Hiding the Bird
HIDING THE BIRD
A DETAILED INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLLO 11 MISSION REPORT'S LUNAR LANDING COORDINATE TABLE AND ITS HORRIFYING IMPLICATIONS OF APOLLO 11 MISSION REPORT FRAUDULENCE
We shall proceed now with a more thorough evaluation of the coordinate confusion/bird hiding issue by focusing on the Apollo 11 Mission Report's own accounting of the landing at Tranquility Base and specifically, on the report's data given in support of NASA's Apollo 11 Mission presentation. This Mission Report analysis will lead to the complete evisceration of the Apollo 11 "official story". We shall move on from this disembowelment of the Apollo 11 Mission Report's credibility to address motives of the fraud's perpetrators in later related pieces, with special attention to their scripting of the phony mission in the particular way that they did. Let's begin with our coordinate analysis.
APOLLO 11 MISSION REPORT COORDINATE ANALYSIS LEADS INEXORABLY TO FOOL PROOF DEMONSTRATION OF APOLLO 11 MISSION FRAUDULENCE.
The Apollo 11 Mission Report was published from the Manned Space Flight Center in Houston Texas in November of 1969. It is in a very real sense, NASA's most thorough "single volume" report on the Apollo 11 Mission. For the moment, we should assume this report to be a full and truthful and honest accounting of the events transpiring from July 16 through July 24 as they relate to NASA's Apollo 11 first manned moon landing adventure. We'll see as we go along, it will become more and more difficult to hang on to that assumption of the report being a truthful and faithful accounting of anything really, but we won't give up on the report until we are confronted with fatal contradictions in the form of fatal "hidden bird" coordinate confusion nonsense.
The section of the report we are most interest in is Section 5 dealing with the descent of the Eagle and its landing at Tranquility Base. On page 6 of the Mission Report's Section 5, we find statements informing us what the planned landing site coordinates were, what the actual Tranquility Base coordinates wound up being and also we find a reference to the Mission Report's table 5-IV where all of the real-time and post flight landing site solutions/coordinates can be found, along with a listing of the methods whereby those solutions were obtained. From the report;
"The coordinates of the landing point,
as obtained from the various real-time and postflight sources, are shown
in table 5-IV. The actual landing point is 0 degree 41 minutes 15 seconds north latitude
and 23 degrees 26 minutes east longitude, as compared
with the targeted landing point of 0 degree 43 minutes 53 seconds north
latitude and 23 degrees 38 minutes 51 seconds east longitude as shown in
figure 5-10. Figure 5-10 is the basic reference map for location of the
landing point in this report. As noted, the landing point dispersion was
caused primarily by errors in the onboard state vector prior to powered descent
initiation."
Since most of the coordinates presented in the Apollo 11 Mission Report appear in garden variety decimal form and not degrees/minutes/seconds of arc, I will use the decimal form as well, converting the few degrees/minutes/seconds entries that do appear to this more easily dealt with format. The motivation is of course that we then won't have to jump around, go back and forth between the forms. It will make things easier for everyone to follow.
So we see that the originally planned targeted landing point was 00 43 53 north and 23 38 52 east. Let's convert that to the conventional decimal form. We get 0.731 as the targeted north coordinate. For the east we get, 23.65 degrees targeted.
For Tranquility Base, the actual landing site, we have the very familiar 00 41 15 north and 23 26 00 east, or equivalently; 0.6875 north and 23.4333. For now I'll leave the decimal forms here expanded to the fourth decimal digit as they are listed that way at times with regard to Tranquility Base coordinates. We may want to write these out to fewer digits of expression, but will defer that decision until later.
On page 5 of the Apollo 11 Mission Report's Section 5, we find the report's authors referring us to figure 5-3. In the second paragraph of the section quoted, the report's authors state there was a 20,000 foot down range error existing at the time of powered descent initiation. In other words, though the targeted east coordinate initially was 0.731 east, even before the descent begins in earnest, the Eagle is off target roughly 20,000 feet/3.788 miles west. As such, the new east targeted coordinate has shifted down range by .2 degrees from the originally targeted 23.65 east to 23.45 east. This is before they've even made a genuine move down toward the lunar surface. (Here I assume the moon's circumference to be 6,790 miles which gives 18.86 miles per degree. 3.788 divided by 18.86 gave 0.2 degrees as the correction for the 20,000 foot down range error at the time the Eagle's descent to the moon's surface began.)
