Piggy's viewpoint here seems to me to be increadibly unscientific, from two perspectives.
The first, and most important, is the view that we can't know anything if we haven't done that specific experiment. It comes down to something like this: we've measured the speed of light to come out to approximately 3x108 m/s. There are some valid questions about whether or not that value has changed with time or is different in different parts of the universe. But Piggy's view is like asserting that we don't know that speed of light is on sunny wednesday afternoons when the temperature is exactly 10.005oC and the finance minister of Kenya has just given a live speech for French television, because we haven't done that experiment.
My understanding is that if you're dealing with the results space of a random system, it's literally impossible to know what it will be until the calculations are actually performed.
The speed of light in a vacuum isn't comparable, because it is a constant (as far as we know).
On the other hand, very different sorts of real-world values, such as the price of oil, do indeed depend on weather, politics, and media.
So if we're dealing with a brain controlling a hand, what sort of system are we looking at, precisely? What will its results space look like when it comes to coin-tossing? Is there anything in that system that will limit streaks, such as unconscious sabotage, for example? Is it truly random, or is there actually a very few number of states that don't vary perfectly randomly?
I don't believe answers to those questions are yet available.
When asked how those things could possibly affect the speed of light he'll reply that he doesn't know, but you can't possibly know either.
I'd never suggest that for the speed of light in a vacuum, but for a brain and a hand, you bet.
Now, that may be true in a way, but I'm confident that if we do measure it in those circumstances it will come out to be the same as it was that last time we made the measurement.
What measurement? You've never made any measurements of people flipping coins that would allow us to draw conclusions about whether it actually does run through all possible combinations or not. Neither has anyone else.
And if we refuse to make those sorts of assumptions, science becomes basically useless, because we can no longer put confidence in any conclusions. The point of science is to make useful predictions, but they are predictions about a universe that is different than it was at any time when previous experiments were made.
No, it's actually good science not to overgeneralize or overstate.
Look at the decelerating universe or the ever-expanding black hole.
We don't know enough about people flipping coins to say if it's true that all mathematically describable combinations will actually be demonstrated, given enough time.
Why is that so difficult to accept?
The second problem I have is that Piggy actually goes further than this: he accepts the abstraction of a fair coin, from which the conclusion that any possible combination is equally likely necessarily follows, and then goes on to suggest that the messiness of the world will make the coin not fair (not in so many words, but that's what his argument amounts to) but doesn't realise that he has just changed the scenario by doing so.
Either we can discuss fair coins (in which case what colour underwear Tom Cruise is wearing today doesn't affect the results of our coin tosses), or we can't. But it's silly to talk about fair coins and then suggest that there are outside forces that affect their results - if those outside forces exist the coin isn't fair.
Actually, this was the point I concede to Ivor. You can't have a fair coin that limits streaks. The two are incompatible by definition.
But you can certainly have a coin that is "locally fair" in that its behavior is literally indistinguishable from the behavior of a fair coin by the people using it, even though it limits streaks.