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Forgiven for what, eactly?

Avalon, it is absurd for you to go around demanding logical syllogisms when you STILL have not defined the workings of how God acquires the knowledge, or the workings of the "free mind" and how it reaches a decision.
 
If there are such fundamental errors, then spell out the logic explicitly and point them out.
You won't do this because you'reAvalonXQ is incapable of it comprehending even the simplest logic.

Fixed that for you.
 
Avalon, it is absurd for you to go around demanding logical syllogisms when you STILL have not defined the workings of how God acquires the knowledge, or the workings of the "free mind" and how it reaches a decision.

Not to mention whether there is a god and whether it is all knowing. But hey, who's counting? :p
 
P = Truman runs for president
not P = Truman does not run for president

Great. Keep going.
P = Truman chooses to run for president at t1.
~P = Truman chooses not to run for president at t1.
C (P) = Truman has the capacity to choose not to run for president at t1.
C (~P) = Truman has the capacity to choose not to run for president at t1.
Premise 1: At t0<t1, God knows P.
Premise 2: At t1, C(P) and C(~P).
Premise 3: P.
...
Okay, who can fill out the rest of the premises and show me, EXPLICITLY, the contradiction?
 
Avalon, it is absurd for you to go around demanding logical syllogisms when you STILL have not defined the workings of how God acquires the knowledge, or the workings of the "free mind" and how it reaches a decision.

Why is it absurd for me to demand people to back up what they're saying? They claim that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible without needing any of these additional definitions, that the contradiction is one of basic logic and extremely obvious. If there are specific definitions needed for their claims to hold, then they should supply them -- and when I disagree with those definitions, we can debate those definitions or agree that their contradictions aren't as iron-clad as they believe.
 
I believe it's possible for a being to have free will even under these circumstances -- that despite each and every one of these variables being known, the moral agent in question really does choose between two or more outcomes, and really could have chosen either.

You can say that all day, but you haven't provided a mechanism for it.

If I push someone off a building (NOTE: I am not advocating pushing anyone off of anything.) was it my choice to push them, or their choice to fall? Let's also say I'm stronger than them, and they were tied up, and what the heck, even drugged. Did they have free will to chose NOT to fall off the building once I had pushed them off? Free will to chose to just hover there instead?

Of course not. But why?

Because I had taken control of the situation. Now let's say that rather than something so overt as drugging them and tying them up, I get a little more subtle. Sneaky. I manipulate events to make them fall off without me pushing them - it involves a spring-loaded platform and a phone cal thelling them that their puppy is on the roof, I won't bother you with the details.

In that case, you could argue that the vector for free will was whether or not they chose to believe me when I told them where the puppy was. Shaky, maybe, depending on the hypothetical scenario - but it's there.

Now let's go back to god. He created the puppy, the building, me, the person falling off the building, the building, the weather conditions, gravity, the air that is being fallen through, etc. He did this all knowing it would mean someone would take a nose-dive off the building. He took control of the situation... EVERY aspect of it... and so the people involved can't be said to have free will. It's not chance that makes that person hit the pavement (and survive, let's say, for the kiddies playing along). It is deliberate calculation - a choice made before time itself.

Any other "choices" are just a part of that earlier arrangement.
 
If God has foreknowledge of what choice we will make, then we are actually fated to make that choice. If we truly have some degree at least of free will, there are chances we might make another choice. If you were to say that God foreknows the odds, and that it's a 90% probability that we will choose x over y, then we would still have free will. There might also exist situations in which God foreknows that we have 50% probability of choosing x over y. However, if you argue that God has perfect foreknowledge (i.e. 100% probability) of every choice we will make before we make it, then we are effectively fated to make such a choice - fated, I might add to make such a choice since we are as God made us - again, with him in complete control.

So, the argument you seem to be making is that God specifically created some of us, knowing in advance that we would make self-damning choices. Thus, Paul's argument in Romans concerning vessels of wrath and vessels of grace - the latter specifically created beforehand for salvation, and the former specifically created beforehand for the express purpose of eternal damnation - would have to be literally and specifically true, despite the fact that it offends both logic and compassion - senses of which, Paul also argues, God specifically imbued us.