Here is the relevant Mission Report citation;
"Figure 5-B contains histories of altitude compared with altitude- rate from the primary and abort guidance systems and from the Network powered flight processor. The altitude difference existing between the primary system and the Network at powered descent initiation can be ob- served in this figure. All three sources are initialized to the primary guidance state vector at powered descent initiation. The primary system, however, is updated by the landing radar, and the abort guidance system is not. As indicated in the figure, the altitude readouts from both systems gradually diverge so as to indicate a lower altitude for the primary system until the abort system was manually updated with altitude data from the primary system.
The powered flight processor data reflect both the altitude and downrange errors existing in the primary system at powered descent initiation. The radial velocity error is directly proportional to the downrange position error such that a 1000-foot downrange error will cause a 1-ft/sec radial velocity error. Therefore, the 20 000-foot downrange error existing at powered descent initiation was also reflected as a 20-ft/sec radial velocity residual. This error is apparent on the figure in the altitude region near 27 000 feet, where an error of approximately 20 ft/sec is evident. The primary-system altitude error in existence at powered descent initiation manifests itself at touchdown when the powered flight processor indicates a landing altitude below the lunar surface. Figure 5-4 contains a similar comparison of lateral velocity from the three sources. Again, the divergence noted in the final phases in the abort guidance system data was caused by a lack of radar updates."
Also, we note as a consequence, not only has a downrange error/adjustment become an issue, but a radial error of 20 feet per second must be taken into account. So the Eagle will not only land long, but also land left, or more precisely, land south of the originally targeted 0.731 north. Obviously, the Eagle cannot land if it is drifting south at 20 feet per second, it will break its legs off. But let's assume for the whole way down, the Eagle is drifting south 20 feet per second above and beyond the anticipated. As we'll see, the exact numbers here are not all that important. We just want some rough idea as to what should have been the expectation given there was this 20 foot per second radial velocity residual. The descent to the moon's surface took roughly 13 minutes, that gives 780 seconds drifting more south than planned at 20 feet per second. We have 2.95 miles south of the targeted site, or equivalently, 0.156 degrees. The Mission Report says the originally target landing site was 0.731 degrees north, so we subtract 0.156 and get, 0.575 north. One would think the "actual number" would be bigger than this because one would have to slow any translational velocities to land a space ship. So we calculated some "extra drift" by assuming the Eagle to be drifting south an extra 20 feet per second for roughly all 13 or so minutes of the descent to landing. Again, we'll see the details here are not important. We just want a rough idea of what the numbers might be , could be, and if we show/talk about all of our assumptions, there should be no problems, especially since we are not going to use any of this south drift estimation business in any major material way in terms of our demonstration that the Apollo 11 Mission Report and indeed the Apollo 11 Mission itself is fraudulent, at least not for the present anyway.
It may be worthwhile to do what we have just done for the anticipated landing coordinates as they appeared in the Apollo 11 Press kit. There on page 85 in that preflight NASA document dated Sunday July 6 1969, we see that NASA had listed slightly different numbers than those appearing in the Mission Report as the targeted landing site coordinates. In the press kit, we find the Eagle is targeted to land at 00 42 50 north and 23 42 38 east, or equivalently 0.714 north and 23.71 east. If we use these instead of the targeted landing coordinates as presented in the Mission report, we find with the 20,000 foot down range error and the 20 foot per second southward drift, the "new" targeted landing site would be .558 north and 23.51 east.
