Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Belz...]

My experiences can be broken down into combinations of elementary subjective qualities such as "blue", "cold", "sweet", "bright", "rough", etc.

No, they can't. Each memory is a composite of all of the "qualities" that were part of the original event. You can't divide them into "components". That's one of the reasons why memory is associative. It's not a big database where you can search for "cold".

Its those basic subjective qualities brought together into an experience at any given time that we're referring to as "qualia".

What about "square root" ? Is that a qualia, too ? Sure, it's easy to call qualia those things you can easily see, but what about abstract concepts ?

"Qualia" isn't a postulated hypothetical but a categorical label of for an indisputable given: We experience and our experiences can be reduced to combinations of subjective qualities. Period. Its that simple.

Your say-so doesn't make it true.

 

[westprog]

If you define qualia as experiences, then you're not talking about the same qualia as Aku or others. And since it's a synonym, there's no reason to have two words.

The whole point is to make stuff up then, it seems.



What rocketdodger is doing is illustrating that the concept of qualia represents just another turtle -- one that isn't necessary.

The entire argument is unnecessary. The concept of subjective experience is what is being examined. The detail of how experiences are broken up is really not that important - it's just a way of avoiding the main confrontation.

We don't know how subjective experience is broken up. We don't know how it works. We can't take this lack of knowledge and turn it into assertions.

 

[westprog]

What about "square root" ? Is that a qualia, too ? Sure, it's easy to call qualia those things you can easily see, but what about abstract concepts ?

Anything you experience is part of your subjective experience. That goes for mathematics as much as anything else.

What a "square root" is, aside from it's existence as a subjective experience, is a separate issue.

 

[Belz...]

The entire argument is unnecessary. The concept of subjective experience is what is being examined. The detail of how experiences are broken up is really not that important - it's just a way of avoiding the main confrontation.

We don't know how subjective experience is broken up. We don't know how it works. We can't take this lack of knowledge and turn it into assertions.

Then you agree that the very concept of qualia amounts to avoiding the actual issues with consciousness ?

Anything you experience is part of your subjective experience. That goes for mathematics as much as anything else.

What a "square root" is, aside from it's existence as a subjective experience, is a separate issue.

That's my question. What's a qualia for "square root" ?

 

[westprog]

Then you agree

Shall we take it that whenever you write "then you agree" that I actually don't?

that the very concept of qualia amounts to avoiding the actual issues with consciousness ?

The idea behind naming the components of subjective experience was to avoid debates about nomenclature. Sadly, the use of the term is used as an excuse to get into a debate about nomenclature. It's apparent that the actual fact of subjective experience is a bit too scary to meet head on.

That's my question. What's a qualia for "square root" ?

Think about square roots. There you go - experienced. Anybody has access to subjective experience - though this particular experience does require some basic mathematical knowledge.

How one person's experience differs from another person's experience of thinking about square roots is not known, of course. It's likely that even the same person has a slightly different experience each time.

 

[cienaños]

The ability to post on this thread demands consciousness. What in the world is all the confusion about?

As Jaynes points out, there exists gradations in awareness (ie.consciousness). Some non-human mammals possess behaviors (semi-advanced language and tools) that hint towards consciousness, but are not fully conscious (yet). Why is this is not enough for you people?

To simplify, it is the combination of language, tools, and most importantly, the ability to REFLECT using language and tools that define full-blown consciousness.

Seriously, what about this is so difficult to grasp?

 

[!Kaggen]

The ability to post on this thread demands consciousness. What in the world is all the confusion about?

As Jaynes points out, there exists gradations in awareness (ie.consciousness). Some non-human mammals possess behaviors (semi-advanced language and tools) that hint towards consciousness, but are not fully conscious (yet). Why is this is not enough for you people?

To simplify, it is the combination of language, tools, and most importantly, the ability to REFLECT using language and tools that define full-blown consciousness.

Seriously, what about this is so difficult to grasp?

