IAEA inspections underway in Iran

bit_pattern

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bit_pattern
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So what is the big problem again? We have an NPT signatory allowing inspectors access to their civilian nuclear programme as per their rights under the NPT - yet for some reason we need to bomb them? :confused:

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57367993/un-nuclear-inspection-gets-under-way-in-iran/

(AP) TEHRAN, Iran - Iran's foreign minister expressed optimism Sunday that a visit by U.N. inspectors to Iran's nuclear facilities would produce an understanding, despite world concerns that Iran is trying to build nuclear weapons.

The three-day inspection tour by the International Atomic Energy Agency team comes during spiking tension. The West is imposing new sanctions to try to force Iran to slow or halt its nuclear program, and Iran is threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, a vital oil passage, in retaliation.

Visiting Ethiopia, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi appeared to be trying to defuse the crisis.

"We are very optimistic about the mission and the outcome" of the IAEA mission, Salehi was quoted as saying by Iran's semiofficial Mehr news agency.

"We've always tried to put transparency as a principle in our cooperation with IAEA," Salehi said. "During this visit, the delegation has questions and the necessary answers will be given,"
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I trust the IAEA will do their job. The last time they inspected Iran they noted all sorts of activity indicating nuclear weapons were being pursued. If they see nothing then that will be reported.
 
Travis said:
I trust the IAEA will do their job. The last time they inspected Iran they noted all sorts of activity indicating nuclear weapons were being pursued. If they are allowed to see nothing then that will be reported.
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FTFY

And if they find evidence that Iran is still persuing nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT, I'm sure the usual suspects will leap to Irans defence.
 
Sword_Of_Truth said:
FTFY

And if they find evidence that Iran is still persuing nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT, I'm sure the usual suspects will leap to Irans defence.
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Ironic considering that your edit of Travis' quote implied that you would never beleive it even if they find no evidence. :rolleyes:
 
bit_pattern said:
So what is the big problem again? We have an NPT signatory allowing inspectors access to their civilian nuclear programme as per their rights under the NPT - yet for some reason we need to bomb them? :confused:

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57367993/un-nuclear-inspection-gets-under-way-in-iran/
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Hmmmm...how about the issue that if Iran is not doing anything wrong, why did they not agree to this earlier? Why did things have to come to such an extreme before they'd allow such an option? Not to mention that just saying they're going to allow inspectors doesn't actually mean they're gonna' grant meaningful access.

My personal prediction (see how my prognostication skills are today): Inspectors will be allowed in, but given limited access, and many sites or activities that they want to inspect will be denied with various excuses. The inspectors will conclude that Iran is being more than a little disingenuous, and that they still appear to be hiding something...but can't prove it, because they weren't allowed access to the places that would provide that proof. Iran, meanwhile, will say, "You see? We let your inspectors in, and they couldn't find any proof that we're doing anything wrong"...and some small, deluded portion of the world's population will actually defend them.
 
Wolfman said:
Hmmmm...how about the issue that if Iran is not doing anything wrong, why did they not agree to this earlier? Why did things have to come to such an extreme before they'd allow such an option?
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Easily answered. They did. They have.

Peter Jenkins was Britain's permanent representative to the IAEA from 2001-06

Nine years have passed since I first talked to Iranian diplomats about their nuclear program. Then, I was Britain's representative at the International Atomic Energy Agency and I disbelieved the reassuring words of my Iranian interlocutors about their commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

At the time, I was all for denying Iran any capacity relevant to making nuclear weapons. Now, however, I see things differently.

The treaty prohibits the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. But it permits the uranium enrichment that has been at the heart of the West's quarrel with Iran. I say ''the West's quarrel'' because more has changed since 2003 than my beliefs.

Then, almost all the states in the IAEA were angry that Iran had concealed its research into enriching uranium. They backed the West's demand that Iran account for its secret work. And they supported the West's view that Iran must suspend enrichment until that accounting was complete.

