Does the traditional atheistic worldview contradict materialism?

[A'isha]

The word 'individual' is the culprit here, when 'individual' is meant in respect to the subjective perception.

No, because we can identify individual and distinct features of each person's brain, and act upon that brain individually to evoke individual responses (ie, if I get drunk and start acting weird, it has no bearing whatsoever on Random Chinese Guy X's brain and behavior).

The subjective sense that I, myself, am a separate and unique person is entirely unrelated to the objective fact that my brain and behavior are separate and unique and can be affected on an individual basis.

Your theory has to deal with both those things, not just the one.

There is no mechanism required at all. It's just how things are. Consciousness is consciousness is consciousness.

You're going to have to do better than assert a tautology, especially regarding something so fundamental to your epistemology.

The crucial point is: there is no qualitative difference between individual persons, only memories and personality discern us from each other.

Except those differences are pretty substantial. That's like saying "other than their purpose and construction, a car is exactly like a television set".

What, exactly, are you asserting is identical to all individual persons, and why is that more determinative than "memories and personality" when it comes to determining whether people are truly separate entities or not?

Materialism then dictates that this also applies to the subjective perception.

Not in the way you're apparently trying to argue. I confess I'm having difficulty trying to grok your reasoning, though.

Because it doesn't require some mysterious "continuity",

That's not mysterious, any more than the fact that your computer has the same files stored on it today that it did yesterday even though you turned it off and unplugged it overnight.

neither does it require some "soul" concept ("soul" not in the religious sense, what I mean here is: a unique property of every individual, that cannot ever be reproduced, neither in this universe nor in any other that might exist. This is why I called it 'mortal soul' concept in the OP. A totally ridiculous concept for any materialist, isn't it?).

Yes. Which is why it's a strawman (as pointed out in a post above).

Of course it can be affected, yes. I don't see how this has any bearing on the clear-distinction-between-persons vs. no-clear-distinction-between-persons issue though.

Because it means that the very things that people think of and refer to when they describe their "self" or their "person" can be affected individually be completely material and mechanistic means. As a result, if you want to assert that the "self" or "person" is something else entirely, you're going to have to explain how it's either unrelated to those things that can be affected individually, or how it's somehow still universal and identical despite the fact that it can be affected individually.

And "it just is!" is not an acceptable answer.

Again, this is not new and there is no mechanism required. It is just as undetectable as what I called 'the traditional atheistic worldview' in the OP. That's the reason why this is mostly a philosophy topic, not a scientific one, you agree? As for the "billions of entire lifetimes": they are isolated from each other by fundamental design, so why not?

Because unless it has some empirical evidence or it or has some use or application beyond confusing message board readers, it's just pointless and bizarre "am I a butterfly dreaming I'm a man" mental wankery.

And, just as a pro tip: if your theory involves undetectable and unknowable mechanisms to explain something that is also undetectable and unknowable, it's not materialist!

Kolak in his book "Who Am I?" has examined the consistency of open individualism with the things you mentioned. He did not find any inconsistencies, though I have to admit that I didn't read the respective chapters completely.

I find the claim that the creator of a crackpot philosophical theory could not find any problems with that theory he himself created to be somewhat less than convincing as an argument for its validity and soundness.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Because it doesn't require some mysterious "continuity",

What is so mysterious about continuity?

 

[tsig]

Exactly. This is empty individualism. It's also my view and, as I understand it, also the view of Hume and Parfit. We might be on the same side here.

Now, to further clarify my point, let me use an example of the well-known transporter thought experiment:

1. I am asked to enter a transporter that creates an identical copy of myself at another place and then destroys the original. What will I answer? I say (assuming that the technology seems reliable): "Sure, let's go ahead." I guess you guys would do the same.

2. I step out of the transporter and 5 minutes later they tell me that something went wrong. The original was not destroyed. Two identical persons existing is against the law and one has to go. They've thrown a coin and it has picked me. They provide proof of the circumstances to me and then ask me to commit suicide. What will I answer? Again, I say: "Sure, I will only loose 5 minutes of my life. The other guy is still almost exactly me and I am not the same person from one moment to another anyway. So what's the big deal? Bring me my shotgun!"

Now, do you still agree with me? What I'm trying to argue in this thread is that someone with a true materialist worldview should answer 'yes' in both cases.

Show me the transporter, tell me the details about how it works and on what principles and then we can have a discussion, till then all you have is a "what if' as in "what if the moon is made of green cheese" IOW you have created an artificial scenario designed to create an artificial dilemma.

hilited:

How do you know that?

 

[mikeyx]

Having read only the thread title: No.

(I was strangely averse to reading the OP - perhaps it was certain phrases that caught my attention and saved me)

you're like my dad who only reads lefty news and the like. sad.

