Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Piggy]

Well, that's the end of the discussion then if you're just going to keep saying 'no it doesn't produce consciousness' even though it appears to. What do we have to go on other than appearances?

The only way we have to judge if something is conscious is if it behaves as if it is. So if something behaves as if it is conscious that is good enough for me to call it conscious. You are seriously telling me you wouldn't consider Data from star trek, or HAL to be conscious? They aren't aware of their surroundings and make decisions based on things they know about themselves? You think that it is really some quirk in the arrangement of the brain and not how it FUNCTIONS that make us conscious?

No, behaving as if it is conscious is not evidence that it is conscious.

And the arrangement of the brain determines how it functions.

I have nothing to say about Data or HAL because I don't know how they were built.

But I've explained as well as possible why it is that the simulation won't make the computer that produces it conscious, if it's not conscious in the first place.

We know consciousness occurs in 4-D spacetime and is produced by the real-world activity of the brain, including (it would seem) neural activity and the simultaneous engagement of at least 4 "signature" brain waves.

If you build a machine that does all this -- whatever it turns out to be -- then that will be a conscious machine.

But if you build a machine that runs simulations (and doesn't do everything the brain does when it's conscious) then running a simulation of a brain won't somehow make that machine start producing consciousness, for the same reason that running a simulation of Hoover dam won't cause it to produce electrical power, because it's only doing the same kinds of things that it's doing when it's producing a simulation of any other equally complex system. The computer never takes on the properties of the simulated system, no matter how complex the simulation.

Can you build a functional model of the human brain out of computer parts? If so, you're going have to include hardware that can do everything the brain does, synchronized brain waves and everything.

That's the only way you're going to make something that's conscious -- design it to do what our brains do when they're conscious, in real space and time.

Behaving as if it were conscious is not enough.

 

[Piggy]

Huh, I just thought of something. No one is saying that a simulation of a person would be conscious, the computer running the simulation would be. I thought this would be obvious, but maybe not. Anyway, that is what I have been claiming at least. So when you keep saying that abstractions can't be conscious I guess I agree, but the computer is not an abstraction.

But that's not the point. An abstraction can't cause a real thing to change. The computer's doing the same thing it does when it's running an equally detailed simulation of anything else. Running a sim of a human brain doesn't change what the computer is doing, so the computer doesn't become conscious when it runs the sim of the brain.

For the same reason, it doesn't heat up when the racecar overheats.

No simulation of anything can make a computer conscious.

Only a machine specifically designed to actually do all of what the brain does when it generates your sense of self, your sense of awarenss of the world, will actually cause that phenomenon to really occur in the world.

Can we get today's sort of computer to do that? Perhaps with the right hardware on top of whatever runs the logic, but never by running the logic alone.

 

[Piggy]

As far as the computer is concerned, it doesn't matter if it is controlling a robot that is painting a car, or controlling a simulated robot that is painting a car, it is doing the same kinds of calculations.

I know. But the point is that bodily functions are like the robot arm, involving something to "run the logic" and something to execute it.

 

[Piggy]

I think ... I don't learn anything from arguing with you, so I am not going to do it anymore. Not on this topic, at least.

I learn when I try to prove westprog wrong. Thats why I like westprog, in a way. You don't even give me that option.

If there were an argument in favor of simulated consciousness being real consciousness, then I'd love to hear it. But there is no such argument.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Piggy, in your thought experiment with 'Guy' you said that 'Guy is conscious whether he is controlling a real body or a simulated body.

If we have a computer that is running a simulation of a human body, it is necessarily controlling that simulated body.

If we then take the part of the computer that is controlling the simulated arms, and have that instead control real arms, and the same with the legs etc, is it now conscious? How has anything changed?

When you say you aren't sure if data is conscious you are starting to sound to me like you are a solipsist. All brains are different, maybe my brain doesn't have that super special part that makes one conscious, you can never know.

 

[Third Eye Open]

No, behaving as if it is conscious is not evidence that it is conscious.

WOW. I guess any kind of conversation with you about ANYTHING is pointless then if you can't accept behavior as evidence.

I suppose if a rock is glowing red that is not enough evidence that it is hot, you have to check the insides first? Touch it maybe?

ETA: Hopefully you meant behavior is not enough evidence that it is conscious.

 

[PixyMisa]

It's a T-Zombie! Has all the outward behviour of a thread, without actually being a thread.

/me goes back to not paying any attention

 

[Dancing David]

No, behaving as if it is conscious is not evidence that it is conscious.

