The Star Trek Transporter Enigma

[westprog]

We do observe differences in it.



Difference in location, from the pov of either system, seems the most basic difference: enough to establish they are different systems, different synchronous frames of physical activity, whatever the status of their other attributes. So far, I'm not persuaded the teleporter enigma, even as a thought-experiment, can get around that (though it would be cool if it could).

I'm just trying to get my head around how you cope with the simple concept of different place at the same time when using the Einsteinian view in which there is no "same time". It's possible for A and A* to be the same object if you can get from A to A* within the limits of relativity, while if A and B are not connectible within the limits of relativity, they can't be the same object. In practice this is broadly equivalent to the Newtonian absolute time way of looking at things - but it's not exactly the same.

 

[rocketdodger]

It would help if you would actually state what you're at the moment only implying. I've being quite clear about this - post teleportation we are dealing with two different people. The fact that at a previous stage there was only one person is irrelevant. At one stage in every person's past, there were just two people, and after some activity and a wait of nine months, there would be three people. Prior to birth, things that happened to the mother had an effect that might also apply to the new, separate person - drug withdrawal, for example.

This makes no difference. There are very simple tests we can use to see whether there are two people, and following the tranporter's operation, they all apply.

If we are to use the "stimulus to one body now affects two" argument to deny that there are two people, then nobody could claim to be a different person to his mother. It's a non-argument. What matters is whether a stimulus to one body effects the other, and it doesn't.

But you are entirely missing the point. And the issue that is the context of the point.

The issue isn't whether or not there are two different people after the teleportation -- everyone agrees that there are clearly two different people. I would go so far as to say that any idea to the contrary is utterly stupid.

The issue is whether, in the instant of teleportation, there are two different people or a single person in two locations.

Your approach is to start with the obvious fact that at any time in the future there are obviously two different people and then argue that this somehow implies that the same person cannot be in two places at once. And all of your arguments reduce to the simple idea that the behavior of objects in different locations will be different -- thats why we consider them different.

But this is clearly not the case for the instant of teleportation. For the instant of teleportation, all of the behaviors of the system that are observable by the system itself are identical, including location. The fact that external observers see two bodies is irrelevant from the viewpoint of the person that is those bodies. So none of your arguments work in that case.

Thats why I was trying to bring up the one-mind-two-bodies hypothetical -- if a mind was in control of two bodies, but external observers insisted that each body was controlled by a distinct mind due to the fact that they saw bodies in distinct locations, who is correct?

If, in the instant of teleportation, there are two bodies with a single mind, why do the external observers get to trump the lone internal observer? The fact that immediately after the process -- a single planck time, actually -- the bodies begin to diverge and there are clearly two minds from then on is irrelevant. The issue is with that single planck time when both bodies are absolutely identical from the standpoint of an internal observer.

 

[rocketdodger]

We do observe differences in it.

Not necessarily.

If you are a diver in the middle of the blue ocean, and you look at your arm, then you look at your arm minutes later, and the location of that arm relative to your head is the same, you will not observe any difference in location at all despite the fact that the location of your arm relative to the world itself is very different. Or a spaceman floating in the black away from any nearby visual markers, etc.

So the important question in this context is whether the location of the particles in your body relative to an external object are more important, or even still relevant, compared to the location of the particles relative to each other.

Obviously, I say their locations relative to each other are the only thing that is important. I haven't found any compelling arguments to the contrary because in my opinion external observers don't dictate whether we are conscious or not. We do.

Difference in location, from the pov of either system, seems the most basic difference: enough to establish they are different systems, different synchronous frames of physical activity, whatever the status of their other attributes. So far, I'm not persuaded the teleporter enigma, even as a thought-experiment, can get around that (though it would be cool if it could).

But there is no difference in any of that from the pov of the system being teleported. That is the whole premise of the teleporter.

So, again, the question is whether the lack of difference from the pov of the system, or the obvious difference from the pov of every other system, is important. Who's observation wins?

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm just trying to get my head around how you cope with the simple concept of different place at the same time when using the Einsteinian view in which there is no "same time". It's possible for A and A* to be the same object if you can get from A to A* within the limits of relativity, while if A and B are not connectible within the limits of relativity, they can't be the same object. In practice this is broadly equivalent to the Newtonian absolute time way of looking at things - but it's not exactly the same.

That comes later.

If you disagree that the impossible "instant" teleporter can have a single person in two locations, then you won't ever agree that the possible ones will work.

If you ever agree that the impossible type can lead to a single person in two locations, then we can move on to adjusting for reality.

 

[westprog]

That comes later.

If you disagree that the impossible "instant" teleporter can have a single person in two locations, then you won't ever agree that the possible ones will work.

If you ever agree that the impossible type can lead to a single person in two locations, then we can move on to adjusting for reality.

I can't see any possible basis for agreeing that there is a single person in two locations, even for an instant. There's one person, and then there are two people. Why do we need to consider this extra intermediate stage taking up no time where there is one person with two bodies?

