Is God necessary for (objective) morality?

[Brian-M]

Right. Because what is "beneficial" is also subjective. Only humans care about outcomes. The universe doesn't care if a bunch of rocks get shifted.

But this fails to explain what the difference is between "subjective" and "situation dependent".

Why are you concentrating on the word "beneficial" here and ignoring the actual point I'm making?

Take a stick of dynamite, light it, and throw it. It might land on the ground, it might land in a lake. In once case you get a hole in the ground, in the other a bunch of dead fish floating in the water.

From the same action you get two objectively different outcomes. Whether or not one such outcome may or may not be considered beneficial isn't the point. The point is you get a objectively different outcomes from the same action depending on the exact nature of the situation (standing in a field or standing on a boat).

There is nothing subjective about the situation-dependent outcome here. The hole in the ground (or the dead fish) exist objectively. Is the difference between "subjective" and "situation dependent" clear yet?

The fact that the consequence of an action may very depending on circumstance does not make these consequences subjective.

No, the fact that humans are making different value judgements on those consequences is what makes them subjective. Obscuring the human element or failing to explicitly mention it doesn't make it go away.

Your confusing the interpretation of a consequence with the consequence itself. A consequence of an action is objective, the interpretation of the action is subjective.

Punch someone in the face and it's an objective fact that the neurons in their brain which deal with pain perception have become more active.

It's the interpretation of this consequence, such as whether or not being punched in the face was worse than being forced to listen to a Justin Bieber album that is subjective.

This doesn't make the damage or consequences subjective. The callous mine owner is measuring the financial effects of the explosion while the miners are measuring the health effects of the explosion.

Right, they are making judgements about the value of the consequences that differ depending on the observer. "Subjective" by definition.

No, your train of thought has gone of the rails again.There is nothing subjective about the fact that the explosion injured and killed a bunch of miners. That is an objective fact.

There is nothing subjective about the fact that the explosion increased the owner of the mine's wealth. That too is an objective fact.

To use an analogy (which seems to be a dangerous thing to do with you as you seem to frequently miss the point I'm trying to convey), you could measure the colour of one part of a tree and come up with green, then measure the colour of another part of the same tree and come up with brown.

That doesn't make the colour of the tree subjective, that just means that different aspects of the tree, such as leaf or bark, have different qualities. That doesn't make these qualities subjective.

In the same way, different aspects of the consequences of the explosion, such as employee health or owner wealth, also have different qualities. That doesn't make these qualities subjective.

It's only when you ask whether overall the explosion was a good thing or a bad thing that the question becomes subjective, as the answer depends on how highly you value employee health vs. owner wealth.

I see what you're trying to get at. That's moved the discussion to a different frame of reference, a different observer. This new observer is no longer considering the exposion itself, he is now considering the mine owner and/or the miners, and the judgement becomes whether the benefit/suffering that occured to those others is "good" or "bad" to the observer.

Nobody was ever considering the explosion itself, only the consequences of the explosion. And I haven't changed observers, not that it would matter if I did. And there is no judgment being made as to whether the benefit/suffering occurred to those others is "good" or "bad" to the observer.

No, I don't think you got the point at all.

Ideas like "right", "wrong", "good" and "bad" are fuzzy and ill-defined. They are subjective because they have been given no objective definition. You'll notice that I haven't been using them in this discussion for exactly that reason.

That's problematic for you then, because the definition of "morality" circles around them.

Me: Here's my attempt at an objective definition of morality.
You: Ideas like "right", "wrong", "good" and "bad" are subjective.
Me: They can be, which is why I didn't use them.
You: Ha! Morality is defined by these words.

The often subjective nature of these words is in no way problematic to my definition of morality if my definition of morality does not use them.

You could define "good" as beneficial and "bad" as harmful,

Which is a subjective judgment.

in which case in the mine example the explosion was objectively good for the mine owner's finances and objectively bad for the miners' health and well being.

No, they are "good" and "bad" only to those using that judgment.

It's not a "subjective judgment", its a clarifying definition, which is a completely different thing altogether.

Words are simply labels for concepts. Often one word can refer to many similar but slightly different concepts. I added that definition to show which concept of "good" I was using the word to mean.

But if you're going to insist that I can't specify what it is I mean by a word when I use that word, and must leave the exact meaning ambiguous when trying to give an unambiguous example, then this conversation is pointless.

