I can't believe the first part of your post is true, Bruce (that the U.S. wouldn't extradite due to 'double jeopardy') because it would mean the U.S. doesn't recognize Italy's legal system. In Italy, of course, people are presumed to be innocent until the final verdict, meaning that this verdict is equivalent to the first verdict in a U.S. case. To me it seems very unlikely the U.S. doesn't formally recognize this.
The United States recognizes Italy's legal system, however it does not surrender Amanda Knox's rights to them wholesale, nor for that matter Raffaele Sollecito's were he to choose to come to America. Look at it this way, many countries consider it within their rights to deny extradition to the United States if the defendant would face the death penalty, a violation of their human rights that some states in the US don't agree with. The United States considers double-jeopardy a violation of their human rights, and the ECHR
agrees:
Handbook on European non-discrimination law Page 86 said:
3.5.4. Criminal law matters
In addition to those matters relating to law enforcement in 3.5.3., the ECHR relates to criminal law matters across a variety of rights, including the right to a fair trial, the right not to be detained arbitrarily, the prohibition on retroactive punishment and double jeopardy, the right to life and the right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Do you have an example of a similar case where the U.S. has refused to extradite on the grounds of double jeopardy?
Why would anyone ask if they knew the answer would be 'no?'
This might have been what Comodi was referring to when she said there was no 'extradition agreement between Italy and the US.' There simply isn't in a case like this.
Agreed, it's purely academic (apart from anything else, I calculate there's a 99.56% chance the Supreme Court will uphold the not guilty verdicts anyway). All the same, I'd be really surprised if the U.S. doesn't recognize the different stages of the Italian legal process.
I can see that the lawyers might contest any extradition attempt on the grounds of double jeopardy, but I imagine that would be just the legal argument they'd put forward rather than a rule already set in stone.
Anyway, yes, academic!
It recognizes the stages, but also the dangers inherent. The ECHR currently makes an allowance for a prosecution appeal in the Trial of the First Instance, such as happened to the Moldavian woman who was Amanda's roommate and convicted after being acquitted initially in the Trial of the First instance, but convicted by the Trial of the Second Instance. This would be an entirely different situation, as the Supreme Court is not a finder of fact, but merely of law, it could only require that the case be remanded to the lower courts for yet
another trial, which would be a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
Otherwise what is to stop the prosecution from admitting to procedural 'mistakes' on its part to force another trial regardless of the outcome of the Trial of the Second Instance?
I don't doubt you're right that she'll never be extradited, even if the SC overturns the verdict (which it won't). I just don't think you're right on the double jeopardy thing, because it makes no sense. As Rolfe says, a more likely argument against extradition would be the weakness of the case (especially post-C&V report) rather than "we won't extradite because we don't recognize your country's legal process".
They
recognize it, but in addition to the above a part of the extradition treaty is that the offense must be considered such in both countries, thus they don't inherently incorporate all the laws of the country asking for extradition either. There is a principle that goes beyond merely the dignity of the legal system in question, that is the rights of the accused.
If it's
this, then I'm not surprised, as it's quite long! I got as far as the 'double jeopardy' clause and then skim-read the rest; hopefully I read the relevant bits...
I already knew that the U.S. wouldn't extradite someone if they were being re-tried for a crime they'd already been convicted or acquitted of, which is what the treaty says. But as I understand it, in Italy no one is finally convicted or acquitted until the Supreme Court ruling (the presumption of innocence applies till then), and the different stages are all part of the same process. I would think it's the Supreme Court ruling which is recognized by the U.S. as a conviction or an acquittal. But I'd be interested to know how this has worked in previous cases.
I disagree. On questions of due process, American courts ignore formalities and focus exclusively on substance. Also, an American court will consider whether the foreign proceeding for which extradition is sought respects the basic due process rights of the accused.
In this case, Knox was acquitted by a jury. An acquittal by a jury cannot be appealed in America, because to allow that would violate what American courts (correctly) regard as a fundamental right of a criminal defendant. An American court will not extradite an American to face a proceeding the very conducting of which constitutes a violation of what is considered, in America, to be a fundamental right. We have a treaty because we are perfectly willing to extradite an American accused of committing a crime in Italy upon a showing of probable cause.
