Has consciousness been fully explained?

[AkuManiMani]

Alright, now its clear that you're just being contrary for contrary's sake.

And only because I disagree with you.

No, because you seem to be feigning incomprehension to avoid recognizing an obvious point.

Tell me, in your experience, is the sensation of "cold" identical to, say, the flavor of "bitter"?

Of course not. Please read what I wrote again.

Last I checked, I couldn't 'easily see' the sensation of nausea either, but its still a quale.

I shouldn't have expected you to understand. You can FEEL nausea easily enough, however. But what about "square root" ?

"Square root", in my mind atleast, is experienced as a procedural instruction to manipulate perceived senses of magnitude in a prescribed way.

At least in my experience, abstract concepts are usually manifested in my mind as some learned symbol(s) which encapsulates some sense(s) of the concept(s) I've been trained to associate them with.

That's not a half-bad answer at all. But although we see the square root symbol, it doesn't really tell us how we can understand such an abstract concept as mathematics with qualia.

Its like organizing subjective tally marks, or beads. It doesn't matter which quale or combinations of qualia one employs,; so long as they are ordered and manipulated property in one's awareness they will suffice.

How about trillions ? We can certainly understand the concept but there is no way in hell we can relate that to real-life experiences. Nobody can imagine trillions of cookies, for instance. So how do you figure that relates to qualia ?

Because the very concepts we abstract in our minds are qualia. Mathematics, like language, is a method of organizing qualia into symbolic systems -- in this case, with the goal of manipulating senses of magnitude/quantity in a logically consistent way.

AMM: "'Numbers' aren't a postulated hypothetical but a categorical label of for an indisputable given--"

Belz...:"Hmph! Your say-so doesn't make it true x-P "

Wow. I see what you did there! You replaced one word with another and thought it applies. Let's see if I can point out why that's flawed:

I does apply. "Qualia" is a label for a given just as the word "numbers" is. The fact that you're trying to equate the term "qualia" with the concept of god demonstrates that you either A) genuinely don't understand what you're arguing against or B) that you're being deliberately obtuse. Being as how you seem fairly intelligent I'm leaning more toward the latter conclusion.

 

[Frank Newgent]

B of Putnam's deduction is that your word refers to non-simulated trees. So if your word for trees refers to non-simulated trees then you are not in a simulation.

Yeah, that is begging the question.

In fact I think that article you linked specifically states that a criticism of Putnam's position is that that step merely begs the question.

And after all of the nonsense in that article -- the kind of nonsense that makes philosophy a not-so-respected profession, even among academic circles -- the criticism was not addressed.

Don't you think you ought to read and digest the entire article before commenting upon it?

Question begging is avoided by acknowledging that the conscious being correctly deducing he is not a brain in a vat/simulation possesses awareness of context such as basic semantics.

I believe I avoided what you refer to as question begging with the wording in my first post about all this:

And that in our complicated real external world our conscious being can know that "oranges" are either features in a simulation or that "oranges" are not features in a simulation.

So our conscious being can (correctly) deduce: if I am in a simulation then it's not true that if my word "orange" does mean something, then it means orange oranges.

If my word "orange" does mean something , then it means orange oranges.

Therefore I am not in a simulation.

I could be wrong. Show me the question begging RD.

Also, Putnam is the individual credited for having first proposed computationalism in its modern form.

Do you think he may have an understanding of the field?

No.

And I will tell you why -- any computationalist that actually understands the principles of computationalism knows that you can only build arguments from the ground up. You start with simple things, that are well defined, and figure out how to get to vastly more complex behavior from those humble beginnings.

Here, Putnam is injecting some high level philosophical jargon that is ill-defined at the computational level -- truth, among other things -- and trying to refute computationalism with some philosophical hand waving.

What would putnam say if we told him "stop talking philosphy, start talking physics. If you have a group of particles, how can they determine the original nature of an indirect cause? How does a molecule of chlorophyl know whether a photon came from the sun instead of a growing light providing the same wavelengths?" Eh? What would he say? What would you say?

The response "well, we know about philosophical truth" is just philosophical hand waving. It is saying "don't worry about the physics, the reality, just focus on the apriori assumptions philosophy lets us make." Don't you realize that the proposition that our neurons can somehow discern the nature of what is activating them is tantamount to dualism? This is proposing that something else besides the observed physical world is taking place.

Sorry, that isn't how computationalism works. And that means you can't argue against computationalism using philosophy. That is like a tribal shaman trying to shoot down a helicopter with spirit prayers or whatever nonsense he can come up with. His best bet is to just pick up a rock and throw it.

So for Putnam to all of a sudden think he can shoot down computationalism with something that doesn't even make sense scientifically illustrates that he doesn't know what computationalism entails any more.

Do you believe your inability to understand a particular thought experiment of Hilary Putnam's invalidates his bibliography?

Hilary Putnam

Hilary Putnam was born on 31 July 1926 in Chicago, Illinois. He received his BA in 1948 from the University of Pennsylvania, majoring in mathematics and philosophy. He received his PhD in philosophy at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1951, working with Hans Reichenbach. Putnam taught philosophy at Northwestern University in 1952–53 and at Princeton University from 1953 to 1961, and then he was professor of philosophy of science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1961 to 1965. He became professor of philosophy at Harvard in 1965 and remained there the rest of his career. In 1976 he became Walter Beverley Pearson Professor of Modern Mathematics and Mathematical Logic; later he was also named Cogan University Professor. He retired from teaching in 2000.

The following bibliography was prepared by John Shook.

This bibliography lists books and then shorter writings. Translations of shorter items are listed if they are the first publication of a text. A selection of the most significant reprintings of essays are provided.



Books
[For tables of contents of these books, see below in the chronological listing of all publications]

The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequences. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1951. New York: Garland, 1990.

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. Edited with Paul Benacerraf. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Philosophy of Logic. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972.

Mathematics, Matter and Method. Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 2nd. ed., 1985.

Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Methodology, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science: Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Stegmüller. Edited with Wilhelm K. Essler and Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983.

Epistemology, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science: Essays in Honour of Carl G. Hempel. Edited with Wilhelm K. Essler and Wolfgang Stegmüller. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985.

The Many Faces of Realism. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987.

Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988.

Realism with a Human Face. Edited by James Conant. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990.

Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Pursuits of Reason: Essays in Honor of Stanley Cavell. Edited with Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1993.

Words and Life. Edited by James Conant. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.

Pragmatism: An Open Question. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

Enlightenment and Pragmatism. Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum, 2001. 48pp.

The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002.

Ethics Without Ontology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life: Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas, Wittgenstein. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.



All Publications

1951

The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequences. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1951. New York: Garland, 1990.



1954

“Synonymity, and the Analysis of Belief Sentences.” Analysis 41 (1954): 114-122.



1956

“A Definition of Degree of Confirmation for Very Rich Languages.” Philosophy of Science 23.1 (January 1956): 58-62.

“Mathematics and the Existence of Abstract Entities.” Philosophical Studies 7.6 (December 1956): 81-88.

“Red, Greens, and Logical Analysis.” Philosophical Review 65.2 (April 1956): 206-217.



1957

“Arithmetic Models for Consistent Formulae of Quantification Theory.” Abstract. Journal of Symbolic Logic 22.1 (March 1957): 110-111.

“Decidability and Essential Undecidability.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 22.1 (March 1957): 39-54.

“Eine Unableitbarkeitsbeweismethode für den Intuitionistischen Aussagenkalkül.” With G. Kreisel. Archiv für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung 3.1-2 (1957): 74-78.

“Psychological Concepts, Explication, and Ordinary Language.” Journal of Philosophy 54.4 (14 February 1957): 94-100.

“Red and Green All Over Again: A Rejoinder to Arthur Pap.” Philosophical Review 66.1 (January 1957): 100-103.

“Review of Hugh Leblanc’s An Introduction to Deductive Logic.” Philosophical Review 66.4 (October 1957): 551-554.

“Review of Rupert Crawshay-Williams, ‘Equivocal Confirmation’.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 22.4 (December 1957): 406-407.

“Three-Valued Logic.” Philosophical Studies 8 (1957): 73-80. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 166-173.



1958

“Elementary Logic and Foundations of Set Theory.” Philosophy in the Mid-Century, ed. Raymond Klibansky (Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1958), 56-61.

“Feasible Computational Methods in the Propositional Calculus.” With Martin Davis. Research report deposited in Robbins Library, Harvard University, 1958.

“Formalization of the Concept ‘About’.” Philosophy of Science 25 (1958): 125-130.

“Reductions of Hilbert’s Tenth Problem.” With Martin Davis. Journal of Symbolic Logic 23.2 (June 1958): 183-187.

“Review of John E. Freund, ‘On the Problem of Confirmation’.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 23.1 (March 1958): 76-77.

“Review of Philipp Frank, Philosophy of Science: The Link between Science and Philosophy.” Science n.s. 127.3301 (4 April 1958): 750-751.

“Review of Thomas Storer, ‘On Defining “Soluble”--Reply to Bergmann’.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 23.1 (March 1958): 75-76.

“Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” With Paul Oppenheim. Concepts, Theories and the Mind-Body Problem, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, ed. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), 3-36.



1959

“Memo on ‘Conventionalism’.” Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science, 22 March 1959. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 206-214.

“Review of Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science.” Science n.s. 129.3364 (19 June 1959): 1666-1667.

“Review of Raphael M. Robinson, ‘Arithmetical Representation of Recursively Enumerable Sets’.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 24.2 (June 1959): 170-171.



1960

“An Unsolvable Problem in Number Theory.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 25.3 (September 1960): 220-232.

“A Computing Procedure for Quantification Theory.” With Martin Davis. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery 7.3 (July 1960): 201-215.

“Exact Separation of Recursively Enumerable Sets Within Theories.” With Raymond Smullyan. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 11.4 (August 1960): 574-577.

“Minds and Machines.” Dimensions of Mind, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1960), 148-180. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 362-385.

“Review of Max Black, Problems of Analysis: Philosophical Essays.” Journal of Philosophy 57.1 (7 January 1960): 38-44.

“Review of Gustav Bergmann, Philosophy of Science.” Philosophical Review 69.2 (April 1960): 276-277.

“Review of Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Gödel’s Proof.” Philosophy of Science 27.2 (April 1960): 205-207.



1961

“Comments on the Paper of David Sharp, ‘The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox Re-examined’.” Philosophy of Science 28.3 (July 1961): 234-237.

“The Decision Problem for Exponential Diophantine Equations.” With Martin Davis and Julia Robinson. Annals of Mathematics 74.3 (November 1961): 425-436.

“Some Issues in the Theory of Grammar.” Structure of Language and Its Mathematical Aspects. Proceedings of Symposium in Applied Mathematics, vol. 12 (Providence, R.I.: American Mathematical Society, 1961), 25-42. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 85-106.

