My argument against materialism

[marplots]

Why are we distinguishing the Universe "out there" from the Universe that makes me? Aren't they the same Universe? I'm not sure where the dividing line is -- my external ear, my internal ear, the nerves leading deeper into my head or somewhere else?

 

[PixyMisa]

I will hold your hand and take you through the three steps this evening, I don't have time right now.

Yes, I agree with your fine description of how the universe formed.

Where did it come from?
Where did the laws of physics come from?

We don't know. It is likely that it is impossible to know. However, some mathematically rigorous speculations are interesting because they predict certain properties of our Universe, giving us the opportunity to test them.

Non-sequiturs do not fall into that category.

 

[AlBell]

Why are we distinguishing the Universe "out there" from the Universe that makes me? Aren't they the same Universe? I'm not sure where the dividing line is -- my external ear, my internal ear, the nerves leading deeper into my head or somewhere else?

That is an interesting, sfaik undecidable, question. Whether any specific photon is 'yours' or 'not-yours' should suffice for materialists.

 

[PixyMisa]

Pixy, your hopeless attempts to sneak in metaphysical materialism through semantics is an aboslute delight to watch.

You're right in one thing: It is semantics.

You're wrong in absolutely everything else.

I'm not trying to "sneak" anything in anywhere. I explained very clearly and specifically how we come to the conclusion that metaphysical materialism is correct. Simply put, again: If all we can know is what things do, then what things are is what they do. Since what things do is, by observation, material stuff, metaphysical materialism is established as correct, albeit slightly different from the naive conception.

I also explained very clearly and specifically why your form of idealism is nothing but special pleading and equivocation. Go back to the start and try again.

 

[gentlehorse]

So you accept that the neumenal essence of things is unknowable - good.

Accept it? I've said as much at least three times in this thread.

That's called faith and belief. You're welcome to your own faith and beliefs.

Conclusions based on evidence aren't matters of faith. Faith is what you have when you believe something regardless of the fact that there is no evidence in support of you belief.

So far so good - reality is certainly mind-independent of our conscious minds.

Yes. Again, I've said as much several times...

Actually, the above should read "and the fundamental nature of the universe is most likely to be a consciousness" (with the added caveat that nothing here suggests any preference for a single God, community of Gods or a soul-creator collective).

The likelihood that you assign is a reflection of the strength of your personal conviction, nothing more.

1) True or false. We know that the fundamental nature of the universe is consciousness.

2) True or false. We do not know that the fundamental nature of the universe is consciousness.

Number 1 is false because there is no evidence in support of the notion that the fundamental nature of the universe is consciousness. Number 2 is true because there is no evidence in support of the notion that the fundamental nature of the universe is consciousness. If you believe that "the fundamental nature of the universe is most likely to be a consciousness", then you believe something for which there is no evidence. You have faith. I, on the other hand, am content to admit that the fundamental nature of the universe is a mystery.

But the point here is, you seem to have lost sight of the fact that a lot of people in this forum are actively atheist rather than agnostic and that a lot of atheist groups in society are actively advocating atheism as somehow a better social philosophy.

I wasn't aware that this was the topic of discussion.

My questions are directed to that way of thinking. After all, I think we can safely assume that the vast majority of prominent atheist's in western civilisation don't believe the Universe to be nothing more than sense-data. Therefore, the without-God stance is actually a metaphysical affirmation that the Universe instead has some non-conscious neumenal essence.

If there is no evidence of consciousness, what are we left with? The statement "There is no evidence of consciousness" is not a metaphysical claim. It's an observation.

I'm just pointing out how it's not - at all - more logical to assume this since metaphysical materialism is multiplying unknowns and therefore less parsimonious a theory about reality than a theistic theory which simply says it's probably another conscious entity beind it that can also store, retrieve and create information somewhat like our individual consciousnesses.

"Theistic theory" is misleading. Again, a theory is a tentative explanation of observed phenomena that has predictive powers.

It is not logical to assume that the universe has a "conscious entity behind it" when there is no evidence that this is the case. The existence of fleeting human consciousness is not an argument for a universe-making consciousness that permeates the fabric of reality. You seemed to agree with this earlier when you said: "...reality is certainly mind-independent of our conscious minds."

