Naturally, in all judgments the exposition of the facts is an essential part of the provision. However, when one is faced with an in-depth illustration of hearings and witness testimonies (quotes which in this case are partial or inaccurate), whilst the space dedicated to the reasoning that guided the Judges to accept one theory rather than another is almost non-existent, this signifies that the judgment has not fulfilled its duty to explain its reasoning.
The imbalance between the exposition of evidence and reasoning requires that the provision be reprimanded because, alongside the extremely long summary of the trial, the enunciation of the choice to embrace one theory [rather than another] translates into a sort of act of faith in one of the various hypotheses under consideration.
To this it must be added that, in the rare portions of the provision in which the sentencing report gives credit to a hypothesis, it displays a second defect: the contested judgment proposes a reversal of logical procedure in its evaluation of the criminal responsibility of the accused.
Rather than beginning with an objective analysis of the evidence which emerged during the course of the trial, and from this proceeding to an evaluation of the importance it assumes in the verification of the facts, the contested judgment has begun with the fact that the accused are unable to conclusively demonstrate their lack of involvement in the crime and deduces their guilt as an immediate consequence.
Ultimately, the reasoning guiding the entire judgment rests on the inability of Raffaele Sollecito and Amanda Knox to disprove the charge [against them].