Has consciousness been fully explained?

[dlorde]

'What is it about particular neural processes that causes some sensory input to be felt as a particular sensation or experience?

I thought I covered this - it's the pattern of activation of the neurons - the particular neural circuits that 'light up'. Different patterns of activation correspond to different sensations or experiences.

What physical property differentiates the quality of these experiences?

The pattern of neural activation is different.

How is this process expressed thru the biochemistry of neurons?

Neurons 'fire' via action potentials.

What part of the system actually has the experience(s) and what are the relevant physical properties of this portion of the system that causes it to be subjectively sensible?'

The many parts of the brain may be involved in the experience (it depends), but it will be primarily the cerebral cortex that 'has' the experience. Physically the cortex is a whitish, deeply folded surface layer of the brain, with the consistency of blancmange, consisting of multiple layers of multiply-connected neurons connected between layers in 'columns'. The physical properties that cause it to be 'subjectively sensible' (have experience?) are the combination of the ways these neurons interconnect locally, and the connective architecture of the cortex as a whole. We don't know the details, but we do know that disrupting the connections in certain areas will result in specific distortions of experience and consciousness.

Why bother trying to gain a deeper grasp of something if you think your understanding is sufficient? How can one work towards addressing a problem if they cannot -- or will not -- even acknowledge to themselves that there is one to begin with?

I don't know - what do you think?

Personally, I don't think we have sufficient understanding of how the organisation of the brain gives rise to the components of consciousness, awareness and perception, and I do think it's worth bothering to gain a deeper grasp of it - and there are projects working towards that goal as we speak.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I thought I covered this - it's the pattern of activation of the neurons - the particular neural circuits that 'light up'. Different patterns of activation correspond to different sensations or experiences.

[...]

The pattern of neural activation is different.

[...]

Neurons 'fire' via action potentials.

[...]

The many parts of the brain may be involved in the experience (it depends), but it will be primarily the cerebral cortex that 'has' the experience. Physically the cortex is a whitish, deeply folded surface layer of the brain, with the consistency of blancmange, consisting of multiple layers of multiply-connected neurons connected between layers in 'columns'. The physical properties that cause it to be 'subjectively sensible' (have experience?) are the combination of the ways these neurons interconnect locally, and the connective architecture of the cortex as a whole. We don't know the details, but we do know that disrupting the connections in certain areas will result in specific distortions of experience and consciousness.

[...]

I don't know - what do you think?

I think that what you've just posted is the equivalent to trying to explain the chemical properties of water in terms of plumbing. I don't think you understand what it is I'm even asking :-/

Personally, I don't think we have sufficient understanding of how the organisation of the brain gives rise to the components of consciousness, awareness and perception, and I do think it's worth bothering to gain a deeper grasp of it - and there are projects working towards that goal as we speak.

I honestly cannot fathom how that lack of understating doesn't spark even a little itch of curiosity in you...


I'm not concerned with issues of the functional architecture and organization of the brain; thats a topic thats already beaten to death and we already have a reasonable grasp of such issues. I'm asking how the components of consciousness in-and-of-itself [what are referred to as 'qualia'] are related to the -physics- of brain activity and -physics- in general. This is a huge scientitic frontier -- a gaping hole in our understanding of ourselves and reality -- and you're writting it off as insignificant????

I'm genuinely flabbergasted...

 

[dlorde]

One of the issues in studying or just discussing consciousness is defining what we mean by it.

Yup.

I don't know if all living things are conscious. I think mammal and bird species, without exception, are conscious. I think reptiles and fish are, but I'm not as sure about that. Insects on down through amoeba, depending on my preferred definition at the time, might or might not be considered conscious. Bacteria and viruses? Perhaps it's better to think of them as being on a scale of decreasing consciousness?

It's a tricky question - are individual bees conscious? The hive as a whole? We have all these concepts that are useful for making judgements in terms of gross behaviours but from which the meaning and usefulness seems to drain the closer you examine them. Reality consists of blended continua - at the 50,00ft level, you can distinguish large-scale conceptual structures, but at ground level, each blends into the next indistinguishably. We have to draw an arbitrary line at some point that will make the concept useful.

And what about plants? Where should they be placed on such a scale?

Fairly low?

Yes, it certainly can be. But when the other person is pleasant to talk with, I find it helps me sharpen my own thinking about what such terms represent.

Yes, that's an interesting observation. The more unpleasant the other person seems, the more negative responses they provoke and the more difficult it is to consider the argument dispassionately.

 

[Orbini]

What is it about particular neural processes that causes some sensory input to be felt as a particular sensation or experience? What physical property differentiates the quality of these experiences? How is this process expressed thru the biochemistry of neurons? What part of the system actually has the experience(s) and what are the relevant physical properties of this portion of the system that causes it to be subjectively sensible? Any alleged scientific model of consciousness that cannot address these questions is just handwaving bull, as far as I'm concerned.