 

[Croc411]

I confess I'm having difficulty trying to grok your reasoning, though.

Okay, I apologize for being so vague. Here is my reasoning in detail (warning: wall of text!):

1. There is zero evidence for a soul (mortal or immortal), so I reject the concept.

2. Everything that constitutes us (including our perceived self) can be traced back to the configuration of the atoms our body (in particular our brain) consists of. #1 and #2 is what materialism is all about.

3. The atoms, as well as the molecules (and maybe even whole neurons) can be arbitrarily exchanged against others of the same type, without changing how we perceive ourselves the slightest bit. There is no such thing as a "lifeforce" attached to any of them. I thought this was implicitely agreed upon so I didn't mention it. I'm still pretty sure that everyone who posted in this thread agrees to this.

3. a) Even if we exchanged all the atoms of our body at once, as long as the configuration stays the same it would not affect how we perceive ourselves (nor, for that matter, how we are perceived by others). Let's define this as going from state A to state B.

I guess until here all materialists agree, now comes the part where you may pounce upon my reasoning and rip it apart ...

4. When going from state A to state B there is no reason to assume that the respective spacetime-coordinates would have any effect on our perception of self either (this follows from #1 and #2, since there is nothing to transfer (no soul etc.) in the first place). On a side note, it also doesn't matter if B is located in another universe, as long as it is sufficiently similar to ours (has atoms, planets etc.).

5. From 3. a) and 4. follows that entering a hypothetical transporter (that is working perfectly on the atomic level) would not end your perceived existence, even if it transported you into the past or distant future (yes, I explicitely include the time dimension here! I don't see any reason why not.).

6. We know from science that both our body and brain change all the time. Whenever the brain gets sensory input, the configuration of the neurons changes etc. This enables our memory to create the illusion of persistence of self, as David put it in a previous post. Let's define this as going from state A to state C.

7. Now the question is: is there a limit to the amount of change applied to our brain configuration at once, after which our "illusion of persistence of self" would break down and end (and a new person would come into existence)? My intuition says yes, but postulating such a limit is problematic because it complicates the theory, raises new questions etc. (Also, Occam's Razor would favour a theory that answers the question with "no"). From my understanding this is the (mysterious) continuity argument. Continuity as a REQUIREMENT for continued subjective existence. IMHO it also violates #1 and #2: how can there be a limit if there is nothing to transfer from state A to state C in the first place?

8. So my default worldview better get rid of that limit from #7. And this is what empty and open individualism provide. It doesn't matter how big the gap is when going from A to C. There are either no individual persons (from a subjective view) at all (just an illusion - empty) or you can consider yourself every conscious being at once, with no causal connection to each other needed (open). It's a matter of taste which one you choose, I don't see any practical difference between the two. Nature does not provide a hard limit for the gap - it is entirely for you to decide if you consider yourself the same person after going from A to C or not. This is why I agreed to my hypothetical suicide in my transporter post above.

9. If we assume that neither going from A to B nor going from A to C (with a big gap) does end our subjective existence, the next step is combining the two. Let's define this as going from state A to state D. So we somehow change both our spacetime-coordinate and our brain configuration (to a degree that we would appear as a different person to an outside observer) simultaneously. But this tears down any distinction between persons alltogether. If I additionally change my outside appearance when reaching state D (shape of face etc.), the difference between A and D is about the same as between A and any other person living on the planet. This is what I mean when I say there is no qualitative difference between persons from a subjective view.

10. As for the evidence for empty / open individualism, I don't know of any. But neither do I know of any for the worldview I held before (closed individualism). I mean it's not that we can ask people what they perceive after they died, can we? I just regard empty / closed as a better default position on personal identity, courtesy of Occam's Razor and materialism in general.


Finally, the strawman argument you accuse me of stems from points #1 and #7. Maybe you're right and it was a silly move on my part to assume that most people here would answer the question in #7 with "yes". But then, why would almost everyone refuse to enter the hypothetical transporter? This puzzles me.

 

[Croc411]

What is so mysterious about continuity?

My view on continuity is that is just an effect stemming from causality.

It becomes mysterious to me if it is turned into a requirement for continued subjective existence.

See #7 in my previous post.

 

[yy2bggggs]

1. There is zero evidence for a soul (mortal or immortal), so I reject the concept.

2. Everything that constitutes us (including our perceived self) can be traced back to the configuration of the atoms our body (in particular our brain) consists of. #1 and #2 is what materialism is all about.

Keep in mind, though, what I discussed in the earlier post about what separates me from other people. As a token separation, when I was a little kid, I had a particular extremely memorable nightmare about a spider. I can remember what the spider's web looked like across my chest in this dream. We can talk about configurations of atoms in bodies if we like, but I would like you to understand that we should be speaking under the guise that a particular configuration of atoms in my body carries the memory of what that spider's web looked like in my dream, and no other individual on the planet carries that memory.

