Explain consciousness to the layman.

[westprog]

Again, you turn a question about consciousness into accusations about Mr. Scott.

Yeah, he does that. He's the ad hominem guy. Never mind the argument, look for the motivation. In fact, ignore the argument, surmise the motivation, and argue against that. Those ideas are just wedges, and shouldn't be addressed.

 

[Mr. Scott]

It didn't hold out for a million dollar contract.

But that's sphexish, not conscious.

 

[Leumas]

I think this thread has gone astray with all the bickering. It is quite confusing to figure out what anyone’s opinions are.

May I suggest something.... PLEASE.....

Everyone who is participating....please....stop for a few minutes and post a SUMMARY of where you currently stand as far as the OP is concerned:

What is consciousness as far as you are NOW concerned after all this?

Please just take a few minutes and write a few words to SUM UP what you think consciousness is. Please also include your view on all the issues that you have discussed or are interested in as far as has been discussed in the forum so far.

Please give the post a Title when you are editing it by putting a title in the title edit box above the body area. Please call it something clear like “Summary of my opinion” or something like that.

 

[westprog]

For one thing, because of the high rate of false positives. I remember watching a paramecium on a microscope slide, and being shocked at how much it looked like a dog searching for a bone (or a skeptic trying to out a woo, or Robert Wright trying to out Daniel Dennett as a Satan worshiper

Let me throw this ball into the melee.

westprog asserted IIRC that a Turing Machine could not be conscious because it didn't have IO or timing control, and therefore couldn't perform interactive functions like controling a ball catching robot.

I'll propose that a true ball catching robot was conscious, because it saw the ball, remembered its position, saw the ball a fraction of a second later, compared its present position with its remembered position, extrapolated its position when it was near enough to catch, rehearsed catching in its internal model of the environment, then reached out its mechanical hand to the ball's future position and instructed the fingers to close in time to grasp the ball before it bounced out. I'm proposing that the robot had a tiny spark of consciousness. Real consciousness. If not, why not?

I don't think that interacting with the environment is a good test for consciousness, because everything* interacts with its environment. Actual computers interact with their environment, but such interaction is made as minimal as possible by design - since the Turing model is of something with no interaction with its environment.**

Human beings clearly use their brains to interact with the environment (or if you prefer, the brains use the humans), and hence I consider it at least possible that this interaction with the environment is essential for consciousness.


*Everything in the real world, that is.
**The Turing model being abstract

 

[dlorde]

How are we to distinguish between two things that both seem conscious but only one is?

That's the key to this thread; how can we explain or describe consciousness to anyone if we can't even recognise it?

Yes, Dennett seems conscious

Indeed, but how can we be sure? Do we always have to measure our confidence by how physiologically similar Dennett (or any other entity) is to ourselves (who we know to be conscious)? That doesn't seem satisfactory to me.

How does one make the transition from mystic, dualist, qualiaphile to physicalist?

Scepticism & critical thinking?

PS: Can we stop playing "out the woo" and talk about consciousness? Pleeeese?

Can't we do both? They tend to be found together - the ill-defined nature of consciousness tends to invite woo explanations.

I've been focusing on the rationality/bias problem punshhh illustrates so well - happy to accept the possibility of consciousness in living creatures; not willing to accept that possibility in non-living constructs; yet admitting to not knowing how to definitively recognise consciousness or describe the exclusive properties of life that are essential to consciousness.

But if we can't point to some attribute(s) unique to living things that are also necessarily essential to consciousness (and it seems we can't), then we cannot reasonably deny the possibility of consciousness in non-living constructs.

However, although the 'you know it when you see it' approach may not be good enough, because, as you point out above, and as punshh himself suggests, you can't be sure that it isn't an imitation, simulation, or mimic of consciousness, it does raise the looks-walks-quacks-like-a-duck (similar criteria) problem; if we can only identify consciousness based on objective behavioural criteria, i.e. we know it when we see it (which we cannot reasonably restrict to living creatures alone), how could we deny consciousness if we encountered apparently conscious behaviour in a non-living construct?

So (rhetorical) what are the objective criteria for consciousness?

We don't know whether it might be possible, in practice, to create such a construct; but it highlights some of the problems of defining and identifying consciousness that need to be addressed. It seems to me that this is relevant not just for the future of AI, but there's also an ethical dimension to identifying degrees and types of consciousness in our fellow creatures.

PPS: I am a huge Dennett fan. Have you seen his YouTube debate with that dickhead Robert Wright? Nice bickering there about consciousness. Still laughing about the gremlinometer.

Me too

 

[westprog]

Summary of what Westprog thinks

I think this thread has gone astray with all the bickering. It is quite confusing to figure out what anyone’s opinions are.

May I suggest something.... PLEASE.....

Everyone who is participating....please....stop for a few minutes and post a SUMMARY of where you currently stand as far as the OP is concerned:

What is consciousness as far as you are NOW concerned after all this?

