re: What are my conclusions if indeed this information is accurate and reliable?
re: What are my conclusions if indeed this information is accurate and reliable?
Well we have to assume a lot of different sources there are accurate and reliable.
If we do, let’s say, then after all of your reading, what are your conclusions?
TAM
Note as you can see I do not assume that any of these source were accurate, but used, consistency between the different reports, and logic, to figure out what were the reports or parts of these reports that were accurate and which ones were inaccurate, and then even why they were inaccurate, for each and every report. Once you aggregated all of the reports I had listed it was possible to tell, what part of each report was accurate and what part had been obfuscated or had left out important details, and even why they had been obfuscated!
An example is when the 9/11 Commission report was trying to explain why the two photos of from Kuala Lumpur were shown to the joint source, one photo of Mihdhar and one photo of an unidentified person. It said that the CIA thought that Khalid al-Mihdhar and Khallad Bin Attash, might be one and the same person. The DOJ IG report said that "CIA overseas personnel" had requested the photos of Mihdhar and Khallad taken at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting so these could be shown to the FBI/CIA joint source. The account of Ali Soufan said Soufan had sent a request to the CIA Yemen station in November 2000, asking if the CIA had any information on Khallad or on any al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The document “CIA Requested Changes to [9/11 Commission] Staff statement #10”, said a cable describing the identification by the joint source of Khallad Bin Attash in the Kuala Lumpur photos had been sent to the Yemen station in January 2001.
From these documents we know that Soufan had made an official request to the CIA Yemen station in November 2000 for any information the CIA had on Khallad Bin Attash, described as the master mind of the Cole bombing, or any information the CIA had on any al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur, and attached to this request was a passport photo of Khallad that Soufan had gotten from the Yemen authorities that had arrested Fahad al-Quso. Fahad al-Quso had been arrested by the Yemen authorities and claimed he was bringing money to Khallad in Kuala Lumpur, when he got stuck in Bangkok on January 6, 2000. Thailand would not let him leave Bangkok for Malaysia due to problems with his travel papers. Since the cable describing the identification of Khallad from the Kuala Lumpur photos went to the Yemen station, we know that the DOJ IG “CIA overseas personnel” who had requested the photos from the Bin Laden unit, of Khallad and Mihdhar taken at the Kuala Lumpur meeting, were in fact the CIA Yemen station.
While all of these accounts are of the same incident, and say almost the same thing, each report leaves out critical details, it appears to make it all but impossible for the American people to put this account back together again in one place. The 9/11 Commission accounts says that the CIA wanted to show the photos of Mihdhar and an unidentified person, to hide the fact that the request was for two photos one of Mihdhar and one of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur, and left out that this request had come from the CIA Yemen station because of an official request by FBI Agent Ali Soufan. The 9/11 Commission report was trying to hide FBI Agent Soufan and what the Yemen station and the CIA Bin Laden unit knew, to hide a clear case of criminal obstruction of FBI Agent Soufan and his investigation of the Cole bombing by both the CIA Yemen station and the CIA Bin Laden unit.
The 9/11 Commission also wanted to keep secret the fact that when Khallad was identified on January 4, 2001 by the FBI/CIA joint source, and this information sent to the CIA Yemen station, the CIA Bin Laden unit, and was known by the CIA Pakistan Station since it was their handler for the joint source that was with the joint source when the identification of Khallad from the Kuala Lumpur photo was made, that this information was intentionally not given to FBI Agent Ali Soufan in February 2001 when Soufan flew out to re-interview the joint source. The 9/11 Commission it appears did not want any suggestion of a wide ranging criminal conspiracy at the CIA to hide this critical information from an ongoing FBI criminal investigation into the murder of 17 US sailors, to block any further criminal investigations into this matter, which might have lead to persons much higher up who had been directing this CIA criminal conspiracy.