Let's turn our attention now to the table of real-time and post flight Tranquility Base coordinate determinations. I will place the lunar module targeted numbers first, even though they appear next to last in the actual Table 5-IV. The rest I will list in the order in which they actually appear in the Mission Report. In my Mission Report, this table is on page 15 of Section 5. My table below lists all coordinates in their decimal form. I have added afeature to my modified chart. TBD indicates the distance a set of coordinates are from Tranquility Base (0.6875 north and 23.4333 east). At the bottom of my table is a brief explanation(appears just as here in the actual Mission Report) indicating that the numbers as they originally appear in the chart must be "corrected" in order to reference trajectory values to the Lunar Map ORB-II-6. Since we are working in decimal representations and not degree/minutes/seconds of arc coordinate representations, we'll add the decimal equivalent of 2' 25", 0.040 degrees, to the north coordinate , and subtract the decimal equivalent of 4' 17", 0.071 degrees, from the east coordinate. These correction factors would seem to apply to all of the solutions with the exception of Lunar Module Targeted, Alignment Optical Telescope, and Photography. These solutions are not trajectory determined and so the correction factors should not apply. However, in the Mission Report Table, there is such a calculation done for photography and so in my table here, I will list both; photography coordinates with the correction and without(subentries a and b). My numbers below appear different from the original table because I have added the corrections in all cases where appropriate in the north coordinates and subtracted the corrections from the originally listed east coordinates where appropriate as well. Let's take a look at my table and see what we get.
SUMMARY OF APOLLO 11 MISSION REPORT LUNAR LANDING COORDINATE TABLE 5-IV. TBD is Tranquility Base Distance
1) Lunar Module:
latitude, 0.691 longitude, 23.72 TBD, 5.41 miles
2) Primary Guidance Onboard Vector
latitude, 0.689 longitude, 23.39 TBD, 0.75 miles
3) Abort Guidance Onboard Vector
latitude, 0.679 longitude, 23.37 TBD, 1.13 miles
4) Powered Flight Processor
latitude, 0.671 longitude, 23.40 TBD, 0.64 miles
5) Alignment Optical telescope
latitude, 0.523 longitude, 23.42 TBD, 3.11
6) Rendezvous Radar
latitude, 0.676 longitude, 23.43 TBD, 0.226 miles/1200ft
7) Best Estimate Trajectory Accelerometer Reconstruction
latitude, 0.687 longitude, 23.434 TBD, no meaningful difference
8)Photography
a. no correction
latitude 0.647 longitude, 23.505 TBD 1.55 miles
b. with correction
latitude 0.687 longitude, 23.435 TBD no meaningful difference
9) Tranquility Base
latitude, 0.6875 longitude, 23.433 TBD, not applicable
a Following the Apollo mission, a difference was noted (from the landmark tracking results) between the trajectory coordinate system and the coordinate system on the reference map. In order to reference trajectory values to the l:100 000 scale Lunar Map ORB-II-6 (lO0), dated December 1967, correction factors of plus 2'25" in latitude and minus 4'17" in longitude must be applied to the trajectory values.
b All latitude values are corrected for the estimated out-of-plane position error at powered descent initiation.
C These coordinate values are referenced to the map and include the correction factors.
The thoughtful reader, having taken just a cursory look at this table as now presented, with nothing changed materially fro the original Apollo 11 Mission Report whatsoever, will immediately see that the numbers/coordinates as I now show them in this more revealing presentation, are in no way compatible with the Apollo 11 Mission story as told by way of the conventional official narrative. We'll examine why that is the case in detail momentarily, but first, let's review what has been done to this chart, just to be sure our argument to follow is not subjected to any unfound criticism , for example charges of meddling/materially changing the numbers.
I have taken the liberty of numbering the solutions, placing the Lunar Module Targeted Solution first instead of next to last as it appears in the Mission Report. I added the actual Tranquility Base coordinates so we can just glance at the chart and remind ourselves of these numbers as we compare the Apollo 11 Mission Report Data with the Tranquility Base coordinates as they officially later became known. I added a feature, TBD, where using the pythagorean theorem I calculated the distance between the coordinate solutions as they appear in the Section 5-IV table and the actual Tranquility Base coordinates. I "doubled" my presentation of the photography numbers presenting one set of numbers which are left raw and unchanged, and another set which takes into consideration as NASA seems to encourage us to do, the need when switching between trajectory determined numbers and map referencing to add 2' 25 to the north value and subtract 4' 17" from the east value.