Well because there are those that wish to include the behavior of certain types of toasters and washing machines into the definition of consciousness and those like yourself that think consciousness starts a little further up the scale of complexity.

 

[rocketdodger]

Maybe not.

What I've bolded, that "all of its input must be converted from the real world into digital signals" seems to violate what you said earlier, namely that "you can't find any arrangement of information that can simultaneously reference all of itself."

Keeping that in mind, what if there were something else existing in the real external world in addition to that input - input which cannot simultaneously reference all of itself - say that is that oranges are not just a round citrus (as per the input) but that they are also the color orange.

And that in our complicated real external world our conscious being can know that "oranges" are either features in a simulation or that "oranges" are not features in a simulation.

So our conscious being can (correctly) deduce: if I am in a simulation then it's not true that if my word "orange" does mean something, then it means orange oranges.

If my word "orange" does mean something , then it means orange oranges.

Therefore I am not in a simulation.

Two can play this RD

Frank, I don't want to offend you, but do you have any formal education at all in subjects like mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, computing, etc ... anything a university would put in its "school of science?"

 

[Frank Newgent]

Is that the best you can do RD?

 

[dlorde]

If SRIP IS consciousness, then we're never unconscious because, as you say, our brains are constantly performing SRIP. Pixy has admitted this before. I think it's absurd.

You may have missed the part where I suggested that it's the implementation of SRIP that is relevant, and consciousness as we experience it is a very complex and sophisticated implementation, possibly an amalgamation of simpler forms.

There's the rub. None of us have a problem with SRIP being a necessary condition for consciousness. Pixy goes much further: SRIP is both necessary AND SUFFICIENT for consciousness; SRIP and consciousness are logically equivalent the same way bachelors are unmarried men.

I already gave my interpretation of a minimal SRIP implementation as a minimal level of consciousness:
"...a minimal implementation of SRIP (e.g. in a simple computer program), ... doesn't seem capable of anything like consciousness as we experience it; and of course, it isn't ... The minimal implementation of SRIP doesn't and can't do anything 'useful' - it's minimal 'consciousness' seems pointless - more potential than actual."

I take you to mean there are additional structures/functions than SRIP required for consciousness.

SRIP is not a structure or a function per se, it is a description of a particular form of information processing. It can be implemented in a variety of ways and levels of complexity/sophistication. My opinion is that for human-level/type consciousness, the kind of architecture found in the brain is probably necessary. It's hard to say exactly which parts are essential, but we know that not all are.

How do you "reduce" consciousness? Would removal of the visual cortex result in "lesser" consciousness?

You can reduce consciousness by simplifying and/or reducing in size, or removing some of the structures involved (e.g. simplify & reduce the size the neocortex to match a bonobo and you'll have a bonobo's level of consciousness - roughly). If you remove the visual cortex you are then no longer conscious of visual input. If you consider visual perception and its influences to be part of consciousness, you may consider that to be a reduction in consciousness. YMMV.

Pixy would disagree with the word "based". Cosnciousness IS SRIP. "Based on" implies SRIP is merely a necessary condition.

As I said, I can't speak for Pixy, I just gave my interpretation.

We don't dismiss consciousness is a FORM of SRIP. We dismiss consciousness IS SRIP. The absurdidies of the latter are pathetically easy to generate (e.g., unconsciously conscious anesthetized patients).

We?

I already gave my interpretation of a minimal SRIP implementation as a minimal level of consciousness. Possibly you may be confusing the usage of consciousness in a general sense, in which it can have have a broad spectrum of levels, with specifically human-level consciousness, and perhaps this may be causing you some difficulty. Without qualifying the word every time we use it, some misunderstanding is inevitable.

 

[dlorde]

Well because there are those that wish to include the behavior of certain types of toasters and washing machines into the definition of consciousness and those like yourself that think consciousness starts a little further up the scale of complexity.

Quite, and we might actually make a little progress if we could agree on the criteria for where the line should be drawn.

 

[Belz...]