Now, the West is all but isolated. Most non-Westerners would prefer to see Iran treated like other treaty parties - allowed to enrich uranium in return for intrusive monitoring by IAEA inspectors. My sympathies lie with the non-Westerners. My hunch is this gathering crisis could be avoided by a deal along the following lines - Iran would accept top-notch IAEA safeguards in return for being allowed to continue enriching uranium. In addition, Iran would volunteer some confidence-building measures to show it has no intention of making nuclear weapons.

This, essentially, is the deal that Iran offered Britain, France and Germany in 2005. With hindsight, that offer should have been snapped up. It wasn't, because our objective was to put a stop to all enrichment in Iran. That has remained the West's aim ever since, despite countless Iranian reminders that they are unwilling to be treated as a second-class party to the treaty and despite all the evidence that the Iranian character is more inclined to defiance than buckling under pressure.

Read more: http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/po...hway-to-war-20120124-1qfiq.html#ixzz1kvu8szAb
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The Times reported, in its lead story the day after the report came out, that I.A.E.A. investigators “have amassed a trove of new evidence that, they say, makes a ‘credible’ case” that Iran may be carrying out nuclear-weapons activities. The newspaper quoted a Western diplomat as declaring that “the level of detail is unbelievable…. The report describes virtually all the steps to make a nuclear warhead and the progress Iran has achieved in each of those steps. It reads likes a menu.” The Times set the tone for much of the coverage. (A second Times story that day on the I.A.E.A. report noted, more cautiously, that “it is true that the basic allegations in the report are not substantially new, and have been discussed by experts for years.”)

But how definitive, or transformative, were the findings? The I.A.E.A. said it had continued in recent years “to receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program” and, as a result, it has been able “to refine its analysis.” The net effect has been to create “more concern.” But Robert Kelley, a retired I.A.E.A. director and nuclear engineer who previously spent more than thirty years with the Department of Energy’s nuclear-weapons program, told me that he could find very little new information in the I.A.E.A. report. He noted that hundreds of pages of material appears to come from a single source: a laptop computer, allegedly supplied to the I.A.E.A. by a Western intelligence agency, whose provenance could not be established. Those materials, and others, “were old news,” Kelley said, and known to many journalists. “I wonder why this same stuff is now considered ‘new information’ by the same reporters.”

A nuanced assessment of the I.A.E.A. report was published by the Arms Control Association (A.C.A.), a nonprofit whose mission is to encourage public support for effective arms control. The A.C.A. noted that the I.A.E.A. did “reinforce what the nonproliferation community has recognized for some times: that Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons development activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, but continued others.” (The American intelligence community reached the same conclusion in a still classified 2007 estimate.) The I.A.E.A.’s report “suggests,” the A.C.A. paper said, that Iran “is working to shorten the timeframe to build the bomb once and if it makes that decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent nor is it inevitable.” Greg Thielmann, a former State Department and Senate Intelligence Committee analyst who was one of the authors of the A.C.A. assessment, told me, “There is troubling evidence suggesting that studies are still going on, but there is nothing that indicates that Iran is really building a bomb.” He added, “Those who want to drum up support for a bombing attack on Iran sort of aggressively misrepresented the report.”

Joseph Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshare Fund, a disarmament group, who serves on Hillary Clinton’s International Security Advisory Board, said, “I was briefed on most of this stuff several years ago at the I.A.E.A. headquarters in Vienna. There’s little new in the report. Most of this information is well known to experts who follow the issue.” Cirincione noted that “post-2003, the report only cites computer modelling and a few other experiments.” (A senior I.A.E.A. official similarly told me, “I was underwhelmed by the information.”)
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Read more http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2011/11/iran-and-the-iaea.html#ixzz1kvvJinyd
 
bit_pattern said:
Easily answered. They did. They have.

Peter Jenkins was Britain's permanent representative to the IAEA from 2001-06
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Iran's claim is that it only wants to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, primarily to fuel nuclear power plants.

