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Has consciousness been fully explained?

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So, let's pretend that "flying" were not so easy to define or recognize. Then some (not all) of the arguments on this thread are the equivalent of saying that if we build a mechanical bird, it might do something that seems in some ways like flying, but it would not actually fly. We know that it would only be simulating flight because it is only a simulated bird.

Yes, that argument does seem silly when applied to something as clearly definable and recognizable as flying. That's my whole point. It makes no more sense when applied to hypothetical conscious machines, but that's less obvious.

Flight is quite an instructive example, in that for many years, people copied what they thought were the obvious, intrinsic elements of bird behaviour, appearance and structure, and didn't get anywhere. They eventually managed to properly analyse what was going on, and produce a device that ignored the superficial aspects of bird behaviour, and reproduced the essential elements of fluid dynamics.

If flight had been undefined and unrecognisable, then I'm fairly sure that the first people who glued feathers to their arms would have insisted that the problem of flight had been solved and that it wasn't especially difficult or interesting.

It seems fairly clear to me that the secret to achieving X is to know firstly what X is, and then to know how X is actually produced.
 
So it's possible to build a conscious machine. Maybe.

I don't think anyone has denied this. (Possibly Al Bell is a bit sceptical about it, but he can speak for himself).

What is being denied is that a very particular kind of machine "doing computations" is both sufficient and necessary for consciousness. It's important to realise that it's that claim which is being disputed, and it's a far stronger claim than the above.
 
The computationalist response to this has been dualistic: it really flies within the simulation. Water is wet within the simulation. So we end up with two categories of real /I]: real in 'our world'; and real 'in the simulated world'. Read Ichneumonwasp's posts, if you don't believe me.



First of all, I am not a computationalist; I am arguing against the people who say that the computationalists are wrong because I do not see merit in their arguments.

Second of all, once again, you do not understand the argument. 'Real', as I have explained to Beth and Cornsail, is a functional word. We speak of something being 'real' because it works in our environment and because we have no reason to suspect that it does not explain 'what really is'. It has no ontological function in the way that I, or any of the others in this discussion, have used it. It is not the case that we, or denizens of a simulation, are correct about the use of such a word.

Even here and now, when we use the word 'real' we are not assured that it describes Ultimate Reality. We simply think that it does.

Within a simulation we discuss functions/processes. Water is wet to any being within a simulation because 'water' in a simulation acts in the same way that it acts in the 'real world'.

The reality of what occurs in a simulation (in the real world) happens in the movements of electrons through gates.

This discussion has been raging for several years now. We have always defined what occurs in a simulation in functional terms, not ontologically and have always argued that it is in the function that actions (such as consciousness or flight) are defined.
 
Describe in detail how, specifically, Mozart's Requiem results from underlying processes. Not Henryk Gorecki's Symphony No. 3. Not "Earth Died Screaming" by Tom Waits.

Mozart's Requiem.

If you can't it must have been produced by magic.
No. Dead wrong, in fact. Indeed, you are as wrong as it is possible to be.

Either you accept that Mozart's Requiem arose from natural processes, or you believe in magic.

Which is it to be?
 
The computationalist response to this has been dualistic: it really flies within the simulation.
How is that dualistic?

Water is wet within the simulation.
Again, how is that dualistic?

Wetness and flight are defined by the physical interactions taking place within the system. Our explanations are precise, correct, and in no way dualist. You're just confused.

So we end up with two categories of real : real in 'our world'; and real 'in the simulated world'. Read Ichneumonwasp's posts, if you don't believe me.
I've read his posts. I don't believe you.

I don't think anyone has any problem with a machine that can model or imitate consciousness. As you said, there's no function unique to neurons (so we think) that can't be reproduced by something mechanical. So it's possible to build a conscious machine. Maybe.

But a conscious machine would be functionally equivalent to us, just as the mechanical bird is functionally equivalent to an organic bird. It's not at all clear that simulated consciousness is real consciousness any more than simulated water is real water. That's where the dispute lies.
But no-one on your side has put forward a single coherent counterpoint to the computationalist position. Not one. Ever.

Whenever you want to start, you know where to find us.
 
I don't think anyone has denied this. (Possibly Al Bell is a bit sceptical about it, but he can speak for himself).

What is being denied is that a very particular kind of machine "doing computations" is both sufficient and necessary for consciousness. It's important to realise that it's that claim which is being disputed, and it's a far stronger claim than the above.


Then I must consider myself an outlier because I am arguing against the implication that it is impossible for computation to account for consciousness. It is one thing to argue that we need to demonstrate that computation is sufficient to account for consciousness (what !Kaggen seems to be arguing) and another thing to argue that it cannot.
 
Which is of course the point of the Planck Scale Simulation.

The simulation is indistinguishable from our world. Either you accept that it can produce conscious minds, or you believe in magic. There's no fence sitting, there's no third alternative, there's no argument that we don't know all the details yet.

Either you accept that such a simulation can produce conscious minds, or you believe in magic.
 
