Explain consciousness to the layman.

[westprog]

A control mechanism modeled inside a Turing Machine...

...or perhaps you might prefer "Universal Computing Machine", if you'd rather not have me use the term "Turing".

I'm not hung up on the precise details of what we call a computing machine. I am concerned with the difference between a control mechanism and a computing machine. While a computation can be exactly duplicated on a different machine, a control mechanism which interacts with the environment cannot.

The essence of, say, the Chinese room concept is that mind is contained in a closed computational environment, where a program is run to produce an output. That seems to me to be a poor model for how the brain works, which is in constant interaction, direct and indirect, with its environment.

 

[Belz...]

"Magic" would be insisting that running a computer simulation of a process can produce the same effects as the process itself. No, I don't believe in that kind of magic.

Dodge.

You could simply have said that I misunderstood what you said, clarified, and moved on. Of course you'd rather be snarky.

As it has been explained to you many times over, there is no such thing as "simulated computation". It's either a computation or it isn't. As such, any computer-simulated consciousness (itself computational) will itself be consciousness.

 

[Belz...]

Do we agree that consciousness evolved, naturally, in at least one species of living entities? If so, then that means qualia, or at least our "sense of having qualia", is a product of evolution, as well. I think it is unlikely that "qualia" came into existence in one solid step. It probably had evolutionary steps of its own, and I call those proto-qualia.

Perhaps, but that wasn't my original point. Allow me to simplify, and go step by step:

Does a computer, sensing colour, experience redness ?

 

[Belz...]

A Turing machine is not a fantasy. It's a specification, like motor-bike or television.

You have no idea what a Turing machine is, then. It's a concept. It doesn't, and probably can't, exist in reality, unlike a motor-bike or a television set.

 

[Belz...]

This thread isn't about Turning Machines.

No, but if we're going to use terms, shouldn't we use the right ones and agree on these terms ?

 

[rocketdodger]

Reducing experiences to "sensory input" (or "physiological input" as I prefer) the same way we reduce a computer images to pixels isn't a very insightful exercise. Yes, it took mankind a looong time to get that far. But, today it's a trivial statement, and doesn't explain how experiences actually come about.

It doesn't *fully* explain how experiences come about, but it is a necessary first step.

Much like understanding raster graphics doesn't *fully* explain what you see on your screen, yet it is a necessary first step.

 

[rocketdodger]

You have no idea what a Turing machine is, then. It's a concept. It doesn't, and probably can't, exist in reality, unlike a motor-bike or a television set.

Well ... like a motor-bike with infinite fuel, or a television with infinite channels.

 

[westprog]

Dodge.

You could simply have said that I misunderstood what you said, clarified, and moved on. Of course you'd rather be snarky.

As it has been explained to you many times over, there is no such thing as "simulated computation". It's either a computation or it isn't. As such, any computer-simulated consciousness (itself computational) will itself be consciousness.

And as I've said many times over, that "proof" takes as its premise that consciousness is a computation, and uses that to demonstrate that it is computational. Of course if you choose to consider the possibilities that consciousness is a computation, you can apply theories of computation to the idea. That doesn't itself demonstrate that consciousness is computational in nature.

As I've been insisting for a long time now, much of the operation of the brain is demonstrably not computational in nature - rather it consists of monitoring and control feedback loops. The theories which apply to computation, such as Church-Turing, do not apply to asynchronous monitoring and control systems. The simulation of such a system is not interchangeable with the system.

 

[westprog]

Well ... like a motor-bike with infinite fuel, or a television with infinite channels.

I fail to see how your insistence that a true Turing machine will have infinite resources helps your contention. Clearly, any implementation of a Turing machine that lacks such infinite resources will be less, not more capable, and hence less, not more likely to be able to duplicate consciousness.

I didn't mention this point because it's unlikely to be of practical concern. If a machine designed to produce consciousness lacked sufficient resources, then more resources could be added. However, insofar as it is a relevant point, it is in my favour.

 

[westprog]

Dodge.

You could simply have said that I misunderstood what you said, clarified, and moved on. Of course you'd rather be snarky.

Don't be absurd. Questions such as "Do you believe in magic" aren't seriously looking for clarification and discussion. It's playing to the gallery. Don't make facetious remarks and then accuse me of being snarky. You could have delved into the issue as to why a refusal to accept the computational rather than physical nature of consciousness equates to a belief in magic. I would address that.

 

[rocketdodger]

I fail to see how your insistence that a true Turing machine will have infinite resources helps your contention. Clearly, any implementation of a Turing machine that lacks such infinite resources will be less, not more capable, and hence less, not more likely to be able to duplicate consciousness.