Again, if this was a car we were transmitting, I don't think there would be any question of there being an instantaneous single car with eight wheels.

 

[westprog]

Not necessarily.

If you are a diver in the middle of the blue ocean, and you look at your arm, then you look at your arm minutes later, and the location of that arm relative to your head is the same, you will not observe any difference in location at all despite the fact that the location of your arm relative to the world itself is very different. Or a spaceman floating in the black away from any nearby visual markers, etc.

So the important question in this context is whether the location of the particles in your body relative to an external object are more important, or even still relevant, compared to the location of the particles relative to each other.

Obviously, I say their locations relative to each other are the only thing that is important. I haven't found any compelling arguments to the contrary because in my opinion external observers don't dictate whether we are conscious or not. We do.



But there is no difference in any of that from the pov of the system being teleported. That is the whole premise of the teleporter.

So, again, the question is whether the lack of difference from the pov of the system, or the obvious difference from the pov of every other system, is important. Who's observation wins?

The point of relativity is that nobody's observation wins. There's me still here, and a copy of me created over there. Or that's me transmitted across the room, and a copy left behind. Or I can see another copy of that man created over there.

For any given observer, there are two people. We don't ask two different observers at two different locations what they see, and surmise that the thing they both see right in front of them is the same thing. In fact, we know that if they are at different locations, they are looking at a different thing.

 

[Chris L]

The idea is that they are connected for an instant, then diverge into two separate identities.

But they aren't. The transporter scans the person at that instant, then recreates that person using the information it obtained from the scan. What appears on the planet (or whatever) is a copy of the original that was never connected to the original (that is disposed of). Again, where are you getting the idea that they are ever connected?

 

[rocketdodger]

The point of relativity is that nobody's observation wins. There's me still here, and a copy of me created over there. Or that's me transmitted across the room, and a copy left behind. Or I can see another copy of that man created over there.

For any given observer, there are two people. We don't ask two different observers at two different locations what they see, and surmise that the thing they both see right in front of them is the same thing. In fact, we know that if they are at different locations, they are looking at a different thing.

This breaks down if the two people observe nothing but themselves. Which is the situation you continue to fail to address.

 

[rocketdodger]

But they aren't. The transporter scans the person at that instant, then recreates that person using the information it obtained from the scan. What appears on the planet (or whatever) is a copy of the original that was never connected to the original (that is disposed of). Again, where are you getting the idea that they are ever connected?

Where are you getting the idea that the you of now is connected to the you a second ago?

 

[rocketdodger]

I can't see any possible basis for agreeing that there is a single person in two locations, even for an instant. There's one person, and then there are two people. Why do we need to consider this extra intermediate stage taking up no time where there is one person with two bodies?

Again, if this was a car we were transmitting, I don't think there would be any question of there being an instantaneous single car with eight wheels.

Because from the viewpoint of the person being teleported there is one person, and then there is one person, not two people.

 

[westprog]

Location, Location, Location

This breaks down if the two people observe nothing but themselves. Which is the situation you continue to fail to address.

I have addressed it, but I can see I will have to say it again.

If two observers at two different locations make exactly the same observation, they are not observing the same thing. That applies whether they are observing themselves or anything else.

 

[westprog]

Because from the viewpoint of the person being teleported there is one person, and then there is one person, not two people.

Which shows how if you use sufficiently vague terminology, you can imply all sorts of things.

The new person who is created might think that he has been transported, and that the other person doesn't exist. But the other person does exist, and he is a separate person.

 

[blobru]

Not necessarily.

If you are a diver in the middle of the blue ocean, and you look at your arm, then you look at your arm minutes later, and the location of that arm relative to your head is the same, you will not observe any difference in location at all despite the fact that the location of your arm relative to the world itself is very different. Or a spaceman floating in the black away from any nearby visual markers, etc.

Absolute location is irrelevant. Any difference in location of one system relative to another is enough to establish they are two different systems.

So the important question in this context is whether the location of the particles in your body relative to an external object are more important, or even still relevant, compared to the location of the particles relative to each other.

Comparing two systems, we look at their position relative to each other, not relative to themselves.

Obviously, I say their locations relative to each other are the only thing that is important. I haven't found any compelling arguments to the contrary because in my opinion external observers don't dictate whether we are conscious or not. We do.

Physical laws dictate whether we are conscious or not, whether we satisfy the physical requirements for "consciousness"; our internal experience is verification only.

But there is no difference in any of that from the pov of the system being teleported. That is the whole premise of the teleporter.

The pov of the system doesn't dictate physical identity. Identity of consciousness follows from the laws of physics, not the subject's pov.

So, again, the question is whether the lack of difference from the pov of the system, or the obvious difference from the pov of every other system, is important. Who's observation wins?

Physics'.