The 9/11 Commission statement that this identification was done because the CIA thought Khallad and Khalid al-Mihdhar might be one and same person, most likely is out and out criminal conduct by the 9/11 Commission by placing clearly misleading statements in the 9/11 Commission report. Since the CIA had the passport photos of Mihdhar and Khallad and even had the Kuala Lumpur photos of these two terrorists at the time the 9/11 Commission report says the CIA thought these two were the same person, there is no conceivable way the CIA would have thought that Mihdhar and Khallad were one and the same person, and the 9/11 Commission knew they were placing this erroneous and misleading statement in their report to cover up out and out criminal conduct at the CIA, and this example is but one of many.
Even today as seen by the comments in this thread, it is clear that people think the CIA just did not share information with the FBI, not that they withheld critical information in a wide ranging criminal conspiracy. Right in this blog, some people say this conclusion is all nonsense when all of this information actually comes right out of official US documents.
It is also obvious that the DOJ IG did not want to identify the “CIA overseas personnel” to make it nearly impossible to actually tell this request had come from the Yemen station, so the CIA Yemen station did not have to answer why they were requesting these exact photos, and their identification by the joint source, to hide the fact that it was FBI Agent Ali Soufan that was making an official request to them for this very information, and was being told none of this information existed at the CIA. Soufan’s official request makes not responding to his request or saying that the CIA had no information, a felony, out and out criminal obstruction of an ongoing FBI criminal investigation.
So what are my conclusions?:
It is clear that by putting these reports back together again that the facts are:
Both the CIA and FBI HQ knew a huge al Qaeda attack was coming in the summer of 2001 that would kill thousands of Americans.
By July 2001 information was sent in email, now publically available, to CIA managers, by CIA officer Tom Wilshire, that indicated that the people at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting were connected to the warnings of a huge al Qaeda attack that the CIA and FBI HQ had been receiving since April 2001. Wilshire specially called out the name Khalid al-Mihdhar in a second email, as a al Qaeda terrorists who would be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda operation, which by this time everyone at these agencies knew would be inside of the US.
By July 2001 the CIA management had denied Wilshire permission on two separate occasions to transfer the information that the CIA had on the Kuala Lumpur meeting, and the fact that the CIA knew that Khallad had been at that meeting with Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi planning the Cole bombing, to the FBI criminal investigators on the USS Cole bombing.
The CIA and FBI HQ had kept secret on many occasions the information that Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with Walid Bin Attash actually planning the Cole bombing. These times were Ali Soufan’s request to the Yemen station in November 2000, Soufan’s request to the Director of the FBI in November 2000, Soufan’s request to the CIA in April 2001, the meeting in New York in June 11, 2001, and even when the Cole bombing investigators found out on August 28, 2001 that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US.
On August 22, 2010 FBI Agent Margaret Gillespie, working at the CIA Bin laden unit, found Mihdhar and Hazmi inside of the US and gave this information to CIA officer, Tom Wilshire, who had been moved over to be Deputy Chief of the FBI ITOS unit and to FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi. This information was sent on August 23, 2001 to the FBI, although not to Bongardt and his team, and to the rest of the CIA when Gillespie forced the CIA Bin Laden unit to issue a worldwide alert for Mihdhar and Hazmi. The FBI HQ and CIA not only knew Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US on this date they also knew they were here to take part in a horrific al Qaeda attack that would kill thousands, but neither the CIA nor FBI HQ gave this information to FBI Agent Steve Bongardt or anyone else at the FBI that was in a position to stop this attack.
When Bongardt found out that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US on August 28, 2001, and even knew they were here to take part in yet another horrific attack, FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi shut down his investigation, claiming the information he would need would have to come from the NSA and this NSA information was forbidden to be given to FBI criminal investigators. But according to the NSA release now in the public records, a NSA release to allow Corsi to give this NSA information to the FBI Cole bombing investigators and FBI Agent Bongardt had already been approved on August 27, 2001. Furthermore Corsi, Wilshire the FBI HQ and the CIA knew by this time that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were not only connected to the east Africa bombings, but had also taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing, crimes which made restrictions due to what was called “the WALL” null and void. They also knew that this information had no connection to any FISA warrant, the only reason NSA information could be denied, because of “the WALL”, from FBI criminal investigators.
