Not sure if this has been covered before, but wouldn´t the bolded part be a reason to frame Megrahi, from the US point of view - after all, with him out of circulation, that whole operation would be dealt at least a serious setback, if it isn´t stopped outright.
Nah. Doesn't fit the way the case progressed.
Anyway, Megrahi had changed jobs by the time Lockerbie happened, and he wasn't even indicted until nearly three years later.
He was just in the wrong place at the wrong time, and by that I mean he happened to be the frameable person who was catching flight LM147 from Malta to Tripoli on the morning of the disaster. Given the volume of traffic between Libya and Malta, with Malta being practically the only doorway to the wider world for Libya at the time, it must have been pretty short odds that some Libyan with a possibly dodgy background would have caught that plane that morning.
Caveat: Caustic Logic thinks they went after Megrahi in person from an early stage. My personal reading of it is that they didn't catch on to the potential for pinning it on a real live Libyan until nearly two years after the crash.
Due to the position of the bomb in the aircraft hold, the two possible airports of origin were Heathrow and Frankfurt. The UK authorities announced on day 9 that it wasn't Heathrow (even though the plane was loaded from empty there), and it had come from Frankfurt (the Frankfurt luggage wasn't security-screened at Heathrow). However, all the Frankfurt baggage records disappeared (or were disappeared) within a few days of the crash, from under the noses of the German cops. The German cops insisted that the bomb had gone on at Heathrow. Stalemate.
This went on for eight months. The atmosphere between the two police forces was poisonous bordering on outright warfare. The stalemate was resolved when the Frankfurt police suddenly produced a small extract from the missing baggage records which had miraculously turned up. This was ambiguous and open to interpretation, but it seemed (possibly) to show two unaccompanied bags heading through Frankfurt towards the feeder flight for Heathrow. One of these was from Warsaw and the other from Malta. Possibly. Or possibly one or both entries were merely coding anomalies.
The clothes packed around the bomb had by then been traced as being of Maltese manufacture, so they ignored the Warsaw lead, and everybody converged on Malta, leaving Heathrow and Frankfurt behind with a collective sigh of relief.
They spent the next year trying to show the obvious suspects (a Palestinian gang) had smuggled the bomb on board at Malta. All they achieved was to show there was pretty much no chance anything untoward had travelled on that particular flight, or could have done. Didn't stop them (Chicago cop syndrome).
Then in the autumn of 1990 it was decided that Libya was the preferred suspect, not the Palestinian gang at all. It was then realised that someone believed to be a Libyan security officer (Megrahi) had been at the airport when the Frankfurt flight left, and that he was travelling on a diplomatic passport in a false name. Hey, paydirt.
Further investigation showed that he had no suitcase with him, checked in no luggage for his half-hour flight, never went airside, and basically behaved like any other airline passenger. And there was still no evidence that any unaccompanied luggage had travelled on the Frankfurt flight, and a lot of evidence that no such thing had happened.
The investigators had been trying to get the man who sold the clothes in the bomb suitcase to identify one of the Palestinian gang as the purchaser, and had partially succeeded - his identification of Abu Talb was at least as confident as his identification of Megrahi, if not more so.
[Oh good grief, once again as I'm typing this, the TV current affairs programme I'm watching is banging on about Megrahi again. This is situation normal of course.]
They then turned their attention to persuading the shopkeeper that it was in fact Megrahi who had bought the clothes. This has been covered
ad nauseam elsewhere, and the hints and the bribery and the "well it's not the man but he looks a bit like him" and so on. It's been suggested that if they'd gone on showing him pictures of clean-shaven men with dark curly hair he'd have gone on picking out people who "resembled" the customer. It was never the sort of identification a case should have stood up on though.
So the CIA simply picked up a low-level Libyan informant and by a combination of threats and bribes managed to get statements out of him describing Megrahi having a suitcase matching the description of the bomb suitcase at the airport in Malta the day before the bombing, and about conversations allegedly implicating Megrahi in a plot to bomb an aircraft.
So I don't think Megrahi was targeted for himself. The investigation was mad keen on Malta because it wasn't Heathrow or Frankfurt. When it was decided to blame Libya, he just happened to be the Libyan who was at the airport at the relevant time, and it all snowballed from there.
Rolfe.