“Uniqueness Ordinals in Higher Constructive Number Classes.” Essays on the Foundations of Mathematics dedicated to A. A. Fraenkel on his Seventieth Anniversary, ed. Yoshua Bar-Hillel and others (Jerusalem: Magness Press, The Hebrew University, 1961), 190-206.



1962

“The Analytic and the Synthetic.” Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3, ed. Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), 358-397. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 33-69.

“Dreaming and ‘Depth Grammar’.” Analytical Philosophy, First Series, ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 211-235. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 304-324.

“It Ain’t Necessarily So.” Journal of Philosophy 59.22 (25 October 1962): 658-671. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 237-249.

“Review of Hakan Tornebohm, ‘On Two Logical Systems Proposed in the Philosophy of Quantum-Mechanics’.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 27.1 (March 1962): 115.

“Review of Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time.” Journal of Philosophy 59.8 (12 April 1962): 213-216.

“Review of R. M. Martin, The Notion of Analytic Truth.” Philosophy of Science 29.3 (July 1962): 318-320.

“What Theories are Not.” Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, ed. Ernest Nagel, Patrick Suppes, and Alfred Tarski (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1962), 240-252. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 215-227.



1963

“A Note on Constructible Sets of Integers.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 4 (1963): 270-273.

“An Examination of Grünbaum’s Philosophy of Space and Time.” Philosophy of Science. The Delaware Seminar vol. 2, 1962-1963, ed. Bernard Baumrin (New York: Interscience/John Wiley, 1963), 205-255. Repr. as “An Examination of Grünbaum’s Philosophy of Geometry” in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 93-129.

“Brains and Behavior.” Analytical Philosophy, Second Series, ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 211-235.

“‘Degree of Confirmation’ and Inductive Logic.” The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (La Salle. Ill.: Open Court, 1963), 761-784. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 270-292.

“Diophantine Sets over Polynomial Rings.” With Martin Davis. Illinois Journal of Mathematics 7 (1963): 251-256.

“Probability and Confirmation.” The Voice of America Forum Lectures, Philosophy of Science Series, No. 10 (Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency, 1963). Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 293-304.

“Review of Georg Henrik von Wright, Logical Studies.” Philosophical Review 72.2 (April 1963): 242-249.

“Review of Norwood Russell Hanson, The Concept of the Positron: A Philosophical Analysis.” Science n.s. 139.3556 (22 February 1963): 745.



1964

“The Compleat Conversationalist: A ‘Systems Approach’ to the Philosophy of Language.” Views on General Systems Theory. Proceedings of the Second Systems Symposium at Case Institute of Technology, ed. Mihajlo D. Mesarovic (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), 89-105.

“Discussion: Comments on Comments on Comments: A Reply to Margenau and Wigner.” Philosophy of Science 31.1 (January 1964): 1-6. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 159-165.

“Introduction.” With Paul Benacerraf. Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, ed. Hilary Putnam and Paul Benacerraf (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 1-27.

“On Hierarchies and Systems of Notations.” Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 15.1 (February 1964): 44-50.

“On Families of Sets Represented in Theories.” Archiv für Mathematische Logick und Grundlagenforschung 6 (1964): 66-70.

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. Ed. Hilary Putnam and Paul Benacerraf. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

“Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?” Journal of Philosophy 61.21 (12 November 1964): 668-691. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 386-407.



1965

“A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics.” Beyond the Edge of Certainty: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, ed. Robert G. Colodny (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 75-101. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 130-158.

“Craig’s Theorem.” Journal of Philosophy 62.10 (13 May 1965): 251-259. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 228-236.

“How Not to Talk about Meaning: Comments on J. J. C. Smart.” Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, ed. Robert S. Cohen and Marx R. Wartofsky (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), 205-222. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 117-131.

“More about ‘About’.” With Joseph S. Ullian. Journal of Philosophy 62.12 (10 June 1965): 305-310.

“On Minimal and Almost-Minimal System of Notations.” With David Luckham. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 119.1 (July 1965): 86-100.

“On the Notational Independence of Various Hierarchies of Degrees of Unsolvability.” With Gustav Hensel. Journal of Symbolic Logic 30.1 (March 1965): 69-86.

“Philosophy of Physics.” Aspects of Contemporary American Philosophy, ed. Franklin H. Donnell, Jr. (Würzburg: Physica-Verlag, Rudolf Liebing K. G., 1965), 27-40. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 79-92.

“Recursively Enumerable Classes and their Application to Recursive Sequences of Formal Theories.” With Marian Boikan Pour-El. Archiv für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung 8 (1965): 104-121.

“Trial and Error Predicates and the Solution to a Problem of Mostowski.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 30.1 (March 1965): 49-57.



1966



1967

“The Craig Interpolation Lemma.” With Burton Dreben. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 8.3 (July 1967): 229-233.

“The ‘Innateness Hypothesis’ and Explanatory Models in Linguistics.” Synthese 17 (March 1967): 12-22. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 107-116.

“The Thesis that Mathematics is Logic.” Bertrand Russell: Philosopher of the Century, ed. Ralph Schoenman (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), 273-303. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 12-42.

“Psychological Predicates.” Art, Mind and Religion, ed. W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), 37-48. Repr. as “The Nature of Mental States” in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 429-440. Repr. in The Many Faces of Realism (1987), 150-161.

“The Mental Life of Some Machines.” Intentionality, Minds and Perception, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1967), 177-200. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 408-428.

“Mathematics without Foundations.” Journal of Philosophy 64.1 (19 January 1967): 5-22. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 43-59. Repr. in Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed. (1983), 295-313.

“Time and Physical Geometry.” Journal of Philosophy 64.8 (27 April 1967): 240-247. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 198-205.

“Rejoinder.” Intentionality, Minds and Perception, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1967), 206-213.



1968

“Degrees of Unsolvability of Constructible Sets of Integers.” With George Boolos. Journal of Symbolic Logic 33.4 (December 1968): 497-513.

“Is Logic Empirical?” Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 5, ed. Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1968), 216-241. Repr. as “The Logic of Quantum Mechanics” in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 174-197.



1969

“Logical Positivism and the Philosophy of Mind.” The Legacy of Logical Positivism, ed. Peter Achinstein and Samuel Barker (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 211-225. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 441-451.

“Normal Models and the Field Sigma-star.” With Gustav Hensel. Fundamenta Mathematicae 64 (1969): 231-240.

“A Recursion-Theoretic Characterization of the Ramified Analytical Hierarchy.” With Gustav Hensel and Richard Boyd. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 141 (July 1969): 37-62.



1970

“A Note on the Hyperarithmetical Hierarchy.” With H. B. Enderton. Journal of Symbolic Logic 35.3 (September 1970): 429-430.

“Is Semantics Possible?” Metaphilosophy 1 (July 1970): 187-201. Revised version in Language, Belief and Metaphysics. Contemporary Philosophic Thought: The International Philosophy Year Conferences at Brockport, vol. 1, ed. Howard E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970), 50-63. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 139-152.

“Liberalism, Radicalism and Contemporary ‘Unrest’.” Metaphilosophy 1.1 (January 1970): 71-74.

“On Properties.” Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel: A Tribute on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday, ed. Nicholas Rescher et al. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1970), 235-254. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 305-322.



1971

Philosophy of Logic. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method, 2nd ed. (1985), 323-357.

CONTENTS
Preface, vii
1. What Logic Is, 3-7
2. The Nominalism-Realism Issue, 9-23
3. The Nominalism-Realism Issue and Logic, 25-32
4. Logic versus Mathematics, 33-34
5. The Inadequacy of Nominalistic Language, 35-43
6. Predicative versus Impredicative Conceptions of “Sets”, 45-51
7. How Much Set Theory is Really Indispensable for Science? 53-56
8. Indispensability Arguments, 57-74
9. Unconsidered Complications, 75-76

“An Intrinsic Characterization of the Hierarchy of Constructible Sets of Integers.” With Stephen Leeds. Logic Colloquium ’69, ed. R. O. Grandy and C. E. M. Yates (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1971), 311-350.



1972

“Other Minds.” Logic and Art: Essays in Honor of Nelson Goodman, ed. Richard Rudner and Israel Scheffler (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), 78-99. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 342-361.



1973

“Explanation and Reference.” Conceptual Change, ed. Glenn Pearce and Patrick Maynard (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973), 199-221. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 196-214.

“Meaning and Reference.” Journal of Philosophy 70.19 (8 November 1973): 699-711.

“Recursive Functions and Hierarchies.” American Mathematical Monthly, Supplement: Papers in the Foundations of Mathematics 80.6, part 2 (June-July 1973): 68-86.

“Reductionism and the Nature of Psychology.” Cognition 2.1 (1973): 131-146. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 428-440.



1974

“Comment on Wilfred Sellars.” Synthese 27 (July-August 1974): 445-455.

“The ‘Corroboration’ of Theories.” The Philosophy of Karl Popper, ed. Paul A. Schilpp ( La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974), vol. 1, 221-240. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 250-269.

“Discussion on Putnam’s ‘Scientific Explanation’.” With Suppes, Cohen, Achinstein, Braunberger, Shapere, Hemple, Kuhn, and van Fraassen. The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed. Frederick Suppes (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 437-458.

“Foreword.” To Norman Daniels, Thomas Reid’s ‘Inquiry’: The Geometry of Visibles and the Case for Realism (Standford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1974), i-vii.

“How to Think Quantum-Logically.” Synthese 29 (December 1974): 55-61.

“The Refutation of Conventionalism.” Noûs 8.1 (March 1974): 25-40. Revised version in Semantics and Philosophy, ed. Milton K. Munitz and Peter K. Unger (New York: New York University Press, 1974), 215-255. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 153-191.

“Reply to Lugg.” Cognition 3.3 (1974-75): 295-298.

“Scientific Explanation.” The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed. Frederick Suppes (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 428-433.

“Solution to a Problem of Gandy’s.” With Stephen Leeds. Fundamenta Mathematicae 81.2 (1974): 99-106.

“Systems of Notations and the Ramified Analytical Hierarchy.” With Joan Lukas. Journal of Symbolic Logic 39.2 (June 1974): 243-253.



1975

“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Language, Mind and Knowledge. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7, ed. Keith Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 131-193. Repr. in Mind, Language and Reality (1975), 215-271.

Mathematics, Matter and Method. Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press, 1975.

