Ever wonder why the Tea Party hates building green?

[Dymanic]

A big difference is in the terms being used, while dire situations can lead to dismal results, dire and dismal shouldn't be seen as synonymous.

Unless that was clearly the intent of the person using it.

 

[mhaze]

I believe that what the facts support is that very soon we are going to be forced to make some very significant changes in the ways in which we obtain energy and the ways in which we use it. In short: under any forseeable scenario, we're going to have less energy available, and are going to have to learn to be a lot more frugal with what we have. I think most of us recognize this but tend to underestimate the degree of change that will be involved. For some, these changes may require completely abandoning cherished lifestyles. That prospect nearly always looks "dire" to one faced with it, but a lot of that may simply boil down to fear of the unknown. I've been forced to abandon cherished lifestyles more than once during the course of my life, and in looking back later, found myself mostly wondering why I didn't choose to make those changes sooner.

Frankly, although I think those who argue dire consequences of AGW on this forum have a poor case, they do have some science on their side. What do you have? Just the Peak Oil theory. How do you support it?

You have to ignore the massive inputs to the energy equation from shale oil and oil sands, the potential of methanol for automobiles, other uses for methane, the true price of oil over the last century, when adjusted for inflation, many other factors, including nuclear power. You've had to ignore simple realities, such as when there is freely available natural gas close by shale or other oil development, it can and will obviously be used freely for the power and processes at these sites.

There's no fear of the unknown here, and there's no need to change some cherished lifestyle. That's all in your head. As I mentioned, the part where we are in agreement is that peak oil is just a theory - it's when it's filtered through an individual's prejudices and opinions that it becomes something to him. And for you, it's a support for things that it isn't for others. But it's not a very good support for your ideas about necessary social changes. Not at all.

 

[Dymanic]

What do you have? Just the Peak Oil theory. How do you support it?

Asked and answered. Hubbert's model is well supported by post hoc analysis showing it to be a good fit to historical production data. You know this. Why the pretense?

You have to ignore the massive inputs to the energy equation from shale oil and oil sands, the potential of methanol for automobiles, other uses for methane, the true price of oil over the last century, when adjusted for inflation, many other factors, including nuclear power.

Again, you don't have to ignore those; they simply become inputs to the model which may change the predictions. Why do you continue to counter refutations of your assertions by merely repeating the original assertions? Is that all you've got?

 

[mhaze]

Asked and answered. Hubbert's model is well supported by post hoc analysis showing it to be a good fit to historical production data. You know this. Why the pretense?

Again, you don't have to ignore those; they simply become inputs to the model which may change the predictions. Why do you continue to counter refutations of your assertions by merely repeating the original assertions? Is that all you've got?

That's all that's needed here.

 

[Dymanic]

That's all that's needed here.

You really think so? Have you ever noticed that "here" is not a Yahoo chatroom?

 

[mhaze]

You really think so? Have you ever noticed that "here" is not a Yahoo chatroom?

Here is a world where the concepts of Julian Simons won the bet against the hysteria monger, Paul Erlich. It's a world where resource scarcity isn't something to be feared, but to be looked on as an opportunity.

That's the difference you and I have in viewpoint.

 

[Trakar]

Here is a world where the concepts of Julian Simons won the bet against the hysteria monger, Paul Erlich. It's a world where resource scarcity isn't something to be feared, but to be looked on as an opportunity.

So a subjective-based reality with little relevence to the actual issues and facts at hand in this discussion?

 

[mhaze]

So a subjective-based reality with little relevence to the actual issues and facts at hand in this discussion?

Well, yes, but likely not the way you intend it - but I'll let you comment on that.

The subjective based reality of Erlich was proven wrong in his bet with Simons, who used econometric data. Dynamic's presented some vague assertions of a dismal/dire future based on ONE interpretation of the peak oil theory. That's definitely subjective based reality, I think, by admission.

I think this article pretty much sums up my understanding of the confluence of "Peakoil" and modern oil shale retrieval, although I have arrived at my opinions independently, they seem quite obvious.

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/23/peak_oil_is_dead_citigroup/

Peak Oil isn't the only casualty of recent energy developments. The death of Peak Oil kicks away the underpinnings from a great deal of policy-making by our bureaucracies and their advisers. Over the past two decades, we've seen the mushrooming of the "sustainability" sector, which is almost completely dependent on state funding and which shares similar erroneous assumptions.