Let's begin to analyze these coordinate solutions by grouping them. Lunar module targeted is unique in the sense that it is a "planned coordinate" and so is not really a solution per se. We can list this particular targeted solution along with the others previously mentioned. First of all we have the planned landing site numbers as they are listed in the Mission Report page 6 of section 5. Those are 0.731 north and 23.65 east. We then made a modification to these figures given the Eagle actually started 20,000 feet downrange from the planned site of powered descent initiation. We also noted the Mission report indicated a 20 foot per second radial velocity residual that we had to take into account and we came up with 0.575 north and 23.45 east as a new targeted coordinate pair. We also saw that a completely different, though "close" set of targeted coordinates were presented in the Press Kit for the Apollo 11 Mission. These numbers are 0.714 north and 23.71 east. Since the Eagle started long and drifting south, we did the same to these numbers just to get a ball park idea of where the Eagle might land based on them. We found .558 north and 23.51 east. We reminded ourselves above that the 20 foot per minute radial velocity residual would really not apply for the entirety of the roughly 13 minute Eagle descent and so our method overestimates the degree of the southward drift. But we only wanted an approximation and for our purposes now, this will do. We simply want to round up all of the coordinates running about out there so we might be able to deal with them effectively if they come up under any circumstances. If they don't , well fine. But if we see numbers, we want to know where they are coming from. So these are the various Lunar Module Targeted coordinates, all a little different. At this point in time, it is somewhat difficult to see where the Lunar Module Targeted coordinates that appear in table 5-IV come from. They don't match the preflight numbers, nor match up with the numbers derived when taking the down range error and radial drift concerns into account,
Non real time coordinate solutions are numbers 7 and 8, the trajectory accelerometer reconstruction and photography solutions. It is not surprising that for these solutions there is really no meaningful difference between the coordinates so determined by these methods and the actual coordinates of Tranquility Base. This is because these are solutions arrived at after the astronauts have returned home and are solutions reflective of careful post flight analysis and consideration.
There are 5 methods of real time solution that we know of for sure appearing in the chart, numbers 2 through 6. All of these numbers reflect solutions as realized in a live sense, while the astronauts were on the moon. In addition, we read in Flight Dynamics Officer H. David Reed's account(chapter 3 of the book, FROM THE TRENCHED OF MISSION CONTROL TO THE CRATERS OF THE MOON) that real time photography studies were in effect and landing coordinate solutions derived from that method were being considered by him and others. We do not know what those numbers were, as Reed does not say in his account, and the numbers here in our table reflect the non real time solution as per the table 5-IV footnote c, once the "trajectory to map" corrections are taken into consideration, this post flight photography solution yields pretty much exactly the Tranquility Base coordinates. It may be that the corrections are necessary here because even though one does not think of photography as a "dynamic solution", there may have been trajectory concerns of some type taken into account which yielded the numbers 0.647 north and 23.505 east, and as such, these numbers would need to be modified by way of the "trajectory-map" corrections in giving an appropriately determined final result.
So it has taken a long time to get here, classifying, reading, calculating, but it will pay off because we know all of our numbers so well. Where they came from and so forth. We can't be fooled in any sense. If we continue to be careful as we have been, much will be revealed. Now with our data, let's commence with the analyzing. Since we are already familiar with H. David Reed's writing on the subject, let's begin there, for familiarity's sake. We'll analyze much more utilizing this table in future posts, but analysis in light of Reed's strong testimony, especially given his position/role as FIDO on the morning of 07/21/1969 is all too compelling to pass up. This is the very best place, with Reed, to start in now with a much more in-depth and very detailed analysis. Remember that H. David Reed as the FIDO or Flight Dynamics Officer is the person responsible for making the appropriate calculations to successfully launch the Eagle and have it rendezvous with the CM Columbia. It is Reed's jobs to determine the coordinates and the relationship between the LM and CM and provide the Apollo 11 Mission with a satisfactory launch solution so that the LM may find the CM and rendezvous safely. this was Reed's job and no one else's. Though he did have help, most significantly from his SELECT officer who selects the best tracking sources, and his DYNAMICs officer who is the computer specialist assisting Reed.