6. We know from science that both our body and brain change all the time. Whenever the brain gets sensory input, the configuration of the neurons changes etc. This enables our memory to create the illusion of persistence of self, as David put it in a previous post. Let's define this as going from state A to state C.

Sure... I've been going through state B for at least a few decades. Is that a big enough gap for you?

7. Now the question is: is there a limit to the amount of change applied to our brain configuration at once, after which our "illusion of persistence of self" would break down and end (and a new person would come into existence)?

This question seems too much like the Sorites paradox to have a specific answer. Is there a number of grains I can remove from a heap of sand such that it is no longer the same heap of sand? (Or more classically, such that it is no longer a heap?)

My intuition says yes, but postulating such a limit is problematic because it complicates the theory, raises new questions etc. (Also, Occam's Razor would favour a theory that answers the question with "no").

I hold this question to be as meaningless as the question of when the heap disappears.

From my understanding this is the (mysterious) continuity argument. Continuity as a REQUIREMENT for continued subjective existence. IMHO it also violates #1 and #2: how can there be a limit if there is nothing to transfer from state A to state C in the first place?

I still don't understand what problem you see with the continuity argument. Here I am in state C, and I remember what the spider web looked like in my nightmare several decades ago. I say, "I had a nightmare of a spider when I was a kid, and I still remember what the web looked like laying across my chest." I see no problem with this.

8. So my default worldview better get rid of that limit from #7. And this is what empty and open individualism provide. It doesn't matter how big the gap is when going from A to C. There are either no individual persons (from a subjective view) at all (just an illusion - empty) or you can consider yourself every conscious being at once, with no causal connection to each other needed (open). It's a matter of taste which one you choose, I don't see any practical difference between the two. Nature does not provide a hard limit for the gap - it is entirely for you to decide if you consider yourself the same person after going from A to C or not. This is why I agreed to my hypothetical suicide in my transporter post above.

Nevertheless, nobody alive on this planet, save myself, remembers what the spider web looked like in my nightmare 30 years ago. This is because they are different individuals; they cannot experience what I experience, they don't have my dreams. They thus cannot remember my dreams. Out of 7 billion brain states, only one knows what the spider web looked like in that nightmare that I had.

9. If we assume that neither going from A to B nor going from A to C (with a big gap) does end our subjective existence, the next step is combining the two. Let's define this as going from state A to state D. So we somehow change both our spacetime-coordinate and our brain configuration (to a degree that we would appear as a different person to an outside observer) simultaneously. But this tears down any distinction between persons alltogether. If I additionally change my outside appearance when reaching state D (shape of face etc.), the difference between A and D is about the same as between A and any other person living on the planet. This is what I mean when I say there is no qualitative difference between persons from a subjective view.

Your argument is missing something critical. Where is the memory of what the spider web looked like in my nightmare in this D state?

Finally, the strawman argument you accuse me of stems from points #1 and #7. Maybe you're right and it was a silly move on my part to assume that most people here would answer the question in #7 with "yes". But then, why would almost everyone refuse to enter the hypothetical transporter? This puzzles me.

I said I would go through it, given that I'm sufficiently sure that it worked as advertised. In particular, this just means that I take myself very seriously, and will not be casual about the transporter.

In the second case, however, you had one of two individuals face suicide because of some law. This is a unique case; both individuals in this case remember what the spider web looked like. However, now there are two individuals. Pick the "lucky" one that won your coin toss and call that one "me", and the other one "him". Now, I am the same person who had the nightmare, and so is he (in the sense that both of us remembers what the spider web looked like). But I am not him (because he now has his own set of experiences, that he can only convey via language). There are now two individuals; he may very well hear something I cannot hear, he sees something I don't see, etc. He has his own set of experiences, and I have my own. So if he commits suicide, he is ending his life.

I cannot expect of him to do that, despite the law. If the situation were flipped, I wouldn't want to commit suicide either. In fact, we can talk of the same situation flipped around, and then I'll be talking about my desire not to commit suicide.

 

[yy2bggggs]

My view on continuity is that is just an effect stemming from causality.

You say that as if that's nothing, but I think it is everything.

It becomes mysterious to me if it is turned into a requirement for continued subjective existence.

I'm completely confused here. If we're talking about particular configurations, per #2, then we're talking about information. How then would effects stemming from causality not be related? Somehow, don't you need to get at least information regarding certain configurations to the next state?

 

[Brian-M]

The traditional atheistic worldview regarding personal identity:
YOU are a distinct person.