Easily done. Where "good" is used to mean something with beneficial effect, adequate sunlight is good for the health of a tree while prolonged inadequate or excessive sunlight is bad for a tree. Now we have something that is "good" or "bad" in an entirely objective fashion that exists outside a brain.

No, we don't. We have an example that depends on "the health of the tree" being valuable. Who values the health of the tree? Does the tree? Does the Universe? Does god?

Wait, what? Who gives a damn about the tree? This hypothetical tree is an eyesore I want to get rid of, but I can't cut it down because it's in a national park that boarders my property. It's an ugly horrible tree and absolutely nobody anywhere values it in the slightest. Everyone who has ever seen it wishes it would just fall over and die.

But does this have any effect on adequate sunlight being good for the health of the tree? Not in the slightest. "A" being good/beneficial for "B" has absolutely no bearing on whether or not "B" is valued by anyone anywhere.

The health of the tree can be empirically measured by an arborist. Whether the health of a tree is improved or worsened by a particular level of sunlight exposure is an objective fact. Consequently whether or not the particular level of sunlight exposure is good for the health of the tree is also an objective fact, for the narrow definition of "good" being used in this particular instance.

The brain functions through physical interactions. The fact that these interactions are occurring is an objective fact. Perhaps your confusing the subject with the observer?

No, you're just jumping frames of reference again.

How so? Whose frame of reference did I start in and whose frame of reference did I finish in? Is there any frame of reference in which these processes are not occurring in the subject's brain?

Right, but up to this point, no moral judgement has been made about the pain. Does the scan show wether the pain is "good" or "bad"?

Of course it doesn't, that's the whole point of defining morality, to create a means of determining whether or not it is "good" or "bad" to cause to act in a manner that causes the pain.

Because it is something that exists in the pysical world Anyone that comes along is going to see the mark. It doesn't work that way with definitions or value judgements.

And any measure of distance made from that mark is dependent on the mark.

The mark was being used as a metaphor for definition, a metaphorical mark in a metaphorical world, but the concept I was trying to convey seems to have missed you completely. So let's forget it and go back to the mountain analogy, and see if I can convey the same concept better that way.

No, it can't because defintions do not exist independent of a human mind either. No, not even printed in a dictionary, because they have to be read and accepted by the reader to be a "defintion".

The definition of height of a mountain does not exist independent of a human mind either. No, not even printed in a dictionary, because they have to be read and accepted by the reader to be a "definition".

Does this mean that the height of a mountain is subjective? After all, if there is no definition of "height of a mountain" as being measured from sea level rather than the center of the earth you can't objectively say that Everest is higher than Chimborazo.

But that's nonsense. One of those two mountains is objectively higher than the other, but which mountain is objectively higher depends on which definition is used.

A definition is not an objective quality, but neither is it a subjective quality. It's an abstract concept, which is a separate category entirely. There doesn't have to be anyone aware of the concept for something to be objectively true (or objectively false) in terms of an abstract concept.

But while a definition is not an objective quality, it can have the quality of being objective. A definition for "height of a mountain" has the quality of being objective because it's a definition based on an objective property (distance). A definition for morality can be objective if it too is a definition based on entirely objective properties, such as actions (which are objective because either an action was taken or it wasn't regardless of who the observer is).

"Better" is an objective term when the application of the word is made clear.

For example, a Mini is better than a SUV in terms of fuel efficiency. This is an objective fact. Another example, a SUV is better than a Mini in terms of pulling power. This is also an objective fact.

You've just shifted frame of reference again, you haven't eliminated the human value judgment, you've just obscured it.

WTF?

In what possible way is a Mini being better than a SUV in terms of fuel efficiency, or a SUV being better than a Mini in terms of fuel efficiency in any way subjective? These are empirically testable qualities, not subjective in any way, shape or form.

Unless you're saying that "better" is the subjective term? If so, any apparent subjectivity is entirely due to ambiguity of definition. If you can't work out what "better" is supposed to mean in this context, visit http://www.thefreedictionary.com/better and take a close look at the fourth definition given: Greater or larger. Whether it's miles per gallon or horsepower, the question as to which one has the "better" rating for each of these properties is not subjective.

If you simply ask someone which is the moral course of action the question is subjective because you haven't provided an objective definition of what "moral" means.

There isn't one.

I've created one.

You say there is nothing to indicate that this is "morality".