When they presented the proposal you've linked to above, France, Germany and the UK responded with a counter-proposal...that Iran would be supplied with nuclear fuel, that it could use for any peaceful purposes it wanted. The nuclear fuel would be produced in other countries, and the fuel rods returned to those countries once it was used up. This proposal fully allowed Iran to pursue any and all peaceful uses of nuclear power that it wanted to...

...and they rejected it entirely. They insisted, and continue to insist, that they must do the enriching themselves.

Now, call me a pessimist...but if Iran's goals were really to seek only the peaceful use of nuclear power, then they would accept this deal, which not only would allow them to accomplish that goal, but would then also enable them to demonstrate that they truly wanted it only for peaceful purposes...giving them a stronger position to bargain later to be able to do their own enrichment, after they had a proven track record.

This is a state that has called unequivocally for the total eradication of Israel. It is a state with extreme control of its people, and little or no tolerance of dissent. It is a state that, in the past, has clearly stated its desire for nuclear weapons (although it now denies that). It is a state that still has a standing reward for the assassination of Salman Rushdie for his book "The Satanic Verses". It is a state that has illegally provided hundreds of millions of dollars of weapons to Hezbollah. None of these things are things that cause me to feel a sense of trust.

And before you start raising issues of Israel, or American actions...I'm opposed to many American policies, and I think that there should be forced inspections of Israel, too. I think that there's a lot of hypocrisy involved...

...but that doesn't mean that being cautious (or even paranoid) about Iran is not justified.
 
bit_pattern said:
Easily answered. They did. They have.

Peter Jenkins was Britain's permanent representative to the IAEA from 2001-06
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I find it funny how some people will fight tooth and nail to support Iranian right to refining nuclear material, but will gladly look the other way when other nations' safety is at risk due to lack of proper safeguards in Iran.

A question you and Jenkins need to answer is this: why does Iran want nuclear refinement and refuses to accept the option to import fuel and is ready to risk major economic damage to that end? Clearly it's not due to any economic logic, so what is it?

McHrozni
 
McHrozni said:
I find it funny how some people will fight tooth and nail to support Iranian right to refining nuclear material, but will gladly look the other way when other nations' safety is at risk due to lack of proper safeguards in Iran.

A question you and Jenkins need to answer is this: why does Iran want nuclear refinement and refuses to accept the option to import fuel and is ready to risk major economic damage to that end? Clearly it's not due to any economic logic, so what is it?

McHrozni
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A. Iran as an NPT signatory has every right to enrich its own uranium

B. Iran has been prepared to negotiate on this point and enrich in Brazil and Turkey but the West rejected it out of hand.
 
bit_pattern said:
Who rejected what now?

http://www.habervesaire.com/news/er...l-with-tehran-snubbed-by-washington-1693.html

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hIgu4hIYOcjSjidAw0DHiSceIzXg
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Exactly what form of twisted logic leads you to think that this is a rebuttal?

A) It has nothing to do with the issue I raised...the proposal given by France, Germany and the UK in August of 2005, which would have allowed Iran to have access to nuclear fuel, and to pursue peaceful nuclear projects...and which Iran rejected, specifically because it wouldn't let them do uranium enrichment themselves

B) The deal you refer to is an entirely different one, where Iran is doing enrichment.
 
bit_pattern said:
A. Iran as an NPT signatory has every right to enrich its own uranium
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As long as it's for peaceful purposes and the state agrees to prove that and keep proving it.

B. Iran has been prepared to negotiate on this point and enrich in Brazil and Turkey but the West rejected it out of hand.
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Clue:
HaberVs, 18.05.2010 17:56

As to why it was rejected, it is quite clearly explained in your article. Iran would still stockpile enriched uranium, in violation of NPT.

