I often don't mind being a p-zombie

[Darat]

Quite the opposite.
The only thing you know for sure is that you aren't a p-zombie.At least, while you are actually pondering that question, you can't be a p-zombie.

Cogito ergo sum.

Which is circular reasoning.

And we no more know this for sure than we do that reality exists independent from us, after all we could be characters created by the solipsist's fertile imagination.

 

[westprog]

Which is circular reasoning.

And we no more know this for sure than we do that reality exists independent from us, after all we could be characters created by the solipsist's fertile imagination.

We have more direct knowledge of the "I" than we do of reality, time and space and other people. It might be possible to doubt that the "I" exists, but if so, there's nothing that we can know for sure.

 

[rocketdodger]

For me, there is always self awareness when I'm awake - not awareness of someone who is looking at "I" but awareness of my awareness of the external thing I focus on.
I guess I'm saying that awareness of something other, such as the road or the program you are writing IS awareness of self - just that at that time, the self you are is the screen that stuff is on.
When properly focussed on a task, at your most efficient, "you" should almost disappear, just being a pure transparent container of the subject matter. It's what zen monks try to teach - "polishing your mirror". A perfect mirror is invisible - you only see the reflected image.

But even in that state you are not a p-zombie. One of those is not only never conscious of itself, it is also never conscious of anything external to it, such as the task at hand.

There is nothing in the definition of p-zombie precluding self awareness, only self consciousness. All computing systems have self awareness to some extent, that is the only way they can function.

Also, you need to draw a distinction between being aware of something and being conscious of something. I tend to think that being "conscious" of X entails being aware of being aware of X. Thus I am not "conscious" of things when I am focused on the task, I am merely aware.

On the other hand if you want to equate consciousness with awareness then you have to come up with another term for when a system can distinguish between itself and the rest of the universe. I have no problem with that but it seems like "aware" is a perfectly good word.

 

[Darat]

We have more direct knowledge of the "I" than we do of reality, time and space and other people. It might be possible to doubt that the "I" exists, but if so, there's nothing that we can know for sure.

to the highlighted bit my answer is always "And so what?"

To the rest I have no more direct "knowledge" of the "I" than I do of the keyboard I am typing on - indeed I would argue I have more direct "knowledge" of the keyboard than I do of the "I". (Hint - it has 4 screws on the back of it.)

 

[rocketdodger]

May be a tall order, but anyone want to define "aware", "conscious", and "I" as we're using them here?

I thought a p-zombie was a physically normal person who lacks conscious experiences. The way I understand that term I have conscious experiences almost all the time. When I'm driving to work and not explicitly thinking about my own consciousness I'm still having conscious experiences, just not the kind of conscious experiences that involve thinking about my own consciousness.

Just think of it in terms of "I."

The way certain people think of the "tiers" of consciousness, you have p-zombies and then people.

But there are many periods where people lack any thought of themselves at all. They are just doing, because they are focused on something besides their "I."

So I fail to see a distinction between human-thought-lacking-an-I and p-zombie-thought-lacking-an-I. We know that a p-zombie must think because otherwise it could not function. So what could we have that a p-zombie does not have, if we aren't thinking of "I?"

 

[rocketdodger]

to the highlighted bit my answer is always "And so what?"

To the rest I have no more direct "knowledge" of the "I" than I do of the keyboard I am typing on - indeed I would argue I have more direct "knowledge" of the keyboard than I do of the "I". (Hint - it has 4 screws on the back of it.)

Yep. The argument that a baby has more knowledge of its "I" than of the direct world around it seems pretty absurd to me. Seems to me that a baby has no "I" to begin with, and only the percepts of the world.

So if all known conscious entities start with no "I" and only world percepts, logic suggests that world percepts are more knowable than "I."

Then again, when has logic been part of these arguments?

 

[aggle-rithm]

V.I. Ramachandran refers to the part of us that goes on "automatic" (such as when we drive home and don't really think about where we're going) as the "zombie". He describes people with "blindsight" (people whose visual systems work but are inaccessible to consciousness) in terms of the "zombie", which can easily perform tasks that require vision, even though the "I" is convinced that it is blind.

As usual, we figure out how the brain works by observing when parts of it don't work.

 

[aggle-rithm]

This goes without saying, but...I, for one, welcome our new p-zombie overlords.