Good for you. And I would hope that you can appreciate that my only claim is that a conscious mind being behind it all is a considerably better theory than the theory that there is a non-conscious self-generating self-perpetuating magic powder/power behind it all.

Your belief is not a theory. It has neither explanatory nor predictive power. Moreover, it is based on your personal conviction rather than observed phenomena. It is simply an unsubstantiated belief.

I don't recall anyone is this thread positing the existence of magic powder/power.

 

[tsig]

Unknown. We each have our 'fundamental reality', and how it maps to reality is the question being discussed.

In my 'fundamental reality' if you drop a ball it falls to the ground. Is yours the same?

That's been the case so far. Which of course answers one of the sillier non-sequiturs I've seen here.

Then how does your 'fundamental reality' differ from my 'fundamental reality'?

If they're no different then what does your first statement mean?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Yes, regarding evidence, let me put it better;

Cool!

The last post in 'Omnipotence a serious question'

"My post is leading to what one might deduce in consideration of an “infinite omnipotent God”.

In my opinion such a God cannot be comprehended or limited by logic in any hypothetical way, as in the OP.

However one may be able to study Gods creation (the known universe) as an example/expression of the nature of God, especially as the existence of God is assumed in the OP.

Hence I conclude that this omnipotent God would be infinitely ‘involved’ in any and every aspect of his creation (the known universe) fully at any and all points of time (with all that this may imply).

As such the known universe could in theory be ‘read as a book’ or ‘story’. The subject of which would be the nature of God expressed in finite form.

This is a kind of empiricist view I suppose and is to me an interesting line of inquiry.

I appreciate what you say about uses of infinity in math’s. I have little knowledge of such things, however I would think that an omnipotent God if one exists would be far ‘removed/irrevelent’ from/to such work".

That's not what evidence is.

Evidence is something which is more likely under one hypothesis than another.

If you have zero observations which are more likely under Theory A than any other theory, you have zero evidence for Theory A.

You can in theory establish that Theory A is logically possible, but absolutely nobody here is arguing that idealism is logically impossible. We're all embracing the fact that it is logically possible, then dismissing idealism as a theory because there is no evidence for it.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I'm not dodging the question - I'm just not playing a one sided game.

I realize you're not playing a one sided game. The problem is that I feel you're playing a two sided game. In particular, my problem isn't that you're fence sitting, or "on the wrong side"; my problem is, instead, that I think you need a lot more sides than two.

If the Universe is massless information then that seems to me very much like sense-data - except that the Universe very clearly exists when I'm not thinking about it. Therefore it's not hard to imagine why there should be another sensor to sense the data (i.e. a consciousness behind the Universe.)

Alright, I'm going to gamble here, and hopefully I'll wind up conveying a bit about my point. There's a real, physical cup in front of me. Presumably, this cup has mass. I can imagine, in my mind, a two ton weight (yes, I like cartoons) above this cup--that's a lot of mass. Furthermore, I can imagine that this weight drops. When I perform this exercise, my imagined two-ton weight "lands" on that cup, and in doing so, something of an informational nature occurred in my mind.

But now I'm actually looking at this real, physical cup, and it has not smashed. So whatever informational kind of thing occurred in my mind, isn't like a real massive object. Is that what you're getting at?

If so, let me refer to the standard model. We know that certain kinds of particles have mass. Perhaps my two-ton weight was made of iron--and iron is made up of massive particles like protons, neutrons, and electrons. But my imagined two ton weight is massless. But what is also massless, is photons. And I assure you, if there were a sufficient number of photons of certain energy; and those photons all hit this cup, it would incinerate just as sure as the two ton weight would smash it.

But I can no more blow this cup up with my imagined photon bombardment than I can smash it with my imagined two ton weight. I know--I tried it, and my cup is still here!

The problem here has nothing to do with whether my imagination has mass. Be it imagined photons or imagined two ton weights, it cannot smash this real cup either way. The same kind of thing is true about sensory data--in fact, only one of our five senses involves sensing massless particles (and even that's debatable if you quibble, but that would be quibbling)--the rest necessitate sensing massive particles.