McHrozni
 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals

Tehran Research Reactor “Fuel Swap” Proposal

In June 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it was seeking assistance to refuel its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), a U.S.-supplied 5 megawatt research reactor that produces medical isotopes. Following Iran’s entreaty, the United States proposed that, in return for a supply of 120 kilograms of fuel for the TRR, Iran ship out an equivalent amount of uranium enriched to 4%, totaling about 1,200 kilograms. The 1,200 kilograms accounted for roughly 80% of Iran’s LEU stockpile at that time, a percentage that diminished as Iran continued to produce LEU. At an initial meeting between the United States, France, Russia, Iran, and the IAEA October 1, 2009, Iranian officials agreed “in principle” to the exchange.

  • Iran exports 1,200 kilograms of LEU in a single batch before the end of the 2009
  • Russia further enriches Iran’s LEU to about 20%, a process producing about 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium for the TRR fuel rods
  • France manufactures the TRR fuel rods for delivery about one year after the conclusion of the agreement, prior to the depletion of the current TRR fuel supply
  • The United States works with the IAEA to improve safety and control implementation at the TRR
Following reservations expressed by Iran about the terms of the deal, the P5+1 indicated their readiness to take some steps to facilitate the arrangement:

  • A political statement of support by the six countries to guarantee that the TRR fuel would be delivered to Iran
  • Financing for the movement of LEU and fuel
  • An option for the IAEA to hold Iran’s LEU in escrow in a third country until the TRR fuel is delivered
In the months following the initial agreement of the TRR proposal Oct.1, Iran delayed giving the IAEA and the P5+1 a definitive response to the proposal, with many prominent Iranian politicians voicing their opposition to the arrangement, motivated at least in part by their opposition to President Ahmadinejad. Iranian officials publicly suggested alterations to the fuel swap proposal, including: staggering the export of Iran’s LEU over the course of a year or transporting 400 kilograms of LEU to Iran’s Kish Island to exchange for TRR fuel. These proposals, however, undermined or eliminated the confidence-building nature of the export of the bulk of Iran’s LEU. Tehran began to increase the enrichment level of some of its LEU to 20% in February 2010, ostensibly for TRR fuel.
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Wolfman said:
It has nothing to do with the issue I raised...the proposal given by France, Germany and the UK in August of 2005
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Here it is in detail, from the same source cited above:

EU3-Iran Proposals

Several months later, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom agreed to discuss with Iran a range of nuclear, security, and economic issues as long as Tehran suspended work on its uranium enrichment program and cooperated fully with an investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, that agreement unraveled the following year when Tehran continued work on uranium conversion, the precursor to enrichment. Iran then agreed with the EU3 in November 2004 to implement a more stringent suspension. Negotiations between the two sides began shortly afterward.

Iran presented four proposals during the course of these negotiations. In addition to Iran’s nuclear program, the proposals covered subjects such as Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations, regional security issues, and economic cooperation.

The Iranian proposals were as follows:

January 17, 2005 This Iranian proposal to the EU3/Iran Political and Security Working Group outlined commitments on both sides in general terms, including:

  • An Iranian commitment not to pursue weapons of mass destruction
  • A rejection of any attacks, threats of attack, or sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facilities
  • Cooperation on combating terrorism, including intensifying the exchange of information and the denial of safe havens
  • Regional security cooperation, including on Iraq and Afghanistan
  • Cooperation on strategic trade controls and the EU removal of restrictions on transfers of conventional arms and dual use goods to Iran
March 23, 2005

The Iranian proposal to the EU3/Iran steering committee in March provided greater detail into the “objective guarantees” Iran was willing to discuss regarding its nuclear program, including:

  • Iran’s adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol and continuous on-site inspections at key facilities
  • Limiting the expansion of Iran’s enrichment program and a policy declaration of no reprocessing
  • Immediately converting all enriched uranium to fuel rods
  • An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe
  • Iran’s guaranteed access to advanced nuclear technology along with contracts for the construction of nuclear plants in Iran by the EU
  • Normalizing Iran’s status under G8 export controls
April 29, 2005