Okay, fair enough.

There might be some (unknown) unique property that constitutes YOU and clearly distinguishes YOU from other people (a mortal "soul").

Most atheists don't believe in souls.

ETA: Except possibly where the term "soul" is interpreted as being a primitive concept of mind. In which case, "soul" would be simply another word for "mind".

Either that, or there is a (unknown) threshold in the amount of changes that can be applied to your brain-wiring from one moment to another before you stop existing as a person.

Sure. If someone changed my brain-wiring enough, such as putting a bullet through my brain, then yes, I'd cease to exist as a person.

Meaning: if your personality/memories were changed enough from one moment to another (e.g. by some outside event), you would simply cease to exist. Your "existence" is now in the same state as it was before you were born and so is your perceived self. Naturally the same happens when you die.

If someone surgically altered my brain wiring enough to significantly alter by behavior and thought patterns, then it could be argued that who I am has been changed, rather than that I've ceased to exist and a new person has begun to exist.

It cannot even explain why we perceive ourselves to be the same person we were 5 years ago without invoking the "soul" concept (contradicting materialism) or something similar, like some equally mysterious "continuity".

What's mysterious about continuity? The change in brain activity are gradual, too small to be noticed on a day to day basis. When we are five, we accept ourselves as being the same person as the day before because there's been no noticeable change. The next day we also accept ourselves as being the same person as before because there's been no noticeable change in our personalities over the course of the day. This continues day after day for years on end, and we simply accept ourselves as being the same person as before simply due to habit and possessing memories from that time.

And of course it gets into serious trouble when it comes to any of the infamous thought experiments involving transporters or twins.

I think you mean transporters and clones/duplicates. There's no confusion with twins.

Personally, I think of identity as a metaphorical stream; a stream of consciousness; with each point on the stream representing a point in time. In the case of magically cloning someone (such as in a Star-Trek style transporter accident), the stream of consciousness forks into two paths. Both are equally the same person from who existed before the duplication, but are now separate persons.

In the case of altering somebody's brain, you are redirecting the stream, not stopping the stream and starting a new one.

Problem resolved.

There is no qualitative difference between the subjective persons of you, me, any other human or even the chimpanzee in the zoo down the street. Only our memories and mindsets discriminate us from each other.

But our memories, mindsets are qualitative differences.

No sharp boundaries between persons, no threshold, no continuity issues. Because of that, in a certain sense "you" are (and "I" am) all conscious beings that live, have ever lived or will ever live in all universes that allow for consciousness (but each one with its distinctive memories and personality).

Consciousness is a product of the brain. In essence, it's what the brain does. The fact that our brains are physically separate and function independently from other people's brains is enough to discriminate us from each-other.

Sharp boundaries do exist. At the surface of your brain. No consciousness transcends the physical boundaries of it's material structure.

It's starting to sound like your point of view is the one that contradicts materialism.

because "you" are all persons in existence anyway (and have always been from the get-go).

Please provide a rational basis for this assertion.

Isn't open/empty individualism THE truly materialistic perspective?

No. You're postulating that consciousness is something more than the product of the behavior of a material system. Consequently, this makes your idea of open individualism a non-materialistic perspective.

IMHO it is more conclusive and simpler (though counter-intuitive) than closed individualism and therefore is clearly favoured by Occam's Razor as the default view.

I believe that the opposite is true.

Or am I missing something important and there is substantial evidence against it?

You do seem to be missing something important. For example, what is the proposed mechanism for this universal consciousness of yours?

1. I am asked to enter a transporter that creates an identical copy of myself at another place and then destroys the original. What will I answer? I say (assuming that the technology seems reliable): "Sure, let's go ahead." I guess you guys would do the same.

As long as the original is destroyed instantly. At the moment of duplication, each copy is the same person, like a copy of a computer file being the same file as the original.

But if enough time passes for each version to experience differences in what they experience, they are no longer the same person. Like copying a computer file, and then making different changes to both. They are no longer the same file.

2. I step out of the transporter and 5 minutes later they tell me that something went wrong. The original was not destroyed. Two identical persons existing is against the law and one has to go. They've thrown a coin and it has picked me. They provide proof of the circumstances to me and then ask me to commit suicide. What will I answer? Again, I say: "Sure, I will only loose 5 minutes of my life. The other guy is still almost exactly me and I am not the same person from one moment to another anyway. So what's the big deal? Bring me my shotgun!"

But at that point you are no longer the same person as the copy. This version of you will die.

Now, do you still agree with me? What I'm trying to argue in this thread is that someone with a true materialist worldview should answer 'yes' in both cases.

Not really. I answered "no" to the second, and some hardcore materialists would answer "no" to the first, because the duplicate is not physically the same person as you.

