Has consciousness been fully explained?

[westprog]

I don't know about everyone involved, but religious concerns are definitely not the case with Piggy and I suspect not the case with Cornsail or Frank Newgent.

Then it must be something else, even more sinister.

 

[westprog]

Oh -- yes, that is a different story. I don't agree that no mathematical definition is possible, but it isn't as easy as rolling, you are correct.

I was specifically addressing westprog's argument that a turing machine can't do certain things, like replace a neuron.

And if I said "a square can't replace a wheel" then I suppose the response would be "a square is an abstract mathematical concept, don't you understand that?".

 

[rocketdodger]

And if I said "a square can't replace a wheel" then I suppose the response would be "a square is an abstract mathematical concept, don't you understand that?".

Why didn't you say "a circle can't replace a wheel?"

That is clearly a better analogy, and I know you thought of it. And I know you realized it would only reinforce my point. So instead you used a "square."

You use such dishonest tactics in debate -- religious training?

 

[rocketdodger]

No, it is not. No model models all the physical functions of a system. No simulation simulates all mathematical relationships in a system. That doesn't imply that there is no difference between a model and a simulation, or that the difference is a matter of degree.

Carbon tetrachloride is a valid model of water. It models its liquid behaviour, and appearance. It doesn't model other things.

And a simulation of a sheet of paper with writing on it happens to "model" the behavior and appearance that we need to be able to read it, when displayed on a monitor.

Why isn't the simulation a model, then?

Is it because a monitor is required to view it? Is that really the issue here?

 

[rocketdodger]

Let's try again, slowly. A model reproduces the physical aspects of the system it is copying. Depending on how authentic it is, it will reproduce some all the physical actions. A perfect model would be identical to the thing it is modelling.

A simulation reproduces the mathematical relationships of the system it is copying. In this way, the behaviour of the system can be predicted. A perfect simulation would perfectly predict the behaviour of the system it is copying. It would not, however, ever reproduce the physical behaviour of the system.

The fact that both models and simulations actually exist in the real world does not imply that a simulation can, if sufficiently detailed, reproduce the physical behaviour of the system it is copying. Reproducing the physical behaviour is not what a simulation is for.

The difference between simulations and models is to be seen in computers, where software can be written to, say, control a power station. Often, such control software is tested by connecting it to a simulation of the power station. The control software has to be written as control software, though. A simulation of the power station controller can't just be "hooked up" to a real power station. That's not how control software works. It has to be designed from the start.

It's not uncommon for programmers designing control systems to mock up simple simulations to study the system they are controlling. It's also not unknown for non-technically-minded managers to suggest "hooking up" the simulation to the actual power plant, or water works, or space shuttle re-entry system. Such category errors can be very expensive if unrecognised.

It's also the case that models of necessity must be also simulations - if they reproduce the physical relationships, they must de facto reproduce the mathematical relationships as well. Simulations may also be models - even if the only physical attribute that they copy is the appearance, say.

Why do you keep ignoring the vast category of physical actions that happen to correlate with mathematical relationships?

Like the text on a piece of paper? Why is a simulation of a book page not a model, given that we can read it just the same?

 

[rocketdodger]

Why do you say this?

Because you consistently question whether the more spiritual and artistic pursuits of the human mind can be mathematically described.

If a thing can't be mathematically described, it is magic. Plain and simple.

If you mean to say that such spiritual and artistic pursuits would be incomprehensibly complex when described mathematically, you should say so. I think everyone here reads your posts and assumes you mean there is some essence to humanity that can't be conveyed via mathematical description alone.

 

[AlBell]

Oh -- yes, that is a different story. I don't agree that no mathematical definition is possible, but it isn't as easy as rolling, you are correct.

Good luck with that definition. Once you implement it we can begin to discuss if the result is conscious.

I was specifically addressing westprog's argument that a turing machine can't do certain things, like replace a neuron.

You can perhaps replace one with a beautiful piece of I/O engineering that likely requires a computer and code to be operational.

I suspect that coding might be possible today. Whether it could be engineered today is another matter.

I know we have devices that read and/or connect directly to neuron output and accomplish something useful with that output. None of that work seems to have any relationship to consciousness per se.

 

[AlBell]

If you mean to say that such spiritual and artistic pursuits would be incomprehensibly complex when described mathematically, ...

I think everyone here reads your posts and assumes you mean there is some essence to humanity that can't be conveyed via mathematical description alone.

See the linkage, and your problem described there?

I at least don't see any need for god.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Because you consistently question whether the more spiritual and artistic pursuits of the human mind can be mathematically described.

If a thing can't be mathematically described, it is magic. Plain and simple.

If you mean to say that such spiritual and artistic pursuits would be incomprehensibly complex when described mathematically, you should say so. I think everyone here reads your posts and assumes you mean there is some essence to humanity that can't be conveyed via mathematical description alone.

Describe mathematically the philosophy of mathematics then.

 

[rocketdodger]

Describe mathematically the philosophy of mathematics then.

What kind of a response is that?

Whether or not I can describe it, and regardless of whether you are capable of understanding it, has no relevance to whether or not it can in fact be described.

