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Explain consciousness to the layman.

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Another computing system will be able to exhibit conscious behavior.

Can you define "computing system" in a way that clearly encompasses my brain and the machine I'm typing this post on, but which clearly excludes other things such as clouds, oceans, muscles, and supernovae?

If you use Wolfram's definition of "compute", then I agree with you, because every physical system is a computer, which means that we have no reason to doubt that a conscious machine could be built.

But if you want to talk narrowly about the kind of object we current call a computer, then you'll have to demonstrate clear equivalence. This is going to be a challenge, given how much is still unkown about the brain.
 
And by the way, why is a question about biology posted in the philosophy forum?

For the same reason that the philosophers are the ones writing books about it. When the phenomenon is properly understood, the philosophers will withdraw and the scientists will take over.
 
Well, my friend, you're gonna have to bring the heat, then.

You're going to have to explain why the brain is an exception.

And the burden of proof is not on those who aren't convinced. Proving that a simulation of the brain would not be conscious is clearly impossible. That does not imply that a simulation of the brain would be conscious.
 
but these assertions are, of course, hopelessly incoherent because the "world of the simulation" exists only in the mind of the perceiver of the output of the simulation and nowhere in objective physical reality. In short, it's an imaginary world.
This isn't quite true. There are many necessary requirements on the "world of the simulation" regarding various mappings of particular interest to (or from) the thing being simulated, which greatly constrain what must be true of the "world of simulation" outside of any interpretation of a mind.
 
No, you're not getting it.

What I'm saying is that the claim itself is nonsense.

Yeah, it's reasonable to say that conscious machines can be built.

But we don't know enough about consciousness to claim that a computer, on its own, is capable of being conscious... and given the lack of functional and structural equivalence between our brains and the machines we call computers, there's no reason at the moment to believe that it could be.
That's the diametric opposite of reality. Your position requires that consciousness is necessarily non-computable. There is not the slightest reason to believe that.
 
There's one big distraction I think we need to dispense with, and that's all the talk about digital computer simulations being conscious.
Nope. Wrong. If they act conscious, if they can actually reflect on their own mental processes, that's proof that they are conscious.

If I made a functional model of a power plant, for instance, it would actually produce energy that I could measure with an electrician's meter. If I made a functional model of a tornado, it would actually toss around objects that were placed in its vicinity.
Blatant category error. As always.

How is a simulated story different from a real story, Piggy? You've never even attempted to address that.
 
This isn't quite true. There are many necessary requirements on the "world of the simulation" regarding various mappings of particular interest to (or from) the thing being simulated, which greatly constrain what must be true of the "world of simulation" outside of any interpretation of a mind.

The model has physical restrictions on it which are designed to be similar to the restrictions which operate on the thing being modelled. That doesn't mean that the process in the model is the same as the process in the thing being modelled, but in a different world. It might be as simple as the inverse square law applying to both.
 
Conscious machines will come into existence when the semantic web and their semantic reasoners are built. They avoid the potential problem of being merely syntactic simulations without any understanding because they are not mere syntactic simulations, and they provide authentic meaning and understanding to the machine via semantics for authentic machine consciousness.
http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/SW-FAQ#
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_reasoner
 
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Can you define "computing system" in a way that clearly encompasses my brain and the machine I'm typing this post on, but which clearly excludes other things such as clouds, oceans, muscles, and supernovae?

If you use Wolfram's definition of "compute", then I agree with you, because every physical system is a computer, which means that we have no reason to doubt that a conscious machine could be built.

But if you want to talk narrowly about the kind of object we current call a computer, then you'll have to demonstrate clear equivalence. This is going to be a challenge, given how much is still unkown about the brain.

Hi Piggy,

Looks like we're on the same side this time. I wonder what sides we'll be on by the end of the debate.

I have put forward the notion that consciousness is a development of living things enabling them to operate in an environment or realm, a physical reality. A sense of spacial presence in that realm is fundamental in consciousness.

I accept that a virtual consciousness could exist in a computer, but it would dwell in a virtual realm and would be very different to consciousness as we know it. It could be mounted in a robot but we would have little more than a walking Pinocchio.
 
Conscious machines will come into existence when the semantic web and their semantic reasoners are built. They avoid the potential problem of being merely syntactic simulations without any understanding because they are not mere syntactic simulations, and they provide authentic meaning and understanding to the machine via semantics for authentic machine consciousness.
http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/SW-FAQ#
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_reasoner
Semantics is syntax.
 
I have put forward the notion that consciousness is a development of living things enabling them to operate in an environment or realm, a physical reality. A sense of spacial presence in that realm is fundamental in consciousness.
Even if we accept that, why is it any problem for a conscious computer?
 
Your post was a direct (one word) response to my post, which claimed that reality couldn't be emulated on a computer. In order to clarify what I meant, I've defined the difference between emulation and simulation.

Programs on a computer that purport to represent reality are not equivalent to that reality. They are real processes in this world. They do not constitute other worlds of their own. Halo is not a real interstellar war.

It depends where you consider the emulation to start and the simulation to end.

Still, your answer had nothing to do with my request for evidence. Just because I ask for evidence does not imply anything about my own beliefs.
 
I've tried for years to figure out how you could program pain, and I can't. I figured out how to program every other human feature

You figured out how to program pleasure? How? Why wouldn't that be simply the opposite of pain?
 
You figured out how to program pleasure? How? Why wouldn't that be simply the opposite of pain?

That's a good point. It can be pleased (satisfied) if it solves a problem because it has likes and dislikes. But if you are referring to pleasure as some sort of specific sensory experience the opposite of pain, then I can't do that.
 
Hi Piggy,

Looks like we're on the same side this time. I wonder what sides we'll be on by the end of the debate.

I have put forward the notion that consciousness is a development of living things enabling them to operate in an environment or realm, a physical reality. A sense of spacial presence in that realm is fundamental in consciousness.

I accept that a virtual consciousness could exist in a computer, but it would dwell in a virtual realm and would be very different to consciousness as we know it. It could be mounted in a robot but we would have little more than a walking Pinocchio.

Pinocchio could walk.
 
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