The proposition we're invited to accept in each case is that modern industrial society is founded on a resource which is being depleted and which cannot be easily replaced. The second part of that is rather crucial. Peak Oil thinking was based on the idea that crude oil couldn't be replaced by unconventional oil and, in time, with synthetic hydrocarbons. We're now seeing unconventional oil production ramp up, and in a decade the low-carbon synthetic replacements for oil will be in production, too, assuming oil remains at $40-$50 a barrel.

The deeper problem shared by both "sustainability" and "Peak Oil" thinking is that both camps insists on thinking of a resource not as a vector, but as a thing - a thing that's rare, unique and irreplaceable.

The Victorians once depended on whale blubber for lighting and heating - and fretted, much like today's sustainability crowd, about what might replace it. Human inventiveness rapidly provided an alternative. And policy-makers were once gripped by the constrained and volatile supply of saltpetre, the nitrate being essential to both feeding their populations and making things that went bang. Then chemistry came to the rescue. Of course a resource is a combination of things - the limits of human invention being just one.

This inflexibility in thinking is proving fatal.​

 

[dc1971]

Who's "anti-transportation"?

It's rather amusing to me that you have inquired about my use of this phrase!

 

[Virus]

It's rather amusing to me that you have inquired about my use of this phrase!

So what does it mean?

 

[mhaze]

So what does it mean?

This thread consists of knowable unknowns, unknown knowables, and unknown unknowns.

What more need you know?

 

[Dymanic]

It's rather amusing to me that you have inquired about my use of this phrase!

The humor in your comment is certainly not lost on me, but, to be fair, while WildCat's views on what represent the most viable solutions to providing energy for transportation vary considerably from mine, I have never, in all the discussions we've had on this subject, seen anything to suggest that he is "anti-transportation". If anything, I am probably more deserving of that label, because I don't see there being any solution or combination of solutions that would permit so many of us to continue to travel as frequently or as far as we are accustomed to doing.

We're going to have to learn to conserve, and to those who don't like that idea I say: deal with it.

 

[Dymanic]

Dynamic's presented some vague assertions of a dismal/dire future based on ONE interpretation of the peak oil theory.

I think I've made it quite clear that starting with different assumptions leads to different predictions, and have noted this to be the explanation for discrepancies in predictions made by different oil experts. (We've all seen the colored graphs showing those different projections, right?) But using different assumptions isn't the same thing as using different interpretations of the theory; Hubbert's model is rather straightforward, and really not subject to a lot of varied interpretation.

I think this article pretty much sums up my understanding of the confluence of "Peakoil" and modern oil shale retrieval.

I'm not surprised. Geologists, eh, what do they know? Bunch of liars anyway, most likely. You want the truth, you gotta go to sources with proven records of honesty and integrity. Like Citigroup. I'll give you this: you're pretty consistent as far your criteria for selecting sources of information.

So am I to understand (finally) that these are the numbers you're going by?:

Bigger impacts are coming as shale oil production accelerates and we expect production to rise by 2-mb/d by 2020, if not more. There is the potential for a resumption of Gulf of Mexicoactivity to add another 1.7- to 2-m b/d to this, although declines in Alaska are expected to continue. If political obstacles to shale oil development in California are overcome, another 1-m b/d could be added, too.

 

[Trakar]

(...)
I think this article pretty much sums up my understanding of the confluence of "Peakoil" and modern oil shale retrieval, although I have arrived at my opinions independently, they seem quite obvious.

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/23/peak_oil_is_dead_citigroup/(...)

So you prefer an oil/investment industry self-promotional whitepaper to independent economic and academic research and considerations? Have you looked at anything other than sources which confirm what you already believe?

I think the primary issue is, again, portrayal. Peak oil/energy isn't a hard wall and cliff situation, so much as it is an issue where demand (even in light of a highly regulated environment designed to discourage use) far outpaces the ability of economic recovery to keep abreast of. It is more an issue of steadily increasing economic stresses and pressures which push us away from petroleum and coal, just as they once did firewood and whale oil. Firewood and whale oil still have a market value today, but by and large, we have moved to other energy sources due to the economics and secondary impacts/influences.

