David Hume vs. Sam Harris

[westprog]

Not quite, Harris thinks it can be concretely, objectively determined using neuroscience what well-being is and in principle what situations lead to better as opposed to worse well-being.

I don't think it's necessary to use neuroscience to hypothesise that almost everybody acts in such a way as to maximise what they think is their well-being. Suppose that we do a massive amount of research to confirm that this is the case? Where does that leave us?

 

[westprog]

I believe Harris is well aware that he hasn't solved the is/ought problem. He's got a philosophy degree and so he's presumably capable of understanding first year content like the is/ought problem (even if many of his followers demonstrably cannot) when it's explained to him repeatedly by professionals in the field.

I think you may have cracked it. If the man has followers - people who will attend seminars, buy books, etc - then why address logical holes which are put forward by people who aren't contributing to the income stream?

If the standard route to charlatanism were to be followed, then expect a closed-ranks approach, where critics are ridiculed in personal terms, and followers are expected to subscribe to the whole package or be considered heretics. Or he could willingly participate in an open debate. By their fruits shall you know them.

 

[Meed]

But Dawkins and Shermer, in their capacity as scientists, should be able to see that Harris is wrong. There is simply no evidence that can be adduced for the hypothesis that we should value well-being.

Heck, one might even suspect Dennett sympathizes with Harris' theory. Harris credits Dennett (among others) in the book, and Dennett doesn't distance himself from Harris' theory, which he should if he disagrees, as Harris is associated with him, and credits him, and it is a philosophically controversial topic.

I suspect Dawkins and Dennett see Harris as an ally in their anti-religious movement. Considering they have a lot of shared fans, crapping on each other would probably be bad business. If Dennett says "Harris' book is crap" he will lose some fans who disagree with him and Harris will lose some fans who trust in Dennett. Dawkins' review was over the top. Whether it was sincere or phony, it made me lose some respect for him. But I can understand simply keeping silent.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Did you read the subtitle of his book?

As for the rest of your post, yes, most humans do share some broadbrush views about morality. But the agreement isn't exact, and it is not necessarily caused by disagreement on facts. We could encounter an alien civilization, and if they had a very different moral system from us, we couldn't say that they are scientifically wrong. It is not hard to find other species even on Earth with diffrerent moral intuitions from us.

Very good point and well worth repeating. I used to phrase this as "what would an intelligent black widow spider think?"


Not to cast dispersions on the intellectual capabilities of black widow spiders.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I suspect Dawkins and Dennett see Harris as an ally in their anti-religious movement. Considering they have a lot of shared fans, crapping on each other would probably be bad business. If Dennett says "Harris' book is crap" he will lose some fans who disagree with him and Harris will lose some fans who trust in Dennett. Dawkins' review was over the top. Whether it was sincere or phony, it made me lose some respect for him. But I can understand simply keeping silent.

Cornsail, How the heck are you? Sadly, I think you are correct about what you say above.

Personally, Harris lost me in his first book when he decided to argue for the benefits of torture.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Cornsail, How the heck are you? Sadly, I think you are correct about what you say above.

Personally, Harris lost me in his first book when he decided to argue for the benefits of torture.

I can certainly see potential danger in people thinking "Torture is morally okay, SCIENCE proves it!". If you're unsophisticated enough to accept either that Harris has solved the is/ought argument, or that he is saying anything in the least part new, you might just be unsophisticated enough to buy that too. Especially if it's something you wanted very much to believe in the first place.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I can certainly see potential danger in people thinking "Torture is morally okay, SCIENCE proves it!". If you're unsophisticated enough to accept either that Harris has solved the is/ought argument, or that he is saying anything in the least part new, you might just be unsophisticated enough to buy that too. Especially if it's something you wanted very much to believe in the first place.

Well, that wasn't actually his argument in the first book (which really just amounted to -- radical Islamist are just so bad and they are trying to kill us, so torturing them to save lives is OK), but, yes, point well taken.

 

[westprog]

Well, that wasn't actually his argument in the first book (which really just amounted to -- radical Islamist are just so bad and they are trying to kill us, so torturing them to save lives is OK), but, yes, point well taken.

