog]

If computers can fly planes in spite of temporal factors, there is no reason a machine can't be conscious in spite of temporal factors.

Computers that fly planes do so according to a real-time, interactive model, not the Turing computational model. A computer operating according to the Turing model would never be able to fly a plane, or play an MP3 file, or run a windowing system. This is the case no matter how powerful the computer. There has to be some kind of explicit temporal element - which is what Piggy has been describing in his post. It's this temporal element that the computationalists have consistently said is not needed - that it is possible to run the computation at one millionth of the speed and get exactly the same result. Clearly it's not possible to run the control program for a plane at a millionth of the speed and get the same results.

This does not, of course, imply that a real-time computer system is necessarily going to be able to produce consciousness. Just that a real-time computer system is the minimal requirement.

 

[westprog]

Another trap is to take the metaphor literally.

Hence my signature. The field of computers is awash with language that's been lifted from the human world and applied to mechanical devices and mathematical abstractions. This has had the effect of anthropomorphising computers and their operations. As Dijkstra pointed out, this is a fundamentally childish and immature approach to a profession, and is guaranteed to warp thinking.

This is an especially sticky tar baby if you spend a lot of time with machines that are specifically designed to make imaginary things look real, and/or in a discipline that uses a standard set of metaphors almost all the time (e.g. information theory, mathematics, computer programming).

The results can be very odd, like taking the post office metaphor of the brain literally, so that you actually believe that patterns of neural impulses are "images" of things which which are "recognized" by brain structures and "routed" to the appropriate destination.

The error becomes somewhat clearer when you apply that to a coin sorting machine, and claim that the coins are "recognized" and "routed", rather than that they simply follow the laws of physics and fall down whenever they're not supported.

But given our experience with the marble machine, there may be some here who would accept that as a literal explanation, too.

If you try to apply that to a log in a river, however -- the log was "recognized" by the river and "routed" into the appropriate channel, rather than "the log was too big to go down one channel so it went down the other" -- the mistake should be apparent to anyone.

Often, this is just confusion. I think that with Dennet, for example, the use of such language is deliberate, and he has an agenda in mind. He is quite explicit that he uses anthropomorphic language deliberately, and is applying an intentional stance to inanimate objects.

 

[Modified]

We know it won't work because we are assured, as part of the computational theory, that a conscious computer emulating the human mind by running the same program need not have the requirement of having to operate the body.

You are equating "need not" and "can not".