What he
said.
Rizzolli Page 85 said:
Here is a The Supreme Court, through successive ruling has further refined the boundaries of non-appeallable acquittals. Under current case law, the prohibition of appealing acquittals applies also to implied acquittals10; to acquittals when a judge is the fact-trier11; or when a judge acquits in face of a deadlocked jury12; and even to acquittals granted on the basis of an error of law13. On the contrary, the government can still obtain a retrial after an hung jury14, and after an acquittal obtained at the appellate level15 unless it is based on insufficient evidence16. Moreover the double jeopardy does not prevent appeals of pre-trial dismissals17, mid-trial acquittals if early termination is obtained on ground unrelated to his guilt or innocence18 or post-trial discharges following conviction by the trier of fact, if the new verdict van be reinstated without exposing the defendant to a second trial before a second trier19.
If you look at the exceptions you can see none of them would apply to this case. There was no hung jury, the Trial of the Second Instance isn't exactly an appellate level court, (it fits the 'trier of fact' in the definition above) and went even beyond 'insufficient evidence.' It was not a pre-trial dismissal, it was not an early termination based upon grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence, and of course they would want to expose Amanda (and potentially Raffaele) to second trial before a
third 'trier of fact.'
Footnotes said:
10 Green v. United States, 355 US 184, 190-191 (1957). The defendant in Green was convicted in appeal with a greater charge of first degree murder compared to the first trial where he was convicted of second
degree murder. The Supreme Court concluded that although the first jury did not explicitly acknowledge an acquittal for the charge of murder of first degree, the jury conviction of the lesser offence still constituted an implied acquittal of the greater charge and thus ruled out a retrial for the higher charge.
11 United States v. Morrison, 429 US 1, 3 (1976). The prohibition of appealing acquittals extends also to bench trials, where a judge rather then a jury is the fact-finder.
12 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 US 564 (1977). An acquittal granted in face of a deadlocked jury cannot be appealed if it implies a second prosecution and thus the government appeal was barred.
13 In Sanabria v. United States, 437 US 54 (1978) the judge acquitted the defendant before a final verdict was rendered and blatantly misinterpreting the relevant statute. The government appealed and the court granted a new trial. The Supreme Court eventually reversed arguing that “there is no exception permitting retrial once the defendant has been acquitted, no matter how “egregiously erroneous” ...the legal ruling leading to that judgment might be.” Sanabria 437 US 75.
14 See Richardson v. United States, 104 S. CT. 2081 (1984).
15 See United States v. Ball 163 US 662, 672 (1896).
16 See Burks v. United States, 437 US 1 (1978).
17 See Serfass v. United States, 420 US 377 (1975).
18 See United States v. Scott, 437 US 82 (1978).
19 See United States v. Wilson 420 US 332 (1975).
Yes, these are my thoughts too - I think refusing to extradite on the grounds of double jeopardy would have consequences beyond this specific case, and that the U.S. would be very unlikely to do it for that reason. As you say, this form of 'double jeopardy' is integral to the Italian system, and to object on those grounds would be to reject the Italian legal process; there may as well be no extradition treaty. Much more likely it would be rejected on the paperwork grounds you suggest ("There is no Amanda
Maria Knox"

).
LOL! Or 'Xnox' for that matter!
Personally I don't think Italy would even
ask and if they did, they'd mumble it. What grounds would they have? 'We held her for four years, we gave her a trial of the First Instance that was dubious in a number of ways, she was completely exonerated on the murder charge but now we think we made a technical mistake by letting her go just yet and think we should be able to play with her life some more?' We want an entirely new trial!
That's the very thing that double jeopardy was designed to prevent, they
don't get to keep trying people until they get the result they want, especially if the demand is predicated on a technicality. I've come across indications that simply allowing the prosecution appeal after a trial of the first instance is on the way out in the EU, remanding the whole thing for an entirely new and
third trial is beyond the pale. Amanda has rights too!