CONTENTS
Introduction: Philosophy of Language and the Rest of Philosophy, vii-xiv
1. Truth and necessity in mathematics, 1-11
2. The thesis that mathematics is logic (1967), 12-42
3. Mathematics without foundations (1967), 43-59
4. What is mathematical truth? 60-78
5. Philosophy of physics (1965), 79-92
6. An examination of Grunbaum’s philosophy of geometry (1963), 93-129
7. A philosopher looks at quantum mechanics (1965), 130-158
8. Discussion: comments on comments on comments: a reply to Margenau and Wigner (1964), 159-165
9. Three-valued logic (1957), 166-173
10. The logic of quantum mechanics (1968), 174-197
11. Time and physical geometry (1967), 198-205
12. Memo on ‘conventionalism’ (1959), 206-214
13. What theories are not (1962), 215-227
14. Craig’s theorem (1965), 228-236
15. It ain’t necessarily so (1962), 237-249
16. The ‘corroboration’ of theories (1974), 250-269
17. ‘Degree of confirmation’ and inductive logic (1963), 270-292
18. Probability and confirmation (1963), 293-304
19. On properties (1970), 305-322


Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press, 1975.

CONTENTS
Introduction, vii-xvii
1. Language and philosophy, 1-32
2. The analytic and synthetic (1962), 33-69
3. Do true assertions correspond to reality? 70-84
4. Some issues in the theory of grammar (1961), 85-106
5. The ‘innateness hypothesis’ and explanatory models in linguistics (1967), 107-116
6. How not to talk about meaning: Comments on J. J. C. Smart (1965), 117-131
7. Review of The concept of a person, 132-138
8. Is semantics possible? (1970), 139-152
9. The refutation of conventionalism (1974), 153-191
10. Reply to Gerald Massey, 192-195
11. Explanation and reference (1973), 196-214
12. The meaning of ‘meaning’ (1975), 215-271
13. Language and reality, 272-290
14. Philosophy and our mental life, 291-303
15. Dreaming and ‘depth grammar’ (1962), 304-324
16. Brains and behaviour, 325-341
17. Other minds (1972), 342-361
18. Minds and machines (1960), 362-385
19. Robots: machines or artificially created life? (1964), 386-407
20. The mental life of some machines (1967), 408-428
21. The nature of mental states (1967), 429-440
22. Logical positivism and the philosophy of mind (1969), 441-451

“What is Mathematical Truth?” Historia Mathematica 2 (1975): 529-543. Repr. in Mathematics, Matter and Method (1975), 60-78.



1976

“Literature, Science and Reflection.” New Literary History 7.3 (Spring 1976), 483-491. Repr. in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (1978), 83-94.

“Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Science.” PSA 1974: Proceedings of the 1974 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 32, ed. Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), 603-610.

“‘Two Dogmas’ Revisited.” Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy, ed. Gilbert Ryle (London: Oriel Press, 1976), 202-213. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983): 87-97.

“What Is ‘Realism’?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1976): 177-194.



1977

“A Note on ‘Progress’.” Erkenntnis 11.1 (May 1977): 1-4.

“Realism and Reason.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 50 (August 1977): 483-498. Repr. in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (1978), 123-138.



1978

“Deduzione/prova.” Trans. A. Collo. Enciclopedia, vol. 4 (Torino, Italy: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1978), 485-501.

“Equivalenza.” Trans. P. Odifreddi. Enciclopedia, vol. 5 (Torino, Italy: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1978), 547-564. English version published as “Equivalence” in Realism and Reason (1983), 26-45.

Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

CONTENTS
1. Meaning and Knowledge, 1-80.
2. Literature, Science and Reflection (1976), 83-94.
3. Reference and Understanding, 97-119.
4. Realism and Reason (1977), pp.123-138

“Meaning, Reference and Stereotypes.” Meaning and Translation: Philosophical and Linguistic Approaches, ed. F. Guenthner and M. Guenthner-Reutter (New York: New York University Press; London: Duckworth, 1978), 61-81.

“The Philosophy of Science: Dialogue with Hilary Putnam.” Men of Ideas: Some Creators of Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Brian Magee (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1978), 224-239.

“Quantum Logic, Conditional Probability, and Interference.” With Michael Friedman. Dialectica 32.3-4 (1978): 305-315.

“There Is at Least One ‘A Priori’ Truth.” Erkenntnis 13 (July 1978): 153-170. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983), 98-114.



1979

“Analyticity and Apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 4, ed. Peter French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 423-441. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983), 115-138.

“Comment on ‘Empirical Realism and Other Minds’.” Philosophical Investigations 2 (Fall 1979): 71-72.

“Formalizzazione.” Trans. M. Mamiani. Enciclopedia, vol. 6 (Torino, Italy: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1979), 324-341.

“Logica.” Trans. A. Conte. Enciclopedia, vol. 8 (Torino, Italy: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1979), 491-550.

“Philosophy of Mathematics: A Report.” Current Research in Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the P.S.A. Critical Research Problems Conference, ed. Peter D. Asquith and Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. (East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, 1979), 386-398. Repr. as “Philosophy of Mathematics: Why Nothing Works” in Words and Life (1994), 499-512.

“The Place of Facts in a World of Values.” The Nature of the Physical Universe: 1976 Nobel Conference, ed. Douglas Huff and Omer Prewett (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979), 113-140. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 142-162.

“Reflections on Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking.” Journal of Philosophy 76.11 (November 1979): 603-618. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983), 155-169.

“Reply to Dummett’s Comments.” Meaning and Use, ed. Avishai Margalit (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 226-228.

“Retrospective Note (1978): A Critic Replies to his Philosopher.” Philosophy as It Is, ed. Ted Honderich and Myles Burnyeat (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1979), 377-380.



1980

“Comments on Chomsky’s and Fodor’s Replies.” Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky, ed. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 335-340.

“How to be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time).” Sprache, Logik und Philosophie: Akten des vierten internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums, ed. Rudolf Haller and Wolfgang Grassl (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempski, 1980), 100-108.

“Models and Reality.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 45.3 (September 1980): 464-482. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983), 1-25. Repr. in Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed. (1983), 421-445.

“Possibilità/necessità.” Trans. G. Millone. Enciclopedia, vol. 10 (Torino, Italy: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1980), 976-995. English version published as “Possibility and Necessity” in Realism and Reason (1983), 46-68.

“Referenza/verità.” Trans. G. Millone. Enciclopedia, vol. 11 (Torino, Italy: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1980), 725-741. English version published as “Reference and Truth” in Realism and Reason (1983), 69-86.

“‘Si Dieu est Mort, alors tout est Permi’... (réflexions sur la philosophie du langage).” Trans. Denis Bansard. Critique 36 (1980): 791-801.

“What is Innate and Why: Comments on the Debate.” Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky, ed. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 287-309.



1981

“Answer to a Question from Nancy Cartwright.” Erkenntnis 16 (November 1981): 407-410.

“Convention: A Theme in Philosophy.” New Literary History 13.1 (Autumn 1981): 1-14. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983), 170-183.

“The Impact of Science on Modern Conceptions of Rationality.” Synthese 46 (March 1981): 359-382. Repr. in Reason, Truth and History (1981), 174-200.

“Philosophers and Human Understanding.” Scientific Explanation: Papers based on Herbert Spencer Lectures given in the University of Oxford, ed. A. F. Heath (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 99-120. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983), 184-204.

“Quantum Mechanics and the Observer.” Erkenntnis 16 (July 1981): 193-219. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983), 248-270.

Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

CONTENTS
Preface, ix-xii
1. Brains in a vat, 1-21
2. A problem about reference, 22-48
3. Two philosophical perspectives, 49-74
4. Mind and body, 75-102
5. Two conceptions of rationality, 103-126
6. Fact and value, 127-149
7. Reason and history, 150-173
8. The impact of science on modern conceptions of rationality (1981), 174-200
9. Values, facts and cognition, 201-216
Appendix (on indeterminate reference), 217-218

“Ricorsività.” Trans. G. Millone. Enciclopedia, vol. 12 (Torino, Italy: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1981), 33-61.



1982

“Beyond the Fact/Value Dichotomy.” Crítica 14.1 (1982): 3-12. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 135-141.

“Comment on Fodor’s ‘Cognitive Science and the Twin Earth Problem’.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23.3 (July 1982): 294-295.

“Peirce the Logician.” Historia Mathematica 9 (1982): 290-301. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 252-260.

“Reply to Two Realists.” Journal of Philosophy 69.10 (October 1982): 575-577. Revised version published as “A Defense of Internal Realism” in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 30-42.

“Review of B. T. Wilkins, ‘Has History any Meaning?’.” CLIO: A Journal of Literature, History and the Philosophy of History 11.3 (1982): 291-293.

“Semantical Rules and Misinterpretations: A Reply to R. M. Martin’s ‘A Memo on Method’.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42.4 (June 1982): 604-609.

“Three Kinds of Scientific Realism.” Philosophical Quarterly 32.4 (July 1982): 195-200. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 492-498.

“Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized.” Synthese 52 (July 1982): 3-24. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983), 229-247.

“Why There Isn’t a Ready-Made World.” Synthese 51 (May 1982): 141-168. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983), 205-228.



1983

“Explanation and Reduction.” In Hebrew. Iyyun 32 (July 1983): 123-137.

“Foreword to the Fourth Edition.” Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, by Nelson Goodman (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1979), vii-xvi. Repr. as “Nelson Goodman’s Fact, Fiction, and Forecast” in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 303-308.

“Is There a Fact of the Matter about Fiction?” Poetics Today 4.1 (1983): 77-81. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 209-213.

Methodology, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science: Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Stegmüller. Edited with Wilhelm K. Essler and Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983.

“On Truth.” How Many Questions? Essays in Honor of Sidney Morgenbesser, ed. Leigh S. Cauman, Isaac Levi, et al. (Indianapolis: Hacket, 1983), 35-56. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 315-329.

Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2nd ed. Edited with Paul Benacerraf. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Includes Putnam’s “Mathematics without Foundations” (1967), 295-313; and “Models and Reality” (1980), 421-445.

“Probability and the Mental.” Human Meanings and Existence. Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5, ed. D. P. Chattopadhyaya (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 1983), 35-56. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 376-388.

Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

CONTENTS
Introduction: An overview of the problem, vii-xviii
1. Models and reality (1980), 1-25
2. Equivalence (1978), 26-45
3. Possibility and necessity (1980), 46-68
4. Reference and truth (1980), 69-86
5. ‘Two dogmas’ revisited (1976), 87-97
6. There is at least one a priori truth (1978), 98-114
7. Analyticity and apriority: beyond Wittgenstein and Quine (1979), 115-138
8. Computational psychology and interpretation theory, 139-154
9. Reflections on Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking (1979), 155-169
10. Convention: a theme in philosophy (1981), 170-183
11. Philosophers and human understanding (1981), 184-204
12. Why there isn’t a ready-made world (1982), 205-228
13. Why reason can’t be naturalized (1982), 229-247
14. Quantum mechanics and the observer (1981), 248-271
15. Vagueness and alternative logic (1983), 271-186
16. Beyond historicism, 287-303

“Taking Rules Seriously: A Reply to Martha Nussbaum.” New Literary History 15.1 (Autumn 1983): 77-81. Repr. as “Taking Rules Seriously” in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 193-200.