From my understanding this is the (mysterious) continuity argument. Continuity as a REQUIREMENT for continued subjective existence. IMHO it also violates #1 and #2: how can there be a limit if there is nothing to transfer from state A to state C in the first place?

Ah, here's where you've gone wrong. It's not a continuity of physical atoms in space (or time) that needs to be conserved. It's continuity of the processes that result from the structure of the brain. The processes are performed by physical structures, but are not the structures themselves.

You can replace the material the structures are made from, or move them through time, but that does not affect the processes upon which consciousness is based.

But change the structures so that the perform the processes differently, and consciousness is altered.

 

[marplots]

I've lived in the same house for about 15 years. The house has changed in that time, in some ways significantly. I still think of it as my home. How is "me" any different than my house?

On the transporter thing, if you ask me whether that guy over there (who is now the subject of the story) should be destroyed, I'd say "sure." If I am the subject of the story, I would say, "No way."

Why? Because, along with duplicating my nose hairs, eyeballs and stuff, you've also duplicated my sense of self preservation, a product of the brain you also duplicated.

How is this confusing?

 

[Halfcentaur]

Knowing that a movie at the theater is only light projected on a screen with speakers playing the sounds intended to be seen coming from the imagery doesn't change the fact that movies are emotionally compelling and enjoyable experiences, and knowing that the sound is being played separately in a clever illusion to appear synced with the visual imagery doesn't mean I don't think the actors are talking in the story.

Quite to the contrary, I've found understanding the purely material aspect of the universe has enriched my aesthetic appreciation for how amazing and precious my existence actually is. It actually cheapens how amazing life is to just chalk it all up to souls and gods or universal plans with human beings in mind.

 

[Brian-M]

Knowing that a movie at the theater is only light projected on a screen

That actually brings to mind a great analogy. The image on the screen is being replaced by a different image 24 times per second.

But with still or slowly panning shots, we still perceive the image on the screen as being the same image that was there a quarter of a second ago, even though the image has been replaced half a dozen times.

Now imagine each frame of the movie as representing a day in our lives...

 

[Soapy Sam]

First of all: let me apologize for any mistakes I made in grammar or style (English is not my first language).

The traditional atheistic worldview regarding personal identity:
YOU are a distinct person. There might be some (unknown) unique property that constitutes YOU and clearly distinguishes YOU from other people (a mortal "soul"). Either that, or there is a (unknown) threshold in the amount of changes that can be applied to your brain-wiring from one moment to another before you stop existing as a person. Meaning: if your personality/memories were changed enough from one moment to another (e.g. by some outside event), you would simply cease to exist. Your "existence" is now in the same state as it was before you were born and so is your perceived self. Naturally the same happens when you die.

In any case, there is a clear distinction of the subjective personalities between each of the 7 billion humans on earth.

I think this sums up the worldview of most atheists pretty well (Daniel Kolak calls it closed individualism). This was also my personal view until a few years ago, but the more I thought about it the more I came to the conclusion that it is fundamentally flawed. It cannot even explain why we perceive ourselves to be the same person we were 5 years ago without invoking the "soul" concept (contradicting materialism) or something similar, like some equally mysterious "continuity".

Why? I think I'm the same person I was ten years ago because I have memories of being that person . I also have the same bank account.

And of course it gets into serious trouble when it comes to any of the infamous thought experiments involving transporters or twins.

Transporters don't exist. Twins are individuals with similar genetics and life histories, who therefore differ less from each other than most couples. What trouble do you see with this?

Now to those explanations of self that I consider much more likely:
There is no qualitative difference between the subjective persons of you, me, any other human or even the chimpanzee in the zoo down the street. Only our memories and mindsets discriminate us from each other.

Those are measurable qualities .

No sharp boundaries between persons, no threshold, no continuity issues.

I don't understand. Can you explain what this means in detail , please?

Because of that, in a certain sense "you" are (and "I" am) all conscious beings that live, have ever lived or will ever live in all universes that allow for consciousness (but each one with its distinctive memories and personality). This is open individualism in Kolak's terms.

No. This is just silly.

It easily explains why you perceive yourself to be the same person that you were 5 years ago: because "you" are all persons in existence anyway (and have always been from the get-go). For the same reason it can cope with the thought experiments mentioned above.

As can the commonsense view. You have done nothing to prove it can't.

Another way to look at it is empty individualism (no-self theory): the self does not exist at all, it's just an illusion created by the brain.

An illusion is a tricking of sensory systems. The concept of self is only illusory if it does not exist. If it does not exist, who perceives the illusion?

As I understand it though, open and empty individualism are just different but equally valid views on the same model. The consequences regarding perception of self are equivalent. The crucial point shared by both is the lack of a qualitative difference between persons.