I am following, just not participating. P-zombie anyone.

If it acts as though it is conscious, you still face the behavioral dilemma, if it acts as though it is conscious, I.E. it meets your criteria, then it is conscious. Or a p-zombie.

 

[Dancing David]

It's a T-Zombie! Has all the outward behviour of a thread, without actually being a thread.

* PixyMisa;6485475 goes back to not paying any attention

Want some p-popcorn?

 

[Frank Newgent]

It's a T-Zombie! Has all the outward behviour of a thread, without actually being a thread.

Would somebody please turn off that car alarm?

 

[Piggy]

Piggy, in your thought experiment with 'Guy' you said that 'Guy is conscious whether he is controlling a real body or a simulated body.

Yes, if he's in a tank with his brain wired to our specially controlled biochemical excretors, then he's conscious when he's conscious, just like he would be if he weren't disconnected from his body and environment, and when he's asleep and not dreaming he isn't conscious.

If we have a computer that is running a simulation of a human body, it is necessarily controlling that simulated body.

If a computer is running a simulation of anything, then it is controlling the simulation.

But keep in mind that the computer is not actually carrying out any of the behaviors in the simulation, and it does not acquire any of the properties of what it is simulating. (E.g. a simulated fish tank doesn't make the computer wet, or make it swim.)

If we then take the part of the computer that is controlling the simulated arms, and have that instead control real arms, and the same with the legs etc, is it now conscious? How has anything changed?

No, it's not conscious.

If the computer was not already conscious, hooking it up to a peripheral to perform physical activities like printing, or painting cars, doesn't make it conscious.

However, if we were to add the hardware that does whatever the brain is doing when it generates Sofia, and if that hardware were controlled so as to perform correctly, then the machine which included the computer would be conscious.

We know that non-conscious computers can control mechanical arms.

If we invent conscious machines, they too will be able to control mechanical arms.

When you say you aren't sure if data is conscious you are starting to sound to me like you are a solipsist. All brains are different, maybe my brain doesn't have that super special part that makes one conscious, you can never know.

Actually, yeah, it should be pretty easy to know if you never were conscious.

Our only problem is determining consciousness in cases of physical paralysis.

ETA: That's incorrect, actually. Terry Schiavo is one case where her behavior convinced some people that she was conscious. But she certainly wasn't posting on forums.

 

[Piggy]

WOW. I guess any kind of conversation with you about ANYTHING is pointless then if you can't accept behavior as evidence.

I suppose if a rock is glowing red that is not enough evidence that it is hot, you have to check the insides first? Touch it maybe?

ETA: Hopefully you meant behavior is not enough evidence that it is conscious.

For the rock, I'd think a thermometer would do, or getting near enough to feel the heat coming off of it. Then you could determine that the glow wasn't, say, phosphorescence.

Yes, behavior isn't enough. Or at least, overt behavior, which is proxy behavior.

Once we figure out what the brain's doing during Sofia events, we can look to the behavior of the brain to determine consciousness.

 

[Piggy]

If it acts as though it is conscious, you still face the behavioral dilemma, if it acts as though it is conscious, I.E. it meets your criteria, then it is conscious. Or a p-zombie.

If we're talking about a computer simulation, then we can also say that it "behaves" as if it has blood pressure. This does not give it blood pressure.

If we're talking about, say, a Julia-style program, then we can say it mimics some behavior common to one species of conscious animal.

But that doesn't make it conscious.

The only behavior that actually defines blood pressure is to literally have a blood pressure in physical reality.

The only behavior that actually defines consciousness is to literally have consciousness in physical reality.

You can't build a robot that behaves outwardly like a human being and then conclude that it must, therefore, somehow have blood pressure or be conscious.

And remember, the brain can perceive the world, remember it, respond to it, and learn from it without involving consciousness at all.

 

[Third Eye Open]

But keep in mind that the computer is not actually carrying out any of the behaviors in the simulation, and it does not acquire any of the properties of what it is simulating. (E.g. a simulated fish tank doesn't make the computer wet, or make it swim.)

Really? So where is that behavior coming from then?

If we program some of the computers circuit's to turn off as if they had shorted out when the simulated water hits it, then it might as well have gotten wet.

 

[Piggy]

For review, what we've seen so far on this thread....

1. Consciousness has not been fully explained. Even if we discard "fully" (what would it mean to fully understand anything?) we can say it has not been sufficiently explained, although we know some things about it. For example:

A. It is a bodily function performed by the brain.

B. It is a resource-intensive behavior.

C. It involves neural activity, and recent research shows it's also correlated with the simultaneous activation of 4 "signature" brain waves.

