Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Belz...]

Wheres the insult? I just wanted to be sure that the person with whom I'm speaking isn't clinically handicapped in some way. Its not a crime to be retarded, Belz

Nor is it a crime to be polite.

we currently lack a rigorous scientific understanding of how consciousness figures into known physics.

That's about as honest as creationists claiming there are no transitional fossils.

 

[Philosaur]

I really don't get what your objection is to the label of "qualia", but the debate over whether or not its a good word is a red-herring.

I'm not objecting to the label at all. I'm objecting to the fact that qualia are currently (and possibly forever) off-limits to science. Qualia reside behind an event-horizon of sorts. There is no access to them from outside the individual having them. Because of this, we can't measure them. We can measure brain activity patterns, compile subject reports, etc.--but you will correctly object that we're not actually measuring qualia themselves.

So where does that leave us with regard to qualia? What can we possibly DO with the notion?

Well, since they are a non-entity with regard to science, they can't enter into scientific discussion in any meaningful way. This precludes them from ever being a criterion for whether or not some entity is conscious.

In any case, when you decide to address my post, which already answered your questions, I'll get back to you.

Rest assured I won't lose any sleep waiting for your reply.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Wheres the insult? I just wanted to be sure that the person with whom I'm speaking isn't clinically handicapped in some way. Its not a crime to be retarded, Belz

Nor is it a crime to be polite.

Though, it is a travesty to waste the courtesy on an individual who neither appreciates or deserves it. I'm seeking to amend that error on my part.

we currently lack a rigorous scientific understanding of how consciousness figures into known physics.

That's about as honest as creationists claiming there are no transitional fossils.

Thats funny, considering that having a discussion on consciousness with you is about as productive as discussing natural history with a YEC. I guess I'm the fool for seriously trying to engage you for so long.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I really don't get what your objection is to the label of "qualia", but the debate over whether or not its a good word is a red-herring.

I'm not objecting to the label at all. I'm objecting to the fact that qualia are currently (and possibly forever) off-limits to science. Qualia reside behind an event-horizon of sorts. There is no access to them from outside the individual having them. Because of this, we can't measure them. We can measure brain activity patterns, compile subject reports, etc.--but you will correctly object that we're not actually measuring qualia themselves.

So where does that leave us with regard to qualia? What can we possibly DO with the notion?

Well, since they are a non-entity with regard to science, they can't enter into scientific discussion in any meaningful way. This precludes them from ever being a criterion for whether or not some entity is conscious.

So basically you're saying that we should just bury the notion because you see no practical way of detecting and studying them beyond first person introspection. I'm sorry, but this does not a valid objection make.

In any case, when you decide to address my post, which already answered your questions, I'll get back to you.

Rest assured I won't lose any sleep waiting for your reply.

And I won't hold my breath waiting for you to address the fact that "qualia" are a very real part of existence.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Indeed. Which is all any conscious entity will ever know; an accepted name for it is qualia. (my bolding)

You mean that you have a logical proof that we can't understand consciousness any deeper than the most superficial level?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Let me ask you something: what explanatory power does this notion of qualia have? What do we get by saying that experiences are composed of qualia?

Does it answer any questions about subjective experience? Does it make possible any new experiments or measurements? Does it somehow deepen our understanding of the mind? From all I have found, the answer is a big, fat NO.

"Qualia" is a place-holder, a gap-filler, as blatantly as the notion of a deity. Your claim that experiences are composed of qualia is only true if you *define* qualia as being components of experience. But terms and definitions don't give us new (synthetic, in Kantian terms) knowledge about the world, they merely give us a short-hand way of referring to something. In the case of qualia, it's something we still--despite having given it a name--know next to nothing about.

I think you're confusing philosophers with scientists. However, if you check out the relatively recent field of experimental philosophy, you'll find this guy:

http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-07132010-134447/unrestricted/sytsma_dissertation.pdf


~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

So basically you're saying that we should just bury the notion because you see no practical way of detecting and studying them beyond first person introspection. I'm sorry, but this does not a valid objection make.