No, I don't. I said there is nothing to show this morality is "objective". "Morality", for everyone, is whatever what they say it is.

Okaaay... I'm taking some time here to try and unhinge my brain far enough to understand what you're trying to say.

Each of those sentences is fairly coherent by itself, but I'm having trouble understanding the meaning of the paragraph as a whole.

... show this morality is objective ... morality is whatever they say it is... ... show this morality is objective ... morality is whatever they say it is...

I just can't see how those two sentences logically connect.

By morality is whatever they say it is you seem to be asserting that anyone can define morality in any way they want. Even if true, that would have no bearing on whether or not my definition can be objectively applied.

It is, for you, because you say it is. What method are you using to check that your defenition is independent of a human mind?

I'll assume by "independent of a human mind" you mean "objective"?

All we have to do is look at the key elements. First, let's take my definition, or the variation of it I'm currently happy with...

Moral: Action likely to minimize harm or suffering of others.
Immoral: Action likely to increase harm or suffering of others.

First, "action likely", which is a little shaky but not necessarily subjective as systems for determining probable outcome can be applied.

Then "to minimize harm or suffering" and "to increase harm or suffering", which is a bit vague since we don't have a clear way of quantizing harm and suffering, but it can be objectively determined in many cases where the relative difference is large enough to overcome the imprecision, or if some method for quantizing harm and suffering is used.

So while not complete on it's own, my definition can be used as a basis to develop a system to objectively determine whether or not a given action should be deemed to be moral or immoral.

Why would it be meaningless? "Broccoli sucks" is a standard composed only of the value "I don't like broccoli", but it still has meaning.

"Broccoli sucks" is not a standard. It's an assertion.

You argue that my simplistic standard is not used by any culture anywhere. But what I've actually done is take a simplistic standard used by many cultures around the world and refined it.

Show me the laws codifying this "golden rule", in any form. It is nothing more than a statement of intent, a sort of wishful thinking. It isn't how humans actually behave in any consistent manner.

Stop moving the goalposts. I never claimed that people consistently behaved in accordance with the golden rule, or any other moral codes. Nobody has. I was responding to your accusation that my standard isn't "isn't used by any culture, anywhere" and showing you that it was derived from one that is. It may not be consistently followed, but it is used by many.

As for showing laws codifying this "golden rule"... WTF? Show me laws codifying "be good". Laws have to be explicit, the golden rule isn't explicit.

Yes, if they value their own "fun" over the property rights of others. Happens all the time.

Valuing their own fun over the property rights of others doesn't mean they thing it's the "right" thing to do. The fact that they know it's wrong probably makes it more fun for them.

Because no precise standard of morality has ever been universally accepted.

Q.E.D.

Wait... what point is this supposed to prove?
No, seriously. You seem to think you've made some big point here, but I have no clue as to what point you think you've just made.

The question of whether or not an objective standard of morals can exist is not even remotely dependent on whether or not any precise standard of morality has ever been universally accepted.

But seriously, this discussion is never going to go anywhere until you offer your definition of "objective".

I think you just don't have a coherent definition of "objective". Why don't you try defining it?

Easily done. Personally, I'd define it as not subject to personal opinion or interpretation, but we could go with a dictionary definition...

1. Of or relating to a material object, actual existence or reality.
2. Not influenced by the emotions or prejudices.
3. Based on observed facts.
(From: http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/objective )

 

[fls]

Brian M, you actually seem to be making the same points that Piscivore is making.

I don't think anyone is arguing that operational definitions for morality cannot be formed, and in that sense form 'objective' criteria. This is very similar to what I have to do for medical research, which is operationalize 'health'. The part which involves a choice (and so would count as 'subjective'), is the choice of "harm or suffering" (however you care to operationalize it) and "others". It is clear that the universe does offer any proscription against harm or suffering, and one could make a case that it is harm or suffering which has given the universe in general and humans in particular its greatest rewards. So suggesting that this can form a relevant criteria is arbitrary on your part. And similarly, the choice of referring to individual humans when considering harm is arbitrary. Again the universe makes little to no distinction in the level at which units are clustered. There is a granularity at each level which is both subject to the same rules which govern other levels and from which new rules may emerge.

By choosing as immoral "action likely to increase harm or suffering of others", you are specifying an arbitrary value judgement as to what is bad. That you take great pains to avoid using the word 'bad' does not mean that you have managed to avoid forming a definition of morality which depends upon it. I don't think anyone is arguing that once you have specified your criteria for bad, objective standards cannot be formed. It is the choice of criteria for 'moral' and 'immoral' which is subjective. And you seem to be cognizant of that point as well.

