Has consciousness been fully explained?

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Westprog, can you just honestly answer these questions:

Do you think that there actually is a purely physical explanation for why life is different from non-life?

Or are you just playing this whole "but that isn't a physical explanation" game because you don't want to admit to all of us that you really don't think such an explanation exists, and that dualism is true?
 
And by extension we are doing the only things that we can do. So what? What is your point?

I never said anything to the contrary. I simply gave you a definition for something called "computing" that, in general, does not take place in lava. It does, in general, take place in life.

EDIT: Oh, I see your point. Since if monism is true we are doing the only things we can do, and you want libertarian free-will and a soul and all that warm fuzzy stuff to exist, then clearly monism must be false and dualism is true. Got it. And you wonder why I say you are a dualist?

You're the one claiming free will here. Except you're calling it "active" behaviour".

I didn't say it was a separate phenomenon or governed by special laws.

I clearly said it was special and unique because it is the result of the same laws everything else follows coming together in a special and unique way.

But lets play a game -- since you know everything about this topic, why dont you tell me what makes life unique and special, since you obviously agree that life is unique and special.

Oh, and please make sure to formulate your response in "physical" terms that don't rely upon human specific concepts, since after all that is your own standard, no?

I'm not trying to make life special and unique. Figuring out exactly why life is special and unique is a tricky business. It's not special and unique because it's more "stable".

But you just said "Life is, of course, a special and unique phenomenon in the universe"

So how is there no distinction at all? If there is no distinction between the behavior of lava and cells, then how can we tell them apart? How could you make a statement like the one you just made?

The implied distinction is between "active" and "passive" behaviour. There is no difference. Unless we slip free will in by the back door.

???



You are claiming that if you take a cell, place it in a random location on the planet, and somehow stop all life processes in that cell, it will continue to exist in the same form for longer than if it was alive?

33-27-TrilobiteFossil.jpg
. That collection of cells has been in the same form for millions of years.

I am talking about local entropy, not universal entropy.

What I clearly mean is that cells exhibit a sequence of physical processes that prevent them from becoming non-cells.

Do you dispute that cells exhibit this behavior?

Any solid object exhibits this behaviour.

Well, I don't see what cells do differently from lava that doesn't fall under the definitions I gave you regarding computation.

If you have some counterexamples -- stuff that life does differently from lava -- then by all means please actually contribute to the conversation.

The concept of "stability" is clearly not the right one for the explanation of life. Living things are not stable in the same sense as solid objects. The concept of "active" and "passive" behaviour doesn't bear close examination. The idea of purposeful behaviour begs the question. Can this all be rephrased in terms of well-defined, well understood physical concepts? Hardly.

And as usual, there's the assumed implication. If you don't accept the distinction between active and passive behaviour, then you can't tell the difference between a lava flow and a mouse.
 
I was actually asking for specific evidence, not names of sciences.
That's your problem. You are asking for the one piece of evidence that proves evolution. There's no such thing, the question doesn't even make sense. What we have instead is an immense body of data (dwarfing even that supporting evolution).

What tells us, without a shadow of a doubt, that consciousness takes place in the brain is what happens when things break. That's why I mentioned psychopathology, rather than the broader field of psychology. Like so many other fields of study, it's the failure modes that teach us the most.

Really? Is there a bodyless brain somewhere that is functioning normally?
No; again, that's a foolish question. However, you can remove any other organ, sometimes whole groups of them, and, perhaps with the aid of a little mechanical jiggery-pokery, retain consciousness. Touch the brain, though, and splat. QED.

Doesn't mean that other organs can't affect consciousness. Does mean they don't produce it. The brain does that.
 
By "executive" I mean "carrying out". That is, without some executive (in this sense) mechanism, the signal associated with constricting the iris won't do anything. The overt behavior won't happen. You'll be left with just the neural chain reactions in the brain.

Something has to translate (so to speak) between the IP-supported-by-just-enough-hardware-to-accomplish-it and the bodily function which is not merely IP.
What bodily function?

Just as with regulating body temperature or heartbeat or anything else you can think of that the body does, something has to "carry out" the task based upon the output, or there is no behavior beyond the background logic, the entire purpose of which (of course) is to drive the behavior.
What task?

