Egypt 2011

[Ivor the Engineer]

I was in Cairo on 21st January. Didn't pick up any vibes of anything going on at all. Initially, news media were certainly linking it to events in Tunisia.

I was in Luxor on 26th January. That was after the trouble started in Cairo, but again, no vibes of anything in Luxor. As a stray tourist on my own, I walked (some of) the streets and interacted with some of the locals, and didn't feel any tensions.

Don't know where it all came from.

Rolfe.

It probably all kicked off because they picked up on the radical SNP vibes you were radiating.

Where will you be holidaying next year?

 

[GreyArea]

Considering that recent polls show 59% of Egyptians prefer Islamists to modernizers...

A majority preferring fundamentalists to modernizers is still not a good thing, but it doesn't necessarily imply support for Islamism.

That 59% statistic does not refer to the entire Egyptian population. A more accurate figure would be 16.5%. I have addressed this in more detail here.

So, while underlying conditions in Egypt are bad, they aren't as bad as you may have thought. I for one hope that we don't see theocrats out-organizing and hijacking a successful secular democratic revolution, like we saw in Iran in the late 1970's.

 

[JihadJane]

Anyway, as I've said before, the chances of Egypt becoming a liberal democracy because of these protests is pretty small. But the chance of it becoming an Islamist theocracy isn't really that much greater. The most likely outcome as things stand currently (especially now that the Army has basically decided to sit tight and declare the protests "legitimate") is that another variant of a military dictatorship will be established.

Power is never willing relinquished but relatively free elections are possible. Rising food prices, linked to high fuel prices and financial and climate instability, are likely to challenge the power of many kinds of regimes, globally. Egypt's economy is fragile. The uprising has made it more so. It is to become a net oil importer next year.

On the bright side, a new generation has entered the political arena and the size and composition of the demonstrations are unprecedented.

On the dark side, native and foreign covert players will likely be busy ... securing "interests".

 

[dudalb]

That 59% statistic does not refer to the entire Egyptian population. A more accurate figure would be 16.5%. I have addressed this in more detail here.

So, while underlying conditions in Egypt are bad, they aren't as bad as you may have thought. I for one hope that we don't see theocrats out-organizing and hijacking a successful secular democratic revolution, like we saw in Iran in the late 1970's.

Here,here.
One thing theocrats have going againt them in Egypt is that tourism is one of the biggest industries in the country, and theocracy's like Iran's are crappy for tourism.

 

[angrysoba]

Muslim Brotherhood?

Does not appear so - They were very later to the party, and did not start organising till after the interner went down on Friday

It doesn't matter who is late to the party. What matters is who is the last to leave.

In this case, ElBaradei seems to be riding an opportunistic wave of consensus and yet he's nobody's candidate really. Who is more likely to take over the institutions needed to run the country?

Anyway, I wonder why no one has mentioned his name yet but does anyone see Yusuf al-Qaradawi having any influence on a future government? Could he be the Ayatollah to ElBaradei's Bani-Sadr?

I certainly hope not.

 

[Debaser]

Here,here.
One thing theocrats have going againt them in Egypt is that tourism is one of the biggest industries in the country, and theocracy's like Iran's are crappy for tourism.

Which is something I've been thinking whenever the MB is mentioned. This seems to be a revolution primarily started over food, prices and jobs and Mubarak's 30 years of failure in those departments.

How much foreign income does Sharm, and those pagan tourist sites bring in to the country? How many people are employed in some ancillary service? If a, let's say, puritanical Islamic state were created where's it going to generate those jobs, how's it going to increase incomes? Compounded by finding itself with a $1.3bn black hole in the budget. I can't see Iran or Saudi sharing the wealth to that degree.

In fact, I think this could be one reason for their reticence, they know that they have nothing to bring to the table to improve the economy even if they accept democracy as a way of governing. Therefore, one of the central greivances of the protestors would continue to go unanswered. And, since the Egyptian people, like the Tunisians before them, seem to have lost 'the fear' it wouldn't bode well for whoever fails them next.

 

[marksman]

I'm not sure Mubarak has 30 years of failure. Anybody who has seen Cairo develop over the last 30 years can see that things have improved since the 1970's, which is why Mubarak didn't see a popular uprising in the past three decades. But the recent worldwide recession hit Egypt very hard and Mubarak seems powerless to improve things.