Please just take a few minutes and write a few words to SUM UP what you think consciousness is. Please also include your view on all the issues that you have discussed or are interested in as far as has been discussed in the forum so far.

Please give the post a Title when you are editing it by putting a title in the title edit box above the body area. Please call it something clear like “Summary of my opinion” or something like that.

• Consciousness is undefined
• Even though consciousness is undefined, we are still able to discuss it
• Subjective experience is an essential element of consciousness, and any model of consciousness that doesn't encompass subjective experience is incomplete
• There is a prevailing theory that consciousness can be created by a computational process, which works according to the Turing Machine model
• According to this model of computation, there is a process which could be carried out on any form of computing equipment which would give an identical subjective experience to being a human being
• I consider this theory of computation unproven
• I also consider that the Turing model of computation does not reflect the way that the brain in fact works, in particular in its role in external interaction
• I regard the definitions of computation commonly used as not being part of a physical theory - i.e. a theory which is part of the science of physics
• If computation is not presented as a physical theory, it therefore follows that consciousness, if created by computation, is also not a physical quantity.
• I believe that it is at least possible that consciousness is created by particular physical activities in the brain, though it is not possible at present to determine what those physical activities might be.
• I am not prepared, in the absence of any reliable theory, to rule anything in or out related to this topic, except where it is self-contradictory.

If any of this isn't clear, then I'd be happy to expand on it. I'm not going to discuss it on the basis that the above isn't what I really think, or what my hidden agenda or beliefs are, or that particular words might have an alternative meaning that at a stretch could be interpreted to mean something else.

 

[westprog]

That's the key to this thread; how can we explain or describe consciousness to anyone if we can't even recognise it?

But we are, in fact, very very good at recognising consciousness. Most human beings are able to distinguish other conscious beings very quickly indeed. It's just that expressing exactly how we do it is very difficult to do. It's also been very difficult to devise an objective test for consciousness.

 

[dlorde]

But we are, in fact, very very good at recognising consciousness. Most human beings are able to distinguish other conscious beings very quickly indeed.

OK. Perhaps I'm different. I seem to see various and uncertain levels of consciousness, and I'm quite uncertain for many creatures, partly because I'm not sure what behaviour counts and what doesn't.

Can you tell me, is a rat conscious? a lizard? a frog? a fish? a bee? an ant? a snail?

Where do you assess the cut-off point to be? what creature do you feel has the most minimal level of consciousness?

 

[H'ethetheth]

Again, you turn a question about consciousness into accusations about Mr. Scott. I will no longer entertain these diversions, and I've already explained why.

By "seems conscious" I mean the gut feeling that an entity is conscious. Should gut feeling even be considered a "metric?" Gut feelings are always suspect and often wrong, e.g., the only thing that makes people conclude qualia are incomputable and immaterial is gut feeling.

I don't think people are talking about gut feeling when they say "seems conscious". Pixymisa, for instance, uses a very specific kind of process as a dividing line. The Turing test is another very specific test, though not quite as specific as self-referential information processing, but as specific as deciding that other people are consious.

And the alternative, if I understand westprog, must be that the only way of knowing with certainty that something has subjective experciences is by being the thing itself. This is, of course, simply impossible, and therefore scientifically an utterly uninteresting proposition. It does not and cannot pertain to the world that scientists can observe.

 

[Irony]

But we are, in fact, very very good at recognising consciousness. Most human beings are able to distinguish other conscious beings very quickly indeed. It's just that expressing exactly how we do it is very difficult to do. It's also been very difficult to devise an objective test for consciousness.

Indeed, humans are so good at it that they will often perceive consciousness in stuffed animals, corpses, weather patterns, volcanoes, and even empty space.

In fact, we know quite well how humans do this. We use our mirror neurons to project our own consciousness on to those things. That's why our "feelings" in the matter cannot be trusted.

 

[westprog]

I don't think people are talking about gut feeling when they say "seems conscious". Pixymisa, for instance, uses a very specific kind of process as a dividing line. The Turing test is another very specific test, though not quite as specific as self-referential information processing, but as specific as deciding that other people are consious.

I don't see how the solution to finding a definition of consciousness is to define something else and call it consciousness. The Pixy definition is not even a definition - it's an explanation, if anything. The Turing test is also not a definition - it's a test for the presence of the undefined quality. One could define consciousness as that quality detected by the Turing test, but clearly that's an unsatisfactory definition.

And the alternative, if I understand westprog, must be that the only way of knowing with certainty that something has subjective experciences is by being the thing itself. This is, of course, simply impossible, and therefore scientifically an utterly uninteresting proposition. It does not and cannot pertain to the world that scientists can observe.