If you are reading other materials, that do not agree with your personal beliefs on the issues of peak oil/energy, I'd be interested in what specific pieces you have read and where you feel them to be wanting.

Suggestions for broader reading:

 

[dc1971]

So what does it mean?

What do you care?

...and why do you need to come to the aid of WildCat every single time?

 

[mhaze]

....by and large, we have moved to other energy sources due to the economics and secondary impacts/influences....

Just as Simons predicted.

....If you are reading other materials, that do not agree with your personal beliefs on the issues of peak oil/energy, I'd be interested in what specific pieces you have read and where you feel them to be wanting. ...

That's an interesting approach, taking the converse of the personal belief pattern.

But Dynamic does not present a mainstream view, not in the least. What he does is present a well understood theory relating to, essentially, specific geological regions, and he extrapolates from it to a worldwide phenomena of "Peak Oil", then extrapolates again to a group of economic and social effects.

At that point, if you were to ask, have I read things from that, the answer is yes, but it is a small alarmist group. We could call them "Peak Oil Alarmists" or "Peak Oil Hysterics" or something. I'd comment in Dynamic's case, that he certainly is sincere, but with logic one cannot get to his conclusions, from his premises. One can reach many conclusions, from the premises. One of those conclusions is the "dire/dismal" one that he prefers or thinks is likely.

But as the article I brought in mentioned (well, it's stuff I already said) when 97% of oil is suddenly found economically retrievable, then a dire and dismal theory regarding the depletion of the 3% isn't going to hold much water.

Incidentally I've also noticed in people that adhere to the dismal future predicated on Peak Oil, ignorance about today's reality of fracking. Just one example, in situ proposed developments in Utah should be producing the highest quality crude, not second rate, and with no wastewater streams. That's late 2020s, not in the next few years.

Some details.

http://energeopolitics.com/2011/08/23/pre-development-of-huge-utah-oil-shale-block-begins-energy/

Three times the reserves of Saudi Arabia. And that's just one region in the USA. Various objections can and have been raised to these developments, for example, CO2 emissions, wildlife, water pollution, etc. But one can't ignore these huge amounts of recoverable oil when looking at the Peak Oil stuff - rather, you have to regenerate the curve and put us currently on the far left side of a 100 year plus peak oil curve. That's just the way it is.

Similarly, one can't ignore gas to liquid conversion technology, or as Ben mentioned, fully synthetic fuels. We well understand how markets react with a commodity scarcity - by substution and innovation, usually with consumer prices winding up lower, not higher. "But with oil it's different".

No.

It's not.

 

[Virus]

What do you care?

...and why do you need to come to the aid of WildCat every single time?

Do you have anything to add except noise?

 

[dc1971]

Do you have anything to add except noise?

Hmmm, interesting that you ask that question. So interesting, it makes me laugh!

 

[Dymanic]

What he does is present a well understood theory relating to, essentially, specific geological regions, and he extrapolates from it to a worldwide phenomena of "Peak Oil"...

Yes, I do. Not the least reason being that Hubbert's key insight was that for fundamental reasons related to the geology and engineering of oil extraction, the (approximate) production curve for an individual well will exhibit roughly the same shape as that for an entire oilfield, or for an entire oil-producing region, or an oil-producing nation. I've challenged you repeatedly to quote a single expert in the field who rejects that, or who does NOT find it reasonable to extrapolate that to global oil production. In response, I got a link to a rather dated article from a libertarian think tank, and one to an article that quoted a newspaper story that quoted a Goldman Sachs "report" that neither of us could find, and finally one citing some actual numbers -- numbers arrived at by the commodities team at Citigroup. I just asked if those are the numbers you've been going by. So far, I've gotten back crickets. I don't want to hound you. Do you intend to answer that question? Would you prefer not to?

...then extrapolates again to a group of economic and social effects.

I regard it as a no-brainer that global oil supply will decline with the inevitable decline in global oil production. Beyond that, things become more difficult to predict. The broader range of economic and social effects will be very dependent on how well and how quickly people (governments, industries, and individuals) respond to the change.

At that point, if you were to ask, have I read things from that, the answer is yes, but it is a small alarmist group. We could call them "Peak Oil Alarmists" or "Peak Oil Hysterics" or something.