Excellent questions, but I'm wondering what kinds of answers you are willing to accept ?

I'm reminded of the Feynman interview (available on youtube), where the interviewer asks Richard Feynman to explain, in layman's terms, how a magnet works. Feynman spends the next few minutes explaining there is no way he can think of to explain this phenomenon correctly in terms that a layman would understand.

I think it's the same with consciousness. Even if I knew the answer, I don't think there's any easy way to explain it, that would make sense on an intuitive basis.

To get a true understanding, consciousness needs to be defined and understood in terms of parts that aren't conscious themselves. That's the hard part. Not even how exactly it would work, but that it would work at all.

 

[AlBell]

I'm not concerned with issues of the functional architecture and organization of the brain; thats a topic thats already beaten to death and we already have a reasonable grasp of such issues. I'm asking how the components of consciousness in-and-of-itself [what are referred to as 'qualia'] are related to the -physics- of brain activity and -physics- in general. This is a huge scientitic frontier -- a gaping hole in our understanding of ourselves and reality -- and you're writting it off as insignificant????

I'm genuinely flabbergasted...

I concluded some time ago p-zombies not only exist but many post here.

 

[Orbini]

I concluded some time ago p-zombies not only exist but many post here.

From the viewpoint of evolution, a p-zombie would be just as successful as a fully conscious person. If you think a p-zombie is a coherent concept, then it makes sense to assume that some people could have a genetic change causing them to develop as p-zombies instead of people with a consciousness.

If they exist, there's no reason they wouldn't be posting here. Of course, you wouldn't be able to recognize them.

 

[AlBell]

From the viewpoint of evolution, a p-zombie would be just as successful as a fully conscious person. If you think a p-zombie is a coherent concept, then it makes sense to assume that some people could have a genetic change causing them to develop as p-zombies instead of people with a consciousness.

If they exist, there's no reason they wouldn't be posting here. Of course, you wouldn't be able to recognize them.

They're recognizable alright.

 

[Orbini]

They're recognizable alright.

According to the common definition of p-zombie, their behavior would be completely indistinguishable.

 

[Orbini]

I'm asking how the components of consciousness in-and-of-itself [what are referred to as 'qualia'] are related to the -physics- of brain activity and -physics- in general. This is a huge scientitic frontier -- a gaping hole in our understanding of ourselves and reality -- and you're writting it off as insignificant????

I would say it is a very interesting and significant subject from a personal viewpoint.

From a scientific viewpoint, I'm not so sure. Consciousness is a subjective phenomenon, and does not lend itself well to thorough scientific investigation. You can only get so far with introspection, as is obvious from the disagreement about even the simplest concepts relating to consciousness.

 

[AkuManiMani]

From the viewpoint of evolution, a p-zombie would be just as successful as a fully conscious person. If you think a p-zombie is a coherent concept, then it makes sense to assume that some people could have a genetic change causing them to develop as p-zombies instead of people with a consciousness.

If they exist, there's no reason they wouldn't be posting here. Of course, you wouldn't be able to recognize them.

I mentioned earlier that the closest human analogue to a p-zombie that we know of are psychopaths, and even they have some conscious experiences -- albeit, of a more limited scope than most other humans. The one's with higher IQs do tend to run circles around humans naive to their nature, tho, [the more clever they are the more insidious they tend to be] so you're at least partially right from the evolutionary perspective.

I guess one example of such a pseudo p-zombie in popular fiction would be Palatine from Starwars. In the story he pulls off an acting job so convincing that he managed to deceive an entire galaxy for 20 years. Real world psychopaths pull of deceptions on par with that in real life all the time. Most people have no idea how many of these creatures live among us and even hold positions of influence in our societies.

I will say one thing, tho. They -are- recognizable; one just needs a level of psychological discernment able to match their ability to hide behind fabricated personas and deceptions.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I would say it is a very interesting and significant subject from a personal viewpoint.

From a scientific viewpoint, I'm not so sure. Consciousness is a subjective phenomenon, and does not lend itself well to thorough scientific investigation. You can only get so far with introspection, as is obvious from the disagreement about even the simplest concepts relating to consciousness.

The frontiers of theoretical physics are currently impossible to investigate experimentally [e.g. M-theory] but that does not render them beyond science. Atleast in the case of consciousness we have introspection we have an immediate empirical basis from which to study from. Introspection is just as valid an empirical approach as examining external objects -- if not more so. Even observing sensory stimuli is itself a form of introspection, except in this case, one it looking out thru a window of their consciousness onto the 'external' consensus world we interact in. At the end of the day, all knowledge is gained within and thru one's own conscious experience.

 

[Orbini]

I will say one thing, tho. They -are- recognizable; one just needs a level of psychological discernment able to match their ability to hide behind fabricated personas and deceptions.

I completely agree that psychopaths are recognizable, but p-zombies are by definition indistinguishable. At least, according to several definitions I have read. What definition are you using, that allows an observable difference ?