In other words, I specifically do not see what massiveness and masslessness have to do with it. Information being massless to me sounds like it can be both equally dependent on, and equally independent of, a consciousness entity as information being massive. Massiveness is simply a particular sort of behavioral pattern.

Either way, things are necessarily informational anyway, and are surely informational in such a way that conscious beings such as us can arise anyway.

Now, I really don't know if this sort of line of thought is the kind of thing you're going through when you imagine that information being massless somehow makes it have to do with it being like our sensory data. I'm simply hoping you'll see that I don't see as obvious what you claim is, and hopefully get some sort of vague idea as to what kind of thing you need to explain to me.

What thesis would you defend? Metaphysical materialsm or none at all? If it's none at all then just take my answer that I am absent the belief in any non-conscious magic stuff as standard.

I'm afraid I don't have a pretty label for the thesis I would defend. I don't call myself a materialist, though I haven't identified any particular issues I have with materialism as certain people present it.

Very easily. While we certainly do have to accept that all metaphysical statements about neumenal reality are ultimately theoretical and conjecture we can still examine which of those metaphysical statements best fit the few details we have.

The answer is very clearly something with a consciousness in the background, like theistic phenomenalism, rather than suggesting some magic fairy dust or other that is pure conjecture (unlike consciousness which we all know to exist).

Well, sure, we do know that consciousness exists. But in a realistic assessment, we know consciousness has many modes. There are "healthy" conscious people, conscious people under heavy narcotics, sleeping people, schizophrenic conscious people--even healthy conscious lab rats, schizophrenic lab rats, and sleeping lab rats. My body goes and drives my stick shift automatically without my being aware that I'm aware of it somehow, except in certain circumstances where, even post hoc, I seem to suddenly be aware of things such as why I shifted to a lower gear simply upon being prompted. Consciousness like ours is extremely multifaceted, nuanced, and complicated.

So when you identify something that is like our sensory data in some way, in a hypothetical metaphysical entity, I do in fact feel that in some sense, because our consciousness actually is composed somehow of things that do in fact exist, that you're justified in noting the similarity. I mean, after all, whatever informational thing builds up our own conscious minds must be something that actually can build up minds like ours. Nevertheless, I feel that you need to appreciate that our conscious mind does not simply come in this nice tight atomic package of sentient agency; so, while you're noting that particular similarity, you're not justified in lumping any other similarity to our consciousness into your presumption.

In other words, I have no problems at all with a form of idealism. In fact, I suspect that it may be a more semantic concern than an ontological one whether or not you claim that the universe is fundamentally mind-stuff, because to me, simply being extant information capable somehow of forming a mind like ours would be enough to count as "mind-stuff". But I don't think you get to separate our sense-data from the sensor no more than you get to separate the information from your informational sensor; nor do I feel you can claim that the "sensor" is, say, an agent, without making a leap. To claim that this sensor is a coherent agent (say, isn't too schizophrenic) is another leap. Capable of immediate level and high level teleology is yet another one.

One of the main problems here is that I'm in more agreement with you than you realize about whether or not a person can make metaphysical claims, but I think you yourself are making too many of them in your hypothetical scenario. Every additional similarity to our mind is a leap. There's a huge chasm to cross to get from "like our sensory data" to "like theistic phenomenalism".

If the best you can do is act as if any rhetorical question I ask is akin to my making a statement of fact and suggest that I'm accusing you of saying things when I'm very clearly asking you for your answer then your debating skills aren't nearly as impressive as you seem to think.

Whatever you're lashing out about here is certainly nothing I put into your mind.

For all I know it's a collection of conscious beings underlying the Universe. And I still say that we cannot comprehend what time would be like to a being (or beings) that are outside of spacetime. So there is little point in asking me to explain that which I believe we cannot comprehend.

I simply disagree that you can justify that we cannot comprehend it. I'm not even sure how you imagine I would be justifying my disagreement by demanding you explain it to me, but let me assure you that I agree it would be pointless, but had nothing like that in mind.

What I have in mind goes something more like this.