Linda

 

[BottledWater]

Which is morally objectionable.

That's sorta like objectively moral, isn't it?

Wouldn't only those who had an emotional connection to him suffer? If I saw a stranger with amnesia, it wouldn't bother me one bit. Only if I formed an emotional connection with that person pre-amnesia would I care.

Do I come off cold-hearted? Maybe. But it's the truth. I hear about horrible stories of torture and death, but unless it happens to someone I care about, I am unmoved by it.

 

[BottledWater]

What does God say about it?

Linda

Who knows. Last I heard God was caught up in his own drama. Seems he got involved with an under-age girl and is facing charges somewhere in North America. Considering God has a history of 'impregnating' young girls, I'm not sure he's going to get these charges dropped.

He resurrected Johnny Cochran to defend him though, so he may stand a chance.

 

[BottledWater]

Sounds like Brian M is saying that subjective experiences are a part of objective reality, so they are ultimately objective.

 

[Dorian Gray]

Bluskool, kudos for a good OP (first time I've heard anyone hear say Craig wins most of his debates ) and for following up the responses with good points.

I agree with you.
Let's take the example of an unconscious (vegetative state) terminally ill 2 year old without living family or friends.
Would it be morally ok to allow 1,000 paedophiles to line up and butt**** the baby before it died (while it was thus still warm and more pleasurable for them)?
Or would there be something objectively morally wrong with that?

I don't believe the social contract approach would have much to say on the matter. In the contract approach if you were the baby you'd be terminally unaware of what was being done to you. Yet I think every non sociopathic and/or sick paedophilic human being would rightly believe such activity was wrong regardless of contractual/experiential consequences.

Sounds like you've given it a lot of thought.

 

[Dorian Gray]

Sounds like Brian M is saying that subjective experiences are a part of objective reality, so they are ultimately objective.

You cannot go against nature, because when you do go against nature, it's part of nature too.

 

[Piscivore]

Easily done. Personally, I'd define it as not subject to personal opinion or interpretation,

That's not really different than the one I've been using, but it is different from the three you offer below (that's why they are numbered and listed separately, you do realise)...

...but we could go with a dictionary definition...

1. Of or relating to a material object, actual existence or reality.
2. Not influenced by the emotions or prejudices.
3. Based on observed facts.
(From: http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/objective )

There's your problem right there- thats not a definition, that's three (four, if you include the first one in this post). Using more than one definition at the same time is called "Equivocation", and it's a logical fallacy.

That's why your arguments lack coherence.

ETA: And that's not even addressing the fact that the three defintions you add to the conversation are incorrect or meaningless when parsed into "objective morality".

FETA: and wow, wiktionary is really crappy. Dictionary.com lists eight defintions for "objective" just as an adjective- the pertinent one being:
"existing independent of thought or an observer as part of reality"

But if you want to use a wiki, the encyclopedia article says "While there is no universally accepted articulation of objectivity, a proposition is generally considered to be objectively true when its truth conditions are "mind-independent"—that is, not the result of any judgments made by a conscious entity or subject."

 

[H'ethetheth]

A man walks in on his wife getting raped. He pulls the guy off, knocks him out and calls the police. For whatever reason, the rapist does not get convicted and doesn't spend a day in jail for his crime. The husband sees the free rapist on the street one day, and he takes out a gun and puts two bullets in his head. Was it wrong for him to kill the man he saw rape his wife?

During his trial we discover (thanks to the indefatigable efforts of the defense attorney's plucky and attractive assistant) that the man he killed hadn't raped his wife after all. Instead the wife had only claimed it was rape to avoid being caught out by her husband (whom she regularly cheated on.) She knew she'd get nothing in the divorce she was planning if her dalliances were exposed.

Now where do we stand?

Or, let's say the rapist is acquitted on a technicality. Even then I would argue that a society with an unavoidably fallible justice system is morally much superior to a society where disgruntled people are allowed to take justice into their own hands.

Note that this is according to my own, subjective moral standards.

 

[Internet Ministry]

Duh

 

[bluskool]

Okay, so I just finished Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape and I thought I would quote a few paragraphs that are relevant to this thread.

