Has consciousness been fully explained?

[dlorde]

If RD and Pixy confined themselves to "perhaps" then there'd be little disagreement.

I agree - but isn't it more interesting this way?

 

[westprog]

I agree - but isn't it more interesting this way?

Maybe. But it does get tedious being translated every time. "Yes, A is likely, but it isn't certain because B is also possible." "So you think that A and B are equally likely." It's like putting out little fires all the time.

 

[westprog]

It requires information transfer, which requires physical interaction. Playing the game involves a series of physical interactions involving information transfer. Thinking requires physical interactions.

Yes, information transfer always involves physical interaction. As far as we can tell, it's not possible for a game of chess to take place without physical interaction. However, that doesn't mean that a game of chess is the physical interactions.

 

[tsig]

Yes, information transfer always involves physical interaction. As far as we can tell, it's not possible for a game of chess sex to take place without physical interaction. However, that doesn't mean that a game of chess sex is the physical interactions.

ftfy

 

[AlBell]

Think about that for a bit and you may notice it wasn't the crushing rebuttal you were hoping for.

 

[blobru]

Yes, information transfer always involves physical interaction. As far as we can tell, it's not possible for a game of chess sex to take place without physical interaction. However, that doesn't mean that a game of chess sex is the physical interactions.

ftfy

Physical... not physical... one thing we do know: the object's the same.

 

[westprog]

Think about that for a bit and you may notice it wasn't the crushing rebuttal you were hoping for.

Absolutely not.

 

[tsig]

Think about that for a bit and you may notice it wasn't the crushing rebuttal you were hoping for.

You can have sex without any physical actions?

 

[Frank Newgent]

You can have sex without any physical actions?

Lying about it?

 

[Belz...]

Are you saying there would be some sort of non-physical interaction? Like telepathy?

The problem with westprog's line of reasoning is that consciousness IS interaction. It doesn't exist in a vacuum.

It's amusing that the constant rebuttal to "we don't know" is a list of questions. "We don't know" means "we don't know". You can't rule things out on the basis of ignorance. You can't define the limits of what consciousness might be based on not knowing how it works.

And he'd like to continue to not know, apparently.

 

[Belz...]

Yes, information transfer always involves physical interaction. As far as we can tell, it's not possible for a game of chess to take place without physical interaction. However, that doesn't mean that a game of chess is the physical interactions.

Of course it does. Everything we know IS physical interactions. What else do you want it to be ?

 

[Philosaur]

No, that's not what I said. The point I'm making is that almost any kind of physical interaction will do.

That can't be the only point you're trying to make, since I've explicitly agreed, and yet--here we are still talking about it.

The difference is the conclusions we draw from that point above: I say that while the details of the physical interaction are unimportant, the physical interaction is a necessary part of the game. You seem to think that a game of chess can happen without any physical interaction, and I'm attempting to get you to explain how.

I think that even when not played with ivory pieces on a wooden board, it's still chess.

Again, I'm glad we agree. But it's a shame about the poor strawman you just knocked over.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Yes, information transfer always involves physical interaction. As far as we can tell, it's not possible for a game of chess to take place without physical interaction. However, that doesn't mean that a game of chess is the physical interactions.

No, but it would mean that chess is physical in nature. Which is what was said in the first place before you started playing word games.

 

[westprog]

The problem with westprog's line of reasoning is that consciousness IS interaction. It doesn't exist in a vacuum.

Another rebuttal of a point I haven't made. I've been the one promoting the interactive, physical nature of consciousness, and arguing against the brain-in-a-box approach of the computationalists, who insist that a self-contained system running a program without interaction is conscious. (N.b. that's "is", not "might be").

The whole point of my catching-a-ball example was to demonstrate that conscious minds interact with their environment, while Turing machines don't. How is it possible to miss this point so totally?

And he'd like to continue to not know, apparently.

Because the best way to learn things is to insist that we know them already when we don't, right?

 

[westprog]

Of course it does. Everything we know IS physical interactions. What else do you want it to be ?

It doesn't matter what I want it to be.

If chess, as a concept, were purely physical in nature, then we'd be able to identify what class of physical interactions made up a game of chess. Instead, a game of chess is identified by the interpretations of physical interactions.

 

[westprog]

That can't be the only point you're trying to make, since I've explicitly agreed, and yet--here we are still talking about it.

The difference is the conclusions we draw from that point above: I say that while the details of the physical interaction are unimportant, the physical interaction is a necessary part of the game. You seem to think that a game of chess can happen without any physical interaction, and I'm attempting to get you to explain how.

No, I've said that some form of physical interaction is a necessity.

Again, I'm glad we agree. But it's a shame about the poor strawman you just knocked over.

 

[Belz...]

Another rebuttal of a point I haven't made. I've been the one promoting the interactive, physical nature of consciousness, and arguing against the brain-in-a-box approach of the computationalists, who insist that a self-contained system running a program without interaction is conscious. (N.b. that's "is", not "might be").

I'm not sure that you can have consciousness without interaction. First of all, as I said, all that is physical IS interaction so consciousness must be so as well. Second, if the thing being conscious doesn't interact with the outside world in any way, how can it have any thoughts ?

The whole point of my catching-a-ball example was to demonstrate that conscious minds interact with their environment, while Turing machines don't. How is it possible to miss this point so totally?

I don't necessarily read ALL of the posts, westprog, especially when a thread becomes so long and the original point becomes diluted in a sea of fallacies. I read all the ones adressed to me, and most of the others.

Because the best way to learn things is to insist that we know them already when we don't, right?

It's no better to deny the things we do know in favour of some cozy state of ignorance.

If chess, as a concept, were purely physical in nature, then we'd be able to identify what class of physical interactions made up a game of chess. Instead, a game of chess is identified by the interpretations of physical interactions.

Using the same line of reasoning used by my opponents about consciousness itself: "interpretation" is physical as well, so chess never exists as anything else than a physical thing.

 

[westprog]

Second, if the thing being conscious doesn't interact with the outside world in any way, how can it have any thoughts ?

That's the problem with conscious Turing machines. IMO it's a major argument against a TM being conscious - that's if consciousness is physical in nature.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't necessarily read ALL of the posts, westprog, especially when a thread becomes so long and the original point becomes diluted in a sea of fallacies. I read all the ones adressed to me, and most of the others.

The problem here is, of course, of Westprog's own making. He's decided that when we talk of something being Turing-computable, we must necessarily be talking of it being implemented on Turing Machines. Which is an absurdity since the Universal Turing Machine is a mathematical abstraction, not a physical device.

This has been pointed out to him. Several dozen times. And yet, he persists.

 

[Belz...]

That's the problem with conscious Turing machines. IMO it's a major argument against a TM being conscious - that's if consciousness is physical in nature.

Of course, a simulation is ALSO physical, and since there's a good chance that, if consciousness is computation-like interaction, simulations, being computational interactions themselves, can be conscious (assuming it can interact with the outside world).