Joe has a time-line. Call it Joe-time. Joe simulates a universe in his head, and somehow (here, note, I don't have to explain how, as the point of this exercise is the comprehensiveness of Joe-time) I find myself within the universe Joe simulated in his head. (Might I add that when Joe simulates something in his head, something informational in nature goes on).

So the simulated universe has its time line--call that my-time.

Note that Joe need not run his simulation forwards in time. In fact, he need not even run his simulation a frame at a time. He could very well simulate the universe a piece at a time, going forwards or backwards, jumping over to other pieces. He could even formulate mathematical models used to figure out what happens with entire classes of objects and, upon seeing objects falling into those classes, just count the answer according to his precomputed model (in which case he "cheats" with certain parts, jumping immediately to an answer rather than running a simulation). What makes my-time work in a time-like fashion is merely the set of rules Joe follows for the simulated universe.

So, the claim is this:

I still say that we cannot comprehend what time would be like to a being (or beings) that are outside of spacetime.​

And my reply is, Joe-time is not incomprehensible.

The only reason I ask what kind of existence can massless information have without some consciousness or other experiencing it is because, to me, it's a very interesting question.

Hopefully you'd be interested in my replies then.

The fact that you've chosen to focus on my statement "we have to ask ourselves" instead of actually answering any questions I've put to you is rather odd.

The fact that you find this odd, I again find odd.

Of course I would choose to focus on the very statement that led to the confusion which prompted me to reply to you in the first place, rather than delve on a tangent before you resolved that point of confusion.

Perhaps you're imagining motives that are not there... maybe that's what you mean by "seem" in your "debating skills" rant.

 

[Robin]

My argument against materialism (=matter is all that primarily exists, everything else are configurations thereof) is really simple:

1. All empirical observations are dependent upon consciousness.

2. Materialism claims that there is something independent of consciousness (matter).

3. Empiricial evidence of something independent of consciousness needs to be independent of consciousness.

4. Because of 1. there can be no such evidence.

5. Therefore: Materialism can never have empirical support.

6. A position that can never have empirical support is worthless / false.

So instead of materialism, idealism (=consciousness is the fundamental reality) seems to be more sensible. Because all observations (which are the basis of all science) rely on consciousness, it seems logical to assume it is fundamental to the knowable world. Of course if we weaken the definition of materialism enough, so that consciousness and matter are co-dependent, or matter is fundamentally equal to consciousness, materialism and idealism are really the same. But I don’t think most materialists would take this position (if you do, I don't object to your form of materialism).

We also could conclude that we don’t (or cannot) know what the basis of reality is.

Most probably this argument is not new, but still many people (especially here) believe in materialism. So what do you think is wrong with this argument? Or if you don't think something is wrong with it, what do you think someone could find wrong with?

You are conscious.

I am conscious.

I don't have your consciousness.

You don't have my consciousness.

But your words are somehow getting from your consciousness to mine.

So something is independent of consciousness.

De Morgan put it better:

When once we have admitted different and independent minds, the reality of external objects (external to all those minds) follows as of course. For different minds receive impressions at the same time, which their power of communication enables them to know are similar, so far as any impressions, one in each of two different minds, can be known to be similar. There must be a somewhat independent of those minds, which thus acts upon them all at once, and without any choice of their own. this somwhat is what we call an external object: and whether it arise in Berkeley's mode, or in any other, matters nothing to us here.

We shall then, take it for granted that external objects actually exist, independently of the mind which perceives them. And this brings us to an important distinction, which we must carry with us throughout the whole of this work. Besides the actual external object, there is also the mind which perceives it, and what (for want of better words or rather for want of knowing whether they be good words or not) we must call theimage of that object in the mind, or the idea which it communicates.

Auguste De Morgan, "Formal Logic" 1847
​

Incidentally - can you name any Materialist philosopher at all who defines Materialism as:

materialism (=matter is all that primarily exists, everything else are configurations thereof)​

I have been asking this question in this forum for years and I can't get the name of this mysterious Materialist.

 

[SusanB-M1]

HypnoPsi
One of the things I've learnt since being a JREFer is that if there's one person on this forum, in the top few many of those who do get the arguments put forward it is PixyMisa.

punshhh
I wonder why it is that those who wish to posit aGod, whatever and wherever such a thing is, or is imagined to be, need so very many words to do so? Just one piece of evidence would be all that is required to obviate such a need.

