Explain consciousness to the layman.

[Piggy]

ETA: Just as a point of clarification... are you talking about the electromagnetic field produced by these impulses inducing neural signaling?

You mean the experimental ones?

Their purpose is to induce neural disturbances and see how they propagate.

As for the natural ones, we don't know exactly what the deep brain waves are doing, but a feedback loop of influence on the activity of various brain regions is expected.

 

[yy2bggggs]

But the non-conscious brain is able to use subliminal input in so many ways -- and, we should note, it's able to use an image of an ape as an image of an ape, and not just a collection of shapes, angles, colors, and brightness, so there's a good bit of coordination on the non-conscious side which makes a "sausage" model (bits get cut off and other bits get merged as you go along) more difficult to propose.

Okay.

In other words, if the non-conscious mind can treat the image as a gestalt, which implies a lot of the time line is complete by the time the processes responsible for experience get involved, and if that's the case, why do the blind spots only appear in conscious experience?

Because, first off, not everything comes together. Secondly, it shouldn't--it wouldn't be as useful. There's a kind of "guess-and-match" process that goes on--it's as if the brain actually performs science, right down to revising its theories. And it's only useful to take the latest and most integrated one to feed to the next higher level; otherwise, you get too much noisy revision in the data (that is, a constant "whoops! My bad, it's a b sound, not a p sound").

Some sort of "strobe effect" appears more likely to me.

Sounds plausible that such a thing contributes, but not at the electromagnetic induction level. But I have to validate that's what you're talking about, so I await your answer to previous posts.

But it can't simply be the strobe, because that itself doesn't do anything to the data. I can think of a number of different ways the strobe can contribute, so I don't think I prefer any particular hypothesis. But I simply cannot understand why you think a regular clock can't be used for the strobe. It's just a neural signal.

 

[Piggy]

Not sniping your interesting post because it doesn't deserve a longer answer but your post ignores the "Layman" part.

In layman's terms I would say conciousness is the label that we learn to apply to a set of behaviours we observe in ourselves and others. It really is no more mysterious than that.

Well, it was about as laymany as I could get.

But as for the "label" approach, I think you might change your mind if a loved one were in a vegetative state and you didn't know if they could experience anything or not, and if so, what could they experience.

Biolocial research on consciousness is making some startling progress in this area.

OK, I really gotta get to work, will respond to other posts later -- I've managed to skip several.

 

[yy2bggggs]

You mean the experimental ones?

Let me rephrase. Are you proposing that the electromagnetic waves produced by the brain induce signals in neurons? In particular, when you say "induce" here:

Their purpose is to induce neural disturbances and see how they propagate.

Do you mean simply, to cause? Or do you mean, as everyone here who has taken a physics course is thinking, that a change in an electromagnetic field causes a corresponding current?

As for the natural ones, we don't know exactly what the deep brain waves are doing, but a feedback loop of influence on the activity of various brain regions is expected.

Sure.

 

[Piggy]

Because, first off, not everything comes together. Secondly, it shouldn't--it wouldn't be as useful. There's a kind of "guess-and-match" process that goes on--it's as if the brain actually performs science, right down to revising its theories. And it's only useful to take the latest integrated one; otherwise, you get too much noisy revision in the data.

I would appreciate it if you didn't speak of "data" in the brain. There are impulses, waves, neurons, blood, all that... but once you're talking about "data" then there's nothing to be found. "Data" can only be a metaphor here.

But more importantly, how does this account for the clear distinction we can observe in repeatable experiment between the temporal granularity we experience consciously, and the apparent lack of it in the parts of our brains that perform tasks without the involvement of the processes that generate experience?

Why that clear distinction between the two?

Must it not be a feature of the processes which produce experience themselves? Or isn't it at least more likely?

 

[Piggy]

The brain is not causing the experience. The brain is processing an experience triggered by an external cause.

Yet another bootstrapping error.

In this model, the external world "triggers" an "experience" which is then "processed"... whatever that may mean.

So for you, the "experience" is caused directly by the outside world.

But this makes no sense, since there's no doubt that the bulk of what our brain does -- which is all "triggered" in some way or another by what's happening outside of it -- is not part of our experience.

Biological investigation shows clearly that experience is a performance of the brain -- in other words, a bodily function -- and a specific one, not a general one.

Impulses caused by things like light and heat and the action of molecules begin cascades of electrochemical events -- which are not experiences and this can be proven.

This chain of events results in electro-neural states of the brain, some of which are coordinated into a conscious experience, which is entirely the product of the brain -- the smell of cinnamon doesn't exist anywhere in the world, and it cannot be deduced from the properties of any molecules in cinnamon. In fact, if we wanted to, theoretically we could rewire the brain to perform blue instead of the smell of cinnamon when those molecules hit our noses.

But anyway, from the point of view of actual observation of the brain in action, your description really makes no sense, I'm afraid.

It's a non-starter. It doesn't conform to observation. Sorry.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

They're not. [Brain waves affecting neurons are] physically impossible.

