Materialism (championed by Darwinists) makes reason Impossible.

I cannot appreciate sceptic ignorance and groupthink any more that of IDists or other airheads.
 
I cannot appreciate sceptic ignorance and groupthink any more that of IDists or other airheads.
I'm confused about why you would post this--specifically, why you felt the need to communicate this sentence to this audience. I don't see it as furthering any argument.
 
Which post did you make the distinction that "you" refers to "conscious self"? I scrolled back, but can't find it, although I didn't look through the entire thread.

Well ehre is your problem. The entire thread has been about "you=the self" and not "you=body acting".

Just to be clear, when someone asks you How much do you weigh? what "you" do you think they're referring to? Conscious self doesn't work for those kinds of sentences.

Indeed but this thread has never been about weight and balance, but about where the consciousness comes from. In view of this last sentence can you udnerstand why the derail with you=body is so damn funny ?

You're claiming that your conscious self is your brain? That's a definitional claim, right? You're defining "conscious self" as "your brain". Would you say that your brain is your conscious self?

The conscious self is an emerging property of the functionning brain is what I would go with.

You're going to run into the same problems as if you said Windows is your computer.
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As I pointed above, windows is not running ON the computer box. it actually ONLY runs on the processor.
FAncy that, he ?
 
How is that dishonest? I know there are problems with dualism. There's no mechanism for causuality, for one. I just don't think the problems are catastrophic for dualism (or immaterialism). I think they are for materialism.

That problem is only in your mind :).

Shows us such situation where the problem arise. Up to now we have defined all cause and effect. Feel free to show one where an effect exist without cause.
 
Now, if you go with some particular subsection, then that (SNIPPED by Aepervius to make post short)

Firstly saying Chemotaxis or quorum sensing is consciousness is an interresting theory which I think you will find out is not being held by many. Heck I could do the same with a mechanical system so by your own theory , I made a conscious system.

Secondely all your post have only demonstrated one thing : the brain need nutriment to work, and a system to bring them to it. It did not demonstrate that the form taken by those nutriment-bringing system is important, or even that those system are involved in consciousness.
 
Partly. Same for the kidney. Me with glasses is different than me without.

Wrong. You with glass has different sensory input than you without glass, or even you in compelte darkness with or without glass. But it is still the same "me" emerging behavior no matter what you wear as correction. The only difference will be the sensory input.

Me extends in time and isn't the same from day to day. I think it would be much more difficult to freeze "me" than it would be to keep this kind of loose narrative definition. Our sense of self depends on autobiographical memory and cannot just be placed in one part of the brain exclusively. This would imply that what has happened to us matters.

Nobody said otherwise. What was said is that the "Me" is SOLELY an emerging process of the brain.

Me as father is different than me as son. The only justification for calling these two the same "me" is historical and illusory. My dog, killed by a car, is still my dog in one sense, but in another it is quite different -- I would stop playing fetch with it for example.

Again nobody said otehrwise we only said consciousness is an emerging process of the brain. You lsiting all that stuff do not contradict that in any shape.

I think there is also a link, besides historicity, with ownership. As if I owned my sense of self. But returning to your example of organ replacement, if I replaced a part of my frontal lobe with another's would I still be me? And even worse, when brain plasticity changes the wiring in my frontal lobe, am I still "me" even without the transplant?

The asnwer would murky. Replace "implant" with just "brain damage" and you will see why. The person is still the same as entity, but not the same as "content" of that entity. So tehre is an equivocation ehre between the content and the process. Whcih is it youa re speaking about ?
 
Wrong. You with glass has different sensory input than you without glass, or even you in compelte darkness with or without glass. But it is still the same "me" emerging behavior no matter what you wear as correction. The only difference will be the sensory input.

This is probably where we differ. I am claiming that sensory input matters to sense of self. The trail for me goes from a conscious that emerges from an unconscious that in turn emerges (at least partly) from sensory input.

Nobody said otherwise. What was said is that the "Me" is SOLELY an emerging process of the brain.

Except that how it emerges matters, I think. I'm guessing you'd take as "brain stuff" all those elements that contribute?

