David Hume vs. Sam Harris

[Ichneumonwasp]

In many of my responses, I will refer to the "Miles" I wrote about in my previous post. Please see that post for more information.

Good character is a hallmark of well-being. In the natural world, it would be very difficult (though perhaps not completely impossible) to obtain a good character without being generally well off. Environments hostile to well-being more often generates a lot of bad characters.

Duty utilitarian. If you have a problem with well-being being utilitarian, it also applies to duty. I'm just sayin'.

A very nice Middle Distance argument. (see my previous post)

No doubt we could. Yes, there are alternatives to science. But, the presence of alternatives does not mean science is not capable of doing the job.

For a Last Mile argument (again, see prev. post), I would say science is going to be more reliable, in the long run. Character ethics, for example, would naturally build a less accurate approximation of reality, than the one science could provide.

That doesn't mean there are no risks. One risk in using science is that you could accidentally allow pseudo-science into the door. And, it is awfully difficult to detect pseudo-science, sometimes. Though we are getting better at it. Back in WW2, for example, some folks used to think eugenics was a science, even though it had no real solid scientific basis behind it.


Clearly, if it was self-evident, he wouldn't have so much trouble convincing people of it! Even bright, intelligent people!

Not going to go through all of these because it isn't really necessary, but to highlight a few points........

Good character is a hallmark of well-being defined how? Some argue that good character is shown through hardship when pleasure is denied.

The issue we are trying to point out is that it is your first mile that is the issue. Science can intercede at all the other points, and I don't think that is controversial at all. The controversy arises when people try to argue that scientific investigation provides or can provide the first mile. For science to work requires a framework; that framework is the first mile. Science simply cannot provide the framework from the outset. One must first start with value, and the feeling of what we value can be studied scientifically, but actually valuing some one thing over another is not a scientific enterprise.

Regarding the self-evident nature of well-being -- I was arguing that Sam Harris was wrong in calling it self-evident. He thinks that it is; I disagree. There are many things that different people think are self-evident. When others argue with them, as you point out, it should be obvious that what they think is self-evident simply isn't.

The problem with well-being as the ultimate goal is that it sometimes becomes impossible to decide what to do when one person's well-being comes into conflict with another's. Do you stop a rapist who might feel that he is maximizing his well-being in the act? I think we would all say, yes, because he is hurting someone else. How do we decide between the two, though? The harder case, if we want to get into the problems with utilitarianism is scapegoating -- one can easily maximize the happiness of many people by sacrificing one in certain situations (the classical case is a pure thought experiment, but you can think of one of those old Star Trek episodes). But that just doesn't seem fair. That is the problem with utilitarianism. It doesn't answer all ethical questions for us. We have more than one way to answer our moral dilemmas.

 

[Piscivore]

Bacon supersedes morality.

Salmon.

 

[Humes fork]

Can the Harris proponents please show me the evidence that we should value well-being?

Yeah?

Another question: In addition to consequentialism, there are two other main schools of thought in normative philosophy. These are deontology and virtue ethics. The former prescribes that we should act in accordance to certain rules, the latter doesn't focus (directly) on how we should act, but rather upon what kind of persons we should be.

What evidence or data can resolve the issue of which one that is correct?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Yeah?

Another question: In addition to consequentialism, there are two other main schools of thought in normative philosophy. These are deontology and virtue ethics. The former prescribes that we should act in accordance to certain rules, the latter doesn't focus (directly) on how we should act, but rather upon what kind of persons we should be.

What evidence or data can resolve the issue of which one that is correct?

The following answers are available...

"This is a First Mile question, which is less interesting than other things I would prefer to talk about. Thus utilitarianism is right and the others are wrong".

"Gosh, it's just so obvious that well-being is better than not-well-being, anyone who doesn't realise that is clearly dysfunctional and I can't talk to them. Thus utilitarianism is right and the others are wrong".

"I see your point of view but don't you think there are all sorts of other more interesting things about Harris' philosophy to talk about? I don't want to get hung up on this one issue. Thus utilitarianism is right and the others are wrong".

"Obviously we've evolved to see that utilitarianism is right and the others are wrong, and obviously anything we've evolved to see as right is right because it's adaptive to be right, and obviously being adaptive is a moral virtue not just the contingent quality of being more successful at evolutionary competition than rival gene pools in the specific environment in question, or close enough anyway. Thus utilitarianism is right and the others are wrong".