It shows the danger that is inherent in Harris' ideas. All the abuses of religion through the centuries are available in a new form, with science as a justifier instead of God.

 

[Meed]

Cornsail, How the heck are you? Sadly, I think you are correct about what you say above.

Personally, Harris lost me in his first book when he decided to argue for the benefits of torture.

Quite well, sir. Sorry for tapping out of our mind/body discussion (although I think it had reached its limit anyway).

In Blue Collar Comedy Tour terms I'd have to say Dawkins is Foxworthy, Hitchens is Ron White, Harris is Bill Engval and Dennett is Larry the Cable Guy. Take that as you will.

 

[Meed]

Pro-torture arguments tend to fit very well into Harris' "maximizing well-being for the greatest number of people" idea, given the assumption that it actually works. So it wouldn't surprise me if he were to link the two lines of argument.

 

[angrysoba]

I don't think it's necessary to use neuroscience to hypothesise that almost everybody acts in such a way as to maximise what they think is their well-being. Suppose that we do a massive amount of research to confirm that this is the case? Where does that leave us?

Actually, that would be something new. It would mean true altruism doesn't exist.

 

[angrysoba]

It might be grammatically an "is" statement, but it is effectively equivalent to saying "The Nazis ought not to behave in they way that they do".

Saying "The Nazis originated in Germany" doesn't translate into an effectively equivalent ought-statement. There's no implication that the Nazis should or should not be in Germany.

The is-ought dichotomy holds. It might be possible to express an "ought" using an "is" phrasing, but that shouldn't be allowed to confuse the two.

What I said was that the fact-value distinction and is-ought distinction are not identical.

I don't think it is true that "The Nazis are bad" is effectively equivalent to "The Nazis ought not to behave in the way that they do" if you think otherwise then you are asserting that ought-statements can be derived from is-statements, something which most people here (including me, actually) disagree with and which pretty much only Harris seems to agree with (in fact, to some extent it is the crutch of his argument that it is "obvious" that a statement such as "Nazis are bad" is essentially the same as "The Nazis ought not to behave the way they do")

But, even if you say that these are ought-statements in disguise, then what about these statements:

The Nazis were efficient administrators.

The Taliban had an exotic code of morality.

Are these fact statements or value statements? If you think they are value statements (and I think you would have a good case) then could you explain the ought-statements that they translate into.

 

[angrysoba]

I suspect Dawkins and Dennett see Harris as an ally in their anti-religious movement. Considering they have a lot of shared fans, crapping on each other would probably be bad business. If Dennett says "Harris' book is crap" he will lose some fans who disagree with him and Harris will lose some fans who trust in Dennett. Dawkins' review was over the top. Whether it was sincere or phony, it made me lose some respect for him. But I can understand simply keeping silent.

It might be true that "crapping on each other would probably be bad business" but it would be the more intellectually honest thing to do. Agreeing with someone because they are your friend or because it makes good business sense whilst simultaneously claiming that you are from a rational tradition and will venture wherever the facts lead opens you up to the charge of hypocrisy.

The point that Hitchens, Harris, Dennett, Dawkins have made over and over again is that atheism is not an institution or set of beliefs but a lack of belief in God/gods. They have an opportunity to demonstrate how a rational disagreement is best conducted. (the problem is that even among philosophers and scientists disagreements over facts - as opposed to values - can be highly vituperative).

 

[angrysoba]

Sam Harris actually does discuss Haidt, particularly his article "The Emotional Dog and It's Rational Tail". The problem Harris identifies with Haidt's work is that whereas he makes a compelling case that people generally create a moral framework from their emotions etc... rather than what they believe are rational reasons, Harris thinks this is often no different from the way that some people hold other beliefs about which there are clearly objective facts.

Harris simply doesn't think that morality is a special case here and the example he gives of a disagreement which fits this model is one that almost everyone on JREF is familiar with: 9/11 Truthers. Yet, whereas some people would like to look at Haidt's work as confirmation that there is no such thing as objective morality we wouldn't say that there is no objective truth to the events of 9/11 despite people holding their own beliefs with huge conviction and apparently immune to reasoning.

Right, but to answer Harris, there is something that happened outside of people's brains on 9/11 that observers can agree upon. They can also disagree, but what occurred is not changed by how anyone thinks about it.