In April Iran’s proposal repeated some of the items in the March proposal, but focused more on short-term confidence-building measures than long term resolutions. Its key terms included:

  • Iran’s adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol
  • A policy declaration of no reprocessing by Iran
  • Continued enrichment suspension for six months
  • Establishment of joint task forces on counter-terrorism and export control
  • An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe
  • July18, 2005

Iranian Message from Hassan Rowhani, then-Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In his statement Rohani proposes:

  • An agreement on initial limitations on uranium enrichment at Natanz
  • Negotiations for the full-scale operation of Natanz
  • Arrangements to import material for uranium conversion and the export of UF6
  • Negotiation of an “optimized” IAEA monitoring mechanism for Natanz
In August 2005 the three European countries presented their own comprehensive proposal for a long-term agreement, outlining the following:

  • Arrangements for the assured supply of low enriched uranium for any light water reactors constructed in Iran
  • Establishing a buffer store of nuclear fuel located in a third country
  • A commitment by Iran not to pursue fuel cycle technologies, reviewable after 10 years
  • A legally binding commitment by Iran not to withdraw from the NPT and Iran’s adoption of the Additional Protocol
  • Arrangements for Iran to return spent nuclear fuel to supplier countries
  • EU recognition of Iran as a long-term source of fossil fuel energy
  • EU-Iran cooperation in a variety of political-security areas, including Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism, and drug trafficking
Iran rejected that proposal days later, claiming that it did not recognize Iran’s right to enrichment. Tehran proceeded with uranium conversion, breaking the suspension agreement with the EU3 and ending negotiations.

In order to support Iran’s talks with the EU, Russia proposed to Iran in October 2005 that Tehran share ownership of a uranium-enrichment plant located in Russia. Following months of discussions on that proposal, Iran ultimately rejected it in March 2006.
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Wolfman said:
So it wasn't the West who ultimately rejected this...it was Iran. Great rebuttal.
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Where did I say it was a rebuttal to anything. Are you able to have a discussion without it turning into a pissing contest?
 
Wolfman said:
Iran's claim is that it only wants to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, primarily to fuel nuclear power plants.

When they presented the proposal you've linked to above, France, Germany and the UK responded with a counter-proposal...that Iran would be supplied with nuclear fuel, that it could use for any peaceful purposes it wanted. The nuclear fuel would be produced in other countries, and the fuel rods returned to those countries once it was used up. This proposal fully allowed Iran to pursue any and all peaceful uses of nuclear power that it wanted to...

...and they rejected it entirely. They insisted, and continue to insist, that they must do the enriching themselves.

Now, call me a pessimist...but if Iran's goals were really to seek only the peaceful use of nuclear power, then they would accept this deal, which not only would allow them to accomplish that goal, but would then also enable them to demonstrate that they truly wanted it only for peaceful purposes...giving them a stronger position to bargain later to be able to do their own enrichment, after they had a proven track record.

This is a state that has called unequivocally for the total eradication of Israel. It is a state with extreme control of its people, and little or no tolerance of dissent. It is a state that, in the past, has clearly stated its desire for nuclear weapons (although it now denies that). It is a state that still has a standing reward for the assassination of Salman Rushdie for his book "The Satanic Verses". It is a state that has illegally provided hundreds of millions of dollars of weapons to Hezbollah. None of these things are things that cause me to feel a sense of trust.

And before you start raising issues of Israel, or American actions...I'm opposed to many American policies, and I think that there should be forced inspections of Israel, too. I think that there's a lot of hypocrisy involved...

...but that doesn't mean that being cautious (or even paranoid) about Iran is not justified.
Click to expand...

why on earth should they agree on that? the NPT allows for enrichment.
and with that proposal of the west, they would be totally dependend on others to provide them with fuel. wich is not needed as the NPT clearly allows them to enrich the uranium themself.
 
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