“Vagueness and Alternative Logic.” Erkenntnis 19 (May 1983): 297-314. Repr. in Realism and Reason (1983), 271-286.



1984

“After Ayer, After Empiricism.” Review of A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. Partisan Review 51.2 (1984): 265-275. Revised version published as “After Empiricism” in Post-Analytic Philosophy, ed. John Rajchman and Cornel West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 20-30. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 43-53.

“The Craving for Objectivity.” New Literary History 15.2 (Winter 1984): 229-239. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 120-131.

“Is the Causal Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical?” Causation and Causal Theories. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 9, ed. P. A. French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 3-16. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 80-95.

“Models and Modules.” Review of Jerry Fodor’s The Modularity of Mind. Cognition 17.3 (August 1984): 253-264. Repr. as “Models and Modules: Fodor’s The Modularity of Mind” in Words and Life (1994), 403-415.

“Necessità (A. Ayer).” Livelli da realtà, ed. Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1984), ??.

“Proof and Experience.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 128.1 (1984): 31-54.



1985

“A Comparison of Something with Something Else.” New Literary History 17.1 (Autumn 1985): 61-79. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 330-350.

“A Quick Read is a Wrong Wright.” Analysis 45 (October 1985): 203.

Epistemology, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science: Essays in Honour of Carl G. Hempel. Edited with Wilhelm K. Essler and Wolfgang Stegmüller. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985.

Mathematics, Matter and Method. Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, 2nd. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Adds “Philosophy of Logic” 323-357.

“Reflexive Reflections.” Erkenntnis 22.1 (January 1985): 143-154. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 416-427.



1986

“Hilary Putnam’s Response.” Meaning and Cognitive Structure: Issues in the Computational Theory of Mind, ed. Zenon W. Pylyshyn and William Demopoulos (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing, 1986), 217-254.

“How Old Is the Mind?” Exploring the Concept of Mind, ed. Richard M. Caplan (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986), 31-49. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 3-21.

“Information and the Mental.” Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernie Lepore (Oxford: Blasil Blackwell, 1986), 262-271.

“Meaning and Our Mental Life.” The Kaleidoscope of Science. The Israel Colloquium: Studies in History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science, vol. 1, ed. E. Ulman-Margalit (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986), 17-32.

“Meaning Holism.” The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, ed. Lewis E. Hahn and Paul A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986), 405-431. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 278-302.

“Rationality in Decision Theory and in Ethics.” Crítica 18.54 (December 1986): 3-16. Revised version in Rationality in Question, ed. Shlomo Biderman and Ben-Ami Scharfstein (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), 19-28.

“The Realist Picture and the Idealist Picture.” Philosophie et Culture: Actes de XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie, ed. Venant Cauchy (Montréal: Montmorency, 1986), vol. 1, 205-211.



1987

“The Diversity of the Sciences: Global versus Local Methodological Approaches.” Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honor of J. J. C. Smart, ed. P. Pettit, R. Sylan, and J. Norman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 137-153. Repr. as “The Diversity of the Sciences” in Words and Life (1990), 463-480.

“Functionalism: Cognitive Science or Science Fiction?” The Future of the Cognitive Revolution, ed. David Martel Johnson and Christina E. Erneling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 32-44.

The Many Faces of Realism. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1987.

CONTENTS
Preface 1-2
Lecture I: Is there still anything to say about reality and truth? 3-21
Intrinsic Properties: dispositions 8-11
Intrinsic Properties: intentionality 11-13
Why intentionality is so intractable 13-16
“The trail of the human serpent is over all” 16-21
Lecture II: Realism and reasonableness 23-40
Reality without the dichotomies 32-40
Lecture III: Equality and our moral image of the world 41-62
The Frankfurt School’s attempt to justify equality 53-56
Democracy without a moral image 57-62
Lecture IV: Reasonabless as a fact and as a value 63-86
Scientific method 71-75
The “Epistemological problem” 76-80
The importance of Peirce’s puzzle 80-86

“Meaning Holism and Epistemic Holism.” Theorie der Subjektivität, ed. Konrad Cramer et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), 251-277.

“Scientific Liberty and Scientific License.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 13 (1987): 43-51. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 201-208.

“Truth and Convention: On Davidson’s Refutation of Conceptual Relativism.” Dialectica 41.1-2 (1987): 69-77. Repr. as “Truth and Convention” in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 96-104.



1988

“After Metaphysics, What?” Metaphysik nach Kant? Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1987, ed. Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988), 457-466. Repr. as part 2 of “Realism with a Human Face” in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 18-29.

“Bringing Philosophy Back to Life.” With A. Sanoff. U.S. News and World Report (25 April 1988): 56.

“The Greatest Logical Positivist.” Review of W. V. O. Quine, Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary. London Review of Books 10.8 (21 April 1988): 11-13. Repr. as “The Greatest Logical Positivist” in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 268-277.

“La objetividad y la distinción ciencia/ética.” Diánoia 34 (1988): 7-25. English version published as “Objectivity and the Science/Ethics Distinction” in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 163-178.

“Much Ado about Not Very Much.” Daedalus 117.1 (Winter 1988): 269-281. Repr. as “Artificial Intelligence: Much Ado about Not Very Much” in Words and Life (1994), 391-402.

Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988.

CONTENTS
Preface, p. ix
Introduction, xi-xv
1. Meaning and Mentalism, 1-18
2. Meaning, Other People, and the World, 19-41
3. Fodor and Block on “Narrow Content”, 43-56
4. Are There Such Things as Reference and Truth? 57-71
5. Why Functionalism Didn't Work, 73-89
6. Other Forms of Functionalism, 91-105
7. A Sketch of an Alternative Picture, 107-120
Appendix, 121-125



1989

“Afterthoughts on My Carus Lectures: Philosophy as Anthropology.” Lyceum 1.2 (Fall 1989): 40-42.

“Aloft with Freedom’s Banner.” The Times Higher Education Supplement no.852 (3 March 1989): 13-15.

“An Interview with Professor Hilary Putnam: The Vision and Arguments of a Famous Harvard Philosopher.” Cogito 3 (1989): 85-91. Repr. in Key Philosophers in Conversation: The Cogito Interviews, ed. Andrew Pyle (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 44-54.

“Model Theory and the ‘Factuality’ of Semantics.” Reflections on Chomsky, ed. Alex George (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 213-232. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 351-375.

“Pourquoi les Philosophes?” With Jacques Riche. L’Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, ed. André Jacob (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), 765-771. English version published as “Why Is a Philosopher?” in The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? ed. Avner Cohen and Marcello Dascal (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), 61-75. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 105-119.

“William James’s Ideas.” With Ruth Anna Putnam. Raritan 8.3 (Winter 1989): 17-44. Repr. in Realism with a Human Face (1990), 217-231.



1990

“An Open Letter on Anti-Armenian Progroms in the Soviet Union.” With others. The New York Review of Books 37.14 (27 September 1990): 16.

“A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy” and “Afterword.” Southern California Law Review 63.6 (September 1990) 1671-1697, 1698. Reprinted with revisions in Renewing Philosophy (1992), 180-200.

“Epistemology as Hypothesis.” With Ruth Anna Putnam. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 26.4 (Fall 1990): 407-433. Repr. as “Dewey’s Logic: Epistemology as Hypothesis” in Words and Life (1994), 198-220.

“Introduction Some Years Later.” The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequences (New York: Garland, 1990), 1-12.

“The Idea of Science.” The Philosophy of the Human Sciences. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 15, ed. P. A. French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 57-64. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 481-491.

The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequences. 1951 Ph.D. dissertation. New York: Garland, 1990.

“Preface.” Medical Choices, Medical Chances, ed. H. J. Bursztajn (London and New York: Routledge, 1981; 2nd ed. 1990), ix-xix.

Realism with a Human Face. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990.

CONTENTS
Preface, vii-xi
1. Realism with a Human Face. Part One: Realism, 3-18. Part Two: Relativism (1988), 18-29
2. A Defense of Internal Realism (1982), 30-42
3. After Empiricism (1984), 43-53
4. Is Water Necessarily H2O? 54-79
5. Is the Causal Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical? (1984), 80-95
6. Truth and Convention (1987), 96-104
7. Why Is a Philosopher? (1989) 105-119
8. The Craving for Objectivity (1984), 120-131
9. Beyond the Fact/Value Dichotomy (1982), 135-141
10. The Place of Facts in a World of Values (1979), 142-162
11. Objectivity and the Science/Ethics Distinction (1988), 163-178
12. How Not to Solve Ethical Problems, 179-192
13. Taking Rules Seriously (1983), 193-200
14. Scientific Liberty and Scientific License (1987), 201-208
15. Is There a Fact of the Matter about Fiction? (1983), 209-213
16. William James’s Ideas (with Ruth Anna Putnam) (1989), 217-231
17. James’s Theory of Perception, 232-251
18. Peirce the Logician (1982), 252-260
19. The Way the World Is, 261-267
20. The Greatest Logical Positivist (1988), 268-277
21. Meaning Holism (1986), 278-302
22. Nelson Goodman’s Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1983), 303-308

“Rorty e Wittgenstein.” Trans. Alessandro Pagnini. Iride n.s. 4/5 (January-December 1990): 313-317.




1991

“Does the Disquotational Theory Really Solve All Philosophical Problems?” Metaphilosophy 22.1-2 (January-April 1991): 1-13. Repr. as “Does the Disquotational Theory of Truth Solve All Philosophical Problems?” in Words and Life (1994), 264-278.

“The French Revolution and the Holocaust: Can Ethics be Ahistorical?” Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Eliot Deutsch (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 299-312. Repr. as “Pragmatism and Relativism: Universal Values and Traditional Ways of Life” in Words and Life (1994), 182-197.

“Il principio di indeterminazione e il progresso scientifico.” Iride 7 (1991): 9-27.

“Logical Positivism and Intentionality.” A. J. Ayer Memorial Essays. Philosophy 30 Supplement (1991): 105-116. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 85-98.

“Philosophical Reminiscences with Reflections on Firth’s Work.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51.1 (March 1991): 143-147.

“Preface.” Erkenntnis 34.3 (May 1991): 269.

“Reichenbach’s Metaphysical Picture.” Erkenntnis 35.1-3 (July 1991): 61-75. Also published as “Introduction” in Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), ix-xix. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 99-114.

“Replies and Comments.” Erkenntnis 34.3 (May 1991): 401-423.

“Wittgenstein on Religious Belief.” On Community, ed. Leroy Rouner (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 56-75. Repr. in Renewing Philosophy (1992), 134-157.



1992

“Atando Cabos.” Trans. Gabriela Montes de Oca Vega and Margarita M. Valdés. Diánoia 38 (1992): 1-15. English version published as “Realism without Absolutes” in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1.2 (September 1993): 179-192. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 279-294.

“Changing Aristotle’s Mind.” With Martha Nussbaum. Essays on Aristotle’s “De Anima”, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amalie Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 27-56. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 22-61.