When Bongardt asked that Corsi get a ruling from the FBI NSLU, on August 28, 2001, records show Corsi fabricated Attorney Sherry Sabol’s ruling that stated that Bongardt could take part in any investigation of Mihdhar and told Bongardt that the NSLU attorneys had ruled he could have nothing to do with any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi. According to the DOJIG report, p 302, Corsi knew when she told Bongardt to shut down his investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, that the CIA had intentionally been hiding the photograph of Walid Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur, from him and his team. Corsi knew that this photo directly connected Mihdhar and Hazmi to Bin Attash and to the planning of the Cole bombing at Kuala Lumpur. Since the CIA had been hiding this photo and any and all information on the Kuala Lumpur meeting since November 2000, it now is apparent that the CIA did this to keep Bongardt and his team from getting enough information so they would be able to start any investigation Mihdhar and Hazmi.
Rod Middleton, Corsi’s boss, received the photo from the CIA of Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur on August 30, 2001, making it clear that Middleton was also part of this wide ranging conspiracy to criminally obstruct the investigation of the Cole bombing by Bongardt and his team.
When Bongardt’s investigation was shut down, this investigation was moved to the FBI intelligence unit in New York field office, and given to Robert Fuller, one of the least experienced FBI intelligence agents. On September 5, 2001, Corsi effectively shut down Robert Fullers’ intelligence investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, after he had failed to find any information on Mihdhar and Hazmi in the FBI data base and asked Corsi for permission to get Mihdhar’s credit card number from Saudi Arabian Airlines. Corsi refused to give him permission to even contact Saudi Arabian Airlines. Because there is no known reason to even begin to explain Corsi’s actions to deny Fuller permission to get this credit card number from Saudi Arabian Airlines, and since this clearly was going to make it impossible for Fuller to get anywhere with this investigation, before that attacks on 9/11, it appears that Corsi not only “let it happen”, but did everything possible to “make sure it would happen”.
But it is now clear that Corsi and Middleton acting under orders from higher level managers at both the FBI HQ and the CIA shut down Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi when the CIA and FBI HQ knew that as a result thousands of Americans would be killed in an al Qaeda attack that could have been prevented had Bongardt’s investigation been allowed to go forward.
Because Corsi was acting under the direction of CIA officer Tom Wilshire and Wilshire had been acting under orders from higher level managers at the CIA, and he had denied twice in July 2001 from turning over the information he had from the Kuala Lumpur meeting, by his managers at the CIA CTC unit, plus the fact that the Cole bombing investigation had been criminally obstructed numerous times by many separate groups at the CIA, and even by the Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, it is clear that the orders to allow the al Qaeda attacks that took place on 9/11 had to have come from the very highest levels of the CIA and FBI HQ.
You can draw a final conclusion from this information based on the two laws regarding actions that result in unintended consequences:
Law 1: There are no actions that result in unintended consequences, every result from actions at the CIA and FBI HQ was exactly as intended
Law2: Go back and read Law 1.
From this you can only conclude that the CIA and FBI HQ intentionally allowed the attacks on 9/11 to take place, even when they knew these attacks would result in the murder of thousands of Americans, and that this result was approved by the very highest managers at both the FBI HQ and CIA, and undoubtedly by people well above this level.
Since all of the information that back up these conclusions is now found in the public domain, and almost all of it comes from official US government documents, much I have even sourced right at this blog, and the 9/11 Commission had access to this exact same information, it is also clear that the 9/11 Commission report was a complete and total fraud on the American people to hide the criminal conduct at the both CIA and the FBI HQ in intentionally allowing the attacks on 9/11 to take place.