Or you accept that simulation can never be accomplished at the needed level of detail ...
other than using the substrate that currently manages to do so.
 
Chalk me up for 'mathematicians and physicists don't understand reality', 'biologists et al don't understand life', and no one understand consciousness.

Get back with me when you've reconciled general relativity and quantum mechanics.
 
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But the super-wonderful planck-scale perfect simulation would have exactly the same limitation as the painting - it's not the thing itself. The picture reproduces some of the relationships between objects. Other relationships will not be present.


This is leaving aside the fact that a computational simulation of the current universe as we understand it would not be possible at any scale. Or that we have no knowledge of how nature works at the planck scale.

Um, so what makes you think that your perceptions are real?
they are just the same, representations derived and modeled from sensations.

And no a picture is only vaguely like a plank scale simulation/model.
 
But the argument is that the simulated consciousness would be conscious in our universe. Mind, I don't accept for a moment the idea that we can create universes with a bit of code. What happens on a computer happens in this universe. Nowhere else. There is no Narnia, either in the wardrobe or on the laptop.

Straw argument. A thought experiment about a large plank scale simulation/model is a thought experiment.
 
I know. That's the part I can't concur with. It really hinges on the definition of conscious, which is hard to define in a way that accurately separates what most people consider conscious from what most people do not consider conscious.

If the model creates something that looks like consciousness, the model if it was run is a model run/simulated in the real world. So the 'consciousness' occurs ina subset of teh real world, ergo it is in the real world.

The model itself is a model in the real world.
 
That is a clearer way of putting it. The problem I have is when you say things like "the water is real in the simulation" or "the person is real in the simulation". Why? I don't consider water to be an action and I don't consider a person to be an action.

You can only describe the actions of the water and the person? As humans we can never experience the noumena, we can only experience their actions and behavior.
 
Cornsail,

OK, let’s try this one more time since I’m obviously not getting my point across very well.

The simulation is intended to make it easier to see how computation should account for consciousness – by removing many of the previous obstacles that arose in earlier discussions of this topic. It obviously creates new confusions, so I will try to explain it in more detail in the hopes that will help.

In the simulation we begin with a description of atoms or subatomic particles (depending on what level we might want to start). These are not actual subatomic particles in the real world. They are defined by code, which is just a way of stating that we control from the top-down how a set of electrons will pass through logic gates. More code defines how these ‘particles’ will interact. We speak, in short-hand, of particles interacting, but what actually occurs ‘in the real world’ is electrons moving through gates, with those movements defined by the code we apply. This creates/defines a rule-following system. All of the simulated particles’ movements are mediated through electron movements just as the ‘particles’ themselves are mediated through electron movements.

This is similar to the way that we calculate in our heads – we think of a number and add that to another number. What actually happens at a neuronal level, though, is that a set of neurons fire together mediating ‘5’ and other sets of neurons fire mediating the act of adding ‘5’ to ‘3’ , for instance.

The simulation continues – again, in order to make it easier to see how it all works – to the point where we recreate everything that occurs in our own experiences. Now, all of this is mediated by electron movements within a huge computer (in the thought experiment) not by actual particles hitting one another (in the simulation). But, the fact that it is mediated by electrons moving through gates shouldn’t really matter because it is the patterns of interaction, defined/limited by the code that is important – and this is a situation in which the amount of code is minimal.

*Aside – just to interject, again, there is the issue of simulating something like ‘flight’ in which we can show a bird flying by having a computer screen light up in a way such that it makes it look like a bird is flying, and this takes considerable coding work I would assume; and there is the situation being discussed in this type of simulation in which a simulated bird ‘follows the rules’ of physical law (the code only provides the descriptions of atoms and physical laws and possibly any tweaking we would need to make the world unfold as it did, assuming perfect knowledge) and flies (the electrons in the computer producing the simulation recreate the pattern of a bird flying, just in a different form).* Granted, as an action, this is hard to see with 'flight' since we think of flight as only occurring with a 'thing', so we use the simulation in order to see it, but the actual interactions occur with the electrons. It should be easier to see this with thinking because we don't normally witness the matter involved in thinking.

To clear this issue, I hope, this is not all that different from ‘our world’ – think Ship of Theseus. We are actually a pattern of interacting parts (atoms), none of which is always a part of ‘us’ (‘us’ actually consisting of pattern). With the simulation the actual interacting parts are the electrons passing through gates, which are hard to conceptualize. Particles ‘in the simulation’ are not so hard to see in our mind’s eye. We speak of ‘in the simulation’ in the same we that we speak of ‘us’ being ‘in the world’ because that is what our language easily allows (and, no, I do not mean to imply that we are in a simulation or that a simulation is identical to ‘reality’). We live in a middle world, not at the level of cosmological or subatomic interaction. Consequently we speak as if what we experience actually occurs as it is described. I drink a cup of coffee. But what really happens is that there are many interacting vibrating strings of energy (assuming that description is correct) forming a particular interacting pattern for every component in that exchange. It is more difficult to see the interacting pattern in a computer because the way the electrons move does not take a form we are used to – like looking at a cup of coffee – meaning, the computer, at its most basic description, doesn’t actually work in this middle world. That is why we use thought experiments like the simulation – to ease visualization of the interactions.