That said, Egypt is in a bind. It doesn't have a lot of oil or other natural resources. The bargaining chips they have are the Suez Canal, tourism, and their proximity to Israel. The first two make them very dependent on European favor. The third can cut two ways. They can support Gazans in their struggle against Israel by opening the Gazan border and allowing weapons through. But that could destabilize the region and strengthen immoderate factions in their own government. Or they could keep the status quo vis-a-vis Israel and work to create more economic ties and a more broad regional economy. If Egypt wants to be more than Panama with Pyramids, they need to start building actual industry.

But tolerance towards Israel could anger the Muslim Brotherhood, currently the largest opposition party in Egypt. In order to create a functioning government, the MB is going to want concessions. An "easy" concession for any new coalition to make could be to open Gaza.

Or not. It's all speculation and we'll just have to see how this plays out.

 

[A'isha]

Anyway, I wonder why no one has mentioned his name yet but does anyone see Yusuf al-Qaradawi having any influence on a future government? Could he be the Ayatollah to ElBaradei's Bani-Sadr?

If it happened, the resulting theocratic Egypt would be...interesting (in that Chinese-curse sense), given al-Qaradawi's often odd mix of moderate views on some things, and extremely fundamentalist views on (most) other things. And also the deep, almost violent animosity between him and his followers and al-Qaeda and their related groups. It certainly would be markedly different from Iran and Saudi Arabia, though it'd still be pretty damn far from anything resembling a liberal, tolerant state.

But given that he's turned down leadership positions in the Brotherhood before, I'm not sure if he'd be eager to throw his hat into the ring now. I guess it depends on how much of an opportunist he is, as opposed to simply seeing himself as a faqih.

There's also the issue that Khomeini's principle of veliyat-e-faqih, which basically justified his taking complete supreme rulership of Iran as its sole guiding theocrat, is a Shia principle. And al-Qaradawi, as a Sunni, has had some pretty unsavory things to say about Shi'ites, and so isn't extremely likely to adopt one of the main principles that separates the two groups, theologically. So, even if al-Qaradawi does take a much more active and direct role in governing a hypothetical Egyptian theocracy, it probably won't be anything like how Khomeini did it.

 

[DC]

the people of Egypt are amazing. They organize security themselfe. They just showed pictures from a train-station were civilians check other civilians for bombs and nobody seem to have a problem with it.
I just hope they don't go theocracy.

 

[WildCat]

If it happened, the resulting theocratic Egypt would be...interesting (in that Chinese-curse sense), given al-Qaradawi's often odd mix of moderate views on some things, and extremely fundamentalist views on (most) other things. And also the deep, almost violent animosity between him and his followers and al-Qaeda and their related groups. It certainly would be markedly different from Iran and Saudi Arabia, though it'd still be pretty damn far from anything resembling a liberal, tolerant state.

But given that he's turned down leadership positions in the Brotherhood before, I'm not sure if he'd be eager to throw his hat into the ring now. I guess it depends on how much of an opportunist he is, as opposed to simply seeing himself as a faqih.

There's also the issue that Khomeini's principle of veliyat-e-faqih, which basically justified his taking complete supreme rulership of Iran as its sole guiding theocrat, is a Shia principle. And al-Qaradawi, as a Sunni, has had some pretty unsavory things to say about Shi'ites, and so isn't extremely likely to adopt one of the main principles that separates the two groups, theologically. So, even if al-Qaradawi does take a much more active and direct role in governing a hypothetical Egyptian theocracy, it probably won't be anything like how Khomeini did it.

The MB says they want a state ruled by Islamic law, but it won't be a theocracy ruled by clerics as Iran is.

This makes no sense to me either.

 

[A'isha]

The MB says they want a state ruled by Islamic law, but it won't be a theocracy ruled by clerics as Iran is.

This makes no sense to me either.

What's so confusing about that? It's the way "Islamic states" have been ruled throughout virtually the entire history of Islam, ever since Abu Bakr became the first Caliph. The way Iran is currently governed is a novelty, almost an aberration, in that respect (not even other Shia ayatollahs agree with what Khomeini established).