 

[dlorde]

I completely agree with you. But what do you mean when you say that you keep feeling that you've missed something obvious?

I mean that people are arguing as if someone has somehow shown that defining well-being can be done with science alone, or at least, as if it isn't obvious that it can't. I was wondering whether I missed the bit where everyone agreed that the precise definition of well-being was assumed.

 

[corbin]

Harris assumes utilitarianism as the ultimate morality, and then proceeds to tell us how science can help us achieve utilitarian goals.

That's not the issue - the area where science has nothing to say is when it comes to deciding which ethic is correct in the first place. Debates about utilitarianism versus Kant and all the other proposed ethical systems are the domain of the branch of philosophy known as ethics, not science.

I don't think this goal of "well-being" is a good goal of ethics. Utilitarian has lots of problems. What is well-being? If it is happiness, then it seems to encourage us to all be blissfully ignorant, i.e. sated fools. If it encompasses something more than mere happiness, then I would love to hear those other things as long as they are not subjective and unquantifiable...

People who say that science is all that is needed for ethical decisions seem to regard the philosophical, fundamental underpinnings of ethics as ultimately decided and not very productive. They seem think it produces little argument in the same way that fundamental mathematical axioms produce little argument - that it is fine to just accept these things and get on with the science. This isn't true though. Ethics is a big, detailed branch of philosophy with intellectual ideas that take a lot of effort to understand and immediate relevance to our lives. It's very much at the cusp of human knowledge, rather than some solidified, antiquated system. What we should do is a very interesting issue that can only be answered by philosophy and reasoning.

 

[angrysoba]

Harris assumes utilitarianism as the ultimate morality, and then proceeds to tell us how science can help us achieve utilitarian goals.

That's not the issue - the area where science has nothing to say is when it comes to deciding which ethic is correct in the first place. Debates about utilitarianism versus Kant and all the other proposed ethical systems are the domain of the branch of philosophy known as ethics, not science.

I don't think this goal of "well-being" is a good goal of ethics. Utilitarian has lots of problems. What is well-being? If it is happiness, then it seems to encourage us to all be blissfully ignorant, i.e. sated fools. If it encompasses something more than mere happiness, then I would love to hear those other things as long as they are not subjective and unquantifiable...

People who say that science is all that is needed for ethical decisions seem to regard the philosophical, fundamental underpinnings of ethics as ultimately decided and not very productive. They seem think it produces little argument in the same way that fundamental mathematical axioms produce little argument - that it is fine to just accept these things and get on with the science. This isn't true though. Ethics is a big, detailed branch of philosophy with intellectual ideas that take a lot of effort to understand and immediate relevance to our lives. It's very much at the cusp of human knowledge, rather than some solidified, antiquated system. What we should do is a very interesting issue that can only be answered by philosophy and reasoning.

Perhaps even more disturbingly is that some studies such as the one reported by the Economist here suggest that those who can apply utilitarian thinking most consistently appear to score highly in psychopath tests.

http://www.economist.com/node/21530078

I would suggest that this has something to do with our intuitive understanding of morals having something to do with feelings for others and the idea that we could be moral by taking out a calclutor and tallying up the beneficial effects of different courses of action is not itself moral action.

Harris in his book has some bizarre thought experiments in which he asks us to suppose world hunger could be ended by a car drive up the road. The car drive would be the most ethical thing he could do.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Harris assumes utilitarianism as the ultimate morality, and then proceeds to tell us how science can help us achieve utilitarian goals.

That's not the issue - the area where science has nothing to say is when it comes to deciding which ethic is correct in the first place. Debates about utilitarianism versus Kant and all the other proposed ethical systems are the domain of the branch of philosophy known as ethics, not science.

I don't think this goal of "well-being" is a good goal of ethics. Utilitarian has lots of problems. What is well-being? If it is happiness, then it seems to encourage us to all be blissfully ignorant, i.e. sated fools. If it encompasses something more than mere happiness, then I would love to hear those other things as long as they are not subjective and unquantifiable...

Regarding bolding... autopoiesis?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autopoiesis

ETA: ethics from the "outside"

ETA: come to think of it actually more of the "inside" of an "outside"

ETA: better yet... the interior acquaintance with the exterior description of the experience of an interior acquaintance

 

[Wowbagger]

You started this thread with a quote from Hume that specifically applies to the first mile,

For the record, I was not the one who started this thread, nor did I quote Hume.