“Comments on the Lectures.” Reasoning and the Logic of Things by Charles S. Peirce, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 55-102.

Définitions. Pourquoi ne peut on pas « naturaliser » la raison. Combas, France: Éditions de l’Éclat, 1992. Consists of the translation of “Why Reason Can’t Be Naturalized” (in Philosophical Papers, vol. 3), joined by a nearly fifty-page interview between Putnam and C. Bouchindhomme titled “Les voies de la raison. Entretien avec Hilary Putnam par Christian Bouchindhomme.”

“Introduction: The Consequences of Mathematics.” With Kenneth L. Ketner. Reasoning and the Logic of Things, by Charles S. Peirce, ed. Kenneth L. Ketner (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 1-54.

Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992.

CONTENTS
Preface, ix-xii
1. The Project of Artificial Intelligence, 1-18
2. Does Evolution Explain Representation? 19-34
3. A Theory of Reference, 35-59
4. Materialism and Relativism, 60-79
5. Bernard Williams and the Absolute Conception of the World, 80-107
6. Irrealism and Deconstruction, 108-133
7. Wittgenstein on Religious Belief (1991), 134-157
8. Wittgenstein on Reference and Relativism, 158-179
9. A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy (1990), 180-200

“Replies.” Philosophical Topics 20.1 (Spring 1992): 347-408.

“Richard Rorty et le Relativisme.” Trans. Jean Pierre Cometti. Lire Rorty: Le pragmatisme et ses conséquences, ed. Jean Pierre Cometti (Combas, France: Editions de l’éclat, 1992), 127-143.

“Truth, Activation Vectors and Possession Conditions for Concepts.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52.2 (June 1992): 431-447.

“Why Functionalism Failed.” Inference, Explanation and Other Philosophical Frustrations, ed. John Earman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 255-270. Repr. as “Why Functionalism Didn’t Work” in Words and Life (1994), 441-459.


1993

“Aristotle after Wittgenstein.” Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers, ed. Robert W. Shaples (Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: UCL Press, 1993), 117-137. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 62-81.

“Education for Democracy.” With Ruth Anna Putnam. Educational Theory 43.4 (Fall 1993): 361-376. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 221-241.

“Hat Philosophie noch eine Zukunft?” Trans. Constantin Schölkopf. Philosophie der Gegenwart, Gegenwart der Philosophie, ed. Herbert Schnädelbach and Geert Keil (Hamburg: Junius, 1993), 21-39.

“Pope’s Essay on Man and Those ‘Happy Pieties’.” Pursuit of Reason: Essays in Honor of Stanley Cavell (1993), 13-20. Repr. as “The Cultural Impact of Newton: Pope’s Essay on Man and those ‘Happy Pieties’” in Words and Life (1994), 513-522.

“Preface: Introducing Cavell.” Pursuit of Reason: Essays in Honor of Stanley Cavell (1993), vii-xii.

Pursuits of Reason: Essays in Honor of Stanley Cavell. Edited with Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1993.

“Realism Without Absolutes.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1.2 (September 1993): 179-192.




1994

“The Best of All Possible Brains?” Review of Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind. New York Times Book Review 144 (20 November 1994): 7.

“Comments and Replies.” Reading Putnam, ed. Bob Hale and Peter Clark (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 242-295.

“The Limits of Vindication.” Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Sweden, August 7-14, 1991, ed. Dag Prawitz, Brian Skyrms, and Dag Westerståhl (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1994), 867-882. Repr. as “Reichenbach and the Limits of Vindication” in Words and Life (1994), 131-148.

“Logic and Psychology: Comment on ‘Logic and Cognition’.” The Logical Foundations of Cognition. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, vol. 4, ed. John Macnamara and Gonzalo E. Reyes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 35-42.

“Nuevas Ideas sobre ‘Los Modelos y la Realidad’.” Diálogos 63 (1994): 40-44.

“Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity.” Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 199-204. Repr. in Words and Life (1994), 151-181.

“Putnam, Hilary.” A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 507-513.

“Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind.” Journal of Philosophy 91.9 (September 1994): 445-517. Repr. in The Threefold Cord (1999), 3-70.

Words and Life. Edited by James Conant. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.

CONTENTS
Preface, v-viii
1. How Old is the Mind? (1986), 3-21
2. Changing Aristotle’s Mind (with Martha C. Nussbaum) (1992), 22-61
3. Aristotle after Wittgenstein (1993), 62-81
4. Logical Positivism and Intentionality (1991), 85-98
5. Reichenbach’s Metaphysical Picture (1991), 99-114
6. Reichenbach and the Myth of the Given, 115-130
7. Reichenbach and the Limits of Vindication (1994), 131-148
8. Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity (1994), 151-181
9. Pragmatism and Relativism: Universal Values and Traditional Ways of Life (1991), 182-197
10. Dewey’s Logic: Epistemology as Hypothesis (with Ruth Anna Putnam) (1990), 198-220
11. Education for Democracy (with Ruth Anna Putnam) (1993), 221-241
12. Rethinking Mathematical Necessity, 245-263
13. Does the Disquotational Theory of Truth Solve All Philosophical Problems? (1991), 264-278
14. Realism without Absolutes (1992), 279-294
15. The Question of Realism, 295-312
16. On Truth (1983), 315-329
17. A Comparison of Something with Something Else (1985), 330-350
18. Model Theory and the “Factuality” of Semantics (1989), 351-375
19. Probability and the Mental (1983), 376-388
20. Artificial Intelligence: Much Ado about Not Very Much (1988), 391-402
21. Models and Modules: Fodor’s The Modularity of Mind (1984), 403-415
22. Reflexive Reflections (1985), 416-427
23. Reductionism and the Nature of Psychology (1973), 428-440
24. Why Functionalism Didn’t Work (1992), 441-459
25. The Diversity of the Sciences (1987), 463-480
26. The Idea of Science (1990), 481-491
27. Three Kinds of Scientific Realism (1982), 492-498
28. Philosophy of Mathematics: Why Nothing Works (1979), 499-512
29. The Cultural Impact of Newton: Pope’s Essay on Man and Those “Happy Pieties” (1993), 513-522 Mind? (1986), 3-21



1995

“Are Moral and Legal Values Made or Discovered?” Legal Theory 1.1 (March 1995): 5-19. Revised version published as “Are Values Made or Discovered?” in The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (2002), 96-110.

“Further Adventures of Wigner’s Friend.” With David Z. Albert. Topoi 14.1 (March 1995): 17-22.

“Logical Positivism, the Kantian Tradition, and the Bounds of Sense.” The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson, ed. Pranab Kumar Sen and Roop Rekha Verma (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1995), 145-160.

“Peirce’s Continiuum.” Peirce and Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquiries, en Kenneth L. Ketner (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995), 1-22.

“Pragmatism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95.3 (March 1995): 291-306.

Pragmatism: An Open Question. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

CONTENTS
Preface, xi-xii
Introductory Remarks, 1-3
1. The Permanence of William James, 5-26
2. Was Wittgenstein a Pragmatist? 27-56
3. Pragmatism and the Contemporary Debate, 57-81

“Pragmatismus und Verifikationismus.” Trans. Alexander Staudacher. Deustche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 43.2 (1995): 219-231.

“Replies.” Legal Theory 1.1 (March 1995): 69-80.

“Review of Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind.” Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 32.3 (July 1995): 370-373.



1996

“Must We Choose Between Patriotism and Universal Reason?” For Love of Country, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 91-97.

“On Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. 70 (1996): 243-264.

“Pragmatism and Realism.” Cardozo Law Review 18.1 (September 1996): 153-170. Repr. in The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture, ed. Morris Dickstein (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998), 37-53.

“The Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy.” With Ruth Anna Putnam. Bulletin of the Santayana Society 15 (1996): 1-14.

“Über die Rationalität et von Präferenzen.” Trans. Astrid Wagner. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 21.3 (1996): 209-228. English version published as “On the Rationality of Preferences” in The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (2002), 79-95.

“What-it’s-like-ness.” Review of Galen Strawson, Mental Reality. London Review of Books 18.3 (8 February 1996): 11.

“What the Spilled Beans can Spell: The Difficult and Deep Realism of Williams James.” With Ruth Anna Putnam. The Times Literary Supplement no. 4864 (21 June 1996): 14-15.



1997

“Acerca de un mal uso del Teorema de Gödel en la Especulación sobre la Mente.” Trans. M. Carmen González Marín. Revista de Libros no. 3 (March 1997): 30-32.

“A Half Century of Philosophy, Viewed from Within.” Daedalus: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 126.1 (Winter 1997): 175-208.

“An Interview with Hilary Putnam.” With G. Marchetti. Cogito 11.3 (November 1997): 149-157.

“God and the Philosophers.” Philosophy of Religion. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 21, ed. P. A. French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 175-187.

“James’s Theory of Truth.” The Cambridge Companion to William James, ed. Ruth Anna Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 166-185.

“La Importancia del Conocimiento No-científico.” Trans. Angel García Rodríguez. Limbo, supplement to Teorema 16.2 (1997): 1-17.

“On Negative Theology.” Faith and Philosophy 14.4 (October 1997): 407-422.

“Review of John McDowell, Mind and World.” Philosophical Review 106.2 (April 1997): 267-269.

“Thoughts Addressed to an Analytical Thomist.” Monist 80.4 (October 1997): 487-499.



1998

“A Politics of Hope.” Review of Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country. The Times Literary Supplement no. 4964 (22 May 1998): 10.

“Floyd, Wittgenstein and Loneliness.” Loneliness, ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 109-114.

“Kripkean Realism and Wittgenstein’s Realism.” The Story of Analytical Philosophy: Plot and Heroes, ed. Anat Biletzki and Anat Matar (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 241-252.

“A Politics of Hope.” Review of Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country. The Times Literary Supplement no. 4964 (22 May 1998): 10.

“Skepticism.” Philosophie in Synthetischer Absicht, ed. Marcelo Stamm (Stuttgart: Klett-Kota, 1998), 239-268.

“Strawson and Skepticism.” The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson, ed. Lewis Hahn (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1998), 273-287.

“The Real William James: Response to Robert Meyers.” With Ruth Anna Putnam. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 34.2 (Spring 1998): 366-381.

“Why Fraternity Cannot be Cloned.” The Times Higher Education Supplement no. 1317 (30 January 1998): 18-19.



1999

“Cloning People.” Genetics and Human Diversity, ed. Justine Burley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1-13.

“Ein Deutscher Dewey.” Neue Züricher Zeitung 12.133 (13 June 1999): 77.

“Introduction.” Understanding the Sick and the Healthy: A View of World, Man, and God, ed. Franz Rosenzweig (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1-20.