Many people are also confused about what it means to speak with scientific “objectivity” about the human condition. As the philosopher John Searle once pointed out, there are two very different senses of the terms “objective” and “subjective.”3 The first sense relates to how we know (i.e., epistemology), the second to what there is to know (i.e., ontology). When we say that we are reasoning or speaking “objectively,” we generally mean that we are free of obvious bias, open to counterarguments, cognizant of the relevant facts, and so on. This is to make a claim about how we are thinking. In this sense, there is no impediment to our studying subjective (i.e., first-person) facts “objectively.”


For instance, it is true to say that I am experiencing tinnitus (ringing in my ear) at this moment. This is a subjective fact about me, but in stating this fact, I am being entirely objective: I am not lying; I am not exaggerating for effect; I am not expressing a mere preference or personal bias. I am simply stating a fact about what I am hearing at this moment. I have also been to an otologist and had the associated hearing loss in my right ear confirmed. No doubt, my experience of tinnitus must have an objective (thirdperson) cause that could be discovered (likely, damage to my cochlea). There is simply no question that I can speak about my tinnitus in the spirit of scientific objectivity—and, indeed, the sciences of mind are largely predicated on our being able to correlate firstperson reports of subjective experience with third-person states of the brain. This is the only way to study a phenomenon like depression: the underlying brain states must be distinguished with reference to a person’s subjective experience.


However, many people seem to think that because moral facts relate to our experience (and are, therefore, ontologically “subjective”), all talk of morality must be
“subjective” in the epistemological sense (i.e., biased, merely personal, etc.). This is simply untrue. I hope it is clear that when I speak about “objective” moral truths, or about the “objective” causes of human well-being, I am not denying the necessarily subjective (i.e., experiential) component of the facts under discussion. I am certainly not claiming that moral truths exist independent of the experience of conscious beings—like the Platonic Form of the Good—or that certain actions are intrinsically wrong. I am simply saying that, given that there are facts— real facts—to be known about how conscious creatures can experience the worst possible misery and the greatest possible well-being, it is objectively true to say that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, whether or not we can always answer these questions in practice.

Okay, so obviously this is a different kind of objectivity than I had been using. I did point out the difference between epistemology and ontology, but I had previously thought that for morality to not be objective ontologically, it could not therefore be objective epistemologically. I now think that I may have been wrong about that. Any thoughts?

 

[OhMan]

Wouldn't Kant's Categorical Imperative be an example of objective morality? Haven't read this whole thread mind you.

 

[JJM 777]

Wouldn't Kant's Categorical Imperative be an example of objective morality? Haven't read this whole thread mind you.

Kant said (not much unlike Jesus long before) that you should not do to others what _you would not wish_ be done to yourself. The underlined section is what makes this principle a subjective one, at least when we get to the details. A suicide bomber is only doing to others what he is doing to himself too, so he does not break Kant's moral imperative.

 

[H'ethetheth]

Kant said (not much unlike Jesus long before) that you should not do to others what _you would not wish_ be done to yourself. The underlined section is what makes this principle a subjective one, at least when we get to the details. A suicide bomber is only doing to others what he is doing to himself too, so he does not break Kant's moral imperative.

I don't think suicide bombers blow up their friends and relatives, or pick up their remains from the street; there's a difference between what they do to others and what they do to themselves.
But if my memory serves me, Kant would disagree for a different reason. I think Kant's ethical theory was that you have to elevate to a "maxim" such acts that would be good if anyone and everyone were to do them. That would make things like stealing wrong, adultery, lying and definitely also suicide bombing.

 

[Robin]

I don't think suicide bombers blow up their friends and relatives, or pick up their remains from the street; there's a difference between what they do to others and what they do to themselves.

Nor did the soldiers who stormed Normandy storm Coney Island Beach.

Nevertheless I doubt that anyone of us thinks of them as anything but heroes to whom we owe an unpayable debt.

But if my memory serves me, Kant would disagree for a different reason. I think Kant's ethical theory was that you have to elevate to a "maxim" such acts that would be good if anyone and everyone were to do them. That would make things like stealing wrong, adultery, lying and definitely also suicide bombing.

That would, of course, depend completely upon the definition of "good".

One of his formulations was "act as if your maxims should serve at the same time as the universal law (for all rational beings)".

If a suicide bomber felt that they were striking out against some terrible injustice or that they were establishing the one true religion, without which any human being would pay a terrible price then they might well consider that their maxims were serving as the universal law.