The asnwer would murky. Replace "implant" with just "brain damage" and you will see why. The person is still the same as entity, but not the same as "content" of that entity. So tehre is an equivocation ehre between the content and the process. Whcih is it youa re speaking about ?

I think they must be intimately related and insperable.

Secondely all your post have only demonstrated one thing : the brain need nutriment to work, and a system to bring them to it. It did not demonstrate that the form taken by those nutriment-bringing system is important, or even that those system are involved in consciousness.

Granted. But they also need neurons and connections. I think it is an artificial line to say it stops with these gray cells and not those others. Even so, I don't see a soul in the mix. All I am really advocating is that in both directions -- inward into the brain, and outward from the brain -- the interactions matter.

I find I cannot define my "self" without using terms that are not brain states but involve relationships outside of my head. When I am angry, I am angry at something. When I am honest, I am honest about something.

Now, if the argument is just to draw a line and say, "Sure, those things matter, but they are just inputs into the brain" then I want to know why some things count as inputs only and why we stop at the skull? I argue that an input that changes an internal state is best viewed as part of a bigger combination, especially when the interaction works both ways. A neuron in my finger that feels pain communicates to the brain and if my brain anticipates pain the experience is changed. Is that neuron part of the brain and self? If not, why not?

In my framing, the loss of a limb makes a difference to self image. I am still "me" before and after the loss, but in either case, it isn't the same "me" because "me" is a slippery thing.
 
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For those who are interested, I have started a thread conjecturing a completely materialistic manner for the conscious, intelligent mind to evolve from the brain:

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=212683

I don't know if the idea is correct or not. But, at the very least, we can demonstrate that it is POSSIBLE to develop an idea that allows Reason to emerge from materialism.
 
Marplots,
I apologize, but am combining your posts for ease of response.

This is probably where we differ. I am claiming that sensory input matters to sense of self. The trail for me goes from a conscious that emerges from an unconscious that in turn emerges (at least partly) from sensory input.
No one ever said that sensory input doesn't matter. Of course it does. But that doesn't make that sensory the consciousness. We can remove senses, and you will still have a person with self-awareness and consciousness.



But returning to your example of organ replacement, if I replaced a part of my frontal lobe with another's would I still be me? And even worse, when brain plasticity changes the wiring in my frontal lobe, am I still "me" even without the transplant?
I would say no. You wouldn't still be you. And yes, I beleive who we are evolves over time. I think I like your argument of historical record as being part of it. But that record is built into the brain. If you eliminated the memory(historical record) of your past experiences, you are likely to be changed. These records are stored in your brain. Hence, going back to my previous argument that you are your brain.




Granted. But they also need neurons and connections. I think it is an artificial line to say it stops with these gray cells and not those others.
I completely agree. It is a game of loki's wager. We know what a head is, but telling me where the head ends and the neck begins becomes immensely difficult. It is why I think the brain is a good dividing line for what a self is or contained. Why do I say this? because it is the smallest divisible unit where we can still imagine self awareness to take place.

Now, if the argument is just to draw a line and say, "Sure, those things matter, but they are just inputs into the brain" then I want to know why some things count as inputs only and why we stop at the skull? I argue that an input that changes an internal state is best viewed as part of a bigger combination, especially when the interaction works both ways. A neuron in my finger that feels pain communicates to the brain and if my brain anticipates pain the experience is changed. Is that neuron part of the brain and self? If not, why not?
because we can remove those inputs and still have the self. Sunlight may increase the surface temperature of a car, but it isn't part of the car. Just because an input can change properties of something, it doesn't make that input part of that something.
 
I cannot appreciate sceptic ignorance and groupthink any more that of IDists or other airheads.
Instead of stomping your feet claiming I am ignorant, why not answer my hypothetical and show where I am being ignorant?

If you chop of a person's head, where does the last remnants of consciousness reside? In the head or the body?
 