None of those thoughts are new, of course. It is a pretty obvious solution to the identity problem - once you get rid of religion and the soul concept. It's simple enough that most people who think a lot about the topic should come to this by themselves at some point (so did I). This is what worries me a little: why do most atheists cling to the traditional view?

Can only answer for me. Because it seems perfectly adequate. I think I am - and propose to go on doing so unless you can prove me wrong. (But if you are right and you are me, why are we arguing?).

Isn't open/empty individualism THE truly materialistic perspective? IMHO it is more conclusive and simpler (though counter-intuitive) than closed individualism and therefore is clearly favoured by Occam's Razor as the default view.

So why does it seem that this worldview is hardly discussed outside of philosophical circles? Is it because debates about identity and existence are so centered on the religion vs. atheism issue? Or is it because the consequences would be so outrageous (subjective immortality for every conscious being by default if the universe is extremely big or infinite or if there is a big enough or infinite multiverse)? Or am I missing something important and there is substantial evidence against it?

I'd say few materialists give a dingo's kidneys for philosophy. This may explain it. I think the self is not an illusion. I think it's a very real property of functioning brains. I think that's all there is to it and the questions you raise are essentially meaningless. But I may be misunderstanding them. ETA- Sorry, I'm on an unfamiliar laptop and having heck with quote tags.

 

[Dessi]

First of all: let me apologize for any mistakes I made in grammar or style (English is not my first language).

Your English is quite good, at least as good as a native speaker.

I think this sums up the worldview of most atheists pretty well (Daniel Kolak calls it closed individualism). This was also my personal view until a few years ago, but the more I thought about it the more I came to the conclusion that it is fundamentally flawed. It cannot even explain why we perceive ourselves to be the same person we were 5 years ago without invoking the "soul" concept (contradicting materialism) or something similar, like some equally mysterious "continuity". And of course it gets into serious trouble when it comes to any of the infamous thought experiments involving transporters or twins.

"What is the self" is a very philosophical question, I don't think its answerable.

"Why do we perceive a continuity of self" is interesting in its own right. Continuity is maintained by a person's memories. Wipe out those memories, you wipe out the continuity. This man has anterograde and retrograde amnesia for 20 years. Everything prior and after the span of the present 30 seconds is a void totally absent of any prior thought or perception, he percieves himself flickering into existence for the very first time. His continuity of self is only a few moments, then its restarts. I can't think of a stronger argument that continuity of self depends on some capacity to retain memories over a span a time, memories which are inevitably tied to physical structure of the brain.

The actual perception of self, as an experience, is interesting. I've made the mistake of taking of very high doses of psychoactives with strong dissociative properties, with the result of losing my capacity to feel myself exist, having no way to differentiate my perspective from the walls perspective, being unable to determine whether I exist concretely or whether I'm an abstract seam in reality, perceiving an abstract ineffable universe with no perspective or point of view (I assure you, these experiences were terrifying).

Being able to percieve yourself existing, differentiate your perspective from other perspectives, differenciate concrete things from abstract ideas are all things the brain does. Imparing the ability to brain to perform these functions can be terrifying, leading to feelings to depersonalization and dissociation.

The relatively fluid perception you experience is something the brain does. For example, you are generally not aware of the massive blind spot right in the middle of your vision until you go looking for it, the brain fills the void with what it thinks should be there. The brain can be tricked into inserting voids in places where they don't exist, such as this illusion, where the 3 yellow dots stimulate your optic nerve throughout the duration of the illusion, yet one or two or sometimes three dots very clearly disappear from view. Interestingly, the brain processes huge amount of sensory input without that input trickling up to your conscious perception (e.g. reflexively pulling your hand from a hot stove before you perceive that its painful, phenomena such as blindsight).

The unified sense of self and surroundings is just another thing the brain does. Split brain studies indicate that each hemisphere is independently aware, but coordinate in tandem to give a singular "I" or "me". Neurons constitute billions of independent "voices" making up a parliment of systems and subsystems, the brain ultimately constructs these independent voices into a single unified "self". "You" are an illusion created by your brain, hopefully that realization does not diminish our respect for such an extraordinary and amazing organ.

I don't know about you, but I have very little interest in teleporter thought experiments -- they are pointless, they contribute no new knowledge of any sort or any use to anyone. Koch's Quest of Consciousness is orders of magnitude more interesting and more enlightening.

 

[marplots]

This man has anterograde and retrograde amnesia for 20 years. Everything prior and after the span of the present 30 seconds is a void totally absent of any prior thought or perception, he percieves himself flickering into existence for the very first time.

That clip has 134,000 views. I'm guess about a hundred thousand of those were Clive's.