I think it does. It may not be a complete deal-breaker, but it raises an important point: How do we know that philosopher's cogitations and people's introspections result in a "model" of consciousness that is anything like the real thing? In particular, how do we know that professional ponderers of consciousness aren't so polluted with post-theoretic notions that their hypotheses are next to worthless? Research by Justin Sytsma and others suggests that the folks' view of phenomenal consciousness is different from that of philosophers.

This is an important question because the argument from philosophers against consciousness as an emergent phenomenon is largely a sort of "you just can't get consciousness from material" argument. I've seen attempts at logical proofs of this assertion, but I think they all fall flat.

So what have qualia done for us lately? I think Philosaur asks a valid question with "What can we possibly DO with the notion?" I would propose that there might be something we can do, but it requires us to dive under the superficial description of qualia as "raw feels."

~~ Paul

 

[ETA]

I am a Biochemistry student and one day I decided to ask one of my research professors to explain consciousness.

She's a neurobiologist and she said that "consciousness" in a scientific sense is the cumulative result of our brain interpreting massive amounts of sensory data along with constantly comparing that data to stored information within our memory.

Probably not a sufficient answer for the philosophical types, but as a scientist it was adequate enough for me until more research can be done.

 

[westprog]

I'm not objecting to the label at all. I'm objecting to the fact that qualia are currently (and possibly forever) off-limits to science. Qualia reside behind an event-horizon of sorts. There is no access to them from outside the individual having them. Because of this, we can't measure them. We can measure brain activity patterns, compile subject reports, etc.--but you will correctly object that we're not actually measuring qualia themselves.

So where does that leave us with regard to qualia? What can we possibly DO with the notion?

Well, since they are a non-entity with regard to science, they can't enter into scientific discussion in any meaningful way. This precludes them from ever being a criterion for whether or not some entity is conscious.



Rest assured I won't lose any sleep waiting for your reply.

There are a number of unspoken assumptions there. They tend to centre around the word "scientific".

 

[Tricky]

Please turn down the level of bickering and insult in this thread.

Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic  Posted By: Tricky

 

[AlBell]

You mean that you have a logical proof that we can't understand consciousness any deeper than the most superficial level?

~~ Paul

Sure. Threads like this one.

 

[Belz...]

Though, it is a travesty to waste the courtesy on an individual who neither appreciates or deserves it. I'm seeking to amend that error on my part.

Ah, so because I don't understand your pathetic explanations, I'm somehow unworthy of being treated as a human beign by you ? You, sir, are not only incapable of communicating your thoughts properly, but you are also unable to determine that the ultimate source of your communication problems lies with you. On top of that you use insults to avoid having to put any effort at making yourself understood and belittle whoever points this out to you. There is no point discussing any subject with you under such circumstances, and it is indeed you who deserves no courtesy.

Welcome to ignore.

 

[Belz...]

I think it does. It may not be a complete deal-breaker, but it raises an important point: How do we know that philosopher's cogitations and people's introspections result in a "model" of consciousness that is anything like the real thing? In particular, how do we know that professional ponderers of consciousness aren't so polluted with post-theoretic notions that their hypotheses are next to worthless? Research by Justin Sytsma and others suggests that the folks' view of phenomenal consciousness is different from that of philosophers.

This is an important question because the argument from philosophers against consciousness as an emergent phenomenon is largely a sort of "you just can't get consciousness from material" argument. I've seen attempts at logical proofs of this assertion, but I think they all fall flat.

So what have qualia done for us lately? I think Philosaur asks a valid question with "What can we possibly DO with the notion?" I would propose that there might be something we can do, but it requires us to dive under the superficial description of qualia as "raw feels."

~~ Paul

Careful, Paul. You're this close to being labeled as a blockhead who understands nothing, like me. If so, I'll be happy to welcome you to my new club. There's only one of us, so far, but I'm sure I can find a ton of people who don't "get" Aku.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Might a simulation/brain in a vat note evidence of being a simulation/brain in a vat leading it to reasonably state "I am a simulation/brain in a vat"?