 

[calebprime]

Aren't many people here changing the definition of P-zombie as stated here in the Wiki?

A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain).


In particular, even when we're lost in thought, we're aware of qualia and of a background body-state. When we're thinking verbally, we're "aware" of the sound of our own inner voice, so to speak. When we listen intently to someone, we're aware of many things--sounds, our own associations, etc.

If that's not true of you folks, and it is of me, it must mean my powers of concentration are very poor compared to yours.

Sorry if this has already been asked and answered, I'll go back over the thread later.

 

[calebprime]

But the main question in the thread seems to be are you a p-zombie when you are aware of external matter, such as when driving or programming (at least afterwards you know you were sufficiently aware of it to do it without crashing the car) but as far as you remember, you were not aware of being aware of your Iness.

In other words, the question seems to be "do I switch in and out of being a p-zombie even when awake and doing something competently?"
By awake, I mean an observer friend will tell you later that you seemed to be awake, and anyway you know you were at least seemingly awake, if not conscious, as you didn't fall off your chair.

For me, there is always self awareness when I'm awake - not awareness of someone who is looking at "I" but awareness of my awareness of the external thing I focus on.
I guess I'm saying that awareness of something other, such as the road or the program you are writing IS awareness of self - just that at that time, the self you are is the screen that stuff is on.
When properly focussed on a task, at your most efficient, "you" should almost disappear, just being a pure transparent container of the subject matter. It's what zen monks try to teach - "polishing your mirror". A perfect mirror is invisible - you only see the reflected image.

But even in that state you are not a p-zombie. One of those is not only never conscious of itself, it is also never conscious of anything external to it, such as the task at hand.

I guess OldBloke is saying something quite similar.

Anyway, p-zombies are just a thought experiment.

Absence seizures come closest, I guess?

 

[yy2bggggs]

But there are many periods where people lack any thought of themselves at all. They are just doing, because they are focused on something besides their "I."

I don't think so. According to the definition, it's supposed to be impossible to distinguish a normal person from a p-zombie under ordinary means.

Your description has a trivial test. Ask the entity if he has an "I".

In addition, "the I" is a psychological entity; people who cannot distinguish between their selves and the external world have personality disorders of varying sorts, as I understand it.

So I fail to see a distinction between human-thought-lacking-an-I and p-zombie-thought-lacking-an-I. We know that a p-zombie must think because otherwise it could not function. So what could we have that a p-zombie does not have, if we aren't thinking of "I?"

I could describe a "human-thought-lacking-an-I" in terms of a potentially working machine, for a particular concept of "I". I won't attempt to describe p-zombies.

 

[Darat]

I don't think so. According to the definition, it's supposed to be impossible to distinguish a normal person from a p-zombie under ordinary means.

Your description has a trivial test. Ask the entity if he has an "I".

In addition, "the I" is a psychological entity; people who cannot distinguish between their selves and the external world have personality disorders of varying sorts, as I understand it.

I could describe a "human-thought-lacking-an-I" in terms of a potentially working machine, for a particular concept of "I". I won't attempt to describe p-zombies.

There was a thread a few years ago that (as we often do) kicked about the p-zombie concept and this is a really good point to read from: http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=1797239#post1797239

 

[rocketdodger]

Aren't many people here changing the definition of P-zombie as stated here in the Wiki?

A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain).


In particular, even when we're lost in thought, we're aware of qualia and of a background body-state. When we're thinking verbally, we're "aware" of the sound of our own inner voice, so to speak. When we listen intently to someone, we're aware of many things--sounds, our own associations, etc.

If that's not true of you folks, and it is of me, it must mean my powers of concentration are very poor compared to yours.

Sorry if this has already been asked and answered, I'll go back over the thread later.

I disagree. I would argue that if things like qualia had a coherent definition, it would be more along the lines of what you are aware of when you are aware of seeing red, for example. And that means we don't experience qualia until we start thinking *about* the qualia. For example, when you look at a red object, are you experiencing "what it is like to see red" before a thought such as "that is red" pops into your head? I say no. Until you have that thought, you are just looking at a red object.

Note that this is kind of a cheap position for me to take because it is impossible to argue against -- since there is no way to evaluate "redness" without thinking about "redness" to begin with -- but I can't help it.

 

[rocketdodger]

I don't think so. According to the definition, it's supposed to be impossible to distinguish a normal person from a p-zombie under ordinary means.