 

[IanS]

Exactly. This is empty individualism. It's also my view and, as I understand it, also the view of Hume and Parfit. We might be on the same side here.

Now, to further clarify my point, let me use an example of the well-known transporter thought experiment:

1. I am asked to enter a transporter that creates an identical copy of myself at another place and then destroys the original. What will I answer? I say (assuming that the technology seems reliable): "Sure, let's go ahead." I guess you guys would do the same.

2. I step out of the transporter and 5 minutes later they tell me that something went wrong. The original was not destroyed. Two identical persons existing is against the law and one has to go. They've thrown a coin and it has picked me. They provide proof of the circumstances to me and then ask me to commit suicide. What will I answer? Again, I say: "Sure, I will only loose 5 minutes of my life. The other guy is still almost exactly me and I am not the same person from one moment to another anyway. So what's the big deal? Bring me my shotgun!"

Now, do you still agree with me? What I'm trying to argue in this thread is that someone with a true materialist worldview should answer 'yes' in both cases.

The problem with suggesting a scenario such as the one above, is that as you know, what you are proposing may be physically impossible, even in principle.

Does that matter? Well, it does if it is setting up a dilemma which is inherently wrong.

Without wishing to get dragged into actually spending time trying to unravel the semantic arguments of what we call academic "philosophy", I suspect Stephen Hawking is right when he says "philosophy is dead".

What I think Hawking means is that when man eventually discovered and began to understand what we call “science” and "scientific" methods, it showed quite clearly why so-called "philosophy" is unlikely every to truly explain or discover anything ... namely because "philosophy" is not generally dealing with real situations. Instead it's just trying to make or "win" arguments purely on the bases of defining words in spoken or written language.

The relevance here is - if you looked at the science behind your transporter proposition, then contrary to your immediate and simplistic philosophical acceptance of the proposition, you might very well find that the proposition is in fact (as much as anyone can ever know what a "fact" is) fundamentally impossible anyway.

And as I say, the reason that matters is that it means you are setting up an entirely false argument.

As for any of that having anything whatsoever to do with the opinions of atheists - afaik, it's completely irrelevant. The only thing that all atheists really have in common is that they do not believe that biblical type gods actually exist. They often have similar opinions on other things, such as the importance of science as our most reliable way of truly discovering and explaining things, and almost always a rejection of claims about anything supernatural etc., but those are really secondary issues on which different atheists may show a range of views.

Put all that more simply - if you actually want to understand real things in the real world around you, then (as I think Hawking implies), I think you should ditch the so-called “philosophy” completely, and start doing some serious science instead.

 

[Darat]

...snip... It cannot even explain why we perceive ourselves to be the same person we were 5 years ago without invoking the "soul" concept (contradicting materialism) or something similar,

...snip...

But I don't think I am the same person I was 5 years ago, when I think back to decisions I made when I was 18 they are very much not the same decision as I would make today in similar circumstances - I change.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

7. Now the question is: is there a limit to the amount of change applied to our brain configuration at once, after which our "illusion of persistence of self" would break down and end (and a new person would come into existence)? My intuition says yes, but postulating such a limit is problematic because it complicates the theory, raises new questions etc. (Also, Occam's Razor would favour a theory that answers the question with "no"). From my understanding this is the (mysterious) continuity argument. Continuity as a REQUIREMENT for continued subjective existence. IMHO it also violates #1 and #2: how can there be a limit if there is nothing to transfer from state A to state C in the first place?

...snip...

Intuition is often not a good guide so I would drop using it. Especially when it is regarding something we have empirical evidence for so we don't need to do any speculating. We know what happens when people have significant changes to their brain and they do show personality changes and so on.

 

[steenkh]

The traditional atheistic worldview regarding personal identity:

I did not know that "traditional atheism" had a worldview regarding personal identity.

Traditional atheism is probably meant to distinguish between those who think atheism and skepticism are closely related, and the modern view that atheism is simply the lack of belief in gods. Skeptic atheists would probably agree with me that there is no soul, but I think it is highly unlikely that they would agree to a specific philosophical view of personal identity.