Why do you believe that anything is required beyond information processing, and what is it?
 
You are asking for the one piece of evidence that proves evolution.
I wasn't asking for "The One Piece of Evidence", I was just asking for a piece of evidence.

That's why I mentioned psychopathology, rather than the broader field of psychology.
Wouldn't neuropathology be more appropriate? Psychology studies behaviour (the outward reactions of the whole body), not the brain.

Like so many other fields of study, it's the failure modes that teach us the most.
This is true, but it does not prove consciousness is a process that is confined to the brain. All it proves is changes in the brain affect consciousness, and that therefore the brain has an important role in the process.

If I start messing with an air traffic control centre, I will profoundly affect air travel. That does not prove that "air travel" is localised in the control centre. Similarly, if I mess with a telephone exchange, I will affect "telecommunication" but I don't prove that the telephone exchange alone "produces" telecommunication. Other things are involved, and therefore it doesn't do it alone. Unless of course you use a definition of "alone" that I am not familiar with.

No; again, that's a foolish question.
By claiming that the brain can do things alone, you claim that it can do things without needing any other organ. And that's a foolish claim.
 
By "executive" I mean "carrying out". That is, without some executive (in this sense) mechanism, the signal associated with constricting the iris won't do anything. The overt behavior won't happen. You'll be left with just the neural chain reactions in the brain.

Something has to translate (so to speak) between the IP-supported-by-just-enough-hardware-to-accomplish-it and the bodily function which is not merely IP.

There's no reason to expect consciousing to be any different.

Just as with regulating body temperature or heartbeat or anything else you can think of that the body does, something has to "carry out" the task based upon the output, or there is no behavior beyond the background logic, the entire purpose of which (of course) is to drive the behavior.

The notion of an "executive" function is a bit of a misunderstanding of brain function. An illusion created by a good match between our will as we perceive it and our actions. I'll use a Hebbian type model to help explain. It matches well with an evolutionary hierarchy, as well as specific experiments, memory issues, etc. There's actually a quiet huge body of empirical data, from false memories to brain probe responses, spanning neuroscience, psychology, illusions, etc., that I'll be glossing over without addressing here.

When we learned that stimulating a particular neuron could fire a specific memory, action, etc., we thought maybe memory was stored somehow in these neurons. But other experiments demonstrated a distributed memory system.

Here's the mechanistic Hebbian model. Consider a pair of metronomes with randomly timed common cycles. If these metronomes are placed on a movable base, they will self sync up similar to neurons. Now consider a group of these distributed between springs, instead of a solid base. Thus the degree they will self sync is determined by the tension in the springs. Some of these metronomes will be tied to sensory input, while others are tied to output actions. No fundamental difference in these at the mechanistic level. A sensory activation corresponds to an increase in a metronomes frequency, after which the metronomes begin self syncing again. We need one more set of very simple rules. When two metronomes are simultaneously activated the spring tension between them begins to increase. When the frequency of two metronomes don't match, the spring tensions between them begin to relax. Now let's implant a basic experiential memory.

An experience simply consist of some subset of metronomes being activated, increasing their frequency. Some of the activations corresponds to different types of senses. The changes in spring tensions corresponds to a memory of that distribution of sensory input. Now, in spite of the memory being distributed in the spring tensions, an activation of one of the associated metronomes will by the same self syncing behavior reactivate the entire subset associated with that memory. The same self syncing behavior, in combination with experientially induced variations in which ones will sync with others, induces a self organization of past experience. This compacts our memories as efficiently as possible, and effectively associates similar memories. Efficiency can be increased by grouping input types effectively.

Now for consciousness it has to be hierarchal. Most simply described as another subset of metronomes which, instead of being tied to sensory or body state, have inputs defined by the state of other metronomes. I'm jumping the gun a little calling this consciousness, but not too much. Now we can begin self organizing, not only the experiential data, but also the data that ties our experiences together.

[Executive]
Now let's try to define what an "executive" function is. Since experiential data can be accessed or triggered by any of the metronomes associated with that experience, action, choice, etc., there exist no singular "executive" for that experiential data. Any of the associated metronomes can work as well for that or similar experiential data. Thus "executive" functions are as distributed as the memories themselves. This leads to an associative capacity on a massive scale, well beyond what you are explicitly aware of. Traditionally labeled the subconcious mind. It's often used by mentalist such as Derren Brown to make you believe you made a choice that was actually made for you. Even brain research shows that with scans, your choices can be known before you know what your choice is going to be yourself. Thus you perceive your choice as an executive action, when in fact is is only an after the fact event.