The simulation/brain in a vat that made this statement would then exist in the real/external world and would not be a simulation/brain in a vat. Anymore.

Yes, correct.

And then, the question of whether it was a BIVIV must be addressed, and then once that is answered whether it is a BIVIVIV.

Which is all pointless, if you ask me.

The only reason the simulation hypothesis is even important is that it shows something about logical consistency -- since it is logically impossible to determine if you are in the *base* frame -- the frame that is not some kind of a nested simulation -- then any arguments must be valid (not necessarily correct) in both the case of us being in a simulation and the case of us being in the base frame.

Case in point -- westprog had argued that if we are in a simulation, then we are not really conscious, because real consciousness cannot exist in a simulation. I don't think this is logically valid, given any definition of consciousness. If it were, then since we know we are really conscious, we could prove we were in the base frame. An inconsistency.

The logically valid formulation of the idea westprog was getting at is to say that perhaps any simulations we make within this frame -- which would be a frame higher or lower than our own, depending on how you look at it -- wouldn't be able to support consciousness like our own frame can. This could be for any number of reasons, all of them reducing to the fundamental question of whether we can simulate every feature of our own frame. That is a valid question. This also implies that if we are in a simulation, perhaps there is stuff one frame out that cannot be part of "our" simulation for the same kinds of reasons. And in that case, it would also be valid to say that we are not really conscious in the same way that a being in that outer world might be conscious. But it is nonsense to say "if I am in a simulation, then I am not conscious."

westprog's arguments are his. In my last post these are the points I made (leaving in what you did not address in your post):

So 夢工場 ドキドキパニック Yume Kōjō: Doki Doki Panikku isn't like Super Mario after all?

That aside, if you were in a simulation with no connection whatsoever to the external world where I happened to be... how could we carry on like this?

Frank didn't you read my post -- I said if we were in different situations, or one of us in a simulation and the other not in a simulation, then nothing I said applies anymore.

We could obviously not carry on like this. We are both in the same frame, or at least in frames that have a connection.

And we both seem to be aware that we both might be, either, in a simulation/vat or in the real/external world.

So already knowing that any passing detail that we observe could be, either, a feature of simulation/vat programming or an actual detail on a sunny afternoon in the real/external world I wonder... how might a simulation/brain in a vat even start to confront the question of what is external and what is simulated concerning real brains and real vats?

With no difficulty whatsoever I have confronted the question of what is external and what is simulated concerning real brains and real vats.

Might a simulation/brain in a vat note evidence of being a simulation/brain in a vat leading it to reasonably state "I am a simulation/brain in a vat"?

The simulation/brain in a vat that made this statement would then exist in the real/external world and would not be a simulation/brain in a vat. Anymore.

You might try denying the external world to make your simulation/brain in a vat argument more consistent.

I agree the example of a simulation/brain in a vat referring to its simulated/vat existence doesn't really make much sense. Simulations and brains in a vat exist in the external objective world and not in a simulated/vat world.

But rather than this being the convoluted example of a simulation/brain in a vat appearing to not be that same simulation/brain in a vat due entirely to advanced vat programming - as I think you suggested - it'd be more straightforward to acknowledge that simply knowing either possibilty exists (our experiences are features of a simulated/vat programming or they are experiences in an external world) is simply knowing that either possibility exists.

We possess a basis from which it can be deduced whether we are in a simulation/vat or in an external world. Unlike (can't really say actual) simulations/brains in a vat.

To claim that this cannot be accomplished equates to denying external reality RD (I suspect you know this).

 

[westprog]

westprog's arguments are his. In my last post these are the points I made (leaving in what you did not address in your post):

I think we know at this stage that unless RD directly quotes me, what he claims I said and what I actually said bear little relation.

 

[AkuManiMani]

So basically you're saying that we should just bury the notion because you see no practical way of detecting and studying them beyond first person introspection. I'm sorry, but this does not a valid objection make.