 

[Croc411]

*Sigh*, I see I still could not get my point across. So I will try one more time, this time even more detailed. Here we go:


Rule 1: There is no soul
1.1 There is no immortal soul in the religious sense.
1.2 There is no "mortal soul" either. Definition of mortal soul: a unique property of every individual, that cannot ever be reproduced, neither in this universe nor in any other.
(Definition of materialism, lack of evidence and Occam's Razor)

Rule 2: Particles that share the same basic properties (mass, charge, spin ...) become indistinguishable from each other. They cannot carry any other information that could be used to discriminate them.
(Natural law)

Rule 3: Everything that constitutes a person can be traced back to the configuration of the particles his body (in particular his brain) consists of. This includes all brain states, memories, thoughts etc. This also includes what Person X at spacetime coordinate z perceives as his "self". No exceptions!
(Definition of materialism)

Rule 4: Everything that constitutes a person can be reproduced by arranging any particles with the same properties as the original ones in the same configuration as in the original body. The spacetime coordinate of the reproduction does not matter.
4.1 This includes all brain states, memories, thoughts etc.
4.2 This also includes what Person X at spacetime coordinate z perceives as his "self". Again, no exceptions!
(follows from #2 and #3)



A word about the transporter we will use: of course it must work on principles that do not violate any natural laws, and no new science can be involved. We know today how to scan and place individual atoms and we know how to transmit information over long distances, basically that's all that is needed. Let's assume that it scans an object on an atom-by-atom basis, transmits the data via fibre channel and then its counterpart reassembles the object, creating a perfect 1-to-1 copy. At the same instant, the original is destroyed by a strong laser beam.

Despite that we cannot build such a device today (and won't be able to for a very long time), this is only an engineering / technical issue and thus can be used in thought experiments to validate theories / worldviews.

Not really. I answered "no" to the second, and some hardcore materialists would answer "no" to the first, because the duplicate is not physically the same person as you.

So here comes our "hardcore materialist" (not you, yy2bggggs and Brian-M, I know ) to our transporter. He says: "No, I won't enter. Because what comes out is not me, it's not physically the same person as I am!" Now what did he do? He violated Rule 4.2, of course. It IS physically the same person, courtesy of Rule 2, for all possible purposes in this universe. He is not allowed to exempt his perceived "self" from Rule 4. No special flowers! By stating this, he left the soil of materialism.

If you still disagree, please tell me what you think is wrong with Rules #2 and #3.


Now lets deal with the darned continuity ...


Consider the following:


scenario #1:

You are a healthy but skinny, nice young person living at location A-town (let's call this state A). After a while you become dissatisfied with your appearance. Your start to change your body. Cosmetic surgery is cheap in A-town, so you get yourself a new face, new hair, start to build up muscle etc. (state B). You move to C-town at the other side of the planet (state C). As you get older you slowly but surely become an old grumpy bastard. Nothing is left of your once nice personality (state D). At old age, you catch Alzheimer disease and slowly degenerate. After a few years with the disease, you have totally forgotten your friends, family and how it was to live in A-town 70 years earlier (state E).

So, you went from state A via B, C, D to state E, completely changing your appearance, your personality, your memories, your location. You did change drastically as a person, but in a gradual, slow process so the continuity of your perceived self was well-preserved. From your point of view, it was a continuous experience.


scenario #2:

This time we use our (not so) perfectly working, hypothetical transporter again. You enter the transporter at state A. It scans you, destroys you, waits 70 years and then reassembles you in C-town. But it does not reassemble you from the scan (for whatever reason), it reassembles you as a perfect 1-to-1 copy of the old, sick bastard from scenario #1, state E. We went from state A to state E directly.

Here you were changed into that state-E-person instantly. Now what about the continuity? It was certainly broken when you were reassembled as a totally different person, don't you think? But Rule 4 absolutely enforces that the you in scenario #2, state E is exactly the you as in scenario #1, state E! This includes your thoughts, memories, perceived self, everything!

And it gets even worse ...


scenario #3:

Same as in scenario #2, but this time before you enter the transporter you are killed by some evil person. He leaves you lying cooling down for an hour, then throws you into the transporter.

So you experienced your own death, then you were reassembled and reanimated as a totally different person! The continiuity was broken in the clearest way imaginable! But guess what? Yes, again Rule 4 absolutely enforces that the you in scenario #3, state E is exactly the you as in scenario #1, state E! Everything included.

So how can continuity be the basis for persistent subjective existence? It cannot. In all three scenarios, both the starting state and the end state were exactly equivalent. But in two of them the continuity was clearly broken, in one of them it was preserved. This is incoherent.

I still don't understand what problem you see with the continuity argument.

yy2bggggs, do you see now what my issue with the continuity argument is? It does not work! And if continuity goes down, it takes closed individualism as a coherent concept with it. Closed individualism (or what I called, maybe wrongly, "traditional atheistic worldview") requires a soul concept to work. It is fundamentally incompatible with materialism, the critical point of course is reproducability.

This is also the reason why I, as a materialist, think it's safe to agree to the suicide in my transporter experiment post above (this is analogous to scenario #3). There are only states, no continuity is involved. Continuity is an effect we (usually) observe, but it's not a cause. If somewhere there is someone you consider similar enough to your current self, it doesn't matter that much if you die. So in the aforementioned case, "I" would only loose 5 minutes of my life.