[...
I skipped over the distinctions between consciousness, instincts, and responses that merely evolve in a manner with a limited similarity to evolution, as it was more depth than needed. Our core emotional system plays the role of an adaptive advancement of instincts, but lacks the rigidness of instincts. Our attention, which most people associate with consciousness, can draw on previous experience to play out expectations we have yet to experience, to predefine future action potentials. Essentially creating experiences to learn from prior to the actual experience. We also mirror other peoples behaviors and emotions within us to gain experiential data we don't have personal experience of. Self proclaimed psychics call this being psychic. In reality it's being human.

Hopefully this 'toy' model will help some think about the issue of consciousness more realistically. Trying to get a sense of it from the raw math is generally problematic. Often our mathematical models fall short when even a modicum of self organization and chaotic behavior is involved.
 
You're the one claiming free will here. Except you're calling it "active" behaviour".
No, I am not.

I'm not trying to make life special and unique. Figuring out exactly why life is special and unique is a tricky business. It's not special and unique because it's more "stable".
If you are able to say that with confidence, then you must have an alternative explanation than mine. Care to share?

Of course you won't share, because you don't have anything better. I know you don't because people have been asking you for your side of the story for 4 years now and you still haven't produced a single statement -- not a single one -- with any explanatory power.

The implied distinction is between "active" and "passive" behaviour. There is no difference. Unless we slip free will in by the back door.

I didn't ask you to rephrase the distinction I am making.

I asked you to provide your own distinction.

Are you going to, or not?

[qimg]http://kentsimmons.uwinnipeg.ca/16cm05/1116/33-27-TrilobiteFossil.jpg[/qimg]. That collection of cells has been in the same form for millions of years.

How is that the same form?

Have you take any biology and/or geology at all? Do you really think the chemical composition of a fossil is in any way similar to that of a living cell?

[Any solid object exhibits this behaviour.

Please provide an example of a behavior exhibited by a block of granite that falls under the category of a sequence of physical processes that prevents it from becoming a non block of granite.

The concept of "stability" is clearly not the right one for the explanation of life. Living things are not stable in the same sense as solid objects.

I clearly stated that the concept of "stability" in this context has to do with continued existence. How, then, are living things not stable in the same sense as solid objects -- since both categories exist longer than many other categories of things?

Remember, the cells of your body are descendants of the very first proto-cells on Earth from billions of years ago. How is that not a long existence?

And as usual, there's the assumed implication. If you don't accept the distinction between active and passive behaviour, then you can't tell the difference between a lava flow and a mouse.

Not exactly. The assumed implication is that if you continually -- for 4 years, to be precise -- insist that there is a difference between a lava flow and a mouse but you just can't be bothered to think of what it could possibly be, then you really can't tell the difference between a lava flow and a mouse.

Or prove me wrong. Just come up with some distinction that you yourself would use to determine if an object was a lava flow as opposed to a mouse. It really isn't that hard, westprog.
 
Sorry I'm so far behind on responding.

Haven't been up to posting on the more demanding threads.

Will catch up as soon as I can.
 
rocketdodger said:
[qimg]http://kentsimmons.uwinnipeg.ca/16cm05/1116/33-27-TrilobiteFossil.jpg[/qimg]. That collection of cells has been in the same form for millions of years.

How is that the same form?


Replacement occurs when the shell, bone or other tissue is replaced with another mineral. In some cases mineral replacement of the original shell occurs so gradually and at such fine scales that microstructural features are preserved despite the total loss of original material. A shell is said to be recrystallized when the original skeletal compounds are still present but in a different crystal form, as from aragonite to calcite.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fossil
 
I wasn't asking for "The One Piece of Evidence", I was just asking for a piece of evidence.
Okay then: Corpus callosotomy studies.

Wouldn't neuropathology be more appropriate? Psychology studies behaviour (the outward reactions of the whole body), not the brain.
That's a hopelessly vague description of psychology.