The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

CONTENTS
Preface xi-xii
ONE. Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind (1994) 3-70
Lecture one. The antimony of realism 3-20
Lecture two. The importance of being Austin: The need for a “second naïveté” 21-41
Lecture three. The face of recognition 43-70
TWO. Mind and Body 73-133
Lecture one. “I thought of what I called ‘an automatic sweetheart’” 73-91
Lecture two. Are psychological conditions “internal states”? 93-107
Lecture three. Psychophysical correlation 109-133
THREE. Afterwords
First afterword. Causation and explanation 137-150
Second afterword. Are appearances “qualia”? 151-175



2000

“A Note on Wittgenstein’s ‘Notorious Paragraph’ about the Gödel Theorem.” With Juliet Floyd. Journal of Philosophy 97.11 (November 2000): 624-633.

“Aristotle’s Mind and the Contemporary Mind.” Aristotle and Contemporary Science, ed. Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou, Jagdish Hattiangadi, and David M. Johnson (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), vol. 1, 7-28.

“Das modeltheoretische Argument und die Suche nach dem Realismus des Common Sense” in Realismus, ed. Marcus Willaschek (Padeborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000), 125-142.

“Nonstandard Models and Kripke’s Proof of the Gödel Theorem.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41.1 (2000): 53-58.

“Paradox Revisited I: Truth.” Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, ed. Gila Sherr and Richard Tieszen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3-15.


“Paradox Revisited II: Sets.” Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons, ed. Gila Sherr and Richard Tieszen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 16-26.

“Philosophie als umgestaltende Tätigkeit. William James über Moralphilosophie.” Die Renaissance des Pragmatismus: Aktuelle Verflechtungen zwischen analytischer und kontinentaler Philosophie, ed. Mike Sandbothe (Weilerswist, Germany: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2000), 234-252. English version published as “Philosophy as a Reconstructive Activity: William James on Moral Philosophy” in The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy: Contemporary Engagements Between Analytic and Continental Thought, ed. William Egginton and Mike Sandbothe (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2004), 31-46.

“Richard Rorty on Reality and Justification.” Rorty And His Critics, ed. Robert Brandom (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 81-87.

“Thoughts about Domestic Tranquility / Bne Brak.” Joshua Neustein: Five Ash Cities, illustrated by Joshua Neustein (Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers, 2000), 100-108.

“To Think with Integrity.” Harvard Review of Philosophy 8 (Spring 2000): 4-13.



2001

“A Reply to John Searle’s Letter ‘On Hilary Putnam’s Farewell Lecture’.” Harvard Review of Philosophy 9 (Spring 2001): 6.

Enlightenment and Pragmatism. Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum, 2001. Reprinted in Ethics without Ontology (2004), 87-129.

“Hans Reichenbach: Realist and Verificationist.” Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, ed. Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 277-287.

“Pragmatism Resurgent: A Reading of The American Evasion of Philosophy.” Cornel West: A Critical Reader, ed. George Yancy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 19-37.

“Reply to Bernard Williams’ ‘Philosophy As a Humanistic Discipline’.” Philosophy 76.4 (October 2001): 605-614.

“Reply to Charles Travis.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55.4 (December 2001): 525-533.

“Reply to Jennifer Case.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55.4 (December 2001): 431-438.

“Reply to Jean-Pierre Cometti.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55.4 (December 2001): 457-469.

“Reply to Michael Devitt.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55.4 (December 2001): 495-502.

“Rules, Attunement, and ‘Applying Words to the World’: The Struggle to Understand Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language.” The Legacy of Wittgenstein: Pragmatism or Deconstruction, ed. Chantal Mouffe and Ludwig Nagl (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 9-23.

“Skepticism, Stroud and the Contextuality of Knowledge.” Philosophical Explorations 4.1 (January 2001): 2-16.

“Was Wittgenstein Really an Anti-Realist about Mathematics?” Wittgenstein in America, ed. Timothy McCarthy and Sean C. Stidd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 140-194.

“Werte und Normen.” Die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunft der Öffentlichkei. Festschrift für Jürgen Habermas, ed. Lutz Wingert and Klaus Günther (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001), 280-313. English version published as “Values and Norms” in The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (2002), 111-134.

“When ‘Evidence Transcendence’ Is Not Malign: A Reply to Crispin Wright.” Journal of Philosophy 98.11 (November 2001): 594-600.




2002

“Antwort auf Jürgen Habermas.” Hilary Putnam und die Tradition des americanishen Pragmatismus, ed. Marie-Luise Raters and Marcus Willaschek (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 306-321.

The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002.

CONTENTS
Preface, vii-ix
Introduction, 1-4
I. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 7-64
1. 7-27
2. 28-45
3. 46-64
II. Rationality and Value
4. Sen’s “Prescriptivist” Beginnings, 67-78
5. On the Rationality of Preferences (1996), 79-95
6. Are Values Made of Discovered? (1995), 96-110
7. Values and Norms (2001), 111-134
8. The Philosophers of Science’s Evasion of Values, 135-145

“Comment on Ruth Anna Putnam’s paper.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 12-13.

“Comment on Richard Warner’s paper.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 38-39.

“Comment on Robert Brandom’s paper.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 59-65

“Comment on Nicholas Rescher’s paper.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 80-85.

“Comment on John Haldane’s paper.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 105-108.

“Comment on Tadeusz Szubka’s paper.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 125-127.

“Comment on John Heil’s paper.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 143.

“Comment on Wolfgang Kunne’s paper.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 166.

“Comment on Gary Ebb’s paper.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 186-187.

“Comment on Charles Travis’s paper.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 209-210.

“Introduction.” The Correspondence of William James, vol. 10, ed. John J. McDermott, Ignas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2002), xxv-liii.

“Levinas and Judaism.” The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 33-62. Revised version as “Levinas on What Is Demanded of Us” in Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life: Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas, Wittgenstein (2008), 68-99.

“McDowell’s Mind and McDowell’s World.” Reading McDowell on Mind and World, ed. Nicholas H. Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 174-190.

“Nachwort” to Stanley Cavell, Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen und andere philosophische Essays, ed. Davide Sparti and Espen Hammer (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2002), 265-279.

“Pragmatism and Nonscientific Knowledge.” Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism, ed. Urszula M. Zeglen and James Conant (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 14-24.

“Quine.” Common Knowledge 8.2 (April 2002): 273-279.

“Travis on Meaning, Thought and the Ways the World Is.” Review of Charles Travis, Unshadowed Thought. Philosophical Quarterly 52.2 (January 2002): 96-106.

“Wittgenstein, le réalisme et les mathematiques.” Wittgenstein, dernières pensées, ed. Jacques Bouveresse, Sandra Laugier and Jean-Jacques Rosat (Marseilles, France: Agone, 2002), 289-313.



2003

“For Ethics and Economics without the Dichotomies.” Review of Political Economy 15.3 (July 2003): 395-412.

“Out of Our Heads.” What Philosophers Think, ed. Julian Baggini (London: Continuum Press, 2003), 226-236.

“Plädoyer für die Verabschiedung des Begriffs 'Idolatrie'.” Religion nach der Religionskritik, ed. by Ludwig Nagl (Vienna: Oldenbourg Verlag; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003), 49-59.



2004

“The Content and Appeal of ‘Naturalism’.” Naturalism in Question, ed. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 59-70.

Ethics Without Ontology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004.

CONTENTS
Acknowledgments, vii-ix
Introduction, 1-11
Part I. Ethics without Ontology
Lecture 1. Ethics without Metaphysics, 15-32
Lecture 2. A Defense of Conceptual Relativity, 33-51
Lecture 3. Objectivity without Objects, 52-70
Lecture 4. “Ontology”: An Obituary, 71-85
Part II. Enlightenment and Pragmatism
Lecture 1. The Three Enlightenments, 89-108
Lecture 2. Skepticism about Enlightenment, 109-129

“The Pluralism of David Hartman.” Judaism and Modernity, ed. Jonathan Malino (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 237-248.

“Sosa on Internal Realism and Conceptual Relativity.” Ernest Sosa and His Critics, ed. John Greco (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2004), 233-248.

“What Is Pragmatism?” With Richard Rorty and James Conant. Think: Philosophy for Everyone 8 (Autumn 2004): 71-88.

“The Uniqueness of Pragmatism.” Think: Philosophy for Everyone 8 (Autumn 2004): 89-106.



2005

“A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again).” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56.4 (December 2005): 615-634.

“The Depths and Shallows of Experience.” In Science, Religion, and the Human Experience, ed. James D. Proctor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 71-86.
“James on Truth (Again).” William James and the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Centenary Celebration, ed. Jeremy R. Carrette (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 172-182.

“Jewish Ethics?” A Companion to Religious Ethics, ed. William Schweiker (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 159-165.



2006

“After Gödel.” Logic Journal of the IGPL 14.5 (October 2006): 745-759.

“A Philosophical Puzzle: Who was this guy Spinoza anyway?” Review of Betraying Spinoza: The Renegade Jew Who Gave Us Modernity by Rebecca Goldstein. The New York Observer (18 December 2006): 25.

“Bays, Steiner, and Wittgenstein's 'Notorious' Paragraph About the Gödel Theorem.” With Juliet Floyd. Journal of Philosophy 103.2 (February 2006): 101-110.

“The Epistemology of Unjust War.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 supplement 58 (May 2006): 173-188.

“Intelligence and Ethics.” A Companion to Pragmatism, ed. John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 267-277.

“Monotheism and Humanism.” Humanity before God, ed. William Schweiker, Michael A. Johnson, and Kevin Jung (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 19-30.

“Philosophy as the Education of Grownups: Stanley Cavell and Skepticism.” Reading Cavell, ed. Alice Crary and Sanford Shieh (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 117-128.

“Replies to Commentators.” Contemporary Pragmatism 3.2 (December 2006): 67-98.

“Science and (Some) Philosophers.” Ontology Studies: Cuadernos de Ontología 6 (2006): 5-6, 11-19.

2007

“Between Scylla and Charybdis: Does Dummett Have a Way Through?” The Philosophy of Michael Dummett, ed. Randall E. Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 2007), 155-167.

“Facts, Theories, Values and Destitution in the Works of Sir Partha Dasgupta.” With Vivian C. Walsh. Review of Political Economy 19.2 (2007): 181-202.

“Metaphysical/Everyday Use: A Note on a Late Paper by Gordon Baker.” In Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 169-173.

“Response to Dasgupta.” With Vivian C. Walsh. Economics and Philosophy 23.3 (November 2007): 359-364.

“Science and (Some) Philosophers.” Ontology Studies: Cuadernos de Ontología 7 (2007): 12-26.
“What James' Pragmatism Offers Us (A Reading of the First Chapter of Pragmatism).” Scopus: Casopis za filozofiju stendenata Hravarkih studija (Zagreb, Croatia) 11.24 (2007): 7-12.

“Wittgenstein and the Real Numbers.” Wittgenstein and the Moral Life, ed. Alice Crary (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 235-250.