I'm just trying to get my head around how you cope with the simple concept of different place at the same time when using the Einsteinian view in which there is no "same time". It's possible for A and A* to be the same object if you can get from A to A* within the limits of relativity, while if A and B are not connectible within the limits of relativity, they can't be the same object. In practice this is broadly equivalent to the Newtonian absolute time way of looking at things - but it's not exactly the same.

I'm not quite sure I see what you're saying (and am no expert anyway). I think "different places at the same time" in Einstein's universe assumes intermediate reference frames. If A in Greenwich does something at noon Greenwich Standard Time and B in New York does something at 7 AM Eastern Standard Time, say, these time zones being 5 hours apart as the earth turns, it might make sense to say A and B are acting "at the same time" if any reference frame established exactly halfway between A and B would receive information about A and B transmitted at the same speed, the speed of light, at the same time. So that's sort-of similar to Newton. The difference with Einstein, the lack of an absolute timeframe, becomes important when A or B leave the earth's timeframe for one moving relative to the earth. (I think.)

 

[bencg]

The idea is that they are connected for an instant, then diverge into two separate identities.

The whole point of contention here is whether there is that instant of connexion or not. Nobody disagrees that after any amount of time has passed at all the two bodies are entirely different consciousnesses.

And it has nothing to do with the technology. It has to do with a fundamental question of whether the same consciousness can inhabit two physically distinct brains for even a single planck time. I am trying to show, through hypotheticals, that there is nothing inherently contradictory about such an idea. Whether it is physically possible isn't what is important at this stage -- only logical possibility.

I think you are wrong, there is something inherently contradictory about such an idea. I see no logical reason to think one consciousness can inhabit two brains even as a thought experiment, there is no instant of connection.


Please correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to think if we can describe consciousness as an algorithm (or as the product of an algorithm?) that this means running the same program on two identical sets of hardware somehow means one mind in two bodies. I just don't get why this should be so, if we stick to the computer analogy then we dont think of two instances of the same program executing as being the same instance even if they are identical in everyway.


I think you are confabulating the fact that 'philosophically speaking' the 2 minds/bodies would be indistinguishable even from themselves (ie. yes they really are identical) into somehow meaning they are the same instance. I mean they would be the same true, but they would not BE the same (instance).

 

[Chris L]

Where are you getting the idea that the you of now is connected to the you a second ago?

It isn't really. I can not feel now what I felt a second ago except as a memory. I can remember almost drowning when I was a child, but I can not feel the water over my head. I can not connect to that past except as a recreation from memory.

 

[bencg]

Where are you getting the idea that the you of now is connected to the you a second ago?

Memory? Physical location? But even if we say there is no actual connection then how does this help your argument?

 

[westprog]

I'm not quite sure I see what you're saying (and am no expert anyway).

Ditto. It's difficult to get your head around.

I think "different places at the same time" in Einstein's universe assumes intermediate reference frames. If A in Greenwich does something at noon Greenwich Standard Time and B in New York does something at 7 AM Eastern Standard Time, say, these time zones being 5 hours apart as the earth turns, it might make sense to say A and B are acting "at the same time" if any reference frame established exactly halfway between A and B would receive information about A and B transmitted at the same speed, the speed of light, at the same time. So that's sort-of similar to Newton. The difference with Einstein, the lack of an absolute timeframe, becomes important when A or B leave the earth's timeframe for one moving relative to the earth. (I think.)

On Earth, the distances are small enough that most events look the same to most observers. The important thing is that no observer is privileged. So if you're looking at two events, which one happens first depends entirely where you're watching from. And as you say, this only becomes relevant at astronomical distances.

I think we sort of understand it. Need a real physicist to do the calculations for us.

 

[westprog]

Please correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to think if we can describe consciousness as an algorithm (or as the product of an algorithm?) that this means running the same program on two identical sets of hardware somehow means one mind in two bodies. I just don't get why this should be so, if we stick to the computer analogy then we dont think of two instances of the same program executing as being the same instance even if they are identical in everyway.

Go down to PC World and they persist in selling multiple, identical copies of Microsoft Office. There's a reason for that. We need multiple instances, and the copy I have is not disposable because an identical copy exists at a different location. I need a copy at this location. Location matters.

I think you are confabulating the fact that 'philosophically speaking' the 2 minds/bodies would be indistinguishable even from themselves (ie. yes they really are identical) into somehow meaning they are the same instance. I mean they would be the same true, but they would not BE the same (instance).

This is so obviously true that I'm not sure what kind of intermediate claim is being made.

 

[rocketdodger]

I have addressed it, but I can see I will have to say it again.

If two observers at two different locations make exactly the same observation, they are not observing the same thing. That applies whether they are observing themselves or anything else.

But you are assuming the conclusion -- that there are two observers!!

 

[rocketdodger]

Physical laws dictate whether we are conscious or not, whether we satisfy the physical requirements for "consciousness"; our internal experience is verification only.



The pov of the system doesn't dictate physical identity. Identity of consciousness follows from the laws of physics, not the subject's pov.

This is an interesting position. You are saying that my subjective experience of myself is in fact not what makes me conscious?