D. The consciousness process generates Sofia events, which are locatable in spacetime. (E.g., if you're standing on the beach, with your back to the palm trees, admiring the ocean, then your sense of the locus of your awareness is somewhere between the ocean and the trees, below the clouds, above the sand, at a particular moment in time.)

E. Conscious awareness of events occurs a fraction of a second after bodily perception of those events.

F. The brain can perceive, respond, remember, and learn without being consciously aware of doing so.

G. Consciousness almost certain "does something" -- i.e., it should affect the system somehow, not simply be a side-effect, or else it would not have evolved and persisted.​

2. Conscious machines are possible in theory.

3. A machine does not become conscious when running a simulation of a human body (or brain) because it does not function any differently in that case than when it runs simulations of anything else; it does not begin performing human bodily functions when running a simulation, for the same reason that it does not begin generating electricity when running a sim of Hoover dam.

"Running the logic" by itself can't make actual bodily functions happen in reality. Some activities of the brain can be described in terms of "information processing" but to say "IP causes consciousness" makes as much sense as saying "Math causes black holes". Math can't cause gravity waves, IP can't cause brain waves.

4. The claim "computers can be conscious" means nothing more or less than this: "It's possible to build a working model of a human brain using computer parts".

5. It has not been established that computers can do everything that the organic organ of the brain can do. If there ever is a conscious machine, it will have to be equipped with the proper hardware to perform whatever's going on when the brain generates Sofia events. (Just as a computer-controlled power plant has to have hardware to actually generate current.)

6. When we understand what the brain is doing when we have Sofia, then we'll be able to build conscious machines (if we can physically accomplish the task). It is not likely to happen the other way around.

 

[Piggy]

Really? So where is that behavior coming from then?

Can we start with an example here?

 

[Third Eye Open]

Can we start with an example here?

What?

You mean what this whole thread has been about? Machines behaving like they are conscious?

 

[Piggy]

What?

You mean what this whole thread has been about? Machines behaving like they are conscious?

This thread is about consciousness, which is a function of the brain.

There are no conscious machines. (Yet.)

Unfortunately, these threads tend to get hijacked away from brain science by those who are interested in the possibility of creating conscious machines. To add to the misfortune, these hijacks tend to ignore much of what is actually known about the brain, and to assert relationships between brains and computers that have not been established, or which can be debunked.

You ask "Where is the behavior [of a simulation] coming from?"

Perhaps we should start with an example of some particular behavior within a particular simulation.

For instance, in a simulated fish tank, we could ask "Where is all the swimming coming from?"

 

[Dancing David]

If we're talking about a computer simulation, then we can also say that it "behaves" as if it has blood pressure. This does not give it blood pressure.

If we're talking about, say, a Julia-style program, then we can say it mimics some behavior common to one species of conscious animal.

But that doesn't make it conscious.

The only behavior that actually defines blood pressure is to literally have a blood pressure in physical reality.

The only behavior that actually defines consciousness is to literally have consciousness in physical reality.

You can't build a robot that behaves outwardly like a human being and then conclude that it must, therefore, somehow have blood pressure or be conscious.

And remember, the brain can perceive the world, remember it, respond to it, and learn from it without involving consciousness at all.

Okay, I don't feel like arguing today.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Okay, I don't feel like arguing today.

Yeah, I'm about done too I think.

Piggy you keep saying the same things and it's really not helping me much more than the first time you said it. I do, now, understand what your opinion actually is, just not WHY you hold it. Which is ok with me for now.

You think that in order for something to be conscious with something other than a human brain, it would have to be built exactly like a human brain which is basically saying that only humans can be conscious.

I agree that to be conscious in exactly the way I am, to 'feel' like I do, then yes, my brain would have to be rebuilt pretty damn exactly the same. But I don't really care about that.

For me to call something conscious, it needs to be aware of it's environment or what it perceives to be it's environment, and aware of its self or what it perceives to be its self

This is why I would be comfortable calling computers conscious. They may not be aware of things in the same way as me, or 'feel' like me, but so what? That is not what consciousness is, that is specifically whathuman consciousness is. It is also different, I'm sure, than what rabbit consciousness is, etc.

It sounds to me like you are pulling a 'no true scottsman' fallacy, and saying that 'only things conscious in exactly the way I am, are conscious'

I don't really know if there is much more to say about this, but I have learned a lot about my own opinions chatting with you, thanks for that