Reed told us that when he walked into work on the morning of 07/21/1969, no one knew where exactly the Eagle had landed. Reed wrote that the MSFN tracking, PNGS, AGS, targeted landing site and geologists (maps/orbital photos) solutions didn't match up with one another. They were not "even close" to one another and so could not be viewed as reliable. They could not be viewed as accurate. If he had the coordinates for the Eagle's landing site and good data on Collin's in the CSM, the launch solution would be a "piece of cake" as he put it. When one reads the account given by Reed on the events transpiring that morning, one get's the feeling that Reed is surprised when he first walks in as no one has the coordinates for him. Here is Reed writing in the book, FROM THE TRENCHES OF MISSION CONTROL TO THE CRATERS OF THE MOON, chapter 3;
"After Apollo XI landed, as the World celebrated and sipped champagne, I slept in preparation for my shift prior to lunar launch. I would work with SELECT and DYNAMICS to get all the relative geometry down and work out the correct ignition time for return to the CSM.Piece of cake really. All we needed were landing site coordinates and a solid ephemeris on the CSM. I sat down at the console for that prelaunch shift and was debriefed by the previous team to complete hand-off. I probably had my second cup of coffee by then and got on the loop to SELECT to get the best landing site. I remember asking SELECT what he had for landing site coordinates. I’ll never forget his answer when he said, “take your pick FIDO!” I also remember not reacting too positively to his offer. He explained that we had five different sites. He said “we have MSFN(tracking radars), PNGS (primary LM guidance computer), AGS(backup LM guidance computer), the targeted landing site and, oh yes, the geologist have determined yet another site based upon the crew’s description of the landscape and correlating that with orbiter photos”. No two of these were even close to each other."
Maurice Kennedy; Charles Deiterich III; William Stoval; William Boone III; Glynn S. Lunney; H. David Reed; Jerry C. Bostick (2011-05-13). From The Trench of Mission Control to the Craters of The Moon (Ebook Locations 5634-5648).
So according to Reed, we should find something very very different from that which we do find in the Apollo 11 Mission Report table 5-IV. With the exception of the Alignment Optical Telescope solution, the other real-time dynamic solutions that do appear in the Apollo 11 Mission Report are unlike the case one would expect based on Reed's fairly detailed testimony. Reed tells us in his writing that all of the coordinate pairs available to him as determined by these various methods of solution were not in agreement at all with one another. But in the Apollo 11 Mission Report table 5-IV, we find exactly the opposite. Here we find coordinate solutions provided by various methods to be if not in excellent agreement, then certainly very good agreement with one another. Reed calculated number 6, the rendezvous radar solution. However, 2, 3 and 4; the PNGS, AGS, powered processor solutions would all have been available to him. Reed says they were not even close to one another when solutions were provided to him upon his first walking into work on the morning of 07/21/1969. Just take a look at 2 and 3 for instance, the PNGS and AGS, those solutions differ from one another by 0.010 degrees or .189 miles. That translates to 998 feet. With regard to the east-west coordinate, the numbers differ by 0.20 degrees or 0.378 miles/1996 feet. Using the pythagorean theorem we find the distance between these two solutions to be 2231 feet 0.423 miles. The numbers, with the exception of the Alignment Optical Telescope solution are all very close to one another. In Reed's book, he says all five solutions were "not even close". Let's continue to compare Reed's experience with the data as presented in the Apollo 11 Mission Report.