2008

“12 Philosophers - and Their Influence on Me.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 82.2 (November 2008): 101-115.

“A Note on Steiner on Wittgenstein, Gödel and Tarski.” Iyyun 57 (January 2008): 83-93.

“Capabilities and Two Ethical Theories.” Journal of Human Development 9.3 (November 2008): 377-388.

Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life: Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas, Wittgenstein. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.

“Wittgenstein and Realism.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16.1 (February 2008): 1-14.

http://www.pragmatism.org/putnam/

 

[Toontown]

On a related note; the causality paradox. Every effect seems to have a cause, which in turn has another cause. However, it seems that either we must arrive at an uncaused cause, or an infinite regression of causes stretching backward through time. Which is more likely? Discuss.

Easy question, easy answer. But off topic.

Oh well...that's never stopped anyone before...

Causality is essentially a sequence of events. An infinite regression implies an infinite sequence of (previous) events. If infinite regression, then the current event could never be reached, since infinity can never be spanned. However, the current event has been reached.

Ergo, uncaused cause (everything that has an end, must have a beginning). Likely an acausal quantum fluctuation in a timeless false vacuum. Maybe a whole bunch of them. With the caveat that causality only applies to what happens inside a spacetime bubble.

 

[Belz...]

No, because you seem to be feigning incomprehension to avoid recognizing an obvious point.

I don't give a hoot what you think I seem to be doing. Perhaps you think that you're so clever that you communicate oh so clearly, but if somehow I don't get what you're saying, it doesn't follow that I'm doing it on purpose: maybe you're simply not half as good a communicator as you think you are.

"Square root", in my mind atleast, is experienced as a procedural instruction to manipulate perceived senses of magnitude in a prescribed way.

See. Another case of me not understanding you.

Because the very concepts we abstract in our minds are qualia. Mathematics, like language, is a method of organizing qualia into symbolic systems -- in this case, with the goal of manipulating senses of magnitude/quantity in a logically consistent way.

No, that's circular reasoning. I'm asking you how qualia account for abstract thought, given that abstract thoughts have nothing to do with everyday sensations qualia proponents like to name ("cold", for instance). You don't get to simply say "well, that's just qualia at work !"

The fact that you're trying to equate the term "qualia" with the concept of god demonstrates that you either A) genuinely don't understand what you're arguing against or B) that you're being deliberately obtuse.

Wait, wait. You mean to tell me that you didn't understand the point of my analogy ? Really ? My point was, quite simply, that you can't arbitrarily replace "qualia" with any other known entity and equate the two sentences. It's amazing you missed that, since I'm usually the only one who doesn't get it.

Being as how you seem fairly intelligent I'm leaning more toward the latter conclusion.

Of course you do. You always do, so it's basically your M.O.: assume that any disagreement stems from dishonesty the way conspiracy theorists do.

 

[rocketdodger]

Don't you think you ought to read and digest the entire article before commenting upon it?

Do I need to read and digest the entire Bible before being able to comment upon it?

Question begging is avoided by acknowledging that the conscious being correctly deducing he is not a brain in a vat/simulation possesses awareness of context such as basic semantics.

What about the conscious being that incorrectly deduces the same thing, who possesses awareness of context such as basic semantics ?

I believe I avoided what you refer to as question begging with the wording in my first post about all this:

I could be wrong. Show me the question begging RD.

How can you deduce that if your word for orange means something, it means orange oranges?

This is my point -- philosophy doesn't consider what goes into language. Where language comes from.

What does the statement "if my word for orange means something, it means orange oranges?" even reduce to? Can you answer that? Can you formulate it in simpler terms?

Do you believe your inability to understand a particular thought experiment of Hilary Putnam's invalidates his bibliography?

What is this, argument from authority day? Are you going to start championing the "bibliography" of Roger Penrose next? Because yeah he sure knows what he is talking about when it comes to this issue, eh?

I believe that my inability to understand this particular philosophical argument -- I understand the "thought experiement" just fine, thank you, it is rather trivial -- illustrates that so much philosophy is garbage. Trying to understand the world using philosophy is like trying to understand a computer using a Windows for Dummies book. I'm sorry, but a computer doesn't really have little file folders piled up inside it and a paperclip who talks to you when you need help. Where do you think the paperclip goes when you turn off the computer? Have you ever opened up your computer to look for that talking paperclip?

 

[punshhh]

Hi, this is my first day in the forum

It appears you guys have described consciousness very well.

Would you consider its purpose, or would you regard it as a function of consciousness?

Could there have been an evolutionary purpose for consciousness?

How would this correlate with an 'intelligent creator's' purpose of consciousness?

punshhh

 

[Dymanic]

No, because you seem to be feigning incomprehension to avoid recognizing an obvious point.

"For some the spell lasted only while the voice spoke to them, and when it spoke to another they smiled, as men do who see through a juggler's trick while others gape at it."

My advice: don't waste any more of your time.

 

[Clive]

Programming is a little misleading because there is all sorts of stuff that is done by the runtime environment, but whatever.


class A {
A someReference;

void think () {
if( &someReference == this ) {
do something <this stuff in here is self referential behavior>
} else {
do something else
}

}

LOL. You are still being serious aren't you?

Okay, so I've taken your template (if I can call it that) and filled in the missing bits to get something I can compile and run. What fun! I assumed you were thinking in terms of C++ but I'm not a mind reader. So here's what I ended up with:

// srip.cpp

// Self-Referential Information Processing (based on rocketdodger's code), 
// and therefore (according to rocketdodger) this will be conscious 
// when compiled and executed. in other words, a working implemention
// of SRIP.

class A {
   A &someReference;
   bool iMayBe;

public:
   A(): someReference(*this) {}
 
   void think () 
   {
      if( &someReference == this ) 
         iMayBe = true;  // this is apparently self referential behavior
      else 
         iMayBe = false; // while this is not
   }
};

int main()
{
   A i;
   i.think();
   return 0;
}

Please check and let me know if you think I've "removed the SRIP" or anything nefarious like that in my attempt to create a working implementation of SRIP (based on your template above) and of the form needed for consciousness. What is shown compiles and executes without any obvious problems although I haven't done a lot of testing.

PS: How did you get on with learning about BF and quines and such? Do you think a BF quine is conscious when it's running?

 

[Frank Newgent]

Don't you think you ought to read and digest the entire article before commenting upon it?

Do I need to read and digest the entire Bible before being able to comment upon it?

If you want to go carry on with somebody about what is specifically written in the Bible that would probably be an excellent idea.

I don't care about the Bible personally.

Question begging is avoided by acknowledging that the conscious being correctly deducing he is not a brain in a vat/simulation possesses awareness of context such as basic semantics.

What about the conscious being that incorrectly deduces the same thing, who possesses awareness of context such as basic semantics ?

Such an entity does not exist in this deduction as it serves no purpose.

Good question, though, as it raises the problem of whether we can know anything that lacks external relationship, that isn't a thing.

In a non-simulated/external world thoughts are about things. In a simulated/vat world thoughts can't be about external things.

You can invalidate Putnam's deduction by claiming there is no connection whatsoever between the real/external world and the simulated/vat world (that you were in?). Words wouldn't represent anything in the simulated/vat world and there'd be no foothold to carry out the deduction Putnam proposes.

But your simulation argument wouldn't mean anything then either.

The one argument I can see for your idea that one could be in a simulation and not have a way of knowing that would be if I were a recently disembodied brain in a vat, with all my prior experiences of the world having remained intact.

That doesn't seem likely to me.

I believe I avoided what you refer to as question begging with the wording in my first post about all this:

I could be wrong. Show me the question begging RD.

How can you deduce that if your word for orange means something, it means orange oranges?

Through experiencing a relationship with the world where an "orange" is orange. Orange "oranges" are the "oranges" in the non-simulated/external world. As opposed to the reduced "oranges" in the simulated/vat world.

This is my point -- philosophy doesn't consider what goes into language. Where language comes from.

What does the statement "if my word for orange means something, it means orange oranges?" even reduce to? Can you answer that? Can you formulate it in simpler terms?

Why on earth formulate it in simpler terms when what you are out to achieve is a sort of detective work, namely "am I in a simulation?"

You would want to progressively dig into deeper levels of detail to solve such a puzzle, not the other way around.

Do you believe your inability to understand a particular thought experiment of Hilary Putnam's invalidates his bibliography?

What is this, argument from authority day? Are you going to start championing the "bibliography" of Roger Penrose next? Because yeah he sure knows what he is talking about when it comes to this issue, eh?

I believe that my inability to understand this particular philosophical argument -- I understand the "thought experiement" just fine, thank you, it is rather trivial -- illustrates that so much philosophy is garbage. Trying to understand the world using philosophy is like trying to understand a computer using a Windows for Dummies book. I'm sorry, but a computer doesn't really have little file folders piled up inside it and a paperclip who talks to you when you need help. Where do you think the paperclip goes when you turn off the computer? Have you ever opened up your computer to look for that talking paperclip?

No, rocketdodger, I haven't. I'm not the one claiming that talking paperclip is conscious

 

[rocketdodger]

LOL. You are still being serious aren't you?

Okay, so I've taken your template (if I can call it that) and filled in the missing bits to get something I can compile and run. What fun! I assumed you were thinking in terms of C++ but I'm not a mind reader. So here's what I ended up with:

// srip.cpp

// Self-Referential Information Processing (based on rocketdodger's code), 
// and therefore (according to rocketdodger) this will be conscious 
// when compiled and executed. in other words, a working implemention
// of SRIP.

class A {
   A &someReference;
   bool iMayBe;

public:
   A(): someReference(*this) {}
 
   void think () 
   {
      if( &someReference == this ) 
         iMayBe = true;  // this is apparently self referential behavior
      else 
         iMayBe = false; // while this is not
   }
};

int main()
{
   A i;
   i.think();
   return 0;
}

Please check and let me know if you think I've "removed the SRIP" or anything nefarious like that in my attempt to create a working implementation of SRIP (based on your template above) and of the form needed for consciousness. What is shown compiles and executes without any obvious problems although I haven't done a lot of testing.

That looks fine

PS: How did you get on with learning about BF and quines and such? Do you think a BF quine is conscious when it's running?

I'm not really interested in BF. But I will say that in my opinion a quine is not necessarily SRIP in any form because SRIP needs something like the if-else above. There has to be a difference between the behaviors when self is referenced vs. when not-self is referenced, and as far as I know such behavior is not included in a quine.

 

[rocketdodger]

You can invalidate Putnam's deduction by claiming there is no connection whatsoever between the real/external world and the simulated/vat world (that you were in?). Words wouldn't represent anything in the simulated/vat world and there'd be no foothold to carry out the deduction Putnam proposes.

But your simulation argument wouldn't mean anything then either.

Frank this has been my position from the very beginning. I am sorry you misunderstood.