This is true, but it does not prove consciousness is a process that is confined to the brain.
Why yes, in fact it does.

If I start messing with an air traffic control centre, I will profoundly affect air travel. That does not prove that "air travel" is localised in the control centre. Similarly, if I mess with a telephone exchange, I will affect "telecommunication" but I don't prove that the telephone exchange alone "produces" telecommunication. Other things are involved, and therefore it doesn't do it alone. Unless of course you use a definition of "alone" that I am not familiar with.
Argument by bad analogy.

By claiming that the brain can do things alone, you claim that it can do things without needing any other organ. And that's a foolish claim.
It would be a foolish claim if I hadn't just established its truth.
 
Yes.
It
does.
It
means
that
the
brain
can
not do
it
in
isolation
or
by
itself.
It means nothing of the sort.

The brain needs input data to train the neural network; this is particularly critical in early childhood.

But it is the brain, and only the brain, that produces consciousness.
 
Sorry I'm so far behind on responding.

Haven't been up to posting on the more demanding threads.

Will catch up as soon as I can.
No worries.

But one of the things Godel, Escher, Bach explains along the way is why there's no need for the "executive" you postulate.

Really, read the book! It's just that good.
 
Dancing David,
It's true that brain function, including consciousness, cannot develop in absentia of sensory input, including feedback from body states. However, that does not mean a developed brain cannot continue to function, and remain conscious, in the absents of these inputs. At least in the short term. Your brain would in fact remain conscious if cut off from all sensory inputs, or bodily functions other than the brain. Yet it would begin to degrade in that capacity fairly quickly.

The reason for this is that consciousness involves a subset of the brain for which the sensory inputs is not defined by external sensory data, but by the state of the brain (neurons), that do have external sensory inputs among other things. A developed brain then has a set of ordered states, stored experiences, etc., that the mind can continue to access and remain conscious, even in the total absence of, or connections to, an external body or sensory data. Once the sensory memories began to relax, which begins happening fairly quickly, the conscious mind will begin degrading in direct proportion.

Thus when PixyMisa said:
Which in no way contradicts what I just said.
it was absolutely correct. The notion that the loss of sensory data, or the brain extensions throughout the body (sensory, entails an immediate loss of consciousness is false. So long as the brain section limited to inside your skull can burn sugar to remain powered up, then even removed from your body may remain conscious for the short term. As the memories associated with the neural connections to sensory data fail to be maintained by new sensory data they began to fade. As these fading states are the sensory inputs of the conscious mind, not inputs from the nervous system in the body or external sensory data directly, the conscious mind will only fade in proportion to the degradation of memories of the external world.

What's funny is that for some people who self reference their own consciousness will reference the totality of their visual sensory data. Others will reference their spacial location wrt the world. Then others will reference their mental states, feelings, thoughts, etc. I tend to fall in the latter as a default. Yet your individual reference to consciousness is not absolute nor even a requirement of consciousness. Your conscious model of the world doesn't even have to be realistic, only an operationally valid one for maximizing interactions with and opportunities in an external world. The reason two identical colors can appear totally different in color on the same image is because our consistent modeling of the world is more important than perceptual accuracy. It makes it easy to discern certain patterns that would otherwise be camouflaged, even at the expense of seeing qualities in those patterns that don't exist to make pattern itself more noticeable. Much of what you are 'conscious' of in your sensory data is not even in the sensory data, but in what the brain added to highlight certain patterns. In many cases these pattern cues are added when it shouldn't.
 
Dancing David,
It's true that brain function, including consciousness, cannot develop in absentia of sensory input, including feedback from body states. However, that does not mean a developed brain cannot continue to function, and remain conscious, in the absents of these inputs. At least in the short term. Your brain would in fact remain conscious if cut off from all sensory inputs, or bodily functions other than the brain. Yet it would begin to degrade in that capacity fairly quickly.
Yep. I don't think that last is necessarily inherent in conscious systems, but it's certainly true for us squishies.

Excellent post.
 
You have a point. If we are able to reproduce machine sentience in a form comparable to our own, then there's no innate reason why it should designed such that it progressively loses consciousness over time in the absents of sensory input as we do. For us it's a product of the way the malleability of intellectual and memory skills are physically stored. A trade off between adaptability and permanence with limited neural resources.
 
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