Chaos Magic

[Robin]

Even geniune mystics can't perform 'magic', they merely notice subtle clues of the nature of reality, rather like the owl sees and catches its mice.

Do you consider yourself one who sees subtle clues about the nature of reality?

 

[!Kaggen]

Um, quick question: if all the evidence confirms that consciousness is computational, how is it confirmation bias to accept that consciousness is computational?

If before 9/11 all the evidence suggested that 2 hijacked passenger airplanes could never fly into New York City in broad daylight, crash into the World Trade Center causing them to burn and collapse killing thousands of people within minutes, how is it confirmation bias for those people before 9/11 that said this would never happen?

Science does not work on confirmation. No amount of evidence makes a scientific theory true. It makes it probable. But one event/find will negate it.
Its the problem of induction and your welcome to offer a solution.

At this stage the computationalist are not offering a test which may negate their theory they are just pointing to existing evidence which confirms it.
The Turing test is one test which could negate their theory which the father of AI suggested, but computationalist like Pixy mostly regard the test as irrelevant since it involves at least one human judge and therefore the possibility of their theory failing the test, since the outcome is not nearly as predictable as a computer program. Which all translates once again to confirmation bias being the strongest in those with a vested interest in the outcome of any scientific test.

 

[Robin]

Maybe the real motivation is so he can rationalize away his own [presumably unpleasant] emotions. Hes conspicuously silent and evasive whenever the topic of his own feelings is brought up. Usually if a person is asked "What are you feeling right now?" they simply answer with something along the lines of "I'm feeling X, why do you ask? or "I don't wish to discuss that, its none of your business". Pixy, however, seems to be extremely reluctant to even acknowledge the question. It can't be a coincidence that he also seems to have an extreme aversion to the concept of qualia, which riefies things like emotions, feelings, and the like. Of course, this is all just idle speculation than could easily be resolved by a strait-forward admission from a particular party...

>_>

I don't think that he has an extreme aversion to the concept of qualia, I think that he simply rejects the concept, as do I.

And I am the sort of person who, when asked "how are you?" will actually answer the question. People who know me generally do not ask.

 

[PixyMisa]

The concept of qualia is incoherent under materialism. Materialism is, as we have already established, true. Case closed.

AkuManiMani's speculation regarding my motives and personality is also incoherent. Do I detect a pattern here?

 

[PixyMisa]

The Rubicon

"The Rubicon" to you too.

I am of course aware not only of confirmation bias, but many of the other types of cognitive and memory biases, which I have pointed out to you before:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_memory_biases

It is not I but AkuManiMani who rejects the idea that his brain might be lying to him.

And it is I, not AkuManiMani, who constantly demands objective evidence and careful statistical analysis to avoid - as much as possible - these biases.

Compare the facts and his assertions and draw your own conclusions.

 

[Robin]

The concept of qualia is incoherent under materialism.

It is incoherent under any metaphysical system.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes. More precisely, it is incoherent under any coherent metaphysical system.

 

[Mirrorglass]

This is actually a very thoughtful and reasonable take on what was presented in the OP. If more posters actually took the time to approach the topic this way the discussion so far would have been a lot more productive and informative

So you liked my post? Great. It's really lovely that you chose to show that by attempting to twist it into a snide attack against people you have personal grudges against, once again trying to poison the discussion.

Seriously. If the only thing you have to contribute is insults against people, don't bother.

 

[punshhh]

Do you consider yourself one who sees subtle clues about the nature of reality?

Yes, occasionally, or at least I try to be open to such experiences.

 

[tsig]

The concept of qualia is incoherent under materialism. Materialism is, as we have already established, true. Case closed.

AkuManiMani's speculation regarding my motives and personality is also incoherent. Do I detect a pattern here?

I do.

 

[Nonpareil]

Serious question:

What, in your opinion, does it mean for something to be computational or non-computational?

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/computational

If before 9/11 all the evidence suggested that 2 hijacked passenger airplanes could never fly into New York City in broad daylight, crash into the World Trade Center causing them to burn and collapse killing thousands of people within minutes, how is it confirmation bias for those people before 9/11 that said this would never happen?

The evidence did not suggest that. Beyond that, your example is incoherent even if it did; if the evidence had suggested that such an event could not happen, it wouldn't have been confirmation bias. So what are you talking about?

Science does not work on confirmation. No amount of evidence makes a scientific theory true. It makes it probable. But one event/find will negate it.
Its the problem of induction and your welcome to offer a solution.

I never said I could solve the problem of induction. But you said that all the computationalists have is confirmation bias, even as in the same breath you say that they argue that all the evidence is on their side. If the evidence is on their side, as they claim, it isn't confirmation bias.

At this stage the computationalist are not offering a test which may negate their theory they are just pointing to existing evidence which confirms it.

Bollocks. There are plenty of tests which could disprove computational consciousness. Just show that there is a situation in which consciousness does not behave as though it is computational.

The Turing test is one test which could negate their theory which the father of AI suggested, but computationalist like Pixy mostly regard the test as irrelevant since it involves at least one human judge and therefore the possibility of their theory failing the test, since the outcome is not nearly as predictable as a computer program.

Depends on the computer program.

The Turing test can only offer evidence against computational consciousness if we are absolutely certain that the tester - the human - is completely without confirmation bias of his own. Since we can't, there's really no way to use the Turing test to disprove computational consciousness.

Which all translates once again to confirmation bias being the strongest in those with a vested interest in the outcome of any scientific test.

No, it doesn't. This doesn't follow at all from your previous statements. What are you talking about?