I am ironing out the rest of my replies. I figured, for now, I should at least clear this one up.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

For the record, I was not the one who started this thread, nor did I quote Hume.

I am ironing out the rest of my replies. I figured, for now, I should at least clear this one up.

Whoops - I apologise, you are right on this point and I was completely wrong.

 

[Paul2]

Whoops - I apologise, you are right on this point and I was completely wrong.

Who says skeptics are dogmatic and can't admit that they can be wrong?

 

[Meed]

Who says skeptics are dogmatic and can't admit that they can be wrong?

Zeke the plumber

 

[Sophronius]

Yeah?

Another question: In addition to consequentialism, there are two other main schools of thought in normative philosophy. These are deontology and virtue ethics. The former prescribes that we should act in accordance to certain rules, the latter doesn't focus (directly) on how we should act, but rather upon what kind of persons we should be.

What evidence or data can resolve the issue of which one that is correct?

The correct one, if by "correct" efficaciousness is meant, I imagine to be consequentialism. I don't know if any studies were done in this area, but I strongly anticipate that it could be shown that consequentialism is more effective in increasing wealth and welfare in a country.

Of course, the next question will be: But why is that good? Which means we're back to the same question that's been repeated a hundred times. My answer to this is: We do things because we ultimately want to, not because they are good in a way that is separate from our desires. There is no "intrinsic good". This doesn't mean that science can't tell us what we should do (given what we want), just that it cannot provide nonsensical "just so" morality. It seems quite impossible to me for science to give 100% objective morality. But it seems silly to me to insinuate that this means that ethics is purely relative and all ethical views are equally good.

 

[Paul2]

This doesn't mean that science can't tell us what we should do (given what we want), just that it cannot provide nonsensical "just so" morality. It seems quite impossible to me for science to give 100% objective morality. But it seems silly to me to insinuate that this means that ethics is purely relative and all ethical views are equally good.

Exactly. Fallacy of the excluded middle. If evolution has given humanity a tendency toward certain cooperative behaviors, that can provide a basis for morality that isn't objective but isn't relative, either.

Kinda in the same way that perception of a color is not a objective/subjective, black and white (hah! get it?!) situation. Color is not out there - grass is not green, there's nothing green in grass, it's just that it reflects a certain wavelength of light. The green is in our heads, but not totally either, because we just can't arbitrarily decide to see anything as green. It's in both places at once and neither.

Lakoff and Johnson apply this type of thinking to philosophy in general with their "embodied mind" philosophy in "Philosophy in the Flesh."

They are big on metaphor, and I don't think we have a good metaphor to describe how color exists between us and the world, and how morality is made between us and the world.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Who says skeptics are dogmatic and can't admit that they can be wrong?

Sorry, forgot where I was for a moment. I meant to say that I never said that, and if I did say that it was because you tricked me and you totally really meant it even if you didn't say it because I know your type and don't bother denying it. You are obviously totally over-invested in this topic and I mock you for it. The fact that you are pointing out my factual errors is proof you are a no-life neckbeard with a dangerous obsession and you are probably also a child molester. Are you really trying to say that nothing you posted could possibly be mistaken for something like something said by the OP? Now you're bullying me and being uncivil and I will put you on ignore. Good day sir!

 

[Democracy Simulator]

The correct one, if by "correct" efficaciousness is meant, I imagine to be consequentialism. I don't know if any studies were done in this area, but I strongly anticipate that it could be shown that consequentialism is more effective in increasing wealth and welfare in a country.

Of course, the next question will be: But why is that good? Which means we're back to the same question that's been repeated a hundred times. My answer to this is: We do things because we ultimately want to, not because they are good in a way that is separate from our desires. There is no "intrinsic good". This doesn't mean that science can't tell us what we should do (given what we want), just that it cannot provide nonsensical "just so" morality. It seems quite impossible to me for science to give 100% objective morality. But it seems silly to me to insinuate that this means that ethics is purely relative and all ethical views are equally good.

This:
>>We do things because we ultimately want to, not because they are good in a way that is separate from our desires. There is no "intrinsic good".<<

Contradicts this:
>>But it seems silly to me to insinuate that this means that ethics is purely relative and all ethical views are equally good.<<

There is no 'middle way'.

Paul 2 wrote:

Exactly. Fallacy of the excluded middle. If evolution has given humanity a tendency toward certain cooperative behaviors, that can provide a basis for morality that isn't objective but isn't relative, either.