I find I cannot define my "self" without using terms that are not brain states but involve relationships outside of my head. When I am angry, I am angry at something. When I am honest, I am honest about something.
But those are brain states.
Now, if the argument is just to draw a line and say, "Sure, those things matter, but they are just inputs into the brain" then I want to know why some things count as inputs only and why we stop at the skull?
This is something I've been trying to figure out too. I can draw a nice line within the brain though.
In my framing, the loss of a limb makes a difference to self image. I am still "me" before and after the loss, but in either case, it isn't the same "me" because "me" is a slippery thing.
I'm confused about what's so slippery about it. Could you explain how you view individuality when twins swap places? (Is that enough of a transformation for you to deem significant? And if not why not?)
 
try to get some real info about consciousness and neurology and we'll talk
I felt a bit embarrassed having exposed your ignorance.
Normally, I enter these discussions to learn something.
you failed me 100%
pleease try to tell me something I do not know, please!
 
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try to get some real info about consciousness and neurology and we'll talk
I felt a bit embarrassed having exposed your ignorance.
Normally, I enter these discussions to learn something.
you failed me 100%
pleease try to tell me something I do not know, please!


Sentences should always start with a capital letter.
 
try to get some real info about consciousness and neurology and we'll talk
I felt a bit embarrassed having exposed your ignorance.
Normally, I enter these discussions to learn something.
you failed me 100%
pleease try to tell me something I do not know, please!
That's a rather significant change in your post. Your original one was at least an attempt to explain why you made a bickering post. To change that into another bickering post is disappointing.

You know the question that you have avoided answering. It is completely clear why. It's just a shame you are unable to admit the error.
 
That's a rather significant change in your post. Your original one was at least an attempt to explain why you made a bickering post. To change that into another bickering post is disappointing.


Yeah, that's why I went snarky. I had a much better response typed up for the original post but it didn't fit at all with the new mini-rant.
 
Marplots,
I apologize, but am combining your posts for ease of response.

I did it to you already but wasn't polite enough to mention it.


No one ever said that sensory input doesn't matter. Of course it does. But that doesn't make that sensory the consciousness. We can remove senses, and you will still have a person with self-awareness and consciousness.
...combined with....

I would say no. You wouldn't still be you. And yes, I beleive who we are evolves over time. I think I like your argument of historical record as being part of it. But that record is built into the brain. If you eliminated the memory(historical record) of your past experiences, you are likely to be changed. These records are stored in your brain. Hence, going back to my previous argument that you are your brain.

I'm no longer sure if you localized self to the prefrontal cortex or not -- apologies if you did not. I found a nice paper about how memory seems to be essential in constructing a "sense of self" : http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21038287 which supports the idea that "it's in there."

I suppose it's a matter of preference for me to say that memory is constructed from outside inputs and doesn't even have to reside in the brain (muscle memory for example) but again, it comes down to where the labels are applied.

I would like to know how consciousness is affected by loss of senses. It's tricky though. The brain has a lot of inputs, some of which aren't obvious -- hormonal, nutritional, already edited nerve impulses.

My bias comes from a reaction to being taught the blood-brain barrier and localization of organs (including the brain) by function in a discrete way. It seems that basic physiology is taught this way and then untaught by way of exceptions. I have to say you are right in the sense that Euclid was right about geometry. I just prefer more dimensions and a non-Euclidean picture.

I've also been influenced by reading "Strangers to Ourselves, Discovering the adaptive unconscious" by Timothy Wilson. He doesn't advocate the picture I am painting, but does allow for unconscious input shaping "who we are."

To revisit the computer analogy, it would be as if outside input were reshaping the hardware in the computer. I agree you could say that all the processing still happens inside the box, but what emerges results from the shaping. I'm still struggling with what sort of consciousness or sense of self is possible with no sensory input (beyond the brain case). Sensory deprivation tanks support your view, not mine.
 
I'm sorry, where's the equivocation? You're making an equivalence claim: you are equivalent to your brain. E.g., a bachelor is equivalent to an unmarried man. What is true for one is true for the other.

How much does the bachelor weigh? The same as the unmarried man.

How much do you weigh? The same as your brain?:boggled:

If you don't see the problem now, you never will.

Who was the nutcase who weighed a body then cremated it and weighed the ashes and concluded that the soul weighed twenty two grams? I read it somewhere.
 

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