A computer simulation that could recreate everything in our world should recreate consciousness. This doesn’t happen at the level of ‘particles’ interacting ‘in the simulation’ but in the electrons moving around through gates. Consciousness is an action – it is a pattern of interacting bits; and if we could recreate the world in a simulation, somewhere in those whizzing electron interactions is a pattern that does the same thing as me writing this on my computer consciously.

To argue against this type of scenario one must either contend that we cannot describe/recreate the patterns of the world using math/computation or that there is some other unexplainable component involved in the process.

The ‘polite fiction’ I mentioned earlier concerned the way we speak of programming languages – because we talk about coding in a way that makes it sound like it actually does something itself (like it has an independent means of interacting). But it doesn’t. Coding is just our way of organizing the rules by which electrons move through certain gates. But I think that talking at the level of electrons passing through gates makes people’s eyes glaze over. It -- the polite fiction -- is applicable to the entire discussion, but it is also applicable to discussions about ourselves since we do not want to speak of drinking coffee at the level of vibrating strings of energy. Granted, there is an extra level of abstraction in the simulation, which makes it more difficult to see what is going on and leaving us talking in very abstract terms when we get down to how it all actually occurs.

ETA:

One addition to the above -- take for example 'flight' or 'me typing on computer keys' -- what happens in the simulation (in the electrons passing through gates) is not a description of those events. We could create a program that consists in a description of those events -- like the program that has pixels light up on a screen to make it look like a bird is flying -- but the only descriptions in this simulation are the descriptions of 'particles' and physical laws. Everything else follows from them. There is no code telling electrons to pass through gates to look like I am typing on computer keys. The same is true of a 'bird flying' in the simulation. It is not a description of a bird flying but a recreation of the relationships/actions using descriptions of 'particles' that does the same thing as occurs when a bird flies past your window. Those relationships are recreated in the movement of electrons, which is what makes it so hard to see that we recreate the same relationships in the simulation; but if you ask where 'flight' is in the bird there is no way to answer the question. It isn't in the bird; it 'is' in the relationships among bird parts in relationship with its environment.
 
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PixyMisa said:
Chalk me up for 'mathematicians and physicists don't understand reality', and 'biologists et al don't understand life', and no one understand consciousness.

'.
Okay, definitely one for the "believe in magic" column.
Try 'lacking the hubris some display'.

How's the GR-QM reconciliation going?
 
If the model creates something that looks like consciousness, the model if it was run is a model run/simulated in the real world. So the 'consciousness' occurs ina subset of teh real world, ergo it is in the real world.

The model itself is a model in the real world.

Give an example of something that looks like consciousness:
 
Ichneumonwasp said:
The idea that either scientists know exactly what is going on or it must be supernatural is pretty much the definition of a false dilemma.

Concerning "substances" and logic... that there can be multiple logically coherent possibilities within that one substance means that that one substance is not the determining factor... or to put it another way note how the logic that allows a theory of one substance to be formed is not accounted for by that theory of one substance.

Not necessarily trying to defend "dualism" just pointing out you've hardly explained it away.


Scientists knowing exactly what is going on is not what is being proposed. That we could theoretically model all of the forces of nature provided there is a single substance is.


That makes total sense provided somebody else taking issue with an aspect of the theoretical model isn't immediately accused of subscribing to the supernatural.

Complicated by the fact we're talking about consciousness which has intentionality or an "interior" (I believe). The theoretical model doesn't address this at all it is assumed that if you build the "outside" the "inside" will come. It worked in "Field of Dreams" :)

Ichneumonwasp said:
No one is saying that magic is not logically possible; and, yes, if it makes sense to speak of the origin of a single substance, then that origin would fit under 'magic'. That is why many argue against the very idea of origin; eternal presence makes more sense logically.


Not familiar with your use of origin and eternal presence here.

We may be misunderstanding each other. My point was as above a reference to "interiors" and "exteriors". That generally speaking a sufficient "interior" structural development (or adequate interpretation of logically coherent possibilities in the very very general example above) is necessary before a theoretical model all of the forces of nature provided there is a single substance can be effectively constructed.

And that this theoretical model all of the forces of nature doesn't account for the "interior" structural elements which enabled its construction at all.

There is no way to explain away dualism. It is logically possible. It is simply intellectually unsatisfying/an intellectual dead end.


I agree it's a dead end though I'm curious how to explain it away logically.
 
PixyMisa said:
Describe in detail how, specifically, Mozart's Requiem results from underlying processes. Not Henryk Gorecki's Symphony No. 3. Not "Earth Died Screaming" by Tom Waits.

Mozart's Requiem.

If you can't it must have been produced by magic.
No. Dead wrong, in fact. Indeed, you are as wrong as it is possible to be.

Either you accept that Mozart's Requiem arose from natural processes, or you believe in magic.

Which is it to be?


I asked you first :D
 
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