The idea behind naming the components of subjective experience was to avoid debates about nomenclature. Sadly, the use of the term is used as an excuse to get into a debate about nomenclature. It's apparent that the actual fact of subjective experience is a bit too scary to meet head on.

Speaking of avoiding the subject matter, do you think you could cease trying to determine why people do what they do, and instead answer my question: You said "The detail of how experiences are broken up is really not that important". If that's true, and qualia are about breaking up experiences into quanta, then why are they brought up in every consciousness thread ? You said that people keep trying to avoid the difficult aspects of the discussion; so I can only conclude from all this that you think that people who bring up qualia are the ones doing the avoiding. Perhaps instead of making another driveby remark you could answer that, no ?

Think about square roots. There you go - experienced.

But "square root" has no basis in anything seen, touched, smelled, etc. So how are they quant...qua...quantacised ?

How one person's experience differs from another person's experience of thinking about square roots is not known, of course.

Somehow this brings up another question: how about experiences are just bunches of neurons firing ? Why is that so problematic ? And don't tell me that it doesn't explain experiences because, as you said yourself, I've just defined experiences as bunches of neurons firing, so "It's a definition, not a claim. As such, it hardly needs much in the way of justification. ".

 

[Belz...]

Frank, I don't want to offend you, but do you have any formal education at all in subjects like mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, computing, etc ... anything a university would put in its "school of science?"

Is that the best you can do RD?

Offense taken, apparently. Even when Rocketdodger asks the question in the nicest way possible, given the circumstances, the mere fact that it's been asked at all is used as a reason to not answer it.

 

[Belz...]

Possibly you may be confusing the usage of consciousness in a general sense, in which it can have have a broad spectrum of levels, with specifically human-level consciousness, and perhaps this may be causing you some difficulty.

This seems to be something we see a lot of in consciousness threads. Moving the goalposts from "consciousness in general" to "human consciousness" and back.

 

[dlorde]

Offense taken, apparently. Even when Rocketdodger asks the question in the nicest way possible, given the circumstances, the mere fact that it's been asked at all is used as a reason to not answer it.

If I was Frank, I'd have expected some explanation/reason for what RD clearly feels may be a sensitive question.

 

[!Kaggen]

Quite, and we might actually make a little progress if we could agree on the criteria for where the line should be drawn.

Will I will start by drawing the line at language . More specifically abstract representations. In humans that would be the first time we recognize the abstract representation essential to all others. That would be when we say "I" for the first time. Approximately the age when we have mastered basic language and we start thinking. By thinking I mean verbal cognition.

How's that?

 

[dlorde]

This seems to be something we see a lot of in consciousness threads. Moving the goalposts from "consciousness in general" to "human consciousness" and back.

Yes; one or other usage may be appropriate depending on the context, and usually the context and a little common-sense is enough to tell. I think some contributors deliberately misconstrue the usage for point-scoring and to make straw-man arguments.

 

[Guybrush Threepwood]

Will I will start by drawing the line at language . More specifically abstract representations. In humans that would be the first time we recognize the abstract representation essential to all others. That would be when we say "I" for the first time. Approximately the age when we have mastered basic language and we start thinking. By thinking I mean verbal cognition.

How's that?

Now I'm confused. What do you think changes in a child between the 'goo-goo' stage and the 'I go potty' stage to change it from unconscious to conscious?

And do you mean that all non-verbal humans are unconscious?

 

[westprog]

Yes; one or other usage may be appropriate depending on the context, and usually the context and a little common-sense is enough to tell. I think some contributors deliberately misconstrue the usage for point-scoring and to make straw-man arguments.

It really doesn't make any difference, in principle. Whether or not animals are conscious - and if they are, which animals - doesn't change anything essential about the discussion. Clearly the mechanics of possible animal consciousness would be similar to that of human consciousness anyway.

"What about animals - are they conscious?" is usually a way to create a diversion.

 

[Frank Newgent]

If I was Frank, I'd have expected some explanation/reason for what RD clearly feels may be a sensitive question.

What do you mean?