Francesca R
Girl
Private health care suffers from market failure in the form of adverse selection, (even with a redistributive state that helps the poor). Privately funded police services and infrastructure building suffer from the "free rider" (public goods) problem, which is another market failure. The evidence is that higher education doesn't (bear in mind it is not, and will not be completely privately financed, and that state up-front payment plus low income underwriting are necessary features of this in order to preserve the aspects which are generally seen as socially desirable)Why is tertiary education to be treated differently from other services. After all, I pay for (and am happy to pay for) the NHS, policing, urban regeneration even though I personally receive proportionally less benefit than others.
That doesn't follow. Society draws the line where it feels it is not appropriate (or necessary) for it to fund life expanding experiences, because society can't pay for all of them (like gap years, for example), nor is it necessarily moral that it should.if we view the purpose of tertiary education as being a life expanding experience then we should continue to provide it.
I have agreed with that. But the risk is underwritten to a significant--and IMO sufficient--extent by the government that is socially just and economically efficient, and I have outlined why I believe this to be the case. Again, the state cannot completely cover (equalise) all the risks the poor face. Well it could in theory, but that's the stuff of Kurt Vonnegut stories.But the poorest take the largest risk.
Not really. Some graduates emigrate already. Others who qualified overseas come here. Small leakage is not a problem that matters.Why massive ? Even a small leak of graduates abroad would be a problem, not least because of the sums involved
Which is an incentive not to charge such high fees.Another problem - Institutions will be asked to underwrite the cost of loans above the government guaranteed level.
The government still provides all the upfront finance (and thus underwrites it), so your claim that the credit risk of the student is an issue for the institution is wrong. Of course the "academic risk"--the probability that the student will fail or drop out and impair the department's reputation--remains an issue as it rightly should. But even in that case, the institution gets paid (probably not after a student drops out)If I'm a "premium priced institution" looking at candidates would I choose the middle class candidate whose parents can underwrite the risk in full or in part or the poor candidate who could leave the country (and me in the lurch)
This argument seems illogical. At what level of loan do you think that the debt service exceeds minimum wage employment? I think that with this, and the previous claim above, you seem to be searching as hard as you can for perverse incentives. There are probably some somewhere, and they might even be fixable, but they don't amount to an argument to scrap the ideas wholesale.But if I was earning minimum wage I wouldn't be required to make payments but interest would be accruing on my debt. I've be better off not earning and not having my debt growing than I would be earning minimum wage
"As low as possible" is a judgement of pragmatism, since lowering barriers comes at a public cost, so the public needs to be OK with it.You're right, if we take the decision that we're no longer prepared to invest in our own future as a nation by keeping the barriers to tertiary education as low as possible
I have not disagreed with that, but it is a big climb down from your first post (that I did disagree with) in which you suggested this would :"Pric[e] all but the richest out of the best universities and most popular courses". Maybe you have softened your position on that.It's my contention that the barrier is largest for the poor
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