But then, of course, the discussions would be boring!

 

[laca]

The obtuseness in this one is stronger.

Since I was sharp enough to notice the humongous amount of projection going on in your post, that's fine by me.

 

[HypnoPsi]

HypnoPsi
One of the things I've learnt since being a JREFer is that if there's one person on this forum, in the top few many of those who do get the arguments put forward it is PixyMisa.

Oh look... a cheerleader for the obtuse. Well that really strengthens his case.

punshhh
I wonder why it is that those who wish to posit aGod, whatever and wherever such a thing is, or is imagined to be, need so very many words to do so? Just one piece of evidence would be all that is required to obviate such a need.

I wonder why it is that those who wish to posit a non-conscious magic entity as responsible for neumenal reality being real, whatever and wherever such a thing is, or is imagined to be, need so very many words to do so? Just one piece of evidence would be all that is required to obviate such a need.

~
HypnoPsi

 

[Belz...]

Note apparently. I just don't see any good reason reason to believe in physicalist models of consciousness.

You mean, aside from the fact that everything we know is physical, and that physical action on the body alters consciousness ?

Come one, don't tell me there is no good reason.

 

[Belz...]

Er, no - if all metaphysical positions are ultimately nothing more than conjecture, we're left with "We don't and can't know". Occam's Razor is all very well, but the limitations of consciousness that we observe suggest that a speculative conscious mind 'behind it all' would be such a different kind of thing that it would itself be an unnecessary additional entity - particularly as consciousness, as we observe it, appears to require a specialised physical substrate to generate and support it. So why even propose such a thing?

Circular reasoning, that's why.

 

[Robin]

I wonder why it is that those who wish to posit a non-conscious magic entity as responsible for neumenal reality being real,

Presumably that is a typo and you mean "noumenal".

In which case I would say that no one here is claiming that there is a noumenal reality or that it is real. I am interested in what you think this long obsolete term denotes.

 

[Belz...]

Again, horse before cart.... and "appears".

Yeah, because it's the only thing we can work with. The "truth" behind it all is not only unknowable, but irrelevant.

All you really know about what you term a "physical substrate" is that it's something that seems to exist and work independently of your beliefs (realism).

We know that without functioning brains we suddenly lose consciousness.

 

[Belz...]

How is this 'fundamental reality' different than plain, old, ordinary reality?

Makes them feel better.

 

[Belz...]

My elephant looks like this;

If one takes my definition of infinity;

It is illogical to accept any kind of finite existence as a boundless singularity is unbounded(limitless). There would be no 'space' 'opportunity' 'anywhere any time' for a finite existence.

If one denies this, there are two problems;

1;
If one logically accepts the existence of a finite existence.
Where did this finite existence come from? What is the origin? Did it all pop into existence out of nowhere(finite no where), fully formed?

Illogical

2;
How do you account for a finite existence? you define it and find yourself asking but what is beyond that, or before that? etc etc.

Illogical

The only logical conclusion is that there can be no 'real' existence other than an unbounded singularity.

Again I ask you to prove the existence of any infinite quantity, anywhere.

My terminology comes from a spiritual/mystical background

Imagination, then.

 

[Belz...]

Well, maybe to you! I like to think that things continue on. Like my old computer that died, then got crunched up and sent to the landfill. How can you say definitively that it's not still computing spreadsheets and surfing the Internet in some other realm?

 

[Belz...]

....and all we can do is experience that outside physical world via our senses. We don't experience things in themselves.

Of course we do. What you're seeing is not a recording. It's a chain of interactions leading from your computer screen to your eyes to your brain.

Indeed, it would even be quite accurate to say that what we really consciously perceive is actually just our sensory signals rather than the "outside" world itself.

Yeah, and the hammer doesn't REALLY break the rock, because it never actually touches it. It's electromagnetic forces at work. Your point ?

But what justification can there ever be for assuming that the neumenal essence of reality is some non-conscious magic powder/power?

What in the blue hell is the "neumenal" (wasn't it noumenal, before ?) ? And what is the "essence of reality" ?