I didn't mention this point because it's unlikely to be of practical concern. If a machine designed to produce consciousness lacked sufficient resources, then more resources could be added. However, insofar as it is a relevant point, it is in my favour.

well its because you keep saying things about Turing machines in real life, and there aren't any in real life.

 

[Wowbagger]

While a computation can be exactly duplicated on a different machine, a control mechanism which interacts with the environment cannot.

A control mechanism can be emulated on a computing machine.

Perhaps, but that wasn't my original point.

We were probably picking on some side issue, perhaps.

Does a computer, sensing colour, experience redness ?

No. Not if we are talking about typical computers and light sensors available today. There would be nothing there to do any experiencing.

But, that doesn't mean it's impossible to build a computer, in the future, that does have the necessary aparatus for experiencing things. But, that's a different story. That's probably not what you were referring to.

If, for some reason, you want to find where proto-qualia exists, it would probably be more productive to examine the spectrum of mental processing available in living entities, instead. Somewhere along that line, I can't say precisely where, there are probably early "proto" forms of qualia brewing. Maybe.

On the other hand, if you don't care about proto-qualia, then this aspect of the discussion isn't worth going on any further about.

No, but if we're going to use terms, shouldn't we use the right ones and agree on these terms ?

I'm not the one who brought up Turning machines. I was just responding to whoever did.

For this discussion, I am fine with using "Universal Computing Machines", if everyone likes that better.

It doesn't *fully* explain how experiences come about, but it is a necessary first step.

Consider that first step taken! Now, let's move on to what I think are the more interesting next steps...

 

[westprog]

You have no idea what a Turing machine is, then. It's a concept. It doesn't, and probably can't, exist in reality, unlike a motor-bike or a television set.

If the theoretical Turing model is not applicable to real-life systems, then all the claims put forward about consciousness don't apply. I'm quite willing to accept this.

 

[westprog]

well its because you keep saying things about Turing machines in real life, and there aren't any in real life.

If the description of Turing machines doesn't have real-life implications, then why are we talking about them at all?

 

[PixyMisa]

You start by assuming that consciousness is a computational process, and using a series of deductive steps, you deduce that consciousness is a computational process.

Please point out any function or property we ascribe to consciousness that is other than computational.

Be sure to insist that anyone who notices that the entire edifice is built on circular reasoning "believes in magic".

No, we leave the logical fallacies and misrepresentations to you.

I said early on that the focus would shift, as it always does, from arguing about consciousness to characterising the motives of the people who fail to fall into line.

Yes, and you're doing a great job of that.

 

[PixyMisa]

As I've been insisting for a long time now, much of the operation of the brain is demonstrably not computational in nature - rather it consists of monitoring and control feedback loops.

What part of that is not computational?

The theories which apply to computation, such as Church-Turing, do not apply to asynchronous monitoring and control systems.

Evidence?

The simulation of such a system is not interchangeable with the system.

How can something appear to be consciousness without being consciousness?

 

[PixyMisa]

If the theoretical Turing model is not applicable to real-life systems, then all the claims put forward about consciousness don't apply. I'm quite willing to accept this.

That bears no relation to anything anyone said. And it's a blatant category error on your part.

Computability theory applies to consciousness the same way the Theory of Relativity applies to GPS.

If the description of Turing machines doesn't have real-life implications, then why are we talking about them at all?

Do you honestly not understand why your question is nonsense?

 

[Complexity]

Computability theory applies to consciousness the same way the Theory of Relativity applies to GPS.

That 'whizzing' sound was it going right past his head.

Thanks for your efforts, though.

 

[Belz...]

And as I've said many times over, that "proof" takes as its premise that consciousness is a computation, and uses that to demonstrate that it is computational.

You're correct that it assumes that consciousness is computation. What's your alternative hypothesis ?

Of course if you choose to consider the possibilities that consciousness is a computation, you can apply theories of computation to the idea. That doesn't itself demonstrate that consciousness is computational in nature.

You're right, of course.

As I've been insisting for a long time now, much of the operation of the brain is demonstrably not computational in nature - rather it consists of monitoring and control feedback loops.

How is that not computational ?

Don't be absurd. Questions such as "Do you believe in magic" aren't seriously looking for clarification and discussion.

I asked you a simple question to clarify what you said. What you think I meant by it doesn't make me lose sleep one bit. Either answer the question or don't, but don't accuse me of something I didn't do, and don't be surprised if I don't understand your position when you are unwilling to discuss it.

 

[Belz...]

If the theoretical Turing model is not applicable to real-life systems, then all the claims put forward about consciousness don't apply. I'm quite willing to accept this.

Again, you seem confused by the discussion.

We model reality with unreal things all the time.