 

[WildCat]

What's so confusing about that? It's the way "Islamic states" have been ruled throughout virtually the entire history of Islam, ever since Abu Bakr became the first Caliph. The way Iran is currently governed is a novelty, almost an aberration, in that respect (not even other Shia ayatollahs agree with what Khomeini established).

Who will interpret "Islamic law", or formulate those laws?

A secular judge? Secular politicians?

 

[A'isha]

Who will interpret "Islamic law", or formulate those laws?

A secular judge? Secular politicians?

Historically, the actual rulers of Islamic states and their subordinate governors (the "executive branch", if you will) has been composed of people who were, of course, devout Muslims, but who weren't members of the Ulama. That is, the people responsible for making decisions of statecraft, military decisions, even sometimes basic judicial decisions (to an extent...this could and did vary) were not theologians, and didn't make any decisions about points of Islamic law. However, the decisions of these rulers did have to be in line with the fatwa issued by those actual theologians, and the governors and rulers were often advised by councils of fuqaha and such.

A really rough comparison would be how the medieval European nobility were not members of the clergy, but still had to rule in line with the principles of Christianity as interpreted and handed down by the clergy, and had to obey Papal and even Episcopal rulings, with high-ranking members of the Church often acting in an advisory capacity when the ruler was making a decision. This isn't an exact comparison, since the church/state separation happened in European Christianity in a way that it really didn't in Islam, but it at least gives you an idea of how non-clerical rulers can rule according to theological dictates, without those clerics being the actual rulers themselves.

Where Khomeinism diverged from the above pattern was in taking the old Shia principle of veliyat-e-faqih (though it's not really all that old) which says that only the fuqaha, or Islamic theologians who are trained in and focus specifically on the legalistic aspects of that theology (ie, what you can and can't do, as opposed to general theological questions like "what's heaven like") can make rulings and changes to those legalistic theological aspects, and expanding it to cover everything. That is, instead of merely determining who can be married and deciding legal disputes according to sharia and letting a non-clerical ruler handle things like military campaigns or opening a new trade route with a neighboring territory, all of those things would now be handled by one person. And that one person would be a trained and capable Alim, making the sole and definitive decisions regarding everything for the entire nation.

As another really really rough comparison, think about the US governmental division of powers. The President is not a member of either Congress or the Supreme Court, but while he can act independently to a degree, his freedom of action is constrained by what Congress instructs and what the Supreme Court interprets. In the style of Islamic rule apparently envisioned by the Brotherhood, simply replace the Supreme Court (and possibly Congress...the Brotherhood has waffled over the years on just how much democracy their hoped-for New Caliphate will actually contain) with a body of Islamic clerics and theologians. Now contrast that to a governmental structure like Iran, which replaces all three with, effectively, the Pope, who can rule on anything from the legality of a law to who the army is going to invade, all on his own accord.

EDIT: I can't believe I overlooked this in all the above, but Saudi Arabia is, in its basic arrangement, similar to what I mean. The monarchs aren't clerics or theologians, and can technically do whatever they want, but the clerics in the judiciary and the advisory in practice constrain the monarch's actions. Saudi Arabia lacks several of the important elements that the Brotherhood hopes to establish in their hypothetical government, however, and the drift of the Salafi impulse is different between the Ulema of each country, so Egypt under the Brotherhood won't look exactly like Saudi Arabia. But it'll look a lot closer to that than it will to Iran in terms of basic governmental organization.

 

[Debaser]

The MB says they want a state ruled by Islamic law, but it won't be a theocracy ruled by clerics as Iran is.

This makes no sense to me either.

Surely making a law that banks should not charge interest on loans is 'islamic', but it could be made by any secular government if they saw a benefit to the nation. It doesn't necessarily need clerics to force the change?

There are banks in the UK (and presumably the US) which operate a similar system voluntarily, but I don't think their management has been infiltrated by the MB yet.

 

[Thunder]

The MB says they want a state ruled by Islamic law, but it won't be a theocracy ruled by clerics as Iran is.

This makes no sense to me either.

why does a nation that has instituted religions laws as part of civil law, have to be a dictatorship ruled by clerics?

the two are not mutually inclusive. (is that a real term or did I just make it up?)