It may or may not be true that the only way to be certain of subjective experience is to experience it. It may also be true that this makes subjective experience outside of scientific interest. However - this doesn't mean that other people's subjective experiences should be of no interest to us as human beings. If Mrs H'ethetheth were to tell Mr H'ethetheth how she feels, and he were to reply that it was entirely uninteresting to him, I don't think that would go down well at all. Other people's subjective experiences are possibly the most important thing to most human beings, next to their own subjective experiences.

 

[westprog]

Indeed, humans are so good at it that they will often perceive consciousness in stuffed animals, corpses, weather patterns, volcanoes, and even empty space.

Yes, some human beings do this. Most don't, most of the time.

In fact, we know quite well how humans do this. We use our mirror neurons to project our own consciousness on to those things. That's why our "feelings" in the matter cannot be trusted.

They probably shouldn't, entirely. However, they are the best we have.

 

[westprog]

OK. Perhaps I'm different. I seem to see various and uncertain levels of consciousness, and I'm quite uncertain for many creatures, partly because I'm not sure what behaviour counts and what doesn't.

Can you tell me, is a rat conscious? a lizard? a frog? a fish? a bee? an ant? a snail?

Where do you assess the cut-off point to be? what creature do you feel has the most minimal level of consciousness?

I tend to see less consciousness in a dog than a human being, and more in a dog than an ant, and none at all in a rock. I have no particular feeling about what it's like to be an ant, and not much about what it's like to be a dog.

 

[Mr. Scott]

Why did consciousness evolve?

ASSUMING consciousness is an uncomputable, mystical, immaterial phenomenon, why did it evolve?

What survival advantage did it endow us with?

 

[westprog]

ASSUMING consciousness is an uncomputable, mystical, immaterial phenomenon, why did it evolve?

If we are to assume that consciousness is "mystical and immaterial" then we have no reason to assume that it evolved. I would have thought that it is better to assume that it isn't mystical and immaterial, because that gives some scope for progress.

What survival advantage did it endow us with?

 

[rocketdodger]

Again, you turn a question about consciousness into accusations about Mr. Scott. I will no longer entertain these diversions, and I've already explained why.

wtf are you talking about? I never accused you of anything. I happen to like you in fact.

By "seems conscious" I mean the gut feeling that an entity is conscious. Should gut feeling even be considered a "metric?" Gut feelings are always suspect and often wrong, e.g., the only thing that makes people conclude qualia are incomputable and immaterial is gut feeling.

I am saying that "gut feeling" is not a consistent feeling. It depends on how much you know about something ahead of time.

I don't have any gut feeling about qualia, because I feel like I know exactly how "redness" works. My gut feeling about redness is that if I had a powerful enough simulator, and a software environment capable of supporting the tools I would need, I could actually create a mind that saw red. I have a very good idea of what the neural network topology would be.

If I didn't know all this ahead of time, my gut feeling would be different.

That being said, there is also the instinctual gut feeling, like the thing mothers claim they feel when their kid is in a car accident across the world. However, even in that case -- if the kid is actually in the next room, I doubt they would have the gut feeling. It all depends on the knowledge ahead of time.

 

[westprog]

I want more than nothing.

If you cannot even accept that "physics" is a real, well-understood term, then I cannot see how you will ever be satisfied.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Physical meaning "related to the study of physics"
Physical meaning "related to the material world"

• Consciousness is undefined
• Even though consciousness is undefined, we are still able to discuss it
• Subjective experience is an essential element of consciousness, and any model of consciousness that doesn't encompass subjective experience is incomplete
• There is a prevailing theory that consciousness can be created by a computational process, which works according to the Turing Machine model
• According to this model of computation, there is a process which could be carried out on any form of computing equipment which would give an identical subjective experience to being a human being
• I consider this theory of computation unproven
• I also consider that the Turing model of computation does not reflect the way that the brain in fact works, in particular in its role in external interaction
• I regard the definitions of computation commonly used as not being part of a physical theory - i.e. a theory which is part of the science of physics
• If computation is not presented as a physical theory, it therefore follows that consciousness, if created by computation, is also not a physical quantity.
• I believe that it is at least possible that consciousness is created by particular physical activities in the brain, though it is not possible at present to determine what those physical activities might be.
• I am not prepared, in the absence of any reliable theory, to rule anything in or out related to this topic, except where it is self-contradictory.

 

[PixyMisa]

But we are, in fact, very very good at recognising consciousness. Most human beings are able to distinguish other conscious beings very quickly indeed. It's just that expressing exactly how we do it is very difficult to do. It's also been very difficult to devise an objective test for consciousness.

We're very good at recognising consciousness when it is there.

We are also very good are inferring consciousness when it isn't there.

False negatives are low, but false positives are off the chart.

Edit: Ninja'd by a household appliance.

 

[PixyMisa]

I didn't expect you to understand.

I understand just fine.

I am making a distinction between self and mind, Can you conceive of that?

Of course.

Of course to you these are both effects generated by the brain.

Because that's what they are.