The simulation argument is a non-starter, kind of like idealism vs. materialism. Since we can't conclude one way or the other it has no impact on anything at all.

In the context of this discussion, my point was that if the vat world was of a certain complexity, with say N calculations being done, is it necessarily the case that reducing it to a slightly lower complexity, with say N -1 calculations being done, would disrupt the consciousness of any brains in the vat?

I argue that no, it would not. If I am a brain in a vat, the vat-computer only needs to feed me information that impacts my senses in a way I can perceive. Like a 3D renderer, it could skip calculating what the back side of mountains looks like, it could skip calculating what most of the population of China is doing, it could even skip calculating things behind me when I turn around, that I am not "facing" in the vat world. Solipsism need not simultaneously encompass the entire universe to be complete from the perspective of the mind in question.

That is the only reason I even brought it up in the first place, because you were asking about how much needed to be computed.

 

[Frank Newgent]

You can invalidate Putnam's deduction by claiming there is no connection whatsoever between the real/external world and the simulated/vat world (that you were in?). Words wouldn't represent anything in the simulated/vat world and there'd be no foothold to carry out the deduction Putnam proposes.

But your simulation argument wouldn't mean anything then either.

Frank this has been my position from the very beginning. I am sorry you misunderstood.

The simulation argument is a non-starter, kind of like idealism vs. materialism. Since we can't conclude one way or the other it has no impact on anything at all.

In the context of this discussion, my point was that if the vat world was of a certain complexity, with say N calculations being done, is it necessarily the case that reducing it to a slightly lower complexity, with say N -1 calculations being done, would disrupt the consciousness of any brains in the vat?

I argue that no, it would not. If I am a brain in a vat, the vat-computer only needs to feed me information that impacts my senses in a way I can perceive. Like a 3D renderer, it could skip calculating what the back side of mountains looks like, it could skip calculating what most of the population of China is doing, it could even skip calculating things behind me when I turn around, that I am not "facing" in the vat world. Solipsism need not simultaneously encompass the entire universe to be complete from the perspective of the mind in question.

That is the only reason I even brought it up in the first place, because you were asking about how much needed to be computed.

I didn't know you considered simulated consciousness to be indistinguishable from solipsism (sounds like that's what you're suggesting now).

Actually I don't understand how you'd consider existence in such flat dimensionality conscious as, for example, your simulation/brain in a vat argument would be incapable of existing in the simulation.

I was under the impression you believed there is no way we can determine whether right here in this very moment we exist in a simulation/vat. Or not.

 

[dlorde]

Please check and let me know if you think I've "removed the SRIP" or anything nefarious like that in my attempt to create a working implementation of SRIP (based on your template above) and of the form needed for consciousness.

That's the self-referencing part - an object function referencing the in-memory object representation. SRIP is Self-Referential Information Processing - a process that can use information about its own functioning as input; permitting elements of feedback and of recursion.

 

[rocketdodger]

I didn't know you considered simulated consciousness to be indistinguishable from solipsism (sounds like that's what you're suggesting now).

Yes. But then so is reality as we know it, so it is another moot point.

Actually I don't understand how you'd consider existence in such flat dimensionality conscious as, for example, your simulation/brain in a vat argument would be incapable of existing in the simulation.

Naw, it could exist. For example if we are in a simulation there is nothing invalidating any of our arguments regarding being in a simulation. Logic is still logic, regardless of the frame.

I was under the impression you believed there is no way we can determine whether right here in this very moment we exist in a simulation/vat. Or not.

Yes, that is correct. We can't determine such a thing.

And by "determine" I mean in an objective, mathematically valid, well defined, way. I don't mean some very fuzzy philosophical argument that can't even be reduced to clear language. If the likes of you and Putnam actually think playing with word salad proves something, then I guess that's OK, but you should realize that it is the kind of "proof" that only makes sense to the prover. That kind of ... logic, if it could be called such a thing ... is pretty useless. But then again, isn't that one of the main criticisms of philosophy?

 

[rocketdodger]

That's the self-referencing part - an object function referencing the in-memory object representation. SRIP is Self-Referential Information Processing - a process that can use information about its own functioning as input; permitting elements of feedback and of recursion.

Can't the assignment of the boolean be considered "information processing?"

I don't see a qualitative distinction between that and anything of greater complexity.

 

[Frank Newgent]

I didn't know you considered simulated consciousness to be indistinguishable from solipsism (sounds like that's what you're suggesting now).

Yes. But then so is reality as we know it, so it is another moot point.

You find reality indistinguishable from solipsism?

Actually I don't understand how you'd consider existence in such flat dimensionality conscious as, for example, your simulation/brain in a vat argument would be incapable of existing in the simulation.

Naw, it could exist. For example if we are in a simulation there is nothing invalidating any of our arguments regarding being in a simulation. Logic is still logic, regardless of the frame.

Impossible to (meaningfully) debate the possibility that we are in a simulation with no connection whatsoever to the external world because if we were in a simulation with no connection whatsoever to the external world the words we are using wouldn't mean anything.

I was under the impression you believed there is no way we can determine whether right here in this very moment we exist in a simulation/vat. Or not.

Yes, that is correct. We can't determine such a thing.

And by "determine" I mean in an objective, mathematically valid, well defined, way. I don't mean some very fuzzy philosophical argument that can't even be reduced to clear language. If the likes of you and Putnam actually think playing with word salad proves something, then I guess that's OK, but you should realize that it is the kind of "proof" that only makes sense to the prover. That kind of ... logic, if it could be called such a thing ... is pretty useless. But then again, isn't that one of the main criticisms of philosophy?

Putnam's deduction assumes an existing relationship between the simulated/vat world and the real external world. You indicated in your last post that from the beginning this had not been your position

You can invalidate Putnam's deduction by claiming there is no connection whatsoever between the real/external world and the simulated/vat world (that you were in?). Words wouldn't represent anything in the simulated/vat world and there'd be no foothold to carry out the deduction Putnam proposes.

But your simulation argument wouldn't mean anything then either.

Frank this has been my position from the very beginning. I am sorry you misunderstood.

I don't know why you are still arguing against that which you have acknowledged isn't even concerned with your position (Putnam's deduction).

 

[dlorde]

Hi, this is my first day in the forum

Welcome.

Would you consider its purpose, or would you regard it as a function of consciousness?

Eh? Can't make sense of that.

Could there have been an evolutionary purpose for consciousness?

No. Evolution is not purposeful. However consciousness very probably is (or was) a selective advantage. See Natural Selection.

How would this correlate with an 'intelligent creator's' purpose of consciousness?

It wouldn't.

 

[dlorde]

Can't the assignment of the boolean be considered "information processing?"

Well, I guess in a strict sense...

I don't see a qualitative distinction between that and anything of greater complexity.

But where in the 'assignment of the boolean' process does it self-refer?

There is information processing - an assignment. You also have a function that references its object. Putting those two in proximity doesn't make SRIP. The assignment process isn't self-referencing. As I said, to me SRIP means a process that can use information about its own functioning as input; permitting elements of feedback and of recursion. A boolean assignment doesn't do that.

YMMV.

 

[AkuManiMani]

No, because you seem to be feigning incomprehension to avoid recognizing an obvious point.

I don't give a hoot what you think I seem to be doing. Perhaps you think that you're so clever that you communicate oh so clearly, but if somehow I don't get what you're saying, it doesn't follow that I'm doing it on purpose: maybe you're simply not half as good a communicator as you think you are.

The concept we're discussing doesn't require eloquence to convey nor a high intellect to comprehend. Qualia is a term for the elements of experience. I find it hard to believe that you genuinely cannot understand that.

"Square root", in my mind atleast, is experienced as a procedural instruction to manipulate perceived senses of magnitude in a prescribed way.

See. Another case of me not understanding you.

Because the very concepts we abstract in our minds are qualia. Mathematics, like language, is a method of organizing qualia into symbolic systems -- in this case, with the goal of manipulating senses of magnitude/quantity in a logically consistent way.

No, that's circular reasoning. I'm asking you how qualia account for abstract thought, given that abstract thoughts have nothing to do with everyday sensations qualia proponents like to name ("cold", for instance). You don't get to simply say "well, that's just qualia at work !"

Think of it this way: qualia are the raw components of experience, while abstract thought is, generally speaking, the manner in which we cognitively organize our experiences.

The fact that you're trying to equate the term "qualia" with the concept of god demonstrates that you either A) genuinely don't understand what you're arguing against or B) that you're being deliberately obtuse.

Wait, wait. You mean to tell me that you didn't understand the point of my analogy ? Really ? My point was, quite simply, that you can't arbitrarily replace "qualia" with any other known entity and equate the two sentences. It's amazing you missed that, since I'm usually the only one who doesn't get it.

It wasn't arbitrary. "Numbers" is a term we use to refer to units of quantity; "Qualia" is a term we use to refer to gradations of experience. The point of the parallel was to convey that "qualia" is not a postulation but a label for something we know to exist.

Being as how you seem fairly intelligent I'm leaning more toward the latter conclusion.

Of course you do. You always do, so it's basically your M.O.: assume that any disagreement stems from dishonesty the way conspiracy theorists do.

So I should just assume that you're irrational enough to attempt to argue against a point you don't even understand?

 

[Belz...]

The concept we're discussing doesn't require eloquence to convey nor a high intellect to comprehend. Qualia is a term for the elements of experience. I find it hard to believe that you genuinely cannot understand that.

Who said I cannot ? I was (and still am) simply curious about how you think all those experiences are built. Saying "qualia is an element of experience, like 'cold' or 'green'" sounds really nice in a philosophical text, but my question about "square root" reveals a slight flaw in that explanation, I think: how do you decompose "square root" into its constituents, and what are they ?

This basically comes down to saying: What, exactly, are qualia ? I'm not asking for a definition. That's easy. See: "Dragons are fire-breathing reptiles". I'm asking you a) how they work, and b) how do we test for them. Because if you can't answer either a or b, then I submit you don't know whether or not they exist at all, as opposed to what you claim.

Think of it this way: qualia are the raw components of experience, while abstract thought is, generally speaking, the manner in which we cognitively organize our experiences.

Is abstract thought composed of qualia, too ?

If so, don't you see that "qualia", assuming they exist, has the same problem as "SRIP" ? Specifically, it's a thing that refers to itself. So if you have a problem with SRIP, why posit qualia, then ?

It wasn't arbitrary. "Numbers" is a term we use to refer to units of quantity; "Qualia" is a term we use to refer to gradations of experience. The point of the parallel was to convey that "qualia" is not a postulation but a label for something we know to exist.

"Numbers" don't exist, Aku. That's a poor choice of words.

So I should just assume that you're irrational enough to attempt to argue against a point you don't even understand?

You should assume that I'm arguing against the points I do understand, and asking you to help me understand the points I don't. But you're conflating the two. No wonder you're .