The only way this to make any sense is if Iranian nuclear infrastructure was critical to their economic well being. It's not, they have alternatives. Therefore your claims they must have an independent fuel supply is useless.
That Iranian nuclear power is acceptable in no way addresses the issue that their nuclear enrichment activities are.
Secondly, much of Iranian enrichment activities amount to much more than just production of fuel. Why? Are you going to claim nuclear medicine is also absolutely vital for Iran to the point of having to rely on imports being completely intolerable?
Nope DavidS, I think "ludicrous drivel" describes your 'argument' quite well.
McHrozni
Then you're still not understanding me.
It was your earlier post that attacked the acceptability of Iranian nuclear power by suggesting it wasn't essential to their national survival. The post quoted above again throws "absolutely vital" at a point to which it just doesn't stick.
I never asserted that Iran "must have an independent fuel supply" for any "absolutely vital" purpose. I never even asserted that Iran should be allowed to have any nuclear operations at all.
My point is that foreign fuel supply offered on the condition that they do not develop their own may have little value for them whether their intent is to generate weapons (the imported fuel is presumably useless for weapons because it won't boom) or electricity (the imported fuel would be useless without costly, long-lead-time infrastructure developments that would then be exposed to supply disruption for as long as they'd need to develop domestic supplies or replace the plants). Whether Iran "must have" that power or weapons generation infrastructure doesn't really come into play. Neither is whether the costs are "critical to their economic well being" relevant; it's enough that those costs are more than they want to risk paying.
So, again:
Iran might reasonably reject, or intend to violate, an agreement to import fuel on condition they forego their own fuel enrichment if they intend to develop nuclear weapons.
Iran might reasonably reject, or intend to violate, an agreement to import fuel on condition they forego their own fuel enrichment if they intend to implement considerable nuclear power generation infrastructure.
Since they might reasonably reject the agreement for either reason, the rejection alone doesn't illuminate which.
Others might reasonably make such an offer to Iran, intending to honor the agreement, if they're willing to accept Iranian nuclear power infrastructure and expecting Iran to honor the agreement.
Others might reasonably make such an offer to Iran, intending to dishonor or threaten to dishonor the agreement sooner or later, if they're unwilling to accept Iranian nuclear power infrastructure without gaining some leverage for future confrontations.
Others might reasonably make such an offer to Iran for the offer's sake alone, expecting Iranian rejection.