Brain waves are very weak. If neurons were sensitive enough to be influenced in that way, turning on a fluorescent light would be instantly fatal. If brain waves were strong enough to do the job, you'd be picking it up on every radio in the world.

I don't mean to frustrate such a proper savaging, but it's arguable that neurons are affected by certain brain waves, in certain situations. Some neurons, especially in the hypothalamus, synchronize their firing to certain phases of the gamma rhythm. You could easily test this by driving an ephys experiment out of phase with an external gamma-band oscillation, which seems like such a simple experiment that I'm sure someone has done it at some point, but a five minute pubmed search didn't turn up what I wanted and I don't know enough of the particular jargon to refine it further.

It's still not Piggy's magic bean, but it does happen.

In other words, you don't know how your hypothesis would distinguish between conscious and non-conscious processes in the brain.

Which, if you don't mind my pointing out, means you don't have a theory, model, or hypothesis of consciousness.

No, it could just mean the distinction is meaningless. That either it's all consciousness or none of it is.

 

[Piggy]

Let me rephrase. Are you proposing that the electromagnetic waves produced by the brain induce signals in neurons? In particular, when you say "induce" here:

Do you mean simply, to cause? Or do you mean, as everyone here who has taken a physics course is thinking, that a change in an electromagnetic field causes a corresponding current?

No, that statement was clearly about the experimental introduction of electromagnetic disturbances -- I said so right up front -- not about the waves produced by the brain.

As to any feedback loops between the waves and the rest of the brain....

It may be -- and I am admittedly leaping off into the Sea of Speculation here -- that for conscious specifically, the carrying of the impulses by neurons might be something of a red herring.

It's entirely possible that what matters to consciousness isn't the neural pathways at all, which is what matters to the non-conscious brain, but rather the electromagnetic "shapes" formed by neural activity in the various densely packed and convoluted regions of the brain.

In other words, evolution may have built conscious awareness out of what was originally "noise" from the brain.

If so, then the pathways of the neural impulses which are so often traced in classical neurology may be practically invisible to consciousness, which instead coordinates the electromagnetic "buzz" of various brain regions.

Think of the humming choir again, as a metaphor. The biological processes which produce the humming are irrelevant to the air, which picks up the patterns of vibrations.

Similarly, the deep brain waves may be influenced by the electromagnetic shapes formed by the neural activity in various bits of the brain (each with a different physical shape and neurological make-up) while ignoring the neurons' roles in pushing forward a chain of signals.

If this is true, then replacing neurons with anything that achieves the role of keeping the signal chain going, but which is not as noisy or is noisy in a different way, might cause the body to be incapable of conscious awareness, or to have a drastically different sort of awareness than the one hoped for.

 

[Piggy]

I don't mean to frustrate such a proper savaging, but it's arguable that neurons are affected by certain brain waves, in certain situations. Some neurons, especially in the hypothalamus, synchronize their firing to certain phases of the gamma rhythm. You could easily test this by driving an ephys experiment out of phase with an external gamma-band oscillation, which seems like such a simple experiment that I'm sure someone has done it at some point, but a five minute pubmed search didn't turn up what I wanted and I don't know enough of the particular jargon to refine it further.

It's still not Piggy's magic bean, but it does happen.

See post 2448. The role of feedback from the waves is an interesting but unanswered question -- does it happen, if so then how?

No, it could just mean the distinction is meaningless. That either it's all consciousness or none of it is.

Since this notion does not match observation and experiment, we can dispense with it.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I would appreciate it if you didn't speak of "data" in the brain.

I would appreciate it if you read my posts.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

See post 2448. The role of feedback from the waves is an interesting but unanswered question -- does it happen, if so then how?

Post 2448 is speculative nonsense. You have not even demonstrated that there is a difference, only repeatedly asserted it based on your subjective experience.

Since this notion does not match observation and experiment, we can dispense with it.

See post 2451 for how assertion != observation and experiment.

 

[Belz...]

If nobody were replying and engaging with my posts, then the number of them would be irrelevant.

Do not confuse the fact that people answer you with the worthiness of your arguments.

It was an attempt to denigrate my arguments by characterising me as being unworthy of response.

Do not confuse concluding that your posts are not worthy of response with an ad hominem.

 

[Belz...]

In layman's terms I would say that it's what it feels like to experience something. It's what we observe about ourselves that isn't connected with behaviour.

What does it feel like to experience something ?

 

[Modified]

However, if you accept that this is necessary, then you exclude a central tenet of the computational theory - which is that the speed of the computation is irrelevant - that any execution of the same algorithm will produce the same result. That is what computational equivalence means.

Yes, if a computational system can contain conscious entities, then it does so regardless of execution speed. But there are those here arguing that such a system can not replace a brain because it's not fast enough, or for some other poorly explained reason, but that a network of such systems can do so.

It's a necessary element of computation equivalence that the hardware which runs the computation is not able to replace a brain.

No, it isn't.

Of course, the issue of even a single artificial neuron begs the question to some extent. If such a thing could be made and inserted, what functionality does it need to provide, and what is unnecessary? We don't know that, even for a single neuron.