Explain that basis.

 

[Marquis de Carabas]

I'm not sure Sam Harris really believes science can cover the First Mile. I stumbled upon this quote of his:

It seems to me, however, that in order to fulfill our deepest interests in this life, both personally and collectively, we must admit that some interests are more defensible than others. Indeed, some interests are so compelling that they need no defense at all. [emphasis added -MdC]

The bolded bit is an entirely unscientific attitude.

 

[Humes fork]

The following answers are available...

"This is a First Mile question, which is less interesting than other things I would prefer to talk about. Thus utilitarianism is right and the others are wrong".

"Gosh, it's just so obvious that well-being is better than not-well-being, anyone who doesn't realise that is clearly dysfunctional and I can't talk to them. Thus utilitarianism is right and the others are wrong".

"I see your point of view but don't you think there are all sorts of other more interesting things about Harris' philosophy to talk about? I don't want to get hung up on this one issue. Thus utilitarianism is right and the others are wrong".

"Obviously we've evolved to see that utilitarianism is right and the others are wrong, and obviously anything we've evolved to see as right is right because it's adaptive to be right, and obviously being adaptive is a moral virtue not just the contingent quality of being more successful at evolutionary competition than rival gene pools in the specific environment in question, or close enough anyway. Thus utilitarianism is right and the others are wrong".

So no serious reply then?

Everyone agrees science can help us get what we value, but not determine what we shoud value (which Harris claims, though sometimes not).

And no, we did not evolve to be utilitarians. Most of us consider the process, and not just the outcome, to be important. Suppose someone drives a car, and drives on another person, killing him. The courts will sentence the driver harsher if he intentionally tried to kill him than if he was just irresponsible and did so by accident. Yet the outcome in both cases is the same, one man died.

 

[Paul2]

Explain that basis.

Depends on what we mean by "basis." I meant "origin."

 

[Sophronius]

This:
>>We do things because we ultimately want to, not because they are good in a way that is separate from our desires. There is no "intrinsic good".<<

Contradicts this:
>>But it seems silly to me to insinuate that this means that ethics is purely relative and all ethical views are equally good.<<

There is no 'middle way'.

You are saying that "no intrinsic good --> all ethical views are equally valid"?

I disagree in that case. Let's take an obvious counter example:

A guy is living in an Islamic country. He is a perfectly normal fellow: he is not mad, not a sociopath, just an ordinary guy. He loves his family and fellow people and firmly believes in helping his fellow man. Unfortunately, he gets brainwashed by Islamic extremists and becomes convinced that he has to blow up westerners in order to attain a place in paradise. He also believes that this is the ethical thing to do, since it says so in the Koran.

Or, other example: A white guy beats up black guys because he believes that they aren't really people. Or a nazi killing jews because he believes they are taking over the world. They believe that they are doing no evil; they see themselves as moral.

Or heck, a more mundane example: A guy refuses to vaccinate his children because he believes that only God decides who lives and dies. He wants his children to be happy and healthy, but still believes it is ethical to let them die.


Do you think these views are perfectly valid? If so, I do not understand how you can say that, since they are based on factually wrong assumptions, and yield courses of action that are directly counter to the true interests of the people who hold them. In what ways could these ethical views possibly be considered correct?

Everyone agrees science can help us get what we value, but not determine what we shoud value (which Harris claims, though sometimes not).

I don't think Harris ever actually said that science can determine what we should value. He said things like "it is obvious that we do not want the greatest suffering for everyone" (which is certainly true for virtually everyone). It seems to me that his main point was that it would be better to stop pretending that ethics is purely up for grabs, that we can just make up whatever we want and call it right, and that we would be better off if we just agreed on some basic ethical rules and go from there.

Also, while I agree that science cannot tell us what we should value (though it can tell us whether our values are incoherent and need re-evaluation), I find that the commonly implied conclusion (and therefore, all ethical views are equally correct) simply does not follow. You can't just decide what values people have. Those values are largely ingrained in human nature or provided by society, and are there for science to examine and draw conclusions from. I do not see any limitations science has on this subject, other than the fact that it has to look at reality (our values) before it can come to conclusions, which is true for EVERY area of science. As such the view that science and morality and in separate magisteria seems entirely nonsensical. It makes no more sense to me than the claim that science and religion are in separate magisteria. Science says that neither religion nor purely objective morality are correct views on reality, and AFAICT is correct on both counts.