 

[Orbini]

Introspection is just as valid an empirical approach as examining external objects -- if not more so.

The problem is that your introspection may lead you to a different hypothesis than somebody else's introspection.

Some people (even on this thread) come to the conclusion that their introspections are perfectly compatible with them being an automaton. Others do not.

Who is right, and how would you determine that ? They could even both be right, since there's no guarantee that everybody's consciousness feels exactly the same.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Introspection is just as valid an empirical approach as examining external objects -- if not more so.

The problem is that your introspection may lead you to a different hypothesis than somebody else's introspection.

Some people (even on this thread) come to the conclusion that their introspections are perfectly compatible with them being an automaton. Others do not.

Who is right, and how would you determine that ? They could even both be right, since there's no guarantee that everybody's consciousness feels exactly the same.

Concerning shared introspection over history you might enjoy reading up on hermeneutic humanism.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/

The forte of thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jürgen Habermas.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I will say one thing, tho. They -are- recognizable; one just needs a level of psychological discernment able to match their ability to hide behind fabricated personas and deceptions.

I completely agree that psychopaths are recognizable, but p-zombies are by definition indistinguishable. At least, according to several definitions I have read. What definition are you using, that allows an observable difference ?

I think classical p-zombies are as possible as square circles. I think the closest thing one can get to a p-zombie IRL would be a being with a very low level of consciousness but a very high level of intellect, or a puppet under the direction of someone who is conscious. How one would go about uncovering them (absent some way to physically identify conscious activity from the 'outside') would vary depending on the zombie in question and the method(s) of trickery being used.

Introspection is just as valid an empirical approach as examining external objects -- if not more so.

The problem is that your introspection may lead you to a different hypothesis than somebody else's introspection.

Some people (even on this thread) come to the conclusion that their introspections are perfectly compatible with them being an automaton. Others do not.

Who is right, and how would you determine that ? They could even both be right, since there's no guarantee that everybody's consciousness feels exactly the same.

Oh, I'm certain that there are differences in the way individuals experience their own consciousness -- some differ radically. However, there -are- commonalities just as there are physiological commonalities between radically different species. When we have a real science of qualia [or consciousness, for those of you who wince every time you see that word ] we'll be able to have meaningful explanations for those variations

 

[PixyMisa]

I think that what you've just posted is the equivalent to trying to explain the chemical properties of water in terms of plumbing. I don't think you understand what it is I'm even asking :-/

That's because you're starting from a false premise. He answered your question as it relates to reality, which is only rather loosely.

I'm not concerned with issues of the functional architecture and organization of the brain; thats a topic thats already beaten to death and we already have a reasonable grasp of such issues. I'm asking how the components of consciousness in-and-of-itself [what are referred to as 'qualia'] are related to the -physics- of brain activity and -physics- in general.

It's self-referential information processing. The precise physics of the brain don't matter; any suitable information processing system can do the same. It doesn't matter whether it's build of neurons or transistors or valves or relays or fluidics.

There's no "consciousness in-and-of-itself". It's not an object, it's a subprocess within a larger process. There's no "qualia" either, obviously.

 

[Frank Newgent]

That's because you're starting from a false premise. He answered your question as it relates to reality, which is only rather loosely.


It's self-referential information processing. The precise physics of the brain don't matter; any suitable information processing system can do the same. It doesn't matter whether it's build of neurons or transistors or valves or relays or fluidics.

There's no "consciousness in-and-of-itself". It's not an object, it's a subprocess within a larger process. There's no "qualia" either, obviously.

What do you think of intersubjectivity?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersubjectivity

 

[AkuManiMani]

That's because you're starting from a false premise. He answered your question as it relates to reality, which is only rather loosely.


It's self-referential information processing. The precise physics of the brain don't matter; any suitable information processing system can do the same. It doesn't matter whether it's build of neurons or transistors or valves or relays or fluidics.

There's no "consciousness in-and-of-itself". It's not an object, it's a subprocess within a larger process. There's no "qualia" either, obviously.

Considering that your own feelings are 'incoherent', 'irrelevant', and 'nonexistent' you're not really -qualified- [Oops! theres that word again ] to meaningfully contribute to a discussion on consciousness. Leave the talking to actual people, m'kay?

 

[PixyMisa]

Considering that your own feelings are 'incoherent', 'irrelevant', and 'nonexistent' you're not really -qualified- [Oops! theres that word again ] to meaningfully contribute to a discussion on consciousness. Leave the talking to actual people, m'kay?

Since none of that even resembles anything I've actually said, and the statement as a whole is in any case a non-sequitur, no.

Also, you could try addressing what I said, which comprehensively answered your question.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Since none of that even resembles anything I've actually said, and the statement as a whole is in any case a non-sequitur, no.

Also, you could try addressing what I said, which comprehensively answered your question.

I did address what you said. We've already established that you do not experience qualia or feelings worth mentioning, ergo what you have to say regarding them amounts to squat. Move along, please.