There can be little doubt that hysterical alarmists are out there. In fact, I think you may be underestimating their number. But the very fact that you consider them to be a small group implies that you may* recognize that there is also a much larger group of people who, while less vocal in expressing any sense of alarm they may feel, nonetheless accept the inevitability of a peak in global oil production, most of the debate among them being directed toward the timing of the event. This group happens to include a large number of thoroughly credentialed and well-respected industry professionals.

* I say "may" because I'm not sure. When I referred to you above as a "peak oil denialist", your response:

Oh, "peak oil denialist" that's a good one. Some of the guys working fracking here disagree with you.

left it unclear as to whether you deny being a peak oil denialist. Do you consider the opinions of "some guys working fracking" to be the final word on the matter? (And how many is "some", anyway?) Can you really be so completely deluded as to suppose that the astonishingly optimistic view you have tried (barely) to support here is representative of the view taken by the scientific mainstream in this field?

 

[mhaze]

Yes, I do. Not the least reason being that Hubbert's key insight was that for fundamental reasons related to the geology and engineering of oil extraction, the (approximate) production curve for an individual well will exhibit roughly the same shape as that for an entire oilfield, or for an entire oil-producing region, or an oil-producing nation. I've challenged you repeatedly to quote a single expert in the field who rejects that, or who does NOT find it reasonable to extrapolate that to global oil production. In response, I got a link to a rather dated article from a libertarian think tank, and one to an article that quoted a newspaper story that quoted a Goldman Sachs "report" that neither of us could find, and finally one citing some actual numbers -- numbers arrived at by the commodities team at Citigroup. I just asked if those are the numbers you've been going by. So far, I've gotten back crickets. I don't want to hound you. Do you intend to answer that question? Would you prefer not to?

I regard it as a no-brainer that global oil supply will decline with the inevitable decline in global oil production. Beyond that, things become more difficult to predict. The broader range of economic and social effects will be very dependent on how well and how quickly people (governments, industries, and individuals) respond to the change.

There can be little doubt that hysterical alarmists are out there. In fact, I think you may be underestimating their number. But the very fact that you consider them to be a small group implies that you may* recognize that there is also a much larger group of people who, while less vocal in expressing any sense of alarm they may feel, nonetheless accept the inevitability of a peak in global oil production, most of the debate among them being directed toward the timing of the event. This group happens to include a large number of thoroughly credentialed and well-respected industry professionals.

* I say "may" because I'm not sure. When I referred to you above as a "peak oil denialist", your response:
left it unclear as to whether you deny being a peak oil denialist. Do you consider the opinions of "some guys working fracking" to be the final word on the matter? (And how many is "some", anyway?) Can you really be so completely deluded as to suppose that the astonishingly optimistic view you have tried (barely) to support here is representative of the view taken by the scientific mainstream in this field?

A "peakoil" theory is developed about 3% of oil reserves. Suddenly we know how to get to and retrieve an order of magnitude more oil. The rational thing would be to say "Ok, I need to revise the "peakoil" theory and now the peak will be a long time off".

But you haven't.

How exactly can that be? That's ignoring reality, isn't it? I guess one could just be skeptical about the payout for the Utah play above mentioned that has 3x the recoverable reserves as Saudi Arabia. And the payout for the Eagle Ford shale. And many, many others. And ignore the obvious possibility of M85 to drastically and immediately cut foreign oil imports. That's why you keep going back to (liquid oil) and I keep emphasizing the subject is (liquid oil and substituent near equivalents). No peakoil theory can ever hold for a commodity and it's substitutes.

By the way, it occurs to me that it may make it clearer if I explain my position as having two arguments.

1. shale and sands will put off the peak on any oil retrieval curve - small area, big area, the country, etc, and quite substantially, to the point of making the Peak oil arguments meaningless
2. commodity substitution economics operates as a result of resource scarcity and price increases.

In a sense, (2) is an example of (1) where shale is substituted for liquid oil retrieval.

But leaving that aside, I am still looking at "resource scarcity and rising prices" as a good thing, while you look at it as a bad thing, because it drives ingenuity, innovation, new methods and ultimately lower prices for goods to fill the category of consumer demand.

M85 alone can put a huge dent in the liquid petroleum requirements of the transportation sector.

There is no dismal future and no dire consequences, and no requirements for "urgent action now" to stave off the Apocalypse resulting from not listening to the hysterical profits of doom....either in this PeakOil discussion or any of several other similar subjects.