When it comes to differing styles of moral decision making, there is not an objective occurrence to which everyone has access. While it may be objectively true that I feel that murder is wrong, you are not privy to my feeling that murder is wrong. And, as you point out, it is not objectively true that every person feels that murder is wrong necessarily.

When it comes to morality, people don't just say, 'but that's how I feel about it" and that's the end of the debate. We aren't all emotivists. We do, however, begin our moral thinking in emotion, and sometimes the negotiation amongst different people never seems to reach a satisfactory conclusion. Since morality begins in a private area and then becomes a public issue I think it is quite different from a public physical event like 9/11 about which people may decide on private beliefs.

If he is really claiming that because there is an objective truth connected with the events of 911, that this indicates that there must be an objective truth connected with moral issues, then that's a remarkably poor argument. Indeed, it's a poor argument in a number of different ways.

Well, it is my reading of Sam Harris' reading of Haidt that suggests Haidt's argument is unsound:

Emotions are a bigger factor in our determination of what is right and wrong than reason.
Emotions are subjective.
Therefore right and wrong is subjective.

There may be a transmission error between my reading of Harris or between Harris' reading of Haidt but all I am showing is that Harris thinks Haidt's work doesn't demonstrate that arguments made intractable through heavy emotional investment shows that there is no fact of the matter. It is merely one objection that he is shooting down. Harris may have chosen to show this by substituting what is right and wrong with the truth about 9/11.

Emotions are a bigger factor in our determination of the truth about 9/11 than reason.
Emotions are subjective.
Therefore the truth about 9/11 is subjective.

So, if my reading of Harris' reading of Haidt is correct then I think it is fair to say that Haidt's objection fails. It doesn't, of course, mean that there aren't more successful objections.

 

[Humes fork]

I suspect Dawkins and Dennett see Harris as an ally in their anti-religious movement. Considering they have a lot of shared fans, crapping on each other would probably be bad business. If Dennett says "Harris' book is crap" he will lose some fans who disagree with him and Harris will lose some fans who trust in Dennett. Dawkins' review was over the top. Whether it was sincere or phony, it made me lose some respect for him. But I can understand simply keeping silent.

But Dawkins is open about his opposition to the Iraq War, whereas Hitchens is open about his support of it. Likewise, Dennett doesn't have to say that Harris' book is crap, just show where it goes wrong. This (very generous) review of Harris' book from a philosopher does that.

Has Dawkins written an entire review of the book? I'm only aware of his endorsement of it.

 

[Humes fork]

Well, it is my reading of Sam Harris' reading of Haidt that suggests Haidt's argument is unsound:

Emotions are a bigger factor in our determination of what is right and wrong than reason.
Emotions are subjective.
Therefore right and wrong is subjective.

There may be a transmission error between my reading of Harris or between Harris' reading of Haidt but all I am showing is that Harris thinks Haidt's work doesn't demonstrate that arguments made intractable through heavy emotional investment shows that there is no fact of the matter. It is merely one objection that he is shooting down. Harris may have chosen to show this by substituting what is right and wrong with the truth about 9/11.

Emotions are a bigger factor in our determination of the truth about 9/11 than reason.
Emotions are subjective.
Therefore the truth about 9/11 is subjective.

So, if my reading of Harris' reading of Haidt is correct then I think it is fair to say that Haidt's objection fails. It doesn't, of course, mean that there aren't more successful objections.

Per Hume (and Russell and Ayer), reason can't determine right and wrong. Reason finds out facts about the world, but for morality, there are no such facts.

"In short, we find that argument is possible on moral questions only if some system of values is presupposed. If our opponent concurs with us in expressing moral disapproval of all actions of a given type t, then we may get him to condemn a particular action A, by bringing forward arguments to show that A is of type t. For the question whether A does or does not belong to that type is a plain question of fact. Given that a man has certain moral principles, we argue that he must, in order to be consistent, react morally to certain things in a certain way. What we do not and cannot argue about is the validity of these moral principles. We merely praise or condemn them in light of our own feelings." - A. J. Ayer

 

[Meed]

But Dawkins is open about his opposition to the Iraq War, whereas Hitchens is open about his support of it. Likewise, Dennett doesn't have to say that Harris' book is crap, just show where it goes wrong. This (very generous) review of Harris' book from a philosopher does that.