Reed says that because he did not have a good solution for the landing coordinates, he employed the LM's rendezvous radar in solving for the relationship between the Lunar Module and the Command Module. He stated in his writing that coordinates themselves were not necessary in arriving at a launch solution as what is more important is the relationship between the LM and CM. That said, good coordinates would have been sufficient to calculate a launch solution for the LM and the coordinates he did have and the LM/CM relationships as calculated by the other solutions were not satisfactory for a successful launch. Indeed, they were at such great variance from one another, it motivated Reed to solve the problem with a rendezvous radar calculation. Once this was done, Reed found his method lead to the rendezvous radar coordinates as they appear in my table above, 0.676 north and 23.43 east. Once Reed completed his launch solution, he discovered that all of the available real-time solutions provided to him for consideration and rejected by him as not meaningful/ not accurate because of their variance from one another were AT LEAST 25,000 FEET FROM HIS RENDEZVOUS RADAR SOLUTION OF; 0.676 north and 23.43 east. As the rendezvous radar derived coordinates calculated by Reed were roughly 1200 feet from the actual Tranquility Base site, we may conclude with a simple subtraction; 25,000 minus 1200 = 23,300 feet, that the real time solutions not only were at the very closest, 25,000 feet/4.73 miles from Reed's solution, but at the very closest; 23,300 feet/4.41 miles from Tranquility Base. Here is Reed's first person account of 07/21/1969's am dramatic Mission Control events;
"I remember taking my headset off and walking up to the Flight Direc- tor, Milt Windler to explain the situation. We only used that kind of face to face communication when we had a serious problem such as this. I detailed the problem as best we knew it and the process that we’d have to follow to get the data we needed, and why we had to start a rev early to finish the calculations and then find the critical lift-off time for lunar launch. I recall the CapCom instructing Buzz Aldrin that we needed him to perform the RR check early but I don’t believe that CapCom explained why, just another check was all. Shaft & trunnion angles were passed up to aid acquisition. Right on time as the CSM cleared the horizon we began seeing data. We counted the agonizing minutes as the telemetry came flowing in until the CSM was receding. Now we had the data we needed to run the problem (a rendezvous problem in reverse) and get the correct liftoff time*. And that’s what we used. Later we would find out just where were we on the surface. We were actually over 25,000 feet from the nearest of the other five choices we had! At 5,000-fps orbital velocity of the CSM that could have been up to a ten second error in liftoff."
Maurice Kennedy; Charles Deiterich III; William Stoval; William Boone III; Glynn S. Lunney; H. David Reed; Jerry C. Bostick (2011-05-13). From The Trench of Mission Control to the Craters of The Moon (Ebook Locations 5657-5672).
So according to Reed, his whole reason for rejecting all of the available coordinates presented to him on the morning of 07/21/1969 as they might be applied in a launch solution had to do with the fact that they were at great variance from one another. AND YES! REED CONSIDERS 25,000 FEET VERY GREAT VARIANCE!!! We have seen already, this variance does not appear in the Apollo 11 Mission Report coordinate table and we may confidently conclude that somebody has directly or indirectly cooked these books. These Apollo 11 Mission Report table 5-IV numbers and Reed's testimony simply cannot both be true, and Reed has no reason what so ever to make this up, especially given the detail he provides. This unquestionably WAS Reed's experience. With the exception of the AOT solution, there is very good agreement among the real-time solutions appearing in the Apollo 11 Mission Report table 5-IV. And not only do the solutions agree pretty well with one another, they are all fairly close to the actual Tranquility Base coordinate numbers; 0.64 miles, 0.75 miles and 1.13 miles distant from Tranquility Base. The PNGS and AGS solutions are only 0.423 miles distant from one another. So the real-time, non rendezvous radar solutions available as presented in the Mission Report are close to one another and furthermore they are all close enough to Tranquility Base(within 2 miles) that there is a reasonable chance the LRRR could have been successfully targeted if the Lick Observatory team had been presented with any of these solutions/coordinates. Finally, and perhaps most damning, Reed says none of the real-time solutions available to him were within 25,000 feet of his. But here in the Mission report we see that is not the case. The PNGS solution is roughly 4,180 feet from Reed's solution. The AGS solution is roughly 5975 feet. The powered flight processor is 2987 feet from Reed. 25,000 feet is a long way from 2987.
We'll end here for now. Having demonstrated the Apollo 11 Mission Report to be utterly inconsistent with the experience of H. David Reed and consequently a fraudulent document. As the Flight Dynamics Officer on the morning of 07/21/1969, Reed was the most important figure and highest authority regarding this subject and his testimony as well referenced above is hardly to be questioned. We move forward now with the greatest confidence on our assertion of the Apollo 11 Mission Report's Fraudulence and along with it, the necessarily associated fraudulence of the entire Apollo 11 Mission. In my further studies, I plan to explore these coordinates more as presented in this modified lunar landing coordinate table. Analytic efforts placed in comparing the coordinates found here in the Mission Report and as presented above in my table with those coordinates fed to Michael Collins in his hunt for the Eagle, provides immensely rich rewards for those Apollo 11 researchers courageous enough to face the daunting implications.
