Has consciousness been fully explained?

[westprog]

Do you mean me or RD?

I was generalising about the tendency to make unsupported claims which pervades this topic generally. I don't think you've made any so far.

 

[rocketdodger]

Assume A is actually impossible.
Assume B cannot prove whether or not A is occurring.

But you made a mistake -- you can't lump the positive and negative proof of A into a single statement. It needs to read:

1) assume A is actually impossible
2) assume B cannot prove that A is not occuring
3) assume B cannot prove that A is occuring

Now look what happened -- the truth of 1) implies the truth of 3). But it still has no bearing on the truth of 2) . The truth of 2) is completely dependent on the ability of B. It has nothing to do with whether or not A is impossible. Even if A were possible, and in fact occuring, and B didn't have the ability to prove it, statement 2) would still be true.

 

[bluskool]

But even without complete knowledge we can know some things are impossible. In particular, mathematical statements that are untrue can never, ever, ever describe reality.

That was why I brought up incompleteness -- we know we have imperfect knowledge, but we also know many things are impossible.

Thus all I need to do is find a way to describe simulations and the act of determining if one is in a simulation, mathematically. Then if "determining one is not in a simulation" ends up being a provably false mathematical statement we know with 100% certainty, even without "complete knowledge," that it is impossible in reality.

Even if 1) is certain, it only means that the "if statement" in 3) is unknowable, not false.

 

[Meed]

But you made a mistake -- you can't lump the positive and negative proof of A into a single statement. It needs to read:

1) assume A is actually impossible
2) assume B cannot prove that A is not occuring
3) assume B cannot prove that A is occuring

Now look what happened -- the truth of 1) implies the truth of 3). But it still has no bearing on the truth of 2) . The truth of 2) is completely dependent on the ability of B. It has nothing to do with whether or not A is impossible.

Exactly. And you used 2) to conclude that 1) was false. That is why I'm saying your logic was not sound.

Even if A were possible, and in fact occuring, and B didn't have the ability to prove it, statement 2) would still be true.

Of course. But statement 2) would obviously not prove that A was possible. Which was your argument.
(Again, I mean actually possible, not possible in the sense that "we don't know if it could happen or not".)

 

[rocketdodger]

Ah I see what people are getting at. Let me change the argument:

1) It is impossible to prove that we are not in a simulation.
2) We are alive and conscious.
3) Therefore it is impossible to prove that life and consciousness cannot exist in a simulation.

Better?

But I don't see how this is much more than a technicality because people here have been specifically saying that anything in a simulation would not be alive. My argument still refutes that claim.

 

[bluskool]

Ah I see what people are getting at. Let me change the argument:

1) It is impossible to prove that we are not in a simulation.
2) We are alive and conscious.
3) Therefore it is impossible to prove that life and consciousness cannot exist in a simulation.

Better?

Yes, much better. Although, I think the case is overstated. If you said it was impossible to prove x, I would pretty much agree with you no matter what x was. I think philosophical skepticism is right about uncertainty, I just don't take the extreme questions all that seriously, and I don't think hardly anyone else does either. Yes, it is impossible to prove that we are not in a simulation, just like it is impossible to prove the universe wasn't created five seconds ago and set up to appear old. Are either of these ideas likely? I don't think so, and I don't spend any time whatsoever worrying about the remote possibility they are true.

But I don't see how this is much more than a technicality because people here have been specifically saying that anything in a simulation would not be alive. My argument still refutes that claim.

Well, it doesn't do that. Your argument only shows that it is impossible to prove, which just seems trivial to me. I would be more interested in a proof that a simulated mind would be just like a physical mind. It seems to me that simulated things are just a bunch of 1's and 0's being shuffled around that mean nothing to anything accept in the physical mind of a conscious observer. Could consciousness be something that just happens whenever a SRIP gets turned on? I suppose, but the idea that my Macbook Pro experiences receiving my email or processing a photo, and, if it spoke english, could describe what those experiences are like seems pretty outrageous to me. I don't think it is unreasonable to ask for proof.

 

[Meed]

What bluskool said.

(except I'm not one claiming that life cannot exist in a simulation, I find that claim too vague to agree or disagree with)

 

[my_wan]

When a simulation contains all real space variables it's no longer a simulation, so simulations never contain all real space variables.

Ok, I'll accept that as a valid definition, even though equally valid definitions could disagree. But if we accept that definition, it means there is no such thing as a simulation. If the variables used to create a simulation aren't real, they can't be used to create a simulation. Since they must be real it means the simulation is real, not a simulation per the definition you provided.

 

[Meed]

Oh, really. I'm jest a simple old country Skinnerian behaviorist, but I can tell that you have no evidence for that.

My adviser studied mathematics under Church and is now in cognitive science. I ran that claim by PM about the Church thesis by him earlier today and he would agree with you (there is no evidence for it because it is wrong).

 

[AlBell]

When a simulation contains all real space variables it's no longer a simulation, so simulations never contain all real space variables.

Ok, I'll accept that as a valid definition, even though equally valid definitions could disagree. But if we accept that definition, it means there is no such thing as a simulation.