 

[angrysoba]

If it happened, the resulting theocratic Egypt would be...interesting (in that Chinese-curse sense), given al-Qaradawi's often odd mix of moderate views on some things, and extremely fundamentalist views on (most) other things. And also the deep, almost violent animosity between him and his followers and al-Qaeda and their related groups. It certainly would be markedly different from Iran and Saudi Arabia, though it'd still be pretty damn far from anything resembling a liberal, tolerant state.

But given that he's turned down leadership positions in the Brotherhood before, I'm not sure if he'd be eager to throw his hat into the ring now. I guess it depends on how much of an opportunist he is, as opposed to simply seeing himself as a faqih.

There's also the issue that Khomeini's principle of veliyat-e-faqih, which basically justified his taking complete supreme rulership of Iran as its sole guiding theocrat, is a Shia principle. And al-Qaradawi, as a Sunni, has had some pretty unsavory things to say about Shi'ites, and so isn't extremely likely to adopt one of the main principles that separates the two groups, theologically. So, even if al-Qaradawi does take a much more active and direct role in governing a hypothetical Egyptian theocracy, it probably won't be anything like how Khomeini did it.

Thanks for the reply.

I think you're right that he might not become a Khomeini, but perhaps a Bin Baz-type figure.

Though, as I've said, I haven't heard anyone talking about it except myself. If it does happen, remember where you heard it first!

The other thing I haven't heard anything about is what the name of this revolution is, until today.

Whereas Iran had the Green Revolution, Georgia was the Rose, Ukraine was the Orange, Tunisia was the jasmine (?), Kyrgyzstan was the tulip (?) revolution, I haven't seen the New York Times, CNN or BBC give a name to this one. I asked an Egyptian friend of mine if there was a national colour or national flower and he suggested the lotus. When I Googled "Lotus Revolution" there do appear to be a few hits relating to Egypt but very few.

Could this reflect an equivocal attitude on the part of the US that hasn't been marketing this by naming it? Just a thought...

 

[timhau]

How much foreign income does Sharm, and those pagan tourist sites bring in to the country? How many people are employed in some ancillary service?

I don't know the number in dollars, but from my visit a bit under a year ago, I remember that tourism is responsible for about 11-12% of the jobs in Egypt.

 

[Rolfe]

If we had chosen either of the two alternative dates for our Egypt trip, we'd either have had to cut the holiday short, or not gone in the first place. Of course we were in the tourist areas (Luxor, Aswan, Cairo and Sharm), but it was striking how many of the locals depended on the tourist industry. An industry which must be at a standstill right now, coming up to what should be a very busy period in the early spring.

I feel desperately sad that these people I met last week and who did so much to make my holiday a memorable one must now be wondering where their next penny is coming from. This is a sizeable proportion of the population, one way and another, including the people who depend on ripping off the tourists, and those who depend on the spending power of those who make their living directly from tourism.

How long can this go on, how long will it be tolerated? Egypt needs the tourists back, but how can this be achieved?

Rolfe.

 

[JihadJane]

'Mohamed ElBaradei: The man who would be President
Exclusive intervew: Robert Fisk meets Mohamed ElBaradei, Egypt's saviour-in-waiting'



...he sometimes appears – even wearing his baseball hat – like a very friendly, shrewd and bespectacled mouse. He will not like that description, but this is a mouse, I suspect, with very sharp teeth.

...


"When a regime withdraws the police entirely from the streets of Cairo, when thugs are part of the secret police, trying to give the impression that without Mubarak the country will go into chaos, this is a criminal act. Somebody has to be accountable. And now, as you can hear in the streets, people are not saying Mubarak should go, they are now saying he should be put on trial. If he wants to save his skin, he better leave."

 

[angrysoba]

I was in Cairo on 21st January. Didn't pick up any vibes of anything going on at all. Initially, news media were certainly linking it to events in Tunisia.

I was in Luxor on 26th January. That was after the trouble started in Cairo, but again, no vibes of anything in Luxor. As a stray tourist on my own, I walked (some of) the streets and interacted with some of the locals, and didn't feel any tensions.

It sounds a bit Bertie Wooster-esque:

Having a lovely time in Egypt. Very relaxed people. Listened to the wireless: Spot of bother in Tunisia. Nothing to worry about.

Weather's here. Wish you were lovely,

Bertie