Your description has a trivial test. Ask the entity if he has an "I".

In addition, "the I" is a psychological entity; people who cannot distinguish between their selves and the external world have personality disorders of varying sorts, as I understand it.

I could describe a "human-thought-lacking-an-I" in terms of a potentially working machine, for a particular concept of "I". I won't attempt to describe p-zombies.

Well now, I just had an interesting thought.

What if we take a conversation filled with "I" and remove them all? Also all the "you?"

I can see an intelligent entity functioning perfectly normally without such references in it's language.

So suppose we take such an entity, and add a chinese room like interface on top of it that, for every statement to and from the entity, it parses the statements and inserts the proper grammatical form of "I" where necessary. Could that entity be a p-zombie?

Or would you say that for the interface to be able to properly place the I's the statements would need to have some implicit way to denote self reference. And in that case, are p-zombies prohibited from having implicit self reference? For instance, can a p-zombie not generate the genuine thought "going to the store" because it implicitly means "I am going to the store?"

 

[westprog]

to the highlighted bit my answer is always "And so what?"

To the rest I have no more direct "knowledge" of the "I" than I do of the keyboard I am typing on - indeed I would argue I have more direct "knowledge" of the keyboard than I do of the "I". (Hint - it has 4 screws on the back of it.)

I think you'd find it very difficult to express your knowledge of your keyboard without reference to the "I".

 

[Darat]

I think you'd find it very difficult to express your knowledge of your keyboard without reference to the "I".

The keyboard is an input device for the personal computer, it contains mechanical and electronic switches, it is black, the keys have white legends, it has an LED. That was easy enough.

 

[case#46cw39]

Yes there is, - just video yourself talking whilst taking one of those drugs that screws with your memory so you won't remember the talking. Then play back the video.

obviously you are referring to alcohol.

 

[westprog]

The keyboard is an input device for the personal computer, it contains mechanical and electronic switches, it is black, the keys have white legends, it has an LED. That was easy enough.

That was stating the facts. How do you know them?

 

[yy2bggggs]

Well now, I just had an interesting thought.

What if we take a conversation filled with "I" and remove them all? Also all the "you?"

I can see an intelligent entity functioning perfectly normally without such references in it's language.

So suppose we take such an entity, and add a chinese room like interface on top
of it that, for every statement to and from the entity, it parses the
statements and inserts the proper grammatical form of "I" where necessary.
Could that entity be a p-zombie?

Well, don't confuse the word with the concept. If you simply elimante the words, the test question should simply translate into the new pronounless language. Forbid me from using "I" and "you" and I can still talk about yy2bggggs and rocketdodger just fine; or, closer to the heart of the matter, "the one typing" and "the one reading".

If you want to start removing the I concept (at particular layers), then that is where you need to start slicing. Knock out my ability to recognize you as a separate agency and I no longer have the same concept, though I may very well still have a feeling of control that I cannot explain. Knock out my sense that I can control actions and you've cut deeper, though I would caution you that at this point you're starting to severely interfere with the "normal working" of this machine. For lighter touches, you can mess up my ability to conceive that the thoughts floating in my head are "mine", or any of a number of similar attacks--and at that point, you no longer need to hypothetically imagine entities, for there are plenty of real ones to study.

This sort of thing might change your question a bit, but I'll offer this general opinion. Having an "I" and having a concept of an "I" are two different things, and neither comes for free. Furthermore, there's nothing special about the Chinese room IMO; it has the same requirements for having either that biological entities have.

I agree with calebprime though--this isn't what p-zombies are supposed to be. They're supposed to refer to entities that lack the "raw feel" of experience, whatever that is. I recognize that you find this incoherent, but I don't see that as a valid objection to the definition. It's still supposed to refer to it. If it happens to be incoherent, it's simply incoherent--reformulating it coherently is still reformulating it all the same.

ETA: Just to note, however, there are various sensations tied to the "I", and I'm not entirely sure about the last paragraph, depending on what "whatever that is" is supposed to be for p-zombies.

 

[case#46cw39]

In Zen we call it sunyata, emptiness. Metaphor is water. Water has no self, no I. If there is a low point the water heads towards it without self will, self desire, consciousness of it doing so, interest in it, care, concern, or thought about it. Thus the Zen saying "When hungry, eat; when tired, sleep." This is all there is.