Not so imo. It means a simulation -- simulations certainly are done -- may be lacking variables and/or relationships needed to actually model what is being theoretically simulated.

If the variables used to create a simulation aren't real, they can't be used to create a simulation. Since they must be real it means the simulation is real, not a simulation per the definition you provided.

I'd only say a simulation may, or may not, be correctly mimicking the reality under study.

 

[Piggy]

Actually, no, you seem to have forgotten what you asked me if you think I am insisting that the simulation has Sofia.

Let us say the simulation doesn't have Sofia.

But it does very adamantly insist that it does have Sofia and even mocks anybody who suggests they don't.

So while the science behind the model does not explain the Sofia, it would clearly explain why we claim to have a Sofia.

Which suggests, as I said, that the reason you claim to have a Sofia has nothing to do with the fact that you have a Sofia.

Sorry to have missed so much action over here. I've been stinking up the Sam Harris thread.

The problem with this approach is that it doesn't actually mean anything, because I don't only have access to claims about Sofia, I have access to the experience itself, as do you.

Since we all experience it, and we all have similar brains, then we can conclude we all have it.

The fact that a simulation would, in simulation space, "claim" to have it is irrelevant. It's like saying that I might not really have driven to work this morning, because a simulation of someone driving to work might include sounds coming out of the speakers which sound like a human voice claiming to be driving to work.

It's totally irrelevant.

 

[Piggy]

So if the reason we cry out in pain is because we actually feel pain, and the simulation of those same brain processes does not actually feel pain - then why does it still let out a simulated cry in pain?

That's like asking why a simulated lunar landing unit fires its simulated rockets in simulated space if it's not actually landing on the moon. After all, it's not really going to crash if it fails to fire the rockets.

 

[Piggy]

But if it does claim consciousness then it can only be through the neural processing since that is what is being modelled.

So if it does claim consciousness then we know that neurons are enough to explain why we claim consciousness.

Whoa, hoss!

Big assumption there.

In this experiment, we've simulated the entire human being. (We have to in our thought experiment because we don't know exactly how consciousness is generated, so we can't leave anything out without risking screwing something up -- we must assume that the entire human being is simulated.)

So there is no reason to claim, solely on that basis, that neural activity alone is involved in the simulated behavior of saying "Yes, I'm conscious".

In other words, if we don't yet know how a brain creates Sofia, then positing a simulation doesn't somehow solve that problem for us.

 

[Piggy]

The point being that until our deep thinkers who believe substrate is irrelevant to consciousness sort that out, what are they doing?

No, they don't seem to believe a computer simulation of life is "alive". Why not, since they believe a non-biologic simulation of the highest expression of life will be conscious?

A complete non-biological model of a human being would be conscious, by definition.

Although we don't know how it's done yet, we can be sure that consciousness is not happening at the cellular level. It must be at a higher level of organization/granularity.

And in cases like that, it's always possible in theory to swap out the bits at a lower level of granularity, as long as they behave the same in aggregate.

Stars can swirl in the same way that heavy cream does in cocoa. Funnels can occur in water or air. As long as things act right at the proper level of organization, the micro-properties of the components can be quite different.

 

[my_wan]

Not so imo. It means a simulation -- simulations certainly are done -- may be lacking variables and/or relationships needed to actually model what is being theoretically simulated.

So add the variables and/or relationships needed for a better model. The variables are still just as real.

So what you appear to say here is the simulation is a simulation because it is missing variables and/or relationships to be real. Does that mean the simulation becomes real when the missing variables and/or relationships are added to the simulation?

We know for a fact that our present simulations are missing variables and/or relationships, which is the point of thought experiments of simulations not missing them. But by saying a simulation can't be real is tantamount to saying simulations:
1) Must be missing variables
2) Needed variables can't be defined by a simulation.

Yet you can't define a real variable that can't be defined. Are you saying fuzzy variables can't be defined? That's not true. We even have fuzzy logic gates where things can only be sort of true.

No matter how you twist it the fact remains that simulation variables are as real as any variable used to define any of your sensory or perceptual variables. Unless you want to label certain variables supernatural, thus not accessible to physics.

 

[Piggy]

I would be more apt to say life is possible in a simulation. Life as we define it has many properties other than intelligence. Evolution, reproduction with mutation, etc. A simulation is nothing more than an environment, which is physically real even for a simulation. You can't after all make a simulation without physically real equipment using real physical laws.

This is a fundamental conflation error.

The physically real environment for the simulation is not the space where the simulation takes place.

If I simulate a racecar on a track, and the oil pressure drops, the pressure inside my computer does not drop. If the simulated car crashes and catches on fire, my computer does not stop working and burst into flames.

If you examine the physically real operations of the device which allows the simulation, you will not find the simulation.

If you do examine the physically real device and find all the properties of the thing being modeled, then it is a true model. If the thing being modeled catches on fire, there is a real fire in front of you which needs putting out.

Simulated life is not life, because it exists only in simulated space, not real space.

 

[Piggy]

1) It is impossible to be certain that we are not in a simulation.