What is your position, Frank? Is your position that it is impossible for a human to understand a mathematical description of the philosophy of mathematics? Or is your position that no such description can possibly exist?

 

[rocketdodger]

See the linkage, and your problem described there?

I at least don't see any need for god.

The difference is whether or not one believes that such a description can exist. A full description of a rock is so complex that it is impossible for a human to comprehend. Yet I don't think anyone disputes that such a description can exist.

Why would the behavior of an evolved monkey be any different?

 

[Drachasor]

What I don't get here is that you keep skimming over the point that a Turing machine + suitable interface doesn't work. Can't work. It won't be a Turing machine any more. It will be a different device altogether.

I know that you keep coming up with ways to avoid this. Yes, a perfect implementation of a Turing machine isn't possible in the real world. So what? The same applies to any design or concept. If we were to use that as an approach, we wouldn't be able to reason about any system.

What makes the concept of the Turing machine useful is that we can make predictions about computations. These predictions are of great practical value. We know that we can launch our Pascal computations into the time-sharing computer, and not worry about implementation details or interaction with the world - and be sure that the program which takes an hour will give exactly the same result as one that take a millisecond.

This is clearly not the case with the replacement neuron. To talk blithely about coupling is to miss the point that a coupled Turing machine is not a Turing machine, and the reasoning we use about Turing machines no longer applies. A Turing machine is, by definition, a closed, non-interacting system. The people who design computers and operating systems have to go to great lengths to provide environments where programs could operate as if they were Turing machines. In almost every case, the computer and operating system which runs the programs has to use a different model, because the Turing model isn't appropriate for running a computer. I gave a link to a paper describing the issues involved in coping with these issues.

So when describing a device which can replace a neuron in a human body, the Turing model is simply irrelevant. Turing-style programs are designed to work as closed systems. The neuron is designed to be open, time-dependent, asynchronous, reactive. The Turing model is of no help in understanding or replacing neuron behaviour.

Then have the Turing machine model the whole universe.

 

[Beth]

Simulation is a different question than duplication. Simulation is easier. What do you mean by metaphysical? Thinking is going on in the brain. Is that metaphysical?

Meta-physical means outside physics (e.g. 'mundane' reality) like a soul or magic. I ask because that kind of makes the conversation pointless if one tosses in things that can't be detected or measured yet affect the real world in some ineffable way.

I'm still not sure if you would classify thinking/consciousness as meta-physical or not. I'm not sure if thinking can be reliably detected (there are some fairly sophisticated machines to scan brains, but I'm not knowledgable about whether they can determine if someone is conscious versus comatose in all cases). At any rate, while we might be able to tell that someone is thinking, we cannot tell the contents of their thoughts. While thinking or consciousness can't be measured objectively, it certainly affects the 'real world' in many different ways via thoughts which are acted upon.

Again, you look at how the incoming information interacts with the system. Eyes, touch receptors, etc just translate certain kinds of stimuli into a form the brain can actually process.

This is not helpful in delineating what is information and what is not. This only indicates that different sorts of information are recognizable by different systems. I don't think it is possible to objectively distinguish between patterns containing information and patterns that don't. I think, like others have indicated, that all patterns can be considered to contain information. Some is meaningful to some creatures, most is not.

How many subjective views do you think it takes to create an objective view? Objectivity is nothing more than reliable consistency from one person to another. All measurements are simply codified and standardized subjective agreement between different people.

It's more than that. If everyone on the Earth agreed that prayer cured disease, that would NOT make it so. There is a huge difference between subjective belief and objective reality.

Reality is not defined by belief.

You seem to have interpreted what I said in a way I did not intend. I do not mean that belief creates reality. I mean that what we consider to be "objective reality" is no more than consistent collective subjective experiences of ourselves and other people.

May I suggest that you try to think of an example of a measurement that isn't a codified and standardized subjective agreement between people. We have developed various forms of measurement (meters, grams, inches, etc.) but they can all be described as codified and standardardized subjective agreement between people. The more standardized and codified, the more objective it is considered. It's easy to forget that people subjectively defined them originally and then developed standards for comparison purposes to make such measurements more consistent. It is the subjective agreement between people that gives rise to what we call 'objective' views. That is the point I wanted to make.

 

[Drachasor]

I know that the drawing comparison is very annoying to the simulationists, because they are thinking of something way more complicated and detailed. But it's entirely appropriate. A drawing is a simulation of the thing it represents, and thinking about drawings is a very good way to realise that the reason a drawing is not the same as the thing it represents is not because it's insufficiently detailed - it's because it's a drawing.

It's annoying because it is stupid. The false distinction between a model and a simulation is also stupid.

There are plenty of bad models for things. Model airplanes don't necessarily fly. The drawing is just as much a model as it is a simulation, because the difference between the words is not exactly distinct; there's quite a bit of overlap.