Avalon XQ,

I may have missed it, but don't believe you responded to my post above. Considering your honesty and high level of courtesy, I'm assuming it c=got lost in the shuffle. After all, you're juggling about three lines of argument here.

I'm also curious as to what you think of my idea of a less than perfect God.
 
Why is it absurd for me to demand people to back up what they're saying? They claim that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible without needing any of these additional definitions, that the contradiction is one of basic logic and extremely obvious. If there are specific definitions needed for their claims to hold, then they should supply them -- and when I disagree with those definitions, we can debate those definitions or agree that their contradictions aren't as iron-clad as they believe.

It's difficult to define free will in the first place. "A method of choice the outcome of which can not be determined at any point prior to the choice." is a definition of my preference, which could work via, say, sufficiently strong quantum fluctuations. But it clashes with any form omniscience, which knows all choices at all points in time.

Now, please explain how your free mind works, and how God's omniscience works.
 
I'm saying that even in a situation with an omnipotent/omniscient creator, there can be genuine free opportunities left in the scenario -- situations where multiple options are open, and it's only an agent's decision that causes one action to occur rather than the other. That even if you knew all of the factors leading up to the decision, the states of all molecules in the universe even, whether the agent made one decision or another would still be entirely the agent's call. The mechanism for this is supernatural -- it's what I understand the human soul to be. But its action, and its role in human free will, is not ruled out even in the case of the creator God.
 
What amazes me is intelligent people like AvalonXQ who have shown a great capacity for critical thinking and the like are so easily swayed by fairy tale books and invisible men that it robs them of even the most basic functions of common sense.
 
Great. Keep going.
P = Truman chooses to run for president at t1.
~P = Truman chooses not to run for president at t1.
C (P) = Truman has the capacity to choose not to run for president at t1.
C (~P) = Truman has the capacity to choose not to run for president at t1.
Premise 1: At t0<t1, God knows P.
Premise 2: At t1, C(P) and C(~P).
Premise 3: P.
...
Okay, who can fill out the rest of the premises and show me, EXPLICITLY, the contradiction?
Premise 1 negates Premise 2.
 
The mechanism for this is supernatural -- it's what I understand the human soul to be.

So, your entire line of argument still demands a mechanism which you can provide no description of other than "it's supernatural"?

Like, say, how it works? How it reaches its decision?

Because I have this shirt here. It's blue, but it's actually red. It's supernatural red that looks blue.
 
It's difficult to define free will in the first place. "A method of choice the outcome of which can not be determined at any point prior to the choice."

I can accept that as a working definition, with a small modification: "A method of choice the outcome of which can not be determined by perfect knowledge of all events prior to the choice." Is that a reasonable modification of your definition?
 
I can accept that as a working definition, with a small modification: "A method of choice the outcome of which can not be determined by perfect knowledge of all events prior to the choice." Is that a reasonable modification of your definition?

Yes, assuming any form of time manipulation (e.g. observing the event happening and then travelling back in time to before it happened) is not possible.
 
Yes, assuming any form of time manipulation (e.g. observing the event happening and then travelling back in time to before it happened) is not possible.

Well, unfortunately, like I said, God is atemporal and gains His knowledge through supernatural means. I believe my understanding of God violates your insistence on linear time.
 
I expect I'll eventually get someone to introduce as a premise:
God knows P --> ~C(~P)
... and will hopefully then realize that they're begging the question. Which is the only way I've found to get a contradiction here.
I may be out until tomorrow. If so, good luck.
 
Not by any of the premises currently in the system. If you believe it does, demonstrate it logically.
P = Truman chooses to run for president at t1.
~P = Truman chooses not to run for president at t1.
C (P) = Truman has the capacity to choose not to run for president at t1.
C (~P) = Truman has the capacity to choose not to run for president at t1.
Premise 1: At t0<t1, God knows P.
Premise 2: God is infallible
Conclusion: At t1, ~(C(~P)).
Conclusion: P.
 

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