Yes, we have Massei report which endorses a theory of multiple attackers. This is one source to counter. But we have also Rudy's appeal, a conclusive report from another court, that is another piece of evidence for the multiple attacker theory, so we have two sources. To this, the defence needs a counter move. Aviello and Alessi bring in suspicion that a second attacker might have been there who is not Raffaele.
Moreover, the Aviello and Alessi testimonies might take advantage from the fact that one element of evidence - a possible semen stain - was not used in the Rudy trial and could in some way be exploited to emphasize a possible alternative scenario.
The reasoning about the SC ruling, I don't understand what you mean: the SC decision is a necessary step in order to use the Rudy verdict. But the Cassazione cannot modify the scenario; they could have rejected Rudy's appeal sentence and could have ordered a new trial, but not modify the conclusions. In this aspect, they could only repeat what the lowr court said, or in alternative reject the verdict. But not change the scenario for Rudy's conviction. Their acceptance of the verdict means that the lower court had worked properly in the evidence assessment, and thus the scenario they worked out is accepted.
With respect, Machiavelli, this makes no sense.
In Rudy Guede's trial, neither Ms. Knox, Mr. Sollecito, nor their respective lawyers were parties or had any standing to cross-examine witnesses, call evidence, or make submissions, so it is not the case that the factual findings made by the court of first instance in Rudy Guede's trial are binding in any way, shape or form on the trials of Ms. Knox and Mr. Sollecito. It matters not at all that the Italian higher court found that Guede's trial was such that no legal errors were made that would entitle him to a reversal of his conviction. There is a vast difference between findings of fact based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution and the defence, and errors of law.
To contend that the higher court's confirmation of Rudy Guede's conviction in his separate trial somehow binds the trial judges in the trial of Ms. Knox and Mr. Sollecito as to findings of fact that were made in Guede's trial is incorrect, and demonstrates an egregious miscomprehension of the law.
When the trials of multiple accused persons are separated, there is always the risk of inconsistent verdicts insofar as factual findings are concerned because the evidence presented in one trial may be very different than the evidence presented in another. This is well known and recognized, but it does not serve to make the factual findings made in the trial of one of the accused binding upon the court hearing the evidence in the trial of the other accused. To suggest otherwise would be perverse, since the accused in the later trial were not parties to the earlier trial.
The reality in this case is that it was in Rudy Guede's best interests to promote the idea of multiple attackers, in order to try to minimize his own actions, and it was simultaneously in the best interests of the prosecution in Rudy Guede's trial to promote the idea of multiple attackers because the police and prosecution had already nailed their colours to the multiple attacker mast by prematurely jailing Ms. Knox and Mr. Sollecito (and Mr. Lumumba) and had long since wed themselves to a particular scenario that they set out to prove come hell or high water. But none of that makes
any of the factual findings made in Rudy Guede's case -
at any level - binding upon those hearing the case of Ms. Knox and Mr. Sollecito, because they were not parties to that trial, had no representation at that trial, had no right of cross-examination at that trial, and no right to call evidence or make submissions at that trial.
