RobRoy
Not A Mormon
You still seem to missing the idea that within the computational model consciousness isn't being transferred, it exists as part of your data set no matter where it is, so no matter where it is you are.
No, I’m not. Which is part of the problem. You’re assuming that’s the case because you seem to be locked into the concept. I’m saying that you’re concept of a computational model as applied to consciousness is incorrect. The computational model cannot take consciousness into consideration.
but it is only apparent to you that you are someplace ( anyplace ) when you are conscious.
[snip]
So the idea that we need to be entirely conscious at all times in order to retain our self identity can become a real quagmire.
Yeppers, there it is exactly. You’ve confused “being conscious” with the concept of “consciousness”. We are not speaking the same language, so it’s no wonder you’re having a tough time understanding what it is that I’m saying. You'll need to do some additional research into "consciousness" before we can continue this discussion.
The computational model facilitates all these circumstances as well or better than assuming that we are not in such a construct.
Then you’re talking science fiction, and you’re able to move the goal posts to address any arguments you want. The computational model does not facilitate the concept of consciousness. It can't, which is the crux of my argument.
Even if it could, that would not be afterlife. That would just be life. You seem unable to grasp this notion, as it is another failure of your argument.
As applied to the possibility of an afterlife, perhaps there may be some lapse of consciousness before being integrated into the next reality, but that is no different than going to sleep in Toronto and waking up in New York. Only the causal mechanism for the change in your data set's coordinates is different.
Once again, this is the fault of your misuse of the term "consciousness" and believing it means "being conscious". These are two incredibly different concepts. Suffice to say that within the computational model, I would go to sleep in Toronto, but I would not wake up anywhere. I would die. RobRoy 2.0 would wake up in New York, and, if perfect, no one could tell the difference . . . well, except for dead RobRoy 1.0. But he's dead, so again, no one.