Um... how would that work, exactly?

I suppose it's technically possible that our entire universe is a model created by some very very large beings with enormous labs.

But how would it be possible for us to be a "simulation"?

 

[Piggy]

Well, a bowl of soup cannot function as a switch.

Well, it could. I don't know why you'd want it to, but it certainly could.

 

[my_wan]

This is a fundamental conflation error.

The physically real environment for the simulation is not the space where the simulation takes place.

So if the exact same machine with the exact same intellectual content had sensory input about the world as you perceive it, then it would be a real intelligence? But if that exact same intelligence instead perceived a computer generated world as primary input, suddenly the exact same intelligence is no longer real because it doesn't see the world you call real?

Do you lose your sophia, or any realness to that sophia, when you are tricked into thinking your somewhere beside where your body is at, or in a simulated environment? Because it's not that hard to fool your senses, and make you think your somewhere else with your real body in front of you.

If I simulate a racecar on a track, and the oil pressure drops, the pressure inside my computer does not drop. If the simulated car crashes and catches on fire, my computer does not stop working and burst into flames.

So if you were a blind deaf paraplegic, wired in so this racecar world was the world you could interact with, race the car, etc., is your sophia somehow lost just because you can't perceive the real world as I know it?

I don't think so.

If you examine the physically real operations of the device which allows the simulation, you will not find the simulation.

As a matter of fact your sense of qualia is a simulation your brain creates for you. This is why certain illusions work so well. This is why your senses can be tricked into an out of body experience, while you watch your real self as it is over there. What you call your sense of consciousness is itself part of the qualia modeled in your head for you.

You think when your hand is touched, you know where that touch was, yet that depends on how your body is modeled in your head, not on how your body really is. This makes touch location illusions possible.

If you do examine the physically real device and find all the properties of the thing being modeled, then it is a true model. If the thing being modeled catches on fire, there is a real fire in front of you which needs putting out.

Your consciousness, the OP subject, is contained in your skull. All the sensory data that feeds it outside information is modeled in your skull. What you see is that model you have made of it, not what it actually is. Hence some pretty awesome illusions are possible. Your brain will even ignore, and not see, what your senses are telling it if it doesn't match the model in your head. What you think are your senses are actually only a model created from a subset of those senses, and the model is all you see.

Simulated life is not life, because it exists only in simulated space, not real space.

So if your brain is transplanted, kept alive, and your senses, touch, smell, sight, hearing, and taste are feed from a simulated environment it means your not really conscious? But if those same senses were provided with access to the world as we perceive it it is conscious?

To me that sounds a lot like classical physics prior to Special Relativity when they where looking for the one "real" frame of reference. Physics doesn't even provide for any absolute realness. In some sense a real person can be squashed to bug size and still be alive and talking to their buddy. You can call it an illusion, but its fundamental physics, so it's just as real as the shape of the room your in. It gets even weirder near a black hole large enough to survive going into.

This preoccupation with, I perceive what is real and other perspective are not is just plain.... If your sense of qualia defined what is uniquely real about the world, Christians have all the evidence they need, as it's more than just a belief, it is a world model like the apparent squareness of that box.

 

[!Kaggen]

I would like to quote a small chapter in the book I am currently reading which is very relevant to the discussion.
The book is called "You are not a gadget: a manifesto" by the computer scientist Jaron Lanier who coined the term "virtual reality".

What makes something real is that it is impossible to represent it to completion

It's easy to forget that the very idea of a digital expression involves a trade-off with metaphysical overtones. A physical oil painting cannot convey an image created in another medioum;it is impossible to make an oil painting look just like an ink drawing, for instance, or vice versa. But a digital image of sufficient resolution can capture any kind of perceivable image_or at least that's how you'll think of it if you believe in bits too much.

Of course, it isn't really so. A digital image of an oil painting is forever a representation, not a real thing. A real painting is a bottomless mystery, like any real thing. An oil painting changes with time; cracks appear on its face. It has texture, odor, and a sense of presence and history.

Another way to think about it is to recognise that there is no such thing as a digital object that isn't specialised. Digital representations can be very good, but you can never foresee all the ways a representation might need to be used. For instance, you could define a new MIDIlike standard for representing oil paintings that includes odors, cracks, and so on, but it will always turn out that you forgot something, like the weight or tautness of the canvas.
The definition of a digital object is based on assumptions of what aspectsof it will turn out to be important. It will be a flat, mute nothing if you ask something of it that exceeds those expectations. If you didn't specify the weight of a digital painting in the original definition, it isn't just just weightless, it is less than weightless.
A physical object, on the other hand, will be fully rich and fully real whatever you do to it. It will respond to any experiment a scientist can conceive. What makes something fully real is that it is impossible to represent it to completion.
A digital image, or any other kind of digital fragment, is a useful compromise. It captures a certain limited measurement of reality within a standardised system that removes any of the original source's unique qualities. No digital image is really distinct from any other; they can be morphed and mashed up. That doesn't mean that digital culture is doomed to be anemic. It just means that digital media have to used with special caution.