Agreed, but all this started with the assumption that such a single neuron replacement was possible, and all of my arguments have continued under that assumption.

 

[westprog]

What does it feel like to experience something ?

Luckily this is an experiment you can do at home, without the complex array of equipment necessary to measure the brain waves that yy2bggggs and Piggy are discussing.

Just place your hand in a drawer and slam it shut, and you'll find out exactly what it feels like. No need for me to describe it to you - you'll know directly.

I wonder if there's any other forum or discussion group where a question like the above would be seriously posed?

 

[westprog]

Yes, if a computational system can contain conscious entities, then it does so regardless of execution speed. But there are those here arguing that such a system can not replace a brain because it's not fast enough, or for some other poorly explained reason, but that a network of such systems can do so.

No, it isn't.

If it is accepted - and this is the computational claim - that all the computers running the same computation are equivalent, and will generate exactly the same instance of consciousness, then necessarily, since most of those implementations won't be able to interface with the brain, it's clear that interfacing with the body in place of the brain is not considered to be a necessary element.

Agreed, but all this started with the assumption that such a single neuron replacement was possible, and all of my arguments have continued under that assumption.

It may be that it would be possible to replace the brain with artificial neurons, one by one. It does not follow that an equivalent computer system implementing an emulation of that network would be conscious.

 

[Belz...]

Luckily this is an experiment you can do at home, without the complex array of equipment necessary to measure the brain waves that yy2bggggs and Piggy are discussing.

Just place your hand in a drawer and slam it shut, and you'll find out exactly what it feels like. No need for me to describe it to you - you'll know directly.

I wonder if there's any other forum or discussion group where a question like the above would be seriously posed?

But that doesn't answer the question, does it ? How does it feel like to experience something ?

Your "answer" doesn't address the whole range of experiences, nor does it actually provide a workable definition. It basically tells me that I'll know when I see it, which is not very useful.

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, of course.

No on thinks the waves are inexplicable, or that they arise without physical cause in the brain. (Everything the brain does must have physical / energetic causes.)

Right.

It's their relationship to conscious experience -- which we can observe changing state as the waves change state, and which doesn't exist when the waves aren't there or are not coherent -- which is of interest.

Certain wave patterns are indicative of, and the result of, conscious processing.

That's what I meant by "noise" -- i.e., something not relevant to what we're trying to study. If they are noise, then they must be noise from some other process that's closely correlated with consciousness.

Right.

And unlike the neural activity which supports the waves, only the waves have the opportunity (as far as I know) to synchronize the activity of disparate brain regions which do not exhibit the kind of neural connection which would allow them to do this neurally.

No. Wrong. Those connections exist and are active precisely when we'd expect them to be active.

And it is physically impossible for brain waves to have the kind of effect you want. They are many orders of magnitude too weak for that. They have less influence in your brain household wiring.

That's why it's so important.

It's not important at all. Indicative, yes. Functional, absolutely not.

And the very close connection with conscious states and the stages of coherence and strength of the waves (waking up, falling asleep, being knocked out) strongly suggests a direct role.

Which we can absolutely rule out because it's impossible.

So it fits with experiment and observation, and we really have no other candidate in the works right now.

Completely wrong in every respect.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't mean to frustrate such a proper savaging, but it's arguable that neurons are affected by certain brain waves, in certain situations. Some neurons, especially in the hypothalamus, synchronize their firing to certain phases of the gamma rhythm. You could easily test this by driving an ephys experiment out of phase with an external gamma-band oscillation, which seems like such a simple experiment that I'm sure someone has done it at some point, but a five minute pubmed search didn't turn up what I wanted and I don't know enough of the particular jargon to refine it further.

It's still not Piggy's magic bean, but it does happen.

Synchronisation happens, yes - that's what produces the strong regular rhythms in our brain waves.

Synchronisation to electromagnetic fields doesn't. It takes an enormously powerful electromagnetic field to induce any effect in the brain at all. Neurons simply aren't sensitive to electromagnetic fields; we're constantly permeated with fields significantly stronger than those produced by our neural activity with no effect whatsoever.

 

[westprog]

But that doesn't answer the question, does it ? How does it feel like to experience something ?

It does answer the question, entirely accurately. Rather than give a reference to something else, or express it in terms which are themselves expressed in other terms, it allows you to directly have the experience yourself, and find out what it feels like.

Your "answer" doesn't address the whole range of experiences, nor does it actually provide a workable definition. It basically tells me that I'll know when I see it, which is not very useful.

You didn't ask for the whole range of experiences. You said "something". Slamming your hand in a drawer is certainly something. Also you did not ask for a working definition. You asked "what does it feel like". I can pretty well guarantee that no matter what the description, nothing will tell you exactly what slamming your hand in a drawer is like as well as actually slamming your hand in a drawer.

The only reason for describing anything to anyone is so that they'll know it when they see it. If that can be done with an accurate definition, that's good, but not as good as direct experience. Who understands birds better, someone with a dictionary or someone who works in an aviary?