 

[The Norseman]

I am one of these mystics refered to (or at least who he should have refered to) in the OP.
It seems rather absurd that sceptics should be investigating or even trying to perform 'magic'.
Its rather like saying lets make some wings out of feathers, get some powerful microphones and night vision binoculars and go out into the fields to catch some mice like an owl! Or some of the first attempts to fly with wings made of feathers or the like.

Not quite. It's the mystics who proclaim that if you stuck feathers in your butt you'd become a chicken.

The skeptics would say, "that sounds implausible. How does this action work, exactly?"

Mystics would then say, "you have to believe first; if you don't believe, it won't work. Then, it's not *really* a physical transformation, that's just the word I used 'become.' The language is imprecise when talking about these kinds of things."

Skeptics then might say, "if it isn't a physical transformation, then how do you know if it works?"

To which the mystic responds, "once you become the chicken, you are able to see reality as it truly exists and not this illusion that you skeptics call reality."

And then the skeptic says, "great! Here are some chicken feathers. Knock yourself out."

Even geniune mystics can't perform 'magic', they merely notice subtle clues of the nature of reality, rather like the owl sees and catches its mice.

There are mystics here on JREF who have made those claims. Who are you to tell them that they're wrong and cannot perform chaos magic?

There is only one form of 'magic' that is even worth attempting and that it is well documented in teachings on 'Raja yoga'.

Ah. You practice raja yoga then, I presume?

I hope you have fond memories of these times, I have a few myself of my early years on the path.

And I have fond memories of when I tried the ouja board and when I and a friend of mine made wiccan magical amulets in order to bring more love into our lives. I kept the little crystal and feather and other stuff that was rubber banded together for a fair number of years. Followed all the steps and everything. Good, innocent intentions; it still didn't work.

Yes, occasionally, or at least I try to be open to such experiences.

The thing I find to be quite fascinating is that mystics think they're doing something that skeptics don't. The hubris can be quite amazing in some cases.

There are a huge number of skeptical JREFfers who have had these kinds of experiences, you're actually nothing special. Or rather more specifically, your experiences are nothing special. Ever had a NDE? I have. Many people have. A good friend of mine has had one and it's interesting to me to see how it's now the core of her life (not necessarily in a bad way); it redefined her and she identifies with her NDE. She has made claims of seeing the beginning of the universe and other similar statements. Alas, in my NDE, I never saw such things. Who knows? Maybe I'd be as "spiritual" as she is now.

And speaking of mundane experiences, that's why I think that for a long while I was really into buddhism. The teachings I read and studied taught that even if or when one reached enlightenment, it was wise to treat it as nothing special. One of my favorite parables is about exactly that.

And by "mundane experiences" I don't mean to belittle the experiences that you, I, all humans encounter. They are all truly amazing to me; it's just that I think it a mistake to take *one* particular experience and hold it up above all others and say "this is it. This is the meaning of ..."

 

[PixyMisa]

Bollocks. There are plenty of tests which could disprove computational consciousness. Just show that there is a situation in which consciousness does not behave as though it is computational.

Which is kind of what this thread is about.

If there were any evidence that Chaos Magic were real, that would be a significant blow to computationalism.

As we have seen, there is no such evidence. Instead, the entire concept of Chaos Magic is one big ugly mass of woolly thinking.

The Turing test can only offer evidence against computational consciousness if we are absolutely certain that the tester - the human - is completely without confirmation bias of his own. Since we can't, there's really no way to use the Turing test to disprove computational consciousness.

Actually, !Kaggen is far wronger than you think. A properly-run Turing Test would be blinded or double-blinded, and replicable, making bias irrelevant.

His assertion that I think the test is irrelevant is entirely his invention too. Indeed, I hold the exact opposite position.... Kind of like Turing. The whole point of the test being, if you can't tell the difference between something you call "conscious" and something you don't, then you don't actually have any basis for that position. That tears the anti-computational position apart; they not only have to claim that a computer can't be conscious, they have to claim that a computer can't act conscious.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Serious question:

What, in your opinion, does it mean for something to be computational or non-computational?

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/computational


[...]

At this stage the computationalist are not offering a test which may negate their theory they are just pointing to existing evidence which confirms it.

Bollocks. There are plenty of tests which could disprove computational consciousness. Just show that there is a situation in which consciousness does not behave as though it is computational.

Saying that consciousness is 'computational' is about as meaningful as saying that water is 'torrential'. Computation is the means by which the experiences of conscious subjects are organized but consciousness IAOI is not computation.

 

[AkuManiMani]

The concept of qualia is incoherent under materialism. Materialism is, as we have already established, true. Case closed.

AkuManiMani's speculation regarding my motives and personality is also incoherent. Do I detect a pattern here?

Do you have motives or emotions you're aware of? If so, are they 'coherent'?

 

[Robin]

Saying that consciousness is 'computational' is about as meaningful as saying that water is 'torrential'. Computation is the means by which the experiences of conscious subjects are organized but consciousness IAOI is not computation.

Do you regard consciousness as a sort of substance?

 

[tsig]

Do you have motives or emotions you're aware of? If so, are they 'coherent'?

Are your emotions coherent?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Saying that consciousness is 'computational' is about as meaningful as saying that water is 'torrential'. Computation is the means by which the experiences of conscious subjects are organized but consciousness IAOI is not computation.

Do you regard consciousness as a sort of substance?

In the most general sense, yes; just as any extant entity is substantive in some way.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Do you have motives or emotions you're aware of? If so, are they 'coherent'?

Are your emotions coherent?

As coherent as musical chords, they are

 

[Robin]

In the most general sense, yes; just as any extant entity is substantive in some way.

So you also see consciousness as an extant entity.

For comparison, is "running" an extant entity?