I think it does. It may not be a complete deal-breaker, but it raises an important point: How do we know that philosopher's cogitations and people's introspections result in a "model" of consciousness that is anything like the real thing? In particular, how do we know that professional ponderers of consciousness aren't so polluted with post-theoretic notions that their hypotheses are next to worthless? Research by Justin Sytsma and others suggests that the folks' view of phenomenal consciousness is different from that of philosophers.

This is an important question because the argument from philosophers against consciousness as an emergent phenomenon is largely a sort of "you just can't get consciousness from material" argument. I've seen attempts at logical proofs of this assertion, but I think they all fall flat.

So what have qualia done for us lately? I think Philosaur asks a valid question with "What can we possibly DO with the notion?" I would propose that there might be something we can do, but it requires us to dive under the superficial description of qualia as "raw feels."

~~ Paul

I've never made the "you just can't get consciousness from material" argument. My point is, and always has been, that we currently lack an understanding of what qualia/experience/consciousness is and how phenomenality relates to known physics. The fact that we can't only make introspective observations of phenomenality does not change the fact that it is real. The practical inconvenience of qualia/consciousness being "private", in some sense, does not change it's reality; it just means that we have to adapt our methodology of study.

Personally, I think it is possible to better understand how consciousness [i.e. qualia/experiences] figures into physics. However, this can't be done by trying to redefine it for convenience or turning to pacifying non-explanations like SRIPs. Regardless of whether one considers "qualia" to be a useful concept, the fact of the matter is that the word is a label for something we know to be real and, in fact, happens to be the very thing we're trying to understand.

 

[tsig]

I've never made the "you just can't get consciousness from material" argument. My point is, and always has been, that we currently lack an understanding of what qualia/experience/consciousness is and how phenomenality relates to known physics. The fact that we can't only make introspective observations of phenomenality does not change the fact that it is real. The practical inconvenience of qualia/consciousness being "private", in some sense, does not change it's reality; it just means that we have to adapt our methodology of study.

Personally, I think it is possible to better understand how consciousness [i.e. qualia/experiences] figures into physics. However, this can't be done by trying to redefine it for convenience or turning to pacifying non-explanations like SRIPs. Regardless of whether one considers "qualia" to be a useful concept, the fact of the matter is that the word is a label for something we know to be real and, in fact, happens to be the very thing we're trying to understand.

As I see it your whole point is to use a mushy, ill defined word in order to sneak "The World Is More Mysterious Than We Can Know" thru the back door of physics.

 

[PixyMisa]

I've never made the "you just can't get consciousness from material" argument. My point is, and always has been, that we currently lack an understanding of what qualia/experience/consciousness is and how phenomenality relates to known physics.

There's no such thing as qualia. Consciousness, on the other hand, is self-referential information processing. How it relates to known physics is that it is a physical process.

The fact that we can't only make introspective observations of phenomenality does not change the fact that it is real. The practical inconvenience of qualia/consciousness being "private", in some sense, does not change it's reality; it just means that we have to adapt our methodology of study.

No. To the degree that it can only be studied by introspection, it's simply fictional.

Personally, I think it is possible to better understand how consciousness figures into physics.

It doesn't. Physics figures into consciousness, in as much as consciousness is a physical process. Consciousness has zero effect on physics.

[i.e. qualia/experiences]

There's no such thing as qualia.

 

[annnnoid]

There's no such thing as qualia. Consciousness, on the other hand, is self-referential information processing. How it relates to known physics is that it is a physical process.


No. To the degree that it can only be studied by introspection, it's simply fictional.


It doesn't. Physics figures into consciousness, in as much as consciousness is a physical process. Consciousness has zero effect on physics.


There's no such thing as qualia.

How, exactly, do you define this thing 'consciousness' and how, exactly, do you define this thing 'physics' that you insist it has no effect on?

 

[tsig]

How, exactly, do you define this thing 'consciousness' and how, exactly, do you define this thing 'physics' that you insist it has no effect on?

Consciousness is what you're doing as you read this post.