 

[Piscivore]

Wouldn't Kant's Categorical Imperative be an example of objective morality? Haven't read this whole thread mind you.

Maybe, until you get the masochists involved.

 

[H'ethetheth]

Nor did the soldiers who stormed Normandy storm Coney Island Beach.

Nevertheless I doubt that anyone of us thinks of them as anything but heroes to whom we owe an unpayable debt.

I think you misunderstand something. I meant that suicide bombers actually do something far worse to others than they do to themselves, but somehow I feel that's not what you read.

That would, of course, depend completely upon the definition of "good".

One of his formulations was "act as if your maxims should serve at the same time as the universal law (for all rational beings)".

If a suicide bomber felt that they were striking out against some terrible injustice or that they were establishing the one true religion, without which any human being would pay a terrible price then they might well consider that their maxims were serving as the universal law.

Yes, but still then they wouldn't want it to be any sort of universal law for rational beings to blow themselves up, I'd think. Universal suicide bombing just isn't much of a viable social structure.

Anyway, I agree that all this does depend on your idea of good, but then I never meant to say Kant's categorical imperative is an objective moral standard, mostly because I'm convinced such a thing is an utter impossibility.

 

[bluskool]

Wouldn't Kant's Categorical Imperative be an example of objective morality? Haven't read this whole thread mind you.

Maybe, until you get the masochists involved.

I think the categorical imperative does provide a basis for objective morality, even though it may not be a very desirable one upon examination.

 

[Piscivore]

I am certainly not claiming that moral truths exist independent of the experience of conscious beings—like the Platonic Form of the Good—or that certain actions are intrinsically wrong. I am simply saying that, given that there are facts— real facts—to be known about how conscious creatures can experience the worst possible misery and the greatest possible well-being, it is objectively true to say that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, whether or not we can always answer these questions in practice.

Okay, so obviously this is a different kind of objectivity than I had been using. I did point out the difference between epistemology and ontology, but I had previously thought that for morality to not be objective ontologically, it could not therefore be objective epistemologically. I now think that I may have been wrong about that. Any thoughts?

It's also a different kind of "objectivity" than most of the people who talk about "objective morality" are using. They do say that "certain actions are intrinsically wrong"- homosexuality, for instance.

What Mr. Harris has done in this paragraph is to say that, okay, there's no objective (existing independent of the experience of conscious beings) moral truths, but once we've subjectively decided what is going to be "right" or "wrong" we have facts about those subjective moral truths (which are not the "truths" themselves) which are objective (existing independent of the experience of conscious beings), which we can apply to moral situations objectively (free of obvious bias).

It's a shell game. He's moving the discussion away from the "moral truths" and onto the facts about them, calling those objective, and trying to wave away the distinction so the morality appears objective. None of which gets anyone any closer to the "certain actions are intrinsically wrong" of the "objective morality" crowd.

 

[bluskool]

It's also a different kind of "objectivity" than most of the people who talk about "objective morality" are using. They do say that "certain actions are intrinsically wrong"- homosexuality, for instance.

What Mr. Harris has done in this paragraph is to say that, okay, there's no objective (existing independent of the experience of conscious beings) moral truths, but once we've subjectively decided what is going to be "right" or "wrong" we have facts about those subjective moral truths (which are not the "truths" themselves) which are objective (existing independent of the experience of conscious beings), which we can apply to moral situations objectively (free of obvious bias).

It's a shell game. He's moving the discussion away from the "moral truths" and onto the facts about them, calling those objective, and trying to wave away the distinction so the morality appears objective. None of which gets anyone any closer to the "certain actions are intrinsically wrong" of the "objective morality" crowd.

I think you are mostly right, but I don't think he is trying to fool anyone with this. His contention is that this is how all fields of science work and even how science itself works. For example, he says:

It is essential to see that the demand for radical justification leveled by the moral skeptic could not be met by any branch of science. Science is defined with reference to the goal of understanding the processes at work in the universe. Can we justify this goal scientifically? Of course not. Does this make science itself unscientific?

It would be impossible to prove that our definition of science is correct, because our standards of proof will be built into any proof we would offer. What evidence could prove that we should value evidence? What logic could demonstrate the importance of logic?

I think he is just saying that we have to start somewhere. All sciences have to have some unjustifiable (subjective?) goals/axioms/definitions to start with, and from there objective facts can be derived.