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Sure. You specifically misinterpreted my post in #1187:
Well materialism is not the same thing as monism first off. So if you want a monist point of view, there are plenty to choose from.
Because you said:
What other monist choices do you see available for a materialist? I see none.
You seem to have thought that I was claiming that materialism has other choices for monism. What I was saying, though, was that monism doesn't entail materialism.
Nor do I see how anyone might consider it a monism.
There's a simple solution. Maybe it's neither monism nor dualism. Recall in #1183 when I said you made a false dichotomy.
Only one is correct. Do you choose the "ontology doesn't map to any conceptualizations" postulate? If so, what do you believe you gain? Here you are participating.
It sounds good, but I'm a bit agnostic.
If you say so. I disagree.
It's not enough for you to disagree. Do you presume you actually get to vote on it? It's not actually up to you. As soon as there's a materialist who is not 100% sure of materialism, but merely convinced of it, you're wrong. It's his vote.
By what means could you possibly know this sort of person doesn't exist? It's a bit ironic that you're trying to argue that materialists are all 100% sure of materialism, and absolutely against any form of dualism; and yet, in the same post, you're also trying to argue that you're only aware of your own consciousness and not anyone else's.
Anyway, let's get to that point.
Maybe. I'm aware of some thing that I have, for sure. But I'm also an English speaker, and "consciousness" is an English word. I didn't make it up--I'm just borrowing it.
Now, the general idea is that words within the context of a language get their meaning from a particular contextual usage--and within that context, from the specific way that the terms are used. What happens here is that I see people using this word "consciousness" a particular way--I defer to that usage that I observe for a definition. Seeing as how I personally seem to have an experience in this world, and how the usage of that term seems to describe this kind of thing that I have, I take a guess that the meaning of the term "consciousness" probably has to do with that thing that I have.
So from this analysis, I think you (and westprog) have it precisely backwards. If that one thing that only you observe is something that only you have, then it's probably not what the term "consciousness" means. But I think the way you are applying this, you're not using the same analysis--you're saying that if only you have it, then only you are conscious.
My objection is that you don't define the language. My only reason to think that consciousness applies to that thing that I have is my guess that it is what everyone is on about when they use the word.
Mine, sure. Yours? I see behaviors which may (or may not) actually map to your consciousness.
...and the idea is, no--not mine. Just the general majority of the people who sustain the English language and use the term. Whatever behaviors they are talking about when they say "consciousness" is, per the rules of language, what consciousness means. If what you have doesn't map, either you're special, or you are missing out on something.
And again, I'm guessing I'm not special.
Because, as most recognize, it is different; hence interminable threads like this one.
You indirectly observe me, and you indirectly observe electricity. Where's the difference? Do you presume you're jumping over two gaps to get to me and only one to get to electricity?