All your doing is talking about how great rectangles are and how bad squares are...which doesn't make a lot of sense. Simulations ARE a type of model. You have have purely mechanic objects designed to simulate certain behavior as well. Further, in actuality engineers will simulate certain behavior in a computer system, and then attach that system to a machine or something else. Acting like simulations can't interact with the world or can't replace certain things is silly and untrue. It's a made-up definition arbitrarily chosen to give people a hard time in this particular thread using a distinction that doesn't actually exist in the real world.

 

[Drachasor]

I'm still not sure if you would classify thinking/consciousness as meta-physical or not. I'm not sure if thinking can be reliably detected (there are some fairly sophisticated machines to scan brains, but I'm not knowledgable about whether they can determine if someone is conscious versus comatose in all cases). At any rate, while we might be able to tell that someone is thinking, we cannot tell the contents of their thoughts. While thinking or consciousness can't be measured objectively, it certainly affects the 'real world' in many different ways via thoughts which are acted upon.

We can tell whether someone is in a coma or not with technology. That said, whether something is metaphysical or not isn't about what we can do with current technology, it is about how the world works.

Metaphysical stuff covers magic like angels, god, etc, etc. If you think magic plays a role in consciousness, then you believe in metaphysics. If you think a person's identity and who they are is composed purely of the matter making up their brain and so forth (e.g. materialism of some sort), then you reject the metaphysical view.

This is not helpful in delineating what is information and what is not. This only indicates that different sorts of information are recognizable by different systems. I don't think it is possible to objectively distinguish between patterns containing information and patterns that don't. I think, like others have indicated, that all patterns can be considered to contain information. Some is meaningful to some creatures, most is not.

And we need a general definition of information to talk about how the brain works....why?

Do you also think it is impossible to teach a class on how computers work without a generalized definition of information?

You seem to have interpreted what I said in a way I did not intend. I do not mean that belief creates reality. I mean that what we consider to be "objective reality" is no more than consistent collective subjective experiences of ourselves and other people.

What we label as "objective reality" isn't necessarily objective reality. Do you agree with that statement?

May I suggest that you try to think of an example of a measurement that isn't a codified and standardized subjective agreement between people. We have developed various forms of measurement (meters, grams, inches, etc.) but they can all be described as codified and standardardized subjective agreement between people. The more standardized and codified, the more objective it is considered. It's easy to forget that people subjectively defined them originally and then developed standards for comparison purposes to make such measurements more consistent. It is the subjective agreement between people that gives rise to what we call 'objective' views. That is the point I wanted to make.

A measurement system is arbitrary, but it can be replaced by any other measurement system to give the same description of reality. There's a big difference between subjective truth, objective truth, and convention.

 

[Drachasor]

No, it is not. No model models all the physical functions of a system. No simulation simulates all mathematical relationships in a system. That doesn't imply that there is no difference between a model and a simulation, or that the difference is a matter of degree.

There's no reason why, in theory, a simulation couldn't simulate all mathematical relationships in a system. Saying it can't doesn't make it so.

 

[!Kaggen]

Then have the Turing machine model the whole universe.

This is precisely the problem, Pixy refuses to debate.

The only way to justify the computationalists view of consciousness is to assume that reality is a simulation.

It is an unjustified ontological stand point.

 

[westprog]

Why didn't you say "a circle can't replace a wheel?"

That is clearly a better analogy, and I know you thought of it. And I know you realized it would only reinforce my point. So instead you used a "square."

Because a wheel is a circle or, rather, possesses circular properties. Now, when one says "a square can't replace a wheel" one could mean "an abstract geometrical shape can't replace an actual physical object", which would be trite and pointless. What one would be assumed to mean would be "a square profile solid object could not be used as a wheel, which requires and object with a circular profile.

Similarly, when I say "a Turing machine can't be used for monitoring and control" I don't mean "a Turing machine is an abstract concept which can't do things in real life", I mean "a Turing machine as implemented according to its specification cannot perform monitoring and control, though it can perform computations."

You use such dishonest tactics in debate -- religious training?

And as usual, free with the insults, short on the arguments. If you had mentioned magic there, you could have concentrated all the bad debating tactics into one sentence.

The constant stream of snide unpleasantness doesn't characterise someone in any way sure of his arguments. IWasp seems able to debate like a decent adult human being, so I don't accept that it's necessary to constantly act like a bad-tempered petulant child.

 

[Drachasor]

This is precisely the problem, Pixy refuses to debate.

The only way to justify the computationalists view of consciousness is to assume that reality is a simulation.

It is an unjustified ontological stand point.

You don't have to propose reality is a simulation. Would you rather I say "have a Turing machine model the Solar System and incident radiation"?

It's a pretty typical thought experiment. No one is saying it much be so or anything silly like that.

 

[westprog]

Because you consistently question whether the more spiritual and artistic pursuits of the human mind can be mathematically described.

If a thing can't be mathematically described, it is magic. Plain and simple.

If you mean to say that such spiritual and artistic pursuits would be incomprehensibly complex when described mathematically, you should say so. I think everyone here reads your posts and assumes you mean there is some essence to humanity that can't be conveyed via mathematical description alone.

I'm not aware of the scientific principle that states that anything that can't be mathematically described is magic. Perhaps you could provide a reference?