Has Dawkins written an entire review of the book? I'm only aware of his endorsement of it.

True, but disagreeing on certain issues is different than criticizing each others' books. I'm just saying, the fact that Dennett hasn't distanced himself from Harris' book, as someone put it, is not good evidence that Dennett agrees with the book.

 

[Dani]

But Dawkins is open about his opposition to the Iraq War, whereas Hitchens is open about his support of it. Likewise, Dennett doesn't have to say that Harris' book is crap, just show where it goes wrong. This (very generous) review of Harris' book from a philosopher does that.

Has Dawkins written an entire review of the book? I'm only aware of his endorsement of it.

Thanks for the link. I just read the review, and although the word choice is soft edged, I share the same reservations about Harris' position (not the book, because I haven't read it).

I only disagree with one thing (which probably has to do with its willful generosity): even if our moral conclusion is the same, the process that leads Harris to that position (a less sophisticated process, as the reviewer would say) is also problematic. In other words, replacing science with scientism is always going to be problematic in our pursuit of the truth.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, it is my reading of Sam Harris' reading of Haidt that suggests Haidt's argument is unsound:

Emotions are a bigger factor in our determination of what is right and wrong than reason.
Emotions are subjective.
Therefore right and wrong is subjective.

There may be a transmission error between my reading of Harris or between Harris' reading of Haidt but all I am showing is that Harris thinks Haidt's work doesn't demonstrate that arguments made intractable through heavy emotional investment shows that there is no fact of the matter. It is merely one objection that he is shooting down. Harris may have chosen to show this by substituting what is right and wrong with the truth about 9/11.

Emotions are a bigger factor in our determination of the truth about 9/11 than reason.
Emotions are subjective.
Therefore the truth about 9/11 is subjective.

So, if my reading of Harris' reading of Haidt is correct then I think it is fair to say that Haidt's objection fails. It doesn't, of course, mean that there aren't more successful objections.

If that is his argument, then I can only point out that he has mangled it in my estimation.

In fact, I think he has sidled his way into an equivocation fallacy.

There are forms of reasoning that do not depend on emotion; we call them mathematics/calculation. It's what our current iterations of computers do.

For human reasoning to function, however, emotion must play a role, but it plays a slightly different role in different types of reasoning.

So, for instance, the reason why we engage in discussions about 9/11 is determined by desires and motivations, but the reasoning process itself is best left to arguing data not determined by emotional factors. His argument about how truthers go about their business supports Haidt's position that folks have a marked tendency to rely on ascertainment bias in their arguments; and emotional input is the primary reason behind it. When it comes to what actually happened on 9/11, however, I will repeat, there is a set of data that is explained better by one and not the other theory. ETA: That a group of people flew planes into several structures and there is no actual evidence of explosives in the rubble, etc. are simple facts. They are not determined by our emotional involvement in discussing the process. Granted, the importance we assign those facts is determined by our emotional involvement, but that is part of the equivocation as I see it.

When it comes to moral reasoning, however, we have no recourse but to rely ultimately on emotion/motivation/desire/feeling. Morality does not exist without values and values do not exist without desire/feeling. In that sense, feeling is the very basis of all moral reasoning in a way that it is not for other types of reasoning -- we only think about 9/11 because of our feelings about it, but we should not think about it using our feelings about it as the primary mode of intellectual input. Feelings are, by their very nature, the primary input for moral thinking, though. ETA: Or, in other words, emotion/desire/motivation/feeling constitute the 'facts' in moral reasoning (as opposed to reasoning about occurrences in the world that many people can see where the facts do not depend on emotion).

So, folks might make the mistake of interjecting too much emotion into their appraisal of 9/11 facts, but it does not follow that subjectivity being the improper approach in that instance translates into a mistake in moral decision making. Morality simply is another fish.

 

[westprog]

Morality simply is another fish.

Analogy is a way to make arguments clearer - but it's not an argument in itself. We've all seen discussions disintegrate over whether an analogy is apt or